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Abstract 
The  object  of analysis  of  this dissertation  is  the  process  of  the
assertion of  the  European  Community as  a  distinct  and  distinctive
international  actor during the  1970s.  The  main  argument is that the
EC's activity on the global stage underwent a major qualitative change
in those years,  increasing considerably in intensity and scope. The EC
asserted itself not only as a major economic player, but also as a distinct
political player. Moreover, its international activity was endowed with
a distinctive character. The EC claimed that it was a «force for good»,
particularly attached to  dialogue  and  cooperation,  and  aimed  at
promoting a more balanced and a more just international order, as well
as an original and innovative approach to international relations. 
To  be  sure,  the  EC's  international  activity remained  quite
fragmentary,  often  declaratory,  and  sometimes  ineffective.  This  was
hardly  surprising. To  a  large  extent,  disappointment  with  the  EC's
achievements was due  to the  excessively high expectations  that  had
been  held of its  activity.  Contrary to most existing  historiography, I
argue that  the  1973–74  crisis  was  more a  beginning than an ending
point for the assertion of the EC as an international actor. In those years
its  traits  and  ambitions  were  de>ned.  The  European  Council  was
established and the  coherence  of  the  EC's  international  activity  was
improved.  The  EC  became  a  recognizable  player  at the  UN  and  it
gained recognition by basically all  of  the world's countries. The range
of action available  for the EC's international activity was de>ned and
quite a clear division of labor with the member states and with the US
was established, leading the EC to focus on “civilian” activities and to
cultivate a distinctive pro>le.
This  is  the >rst extensive and dedicated historical  account of  the
EC's international activity as a whole during the 1970s.  I consider  all
the  main aspects  of  it,  in order to  reconstruct the overall  process  of
assertion of the EC on the international stage and the general traits of
the  EC  as  an  international  actor.  I  consider  how and why  such  an
assertion was promoted,  how it was connected to other contemporary
developments, and who infuenced the de>nition of the traits of the EC
as a global player. I focus on instances where the assertion of the EC on
the global stage was debated and its traits were de>ned. In most cases
debates  about it were  not explicit,  and debates on  more speci>c and
x
actual topics worked as proxies for them. As a consequence, I focus on
the  aspects  of  the EC's international  activity  where the fundamental
conceptions underlying it were the most apparent.  
Actors involved in the making of the EC as an international actor
often held different views and conceptions of it.  The compromise and
combination  of  these different  conceptions  led to  the  de>nition  and
assertion of the EC's speci>c traits as an international actor.  The main
actors  involved  were the governments  of  the  EC  member states  –  a
particularly  important  role  being  played  by  France  – but the  EC
Commission  also  took  some  signi>cant initiatives.  In  order  to
reconstruct the views of the governments and of the Commission, I rely
mainly  on  archival  sources drawn  from  the  archives  of  the  EC
institutions and from the archives of the foreign ministries of France,
Britain and Germany. 
The  >rst  three  chapters  of  the  thesis  focus  on  the  process  of
establishment  of  the  EC as  a  distinct  international  actor.  Thus,  they
focus on the de>nition of the structures,  procedures and means for  its
international  activity. I  show  that  the  design  of  the institutional
structure for it was quite dif>cult and it often required to reach fragile
and  ambiguous  compromises.  The  reason  for  this  was  that  the
institutional design was strongly affected by the member states' views
on  the  >nal  form  of  European  political  integration,  which  were
divergent.  I look at the means  created for the expression of  the  EC's
voice on the international stage, and I argue that the main reason why
the EC did not always manage to speak clearly was its member states'
reticence about it.  The structure for the EC's international activity was
heavily affected not only by institutional constraints, but also by some
political  ones. These constraints led to the  exclusion of entire >elds of
international affairs from it. I argue that this exclusion strongly affected
the traits of the EC as an international actor, by inviting it to focus on
speci>c “civilian” sectors of international affairs. 
The adoption of  a distinctive approach  to international affairs  was
useful for the EC's assertion, since it made it possible  to highlight its
original character with regard to its own member states and to the US.
The EC  sought to  assert  itself  as  a distinctive  international  actor  by
focusing on > elds  of  international  affairs such  as  development
cooperation, dialogue with the developing countries, the promotion of
human rights in third countries, and so on. It is  towards these >elds
that I  turn to in chapters 4  through 6.  In each chapter,  I analyze  the
conceptions underlying the EC's engagement in the >eld, as well as the
image that the EC tried to project on the international stage. I show that
the EC consistently tried to convey an image of itself as a «force for
xi
good.»  However,  there  was  a  fundamental  mismatch  between  the
discourse and image of the EC as a force for good and its actual policies
and initiatives:  deeds  often  fell  well  short  of  words.  I  consider  this
mismatch,  analyzing  the  reasons  why  the  EC  rhetoric  set  very
ambitious goals and why the EC found it very dif>cult to meet them.
Part of the reason for it was that rhetoric was meant to rationalize some
of the limited capabilities available for the EC's international activity,
and to make up for  them. I  argue that  the EC established a  sort  of
vicious circle: it resorted to rhetoric in order to make up for its limited
capabilities, but this strategy raised very high expectations. The EC was
unable  to  meet  these  expectations,  and  as  a  result  the  limits  of  its
capabilities were exposed even more. 
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Introduction 
Object and argument of the dissertation
At the end of the 1960s, the EC's international activity consisted in
the external commercial relations of the Community and in its policies
for the management of relations with some former colonies of the EC
member states. By the end of the 1970s, the Community had joined the
UN and the G7 summits, and it had taken part in major international
negotiations such as  the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe and the Conference on International Economic Cooperation. It
had established direct relations with almost all of the world's countries
and it  had concluded  commercial  and  cooperation  agreements  with
many of them. EC member states had started to coordinate their foreign
policies,  and they had adopted a  number of  common positions and
declarations on the main international political issues.
The argument of  this thesis  is that the EC's  international  activity
underwent  a  major  qualitative  change  in the  1970s,  leading  to  the
assertion of the EC as a distinct and distinctive international actor. The
EC's activity on the global stage increased considerably in comparison
to the previous period, both in terms of intensity and  scope. The EC
asserted itself not only as a major global economic player, but also as a
distinct global political player. Moreover, the EC's international activity
was  endowed  with  a distinctive  character,  claiming  a  particular
attachment to dialogue and cooperation. The EC claimed that it was a
«force for good» and that its distinctive activity on the global stage was
to promote a more balanced and a  more  just international order. The
process  of  the  assertion of  the  EC  as  a  distinct  and  distinctive
international  actor during  the  1970s  is  the  object  of analysis  of  this
dissertation. 
By  using  the  term  “the  EC,”  I  refer  to  the  complex  of  the
Community system (EEC, ECSC, Euratom), of the European Political
Cooperation system, of the European Council and of other initiatives
jointly taken by their member states.1 All these instances were different
1 The EC member states were France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy,
Belgium,  the  Netherlands,  Luxembourg,  and  starting  from 1973  the  United
1
expressions  of  a  general  activity  of  cooperation  involving  the  same
group of European countries and aiming at the promotion of a closer
integration between them. By “international activity” of the EC I refer
to the complex of policies, initiatives and relations carried out on the
international stage by the EC in its various forms, such as for instance
the Community's external policies and the EPC initiatives. As for the
notion of “international actor,” I adopt Christopher Hill's de:nition of
it:2 an international actor is clearly delimited from others and from its
environment;  it  has  procedures  to  make  its  own  decisions;  it  has
structural prerequisites and means for international action. 
My  dissertation  contributes  to the burgeoning  trend  in
historiography that challenges the long held view that the 1970s were a
period of deep crisis and inability to act for the EC. To be sure, the EC
was  seriously  affected  by  the  economic  and  energy crisis,  by  the
evolution of the international monetary system, by evident strains and
tensions  in  transatlantic  relations,  by the  problems concerning the
British membership, and so on. All of these problems were real, and it
is clear that the EC experienced a «crise de con:ance, crise de volonté,
crise  de  lucidité»  during  the  1970s.3 However,  growing  evidence
indicates that the period was also one of striking dynamism for the EC.
The  EC  experienced  its  :rst  enlargement,  and  major  institutional
innovations were decided, such as the  establishment of the EPC, the
creation  of  the  European  Council  and  the  direct  election  of  the
European Parliament. New common policies were launched, such as
the regional policy and the social policies. Most importantly, the project
of monetary cooperation led to the creation of the European Monetary
System. 
It was in the external sphere that the EC  reached some of its most
Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark. 
2 C.  Hill,  «The  capability–expectations  gap,  or  conceptualizing  Europe's
international role,» in Journal of Common Market Studies, 31 (3), 1993, p. 309. On
the possibility of considering the EC as an international actor see G. Garavini,
«Foreign  policy  beyond  the  nation-state:  Conceptualizing  the  external
dimension,» in European Union History: Themes and Debates, ed. W. Kaiser and A.
Varsori (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010);  G. Laschi, «Introduzione. La
Comunità europea e le relazioni esterne 1957–1992,» in La Comunità europea e le
relazioni esterne 1957–1992, ed. A. Bitumi, G. D'Ottavio, and G. Laschi (Bologna:
CLUEB, 2008), pp. 7–11. 
3 EC Commission, Déclaration sur l'état de la Communauté, January 31, 1974,
in  Archives  centrales  de  la  Commission  européenne  [ACCE],  Speeches
collection. 
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remarkable achievements during the 1970s,  as was recognized at the
time. For instance, in late 1977 the President of the EC Commission Roy
Jenkins worried about the  imbalance between the  «apparent,  and at
present, real external strength»  of the EC, and «its internal weakness
and  dif:culties.»4 These  achievements  did  not  lead  only  to  the
consolidation of the EC's position as a major international  economic
actor,  but  also  to  the  assertion  of  the  EC as  a  distinct  international
political actor.5 Daniel Möckli and Maria Gainar have recently analyzed
such a development,  but they  have  focused  almost exclusively on  the
creation of the EPC and on its activities.6 In this dissertation I show that
the EC's assertion as an international  actor did not  concern only the
EPC: I consider also the other aspects of the EC's international activity
and I show that they contributed to the EC's assertion to a considerable
extent.7 
The existing historiography tends to argue that the goal of asserting
the EC as a political global player was abandoned very quickly after its
launch, mainly because of the pressures exerted by the US against it
and because of the economic and political crisis begun in 1973–74. The
clearest example of this interpretation is offered by Daniel Möckli in
European Foreign Policy during the Cold War. My dissertation challenges
this interpretation: I argue that 1973–74 was indeed a turning point for
the  EC's  international  activity,  but  it  was more a beginning than an
ending point for the assertion of the EC as an international actor. In
order to appreciate this, it is essential to look beyond the EPC and to
consider the more general picture of the EC's international activity. It is
also essential to adopt realistic benchmarks for the assessment of such
4 R. Jenkins, Speech «The Community's role in world affairs,» Institut Royal des
Relations  Internationales,  Brussels,  November  29,  1977,  in  ACCE,  Speeches
collection. 
5 For the assertion of the EC as a major economic and commercial power, see L.
Coppolaro,  The  Making  of  a  World  Trading  Power.  The  European  Economic
Community (EEC) in the GATT Kennedy Round negotiations (1963–67), (Farnham:
Ashgate, 2013). 
6 M. Gainar,  Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne: Les Neuf et la Coopération
politique européenne de 1973 à 1980 (Bruxelles: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2012); D. Möckli,
European  Foreign Policy  during  the  Cold  War.  Heath,  Brandt,  Pompidou and the
Dream of Political Unity (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009). The EPC was
a system for  EC member states'  cooperation in the foreign policy :eld.  It was
established in 1970, and it was managed by intergovernmental institutions and
procedures which were formally separated from the Community ones. 
7 The Community's international activity mainly concerned commercial issues
and development cooperation. Other aspects of the EC's international activity
concerned the European Council. 
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an activity, properly taking into account the constraints affecting it. 
In the  early 1970s, the EC's international activity  had quite vague
traits and imprecise ambitions. It was in its very infant phase, and it is
not by chance that  most of the debates  about it  focused on structures,
procedures and institutions.  It was the 1973–74 crisis  which  made the
EC's project of political integration really engage with reality, favoring a
much clearer de:nition of its traits. Initial ambitions certainly had to be
reduced as  a  result,  but  the  EC's  international  activity  did  not  end.
Quite  the  contrary,  it  experienced its  real  beginning.  The  European
Council  was  established and the coherence  of the  EC's  international
activity was improved. The EC became a recognizable player at the UN
and it  gained recognition by basically all  of the world's countries. The
limits  of  the  room  of  maneuver  available  for  the  EC's  international
activity were de:ned and  quite  a clear  division of labor with the US
was established, leading the EC to focus on “civilian” activities and to
cultivate a distinctive pro:le.
While this dissertation shows that the EC asserted itself as a distinct
international political actor, it also advances the argument that the EC
sought  to  assert  itself  as  a  distinctive international  actor  during  the
1970s.  The  EC  consistently  presented  itself  as  an  international  actor
adopting  and  promoting an  original  and  innovative  approach  to
international  relations.  This  approach  assigned  a  central  role  to  the
notions of international cooperation and dialogue, to the understanding
of  international  relations  as  a  positive  sum  game,  to  the  pursuit  of
values  rather  than  only  material interests.  The  adoption  of  this
approach was useful for the EC's assertion as a distinct international
actor, since it made it possible  to highlight its original character with
regard to its own member states and to the US. It also made it possible
to compensate the limited capabilities available for the EC to act with
rhetoric. While doubts can be held on both the plausibility and sincerity
of this distinctive approach to international relations, fewer doubts can
be held on the fact that the EC did stress its attachment to it.  The EC
often tried to substantiate its distinctive approach with the adoption of
actual policies and initiatives,  even though it rarely managed to do so
effectively. 
To  argue  that  the  EC asserted  itself  as  a  distinct  and distinctive
international  actor  during  the  1970s  does  not  mean  to  dismiss  or
overlook the limits, shortcomings and faws of this process,  which are
quite  evident. The  EC's  international  activity remained  quite
fragmentary,  often  declaratory,  and  sometimes  ineffective.  This  was
hardly surprising, given the gravity of the economic and political crisis
hitting  Europe  in  those  years,  and  given  the  inherent  dif:culty  of
4
promoting political integration between nation states with signi:cantly
different  interests  and  political  cultures. To  a  large  extent,
disappointment with the EC's  achievements could be attributed to the
excessively high expectations that had been held of it.8 In this respect,
the EC created a sort of vicious circle,  a capabilities–expectations trap:
its limited capabilities of acting effectively on the international stage led
it  to rely  much on rhetoric,  but  rhetorical  commitments raised  even
higher expectations,  which  in turn had less and less chance of being
met given the available capabilities.
Relations with the literature and contribution to it
The EC's international activity in the 1970s has attracted a signi:cant
amount of interest from historians during the last few years. The most
comprehensive view on it is provided by the collective volume Europe
in the International Arena during the 1970s, edited by Antonio Varsori and
Guia  Migani.9 Most  of  the other  studies  have  focused on  speci:c
external  policies  of  the  Community  or  on  the  activities  of  the  EPC.
Studies have dealt with the external trade policies  of the Community
and with its policies of development cooperation.10 Analyses have been
devoted to the evolution of the relations between the EC and the US,11
8 M.  Gilbert,  European  Integration.  A Concise  History  (Lanham:  Rowman  &
Little:eld, 2012), p. 90. 
9 Europe in the International Arena during the 1970s. Entering a Different World, ed.
A. Varsori and G. Migani (Bruxelles: P.I.E.–Peter Lang, 2011). The main aspects
of the EC's international activity are also considered in La Comunità europea e le
relazioni esterne 1957–1992, ed. A. Bitumi, G. D'Ottavio, and G. Laschi (Bologna:
CLUEB, 2008). 
10 V. Dimier, The Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy. Recycling
Empire  (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014); Il primato sfuggente: l'Europa e l'intervento
per lo sviluppo (1957–2007), ed. E. Calandri (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2009). 
11 The  literature  on  the  relations  between  Western  Europe  and  the  US  is
extremely large.  Notable recent works are:  A. É.  Gfeller,  Building a  European
Identity. France, the United States and the Oil Shock, 1973–1974,  (New York and
Oxford:  Berghahn, 2012);  Atlantic, Euratlantic, or Europe-America?,  ed. G. Scott-
Smith and V. Aubourg (Paris: Soleb, 2011);  The Strained Alliance: US–European
Relations from Nixon to Carter, ed. M. Schulz and T. A. Schwartz (Cambridge and
Washington:  Cambridge  University  Press  and  German  Historical  Institute,
2010); European Community, Atlantic Community?, ed. V. Aubourg, G. Bossuat,
and G. Scott-Smith (Paris: Soleb, 2008).  
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the  Soviet  bloc,12 China,13 and  the  non-aligned  or  developing
countries.14 The role played by the EC in  its  neighborhood has been
studied, focusing in particular on the CSCE15 and on its activity in the
Mediterranean and in the Middle-East.16 The EPC system and activities
have been thoroughly analyzed by  Möckli  and Gainar.17 Finally, some
studies have looked at the creation of the European Council18 and at the
establishment of connections between the EC and the G7 summits.19 
Detailed  and  accurate  historical  reconstructions  of  the speci:c
aspects  and instances of  the  EC's  international  activity are essential.
12 S.  Kansikas,  Socialist  Countries  Face  the  European  Community.  Soviet-Bloc
Controversies  over  East–West  Trade (Frankfurt am Main:  Peter  Lang,  2014);  A.
Romano, «Untying Cold War knots: The EEC and Eastern Europe in the long
1970s,» in Cold War History, 14 (2), 2014.
13 M. Chenard,  The European Community’s Opening to the People's Republic of
China,  1969–1979:  Internal  Decision-Making  on  External  Relations,  PhD  thesis
(LSE), 2012. 
14 B. Zaccaria, For the Sake of Yugoslavia. The EEC's Yugoslav Policy in Cold War
Europe,  1968–1980,  PhD thesis (IMT Lucca),  2014; G. Garavini,  After Empires:
European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South 1957–
1986 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Il primato sfuggente, ed. Calandri. 
15 S. Lamberti  Moneta,  Helsinki  Disentangled  (1973–75):  West  Germany,  the
Netherlands,  the  EPC and the  Principle  of  the  Protection  of  Human  Rights,  PhD
thesis  (University  of  Trento),  2012;  A. Romano,  From  Détente  in  Europe  to
European Détente. How the West Shaped the Helsinki Final Act  (Bruxelles: P.I.E.–
Peter Lang, 2009);  D. Thomas,  The Helsinki Effect.  International Norms, Human
Rights,  and  the  Demise  of  Communism (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,
2001). 
16 Detente in Cold War Europe: Politics and Diplomacy in the Mediterranean and the
Middle  East,  ed.  E.  Calandri,  D.  Caviglia,  and A.  Varsori  (London and New
York: I.B. Tauris, 2012); D. Allen and A. Hauri, «The Euro-Arab dialogue, the
Venice Declaration, and beyond: The limits of a distinct EC policy, 1974–1989,»
in  European–American  Relations  and the  Middle  East:  from Suez  to  Iraq,  ed.  D.
Möckli and V. Mauer (London and New York: Routledge, 2011).  
17 Gainar,  Aux origines  de  la  diplomatie  européenne; Möckli,  European  Foreign
Policy during the Cold War.
18 E.  Mourlon-Druol,  «More  than  a  prestigious  spokesperson:  the  role  of
summits/the European Council in European Political Cooperation (EPC), 1969–
1981,»  in  The  European  Council  and  European  Governance.  The  Commanding
Heights of  the EU,  ed.  F. Foret and Y.-S.  Rittelmeyer (London and New York:
Routledge, 2014); E. Mourlon-Druol, «Filling the EEC leadership vacuum? The
creation of the European Council in 1974,» in Cold War History, 10 (3), 2010. 
19 G. Garavini, «The battle for the participation of the European Community in
the G7 (1975–1977),» in Journal of European Integration History, 12 (1), 2006.
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Building upon them, it is now possible and necessary to draw a broader
picture of the EC as a global player. In this dissertation I take a broad
perspective on  the EC's international  activity, considering its general
process of de:nition and growth during the 1970s. I consider how and
why the assertion of the EC as a distinct and distinctive international
actor  was  promoted,  how  it  was  connected  to  other  contemporary
developments, and who infuenced the de:nition of the traits of the EC
as a global player. In doing so, I analyze the fundamental conceptions
underlying the main aspects of the EC's international activity,  such as
its institutional structure and the limits of its room of action. 
So far there have not been any extensive and dedicated historical
account of the EC's international activity as a whole and of the general
conceptions  underlying  it.  Some  recent  works  have  taken  into
consideration limited aspects of it.  Some of them have focused on the
Declaration on European identity released by the EC member states in
1973,  which  largely  dealt  with  the  EC's  international  activity.20 The
Declaration is  quite  an interesting document, but  its elaboration  was
strictly connected to  a contingent attempt  at reassessing transatlantic
relations and it was mostly meant to infuence the negotiations about it.
The Declaration was only one speci:c step in a much longer and more
composite process of de:nition  and assertion  of the EC's  role on the
global stage.  After Empires  by Giuliano Garavini21 is possibly the most
remarkable  attempt  to  date  to  analyze  the  general  conceptions
underlying the  EC's  international  activity  and it  is  one of  the  main
points of reference for my dissertation. However, Garavini focuses on a
speci:c  aspect  of  the  international  activity  of  the  EC,  namely  its
relations with the “Global South” countries. 
By extensively and speci:cally investigating the process of assertion
of  the  EC  as  a  distinct  and  distinctive  international  actor,  I  aim  at
enriching the historical understanding of the evolution  undergone by
the EC's international activity  during the 1970s.  On the one side, my
20 Gfeller,  Building a European Identity;  M. C. Beers, «European  unity and the
transatlantic  gulf in 1973,» in  Atlantic, Euratlantic, or Europe–America?,  ed.  G.
Scott-Smith  and V.  Aubourg (Paris:  Soleb,  2011);  P.  Chassaigne,  «Identité  et
conscience  européenne:  l’émergence  d'un  débat  inachevé.  Le  Sommet  de
Copenhague, 14–15 décembre 1973,» in  Europe in the International Arena in the
1970s:  Entering  a  Different  World,  ed.  Antonio Varsori  and  Guia  Migani
(Bruxelles:  P.I.E.–Peter  Lang,  2011);  D.  Möckli,  «Asserting  Europe’s  distinct
identity:  The  EC-Nine  and  Kissinger's  “Year  of  Europe”,»  in  The  Strained
Alliance,  ed.  M. Schulz  and  T. A.  Schwartz  (Cambridge  and  Washington:
Cambridge University Press and German Historical Institute, 2010).
21 Garavini, After Empires. 
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analysis can enrich the understanding of speci:c aspects of  it.  On the
other side, my analysis can provide some  insight  on the evolution of
the more general process of  European integration.  Conceptions of the
EC as an international actor and debates about it concerned different
signi:cant  aspects of  European integration,  such as the structure and
traits of the EC's institutions, the relationship between the Community
and its member states, the de:nition of the :nal goal of integration, and
so on. The analysis of the  process of assertion of the EC  as a  global
player can also provide some insight into the long-term process of the
reassessment of the position and role of Europe  on the international
stage,  with  the  transition  from  the  European  empires  to  a divided
Europe in a bipolar world,  to a Europe taking part in a globalizing,
multipolar international order. 
Besides contributing to  the  literature  on  the  history  of  European
integration,  my  dissertation  can  contribute  to  the  political  science
literature on the European Union as an international actor. Especially in
the last decade, the question of the character and identity of the EU as
an  international  actor  has  attracted  much  attention  from  political
scientists.22 They have  discussed and looked at the role played by the
EU in  international  affairs,  at  the  principles  orienting  its  activity  in
them, at the interests and values informing their design.23 The extent to
which the EU can be considered a distinct international actor has been
widely debated, as well as the extent to which it can be considered a
distinctive  international  actor  with  a  «civilian»  or  «normative»
character. 
Political  science  debates  on  the  general  traits  of  the  EU  as  an
22 Early works on the subject were: F. Duchêne, «Europe’s role in world peace,»
in  Europe  Tomorrow:  Sixteen  Europeans  Look  Ahead,  ed.  R.  J. Mayne (London:
Fontana, 1972); J. Galtung, The European Community: A Superpower in the Making
(Oslo and London: Universitetsforlaget and George Allen & Unwin,  1973); G.
Sjoestedt,  The  External  Role  of  the  European  Community (Farnborough:  Saxon
House, 1977); H.  Bull, «Civilian power Europe: a contradiction in terms?,»  in
Journal of Common Market Studies, 21 (1), 1982. 
23 Seminal contributions to the debate have been: R. G. Whitman, From Civilian
Power  to  Superpower?  The  International  Identity  of  the  EU (Basingstoke:
Macmillan,  1998);  I.  Manners,  «Normative  power Europe:  a contradiction in
terms?,» in Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (2), 2002; R. Kagan, Of Paradise
and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Knopf, 2003);
E. O. Eriksen «The EU – a cosmopolitan polity?,» in Journal of European Public
Policy,  13  (2),  2006;  I.  Manners, «Normative  power  Europe  reconsidered:
beyond the crossroads,» in  Journal of European Public Policy,  13 (2),  2006;  A. A.
Hyde-Price,  «A  “tragic  actor?”  A  realist  perspective  on  “ethical  power
Europe,”» in International Affairs, 84 (1), 2008. 
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international actor have mostly been theoretically oriented so far. The
biggest efforts to investigate them empirically have been carried out by
Sonia Lucarelli and a handful other scholars.24 While being aware of the
differences existing between the EC and the EU and between historical
and  political  science  research,  my  dissertation  can  offer  empirical
evidence  and  historical  insight  to  the  debate  on  the  EU  as  an
international  actor.  Contrary  to  what  most  of  the  political  science
literature assumes, I show that the process of assertion of the EC/EU as
an international actor started well before the establishment of the EU
and  of  its  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy.  Moreover,  a
comprehensive analysis of the early conceptions, traits and image of the
EC as an international  actor  can help to understand how they were
de:ned,  how they were  engrained,  and how they  affected the  later
developments of the EC/EU's international activity and identity.  
Approach and focus of the analysis
In  this  dissertation  I  analyze  how  the  assertion  of  the  EC  as  a
distinct  international  actor  came about,  and how it  was de:ned the
distinctive character assigned to it. In order to do so, I consider both the
Community and the EPC dimensions of the EC's international activity,
differently  from  most  of  the  existing  studies.  The  institutional
separation between these  two  dimensions  should not be overlooked.
However,  such  a  separation  should  not  obliterate  the  fact  that
Community and EPC dimensions involved the same countries  and to
some extent the same people, and that they were both meant to concur
to  European  political  integration.  To  look  at  the  EC's  international
activity as a whole is essential in order to appreciate the overall process
of assertion of the EC on the international stage and the general traits of
the EC as an international actor.  
In  order  to  analyze  the  assertion  of  the  EC  as  a  distinct  and
distinctive international actor, I focus on instances and debates where
its assertion was debated and its traits were de:ned. Actors involved in
the  making of  the  EC as  an  international  actor  often  held  different
24 Values and Principles of the EU Foreign Policy, ed. S. Lucarelli and I. Manners
(London and New York: Routledge, 2006);  The Search for a European Identity:
Values,  Policies  and  Legitimacy  of  the  European  Union,  ed.  F.  Cerutti  and  S.
Lucarelli (London and New York: Routledge, 2008);  External Perceptions of the
European Union as a Global Actor, ed. S. Lucarelli and L. Fioramonti (London and
New York: Routledge, 2010). 
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views and conceptions of it. In particular, member states' governments
advocated different conceptions of the EC's international activity and
promoted different understandings of its traits as an international actor.
For  instance,  the  French  government  insisted  on  the  necessity  to
establish the EC as an actor clearly distinct from the US. The Dutch
government argued that the EC should assert itself as generous partner
of the developing countries, the Italian government called for a federal
outcome  of  the  European  political  integration,  and  so  on.  The
compromise and combination of these different conceptions led to the
de:nition and assertion of the EC's speci:c traits as an international
actor. 
In some cases member states explicitly and directly discussed the
assertion of the EC as an international actor. The case of the elaboration
of the Declaration on the European identity was one instance of this.
However, in most cases refections and debates leading to the de:nition
of  the  traits  of  the  EC  as  an  international  actor  were  less  explicit.
Debates  on  more  speci:c  and  actual  topics  worked  as  proxies  for
debates  on  the  conception  of  the  EC  as  an  international  actor.  For
instance,  when  the  EC  member  states  discussed  the  location  of  the
headquarters of the EPC secretariat, they were actually debating about
the  relationship  that  should  incur  between  the  Community  and the
EPC,  and  the  desirable  degree  of  involvement  of  supranational
institutions in the EC's international activity. I focus on the aspects of
the  EC's  international  activity  where  the  fundamental  conceptions
underlying  it  were  the  most  apparent,  such  as  the  design  of  the
institutional  structure  for  it,  the  de:nition  of  its  relationship  with
transatlantic cooperation, the pursuit of policies deliberately aimed at
projecting a distinctive image of the EC, and so on. 
I  focus  on  the  EC's external  policies  which  were  deliberately
intended to  af:rm the distinctiveness of the EC,  such as the policies
concerning the developing countries and human rights. These policies
were deemed important to  show and claim the originality of the EC's
approach to  international affairs, and to signal the EC's willingness to
leave its mark on them. I focus especially on the assertion of the EC as a
global  player,  and  on  policies  meant  to  bring  a  distinctive EC
contribution  to the  international system at large.  For this reason, I do
not  pay special attention to policies mostly concerning Europe and its
neighborhood, such as the enlargement and Mediterranean policies and
the EC's participation in the CSCE. I do not focus on external policies
mostly dealing with day-by-day business either  or  mostly  aiming at a
quite straightforward protection of European interests,  such as  many
commercial and monetary policies. To be sure, such a selection does not
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imply that  these  policies  were  not  relevant  –  the  only  thing  that  it
implies is that they were less relevant than others as far as the assertion
of the EC as a distinctive global player was concerned. 
In analyzing the process of the de:nition and assertion of the EC as
an international actor, I focus on the main actors involved in the design
and management of the EC's international activity. To a great extent, the
governments of the EC member states were the main actors involved.
States played a crucial role in the design of the general features of the
EC's  international  activity  and  in  the  making  of  its  policies  and
initiatives in international affairs. To focus on governments, it means to
look at politicians on the one hand and at of:cials and diplomats on the
other hand. In assessing states' views and actions, I assume that they
were  mostly  driven  by  a  rational  pursuit  of  interests.  However,  I
assume that ideas and role conceptions also matter in the making of
foreign policy.25 Especially in cases such as French Gaullism or Dutch
Third-Worldism,  ideas  clearly  affected  the  way  in  which  national
interests were framed, the de:nition of the goals worth pursuing, and
the room available  to compromise with alternative conceptions of the
EC's international activity. 
Beside  member  states'  governments,  I  take  into  account  the  role
played  by  the  EC  Commission.  The  Commission  took  signi:cant
initiatives in favor of the assertion of the EC as a distinct and distinctive
international actor,  partly because such an assertion was expected to
strengthen the Commission's weight. A particularly signi:cant role was
played by some members of the Commission, such as Sicco Mansholt,
Christopher Soames, Claude Cheysson, and Roy Jenkins. The European
Parliament  played  little  role  in  the  assertion  of  the  EC  as  an
international actor, since it had limited competences and weight in this
respect.  However,  its  activity favored the elaboration of  some cross-
national and cross-party views on the EC's international role,  and in
some cases the Parliament managed to assert these views. For instance,
the Parliament contributed to the devotion of increasing attention to
human rights by the EC in the second half of the 1970s. 
In order to reconstruct the views of the EC's international activity
held by the member states' governments and by the EC institutions, I
rely mainly  on documents  produced by them.  The kinds  of  sources
25 See  for  instance  L.  Aggestam,  «Role  identity and the  Europeanisation of
foreign  policy:  A political-cultural  approach,»  in  Rethinking  European  Union
Foreign  Policy,  ed.  B.  Tonra  and  T.  Christiansen  (Manchester:  Manchester
University Press, 2004); Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political
Change, ed. J. Goldstein and R. Keohane (Ithaca and London: Cornell University
Press, 1993). 
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considered are mainly internal documents preparing policy positions,
reports  from  member  states'  embassies  and  speeches  by  European
leaders. Archival sources are mainly drawn from the archives of the EC
institutions and from the archives of the foreign ministries of France,
Britain and Germany, which were the most infuential member states.26
The variety of the archival sources considered is a relevant feature of
this  dissertation.  The  existing  literature  on  the  EC's  international
activity relies mainly on French sources:27 this poses a problem of bias,
especially because France was often the odd man out in the various
debates on the EC's international activity. 
In terms of time frame, my analysis spans between 1969 and 1979.
Major  changes  occurred  between  1969  and  1972,  which  created
qualitative  changes  in  the  EC's  international  position  and  activity,
triggering the very beginning of the process of assertion of the EC as a
distinct  international  actor.  Particularly  important  changes  in  this
regard were the resignation of Charles De Gaulle, the approval of the
British entry into the EC, the beginning of détente, the decoupling of
the dollar from gold, and the increasing assertiveness of the developing
countries.  Major  changes occurred between 1979 and 1981 opened a
new  and  different  phase  for  the  process  of  assertion  of  the  EC.
Important changes in this regard were the outbreak of the second oil
shock,  the  election  of  Margaret  Thatcher,  François  Mitterrand,  and
Ronald Reagan, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the af:rmation
of a neo-liberal paradigm in global North–South relations. While there
are  good reasons  to  regard  1969–79  as  a  relatively  coherent  unit  of
analysis, some signi:cant turns did occur during that period as well.
The most important  turn occurred in 1973–74,  with the transatlantic
crisis of the «Year of Europe,» the outbreak of the energy and economic
crisis and the election of new leaders in Britain, France and Germany. 
26 Documents are drawn from the following archives: Historical Archives of
the European Union (Florence), Central Archives of the European Commission
(Brussels), Central Archives of the Council of the EU (Brussels), Archives of the
French foreign ministry (Paris),  National Archives (Paris),  National Archives
(London),  Archives  of  the  German  foreign  ministry  (Berlin),  Central  State
Archives (Rome). Some funds were consulted also at the Churchill Archives in
Cambridge and at the Archives of the International Institute for Social History
in Amsterdam. 
27 The most striking case in this respect is the monumental history of the EPC
written by Maria Gainar, wherein the only national archival sources considered
are the French ones (Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne). 
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Structure of the dissertation
The dissertation is  divided into six  chapters,  preceded by a brief
prologue providing some essential background and contextualization.
Because  of  the  complex  and  composite  character  of  the  process  of
assertion  of  the  EC  as  an  international  actor,  the  dissertation  is
organized by a thematic rather than a chronological structure. The :rst
three  chapters  focus  on  the  de:nition  and  establishment  of  the
structures,  procedures  and means  for  the  EC's  international  activity,
enabling it to assert itself as a distinct international actor. The last three
chapters focus on the traits and contents of the EC's activity in three
policy  :elds  which  were  particularly  relevant  for  its  assertion  as  a
distinctive international actor. To some extent, the division between the
two halves of the thesis does mirror a chronological difference, since
the processes analyzed in chapters 1 through 3 mainly occurred before
or during the 1973–74 crisis, while the processes analyzed in chapters 4
through 6 mainly occurred during or after it. 
In  chapter  1  I  analyze  the  de:nition  and  establishment  of  the
institutional structure for the EC's international activity: the creation of
the  EPC,  the  de:nition  of  its  relationship  with  the  Community,  the
debate on the political role that could be played by the EC Commission,
the  attempts  at  improving  the  coherence  of  the  EC's  international
activity.  I  show  that  the  design  of  this  institutional  structure  was
strongly  affected  by the  different  member  states'  views  on  the  :nal
form  of  European  political  integration.  To  evaluate  possible
institutional  innovations,  states  always  considered  whether  these
innovations  moved  political  integration  towards  a  federal  or  a
confederal model. As a consequence of these deep implications of the
traits of the institutional structure for the EC's international activity, its
design was quite dif:cult  and it  often required to  reach fragile  and
ambiguous compromises between divergent conceptions. 
Chapter 2  is to a large extent complementary to chapter 1, since it
focuses  on  the  de:nition  and  establishment  of  the  institutions  and
means  meant  to enable  the  EC to  speak with  a  single  voice  on the
international  stage.  Once  common  positions  were  reached  between
member states, these positions had to be expressed. On the one hand, I
look at the means created for the expression of the Community's voice,
on the other hand, I look at the means for the expression of the EPC and
of  the  European  Council.  I  show  that  most  world  countries  were
receptive to the assertion of the EC on the international stage, and it
fact  they favored further  progress  in  political  integration.  The  main
reason why the  EC did not  always  manage to  speak clearly  on the
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international  stage  was  its  member  states'  reticence  about  it.  One
common European voice might sometimes be expressed, but it should
not substitute the choir of single national voices. 
Chapter 3 also focuses on the de:nition of the structure for the EC's
international  activity.  However,  the  chapter  does  not  focus  on
institutional aspects but rather on political ones, namely the political
constraints which led to the exclusion of entire :elds of international
affairs  from  the  EC's  international  activity.  I  look  at  member  states'
domaines  réservés,  as  well  as  at  the  substantial  exclusion  of defense
matters  from  the  range  of  action  available  to  the  EC.  Other  major
constraints on it were promoted by the US: the EC should deal only
marginally with the Middle East question and with energy matters. I
argue that this restriction of the range of action available for the EC's
international activity strongly affected its traits, by inviting the EC to
focus on speci:c “civilian” sectors of international affairs. As a result, a
division  of  labor  was  established  between  the  EC  and  its  member
states, as well as between the EC and the US. 
Political  constraints  on the  EC's  international  activity directed  its
focus  towards  :elds  of  international  affairs  such  as  development
cooperation, dialogue with the developing countries, the promotion of
human rights  in  third countries,  and  so  on.  Activity  in  these  :elds
enabled the EC to assert itself as a distinctive international actor – as
some put it at the time, as a «civilian power.»28 It is towards this activity
that I turn to in chapters 4 through 6. In chapter 4 I look at the EC's
engagement  in  favor  of  development  cooperation,  especially  at  the
reassessment of its cooperation system with the Lomé Convention. In
chapter  5 I  look at  the EC's  efforts  for  a reform of the international
economic order offering more weight to the developing countries and
favoring an overcoming of the juxtaposition between economic blocs.
In chapter  6 I  look at the EC's activity for the promotion of  human
rights in third countries outside Europe. 
In  each  chapter,  I  analyze  the  conceptions  underlying  the  EC's
engagement in the considered :eld, as well as the image that the EC
tried  to  project  on  the  international  stage.  I  show  that  the  EC
consistently tried to convey an image of itself as a «force for good,»
caring  about  third  countries'  dif:culties  and  about  their  people's
welfare.  However,  there  was  a  fundamental  mismatch  between  the
discourse and image of the EC as a force for good and its actual policies
and initiatives:  deeds  often  fell  well  short  of  words.  I  consider  this
mismatch,  analyzing  the  reasons  why  the  EC  rhetoric  set  very
28 Duchêne, «Europe’s role in world peace.»
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ambitious goals and why the EC found it very dif:cult to meet them.
Part of the reason for it was that rhetoric was meant to rationalize some
of the limited capabilities available for the EC's international activity,
and to make up for  them. I  argue that  the EC established a sort  of
vicious circle: it resorted to rhetoric in order to make up for its limited
capabilities, but this strategy raised very high expectations. The EC was
unable  to  meet  these  expectations,  and  as  a  result  the  limits  of  its
capabilities were exposed even more. 
15
16
Prologue 
The failure of early attempts at political integration
The  Second  World  War  drastically  changed  Europe's  position  in
international affairs, making it weaker, and sanctioning the emergence
of the US and the USSR as the two new world superpowers. The sharp
diminution of Europe's global standing was to be further accentuated
by the process of decolonization, which was partly a by-product of the
war itself. Beside the decrease in global standing, European countries
had to address two major strategic problems. With the beginning of the
Cold War in the late 1940s, Europe was divided into two parts and it
became  a  major  theatre  of  confrontation  between  the  West  and  the
Soviet bloc. The other major strategic problem was the reconstruction
and the division of Germany: Western countries were eager to tie West
Germany to them and to ensure that its recovery would not endanger
Europe's stability. 
In  order  to  address  these  challenges,  some  infuential  European
political  leaders,  intellectuals,  and  pressure  groups  advocated  the
promotion of economic and political integration of Western European
countries. Only in this way, it was believed, could they restore some
weight and infuence in a world dominated by the two superpowers, as
well as discourage the expansion of Soviet infuence in Western Europe
and deal with the German problem. Integration would offer  the West
Europeans «une  revanche  contre  le  destin»1 and  a  chance  «d’être
présentes  […]  au  rendez-vous  du  XXIème  siècle.»2 The  :rst  major
governmental  initiative  for  Western  European integration  led  to  the
establishment of a European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, which
was  followed  by  the  European  Economic  Community  and  the
European Community for Atomic Energy in 1958. 
1 G. Robin (Presidency of the French Republic), Note sur l'Europe, August 23,
1974, in Archives Nationales [AN], AG 5(3), 921. 
2 Ibid. 
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Besides increasing the international weight  of Western Europe as a
whole,  European  integration  was  also  meant  to strengthen the
international weight of  each member state.3 This goal was extremely
clear in the case of France: according to  the French President Georges
Pompidou, European countries «ont l'habitude et, donc, ont contracté le
besoin de jouer un rôle mondial.»4 France could not easily acquiesce to
its marginalization in international relations, and European integration
was  expected  to  work as  a  multiplier  of  French  infuence  in
international affairs.  France expected to play the role of  the pivot in
Western Europe, enjoying a particular prominence within it.5 However,
European political integration would work as a multiplier of infuence
for the other member states as well. 
Early initiatives  for  European integration  had a  mostly economic
content,  focusing  on  the  creation  of  a  common market  and of  joint
institutions for the management of economic issues. Not only had these
initiatives  a  clear  political  import  however,  but  they  were  also
combined  with  initiatives  explicitly  aimed  at promoting  European
political integration.  The notion of political integration referred to two
different yet  interconnected  processes.  On the one hand,  it referred to
the establishment of a common European political space with common
institutions and states' cooperation in a number of policy :elds. On the
other hand,  it referred to the promotion of consultation, coordination
and joint action between European countries in international affairs. 
In the early 1950s the establishment of a European Community of
Defense was discussed. The EDC envisaged integration in the military
sector,  with the creation of common armed forces. The EDC was to be
included in a European Political Community, which was conceived in
federal terms and which was to promote member states' foreign policy
coordination as well. However, the rati:cation of the EDC Treaty was
3 É. Burin des Roziers (French permanent representative to the EC), Note sur
les velléités d'étendre à la politique étrangère la compétence de la CEE, January
29,  1973,  in  AN,  AG  5(2),  1035;  Ministère  des  affaires  étrangères  [MAEF],
Europe occidentale,  Note sur l'Italie et  la construction politique de l'Europe,
May  16,  1973,  in  Archives  du  ministère  des  affaires  étrangères  [AMAEF],
Affaires politiques, CE, 3771; G. Robin, Note sur l'Europe, August 23, 1974, in
AN, AG 5(3), 921. 
4 Pompidou  quoted  in  Un  projet  pour  l'Europe:  Georges  Pompidou  et  la
construction  européenne,  ed.  É.  Bussière  et  E.  Willaert  (Bruxelles:  P.I.E.–Peter
Lang, 2010).
5 Foreign and Commonwealth Of:ce [FCO], Planning Committee, Paper on the
external relations of the EC, November 1972, in  the National Archives [NA],
FCO 49/391. 
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rejected  by  the  French  National  Assembly  in  August  1954,  mainly
because of its concern with the German rearmament and because of the
Gaullist  opposition  to  the  EDC's  federalist conception.6 In  1960 the
French President Charles De Gaulle launched another major attempt at
European  cooperation  in  international  affairs.  What  the  so-called
Fouchet  Plans aimed  at,  was  to  build a  «Union  of  States»  with  a
common foreign and defense policy. The Union was to be governed by
regular meetings of the member states' heads of state and government,
who would  deliberate by  unanimity.7 Negotiations  on  the  Fouchet
Plans failed in 1962, because of sharp divergences between France and
its partners  on the relationship between the Union and NATO, on the
position  of  Britain,  and  on  the  intergovernmental  character  of  the
envisaged institutions. 
After the failure of the Fouchet Plans, no other major attempt was
made for the political integration of the EC member states. A few other
initiatives were envisaged, but they were aborted at a very early stage.8
Favorable conditions for political integration were missing in the 1950s
and 1960s. Because of the Cold War, Western Europe enjoyed a limited
room of maneuver in international affairs. Even when some room did
exist, Western Europeans could not agree on the way to follow, mainly
because of  the sharp divergence between De Gaulle's  European and
foreign policy and the policies of the other EC governments. As a result,
the EC's international activity was essentially limited to external trade
matters. Community institutions were in charge of the external aspects
of the common commercial  policy, and of the external aspects of the
common agricultural policy. For the matters concerning the common
market, it was the Community institutions which were competent in
the economic international organizations. The Community also had a
role to play in the relations with the African countries associated with
it.
6 On the failure of  the EDC see  K. Ruane,  The Rise  and Fall  of  the European
Defence Community. Anglo-American Relations and the Crisis of European Defence,
1950–55 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 89–102. 
7 G.-H. Soutou, «Les présidents Charles de Gaulle et Georges Pompidou et les
débuts  de  la  coopération  politique  européenne:  du  Plan  Fouchet  au  Plan
Fouchet light,» in Relations internationales, 140 (4), 2009; G. D'Ottavio, «Il piano
Fouchet ovvero la storia di uno o di più fallimenti,» in La Comunità europea e le
relazioni esterne 1957–1992, ed. A. Bitumi, G. D'Ottavio, and G. Laschi (Bologna:
CLUEB, 2008). 
8 For instance, in 1964 plans were advanced by Paul-Henri Spaak, Giuseppe
Saragat, and by the German government, and another plan was proposed by
Pierre Harmel in 1968. 
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The scope of  Community competences in international affairs was
limited  by  the  EC  treaties,  and  particularly by  the  narrow
interpretations  given  by  the  member  states  to  them.9 Even  if the
Community did  have  some competences,  its  activity  was  not  very
effective. Coordination between its different external policies was weak,
as they were pursuing partially different goals. Trade, agricultural and
association policies were designed by different directorate-generals of
the EC Commission and by partially different formations of the Council
of  ministers.  The  making  of  the  Community's external  policies  was
described as «accidental, improvised and disjointed»10 by the President
of the EC Commission.  Even more de:cient were the coherence and
coordination  between  the  Community's external  policies  and  the
foreign  policies  bilaterally  pursued  by  the  member  states,  and  the
coherence between bilateral foreign policies themselves. 
One of the reasons why coherence was limited and policies tended
to be conceived in narrow sectorial terms in the 1960s was the lack of a
clear general political vision underlying the Community's international
activity:  «Une  formulation  de  principe  des  bases  de  notre  politique
extérieure communautaire a fait  défaut jusqu'ici.»11 The international
activity  of  the  Community was  mostly  determined  by  the  need  to
manage  the  immediate  external  consequences  of  speci:c  aspects  of
internal economic integration. There was no general vision providing
overall coherence and direction to them, and the EC commissioner for
external relations Ralf Dahrendorf acknowledged that «le processus de
formation de la volonté sur le plan de la politique étrangère dans la
Communauté ne va pas de pair avec leurs effets sur ce même plan.»12
Similarly, the President of the EC Commission Franco Maria Malfatti
argued that «nous af:rmons notre présence dans le monde parfois en
9 R. Dahrendorf, Personal communication «Quelques principes et points de vue
relatifs aux relations extérieures de la CE,» June 13,  1972,  in  Archives of the
International Institute for Social History [IISG], Mansholt 216.  The art. 235 of
the EEC Treaty  made it possible for the Council  of ministers  to  give a broad
interpretation of the Community competences. 
10 F. M. Malfatti, Speech to the European Parliament on the programme of the
Commission for 1971, February 10, 1971, in ACCE, Speeches collection. 
11 R.  Dahrendorf,  Interview with  Europäische Gemeinschaft,  translated by the
spokesman's group of the EC Commission, April 1972, in ACCE, BAC 3/1978
729. 
12 Spokesman's  group  of  the  EC  Commission,  Summary  of  speech  by
Dahrendorf,  Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik,  Bonn, January 25,
1971, in ACCE, BAC 3/1978 727.
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fonction des seules nécessités immédiates et impérieuses.»13 
The re-launch of political integration in the late 1960s
It  was  in  the  late  1960s  that  Western  European  governments
seriously started to discuss political integration again. The shift from
limited  economic  integration  to  increasingly  comprehensive  political
integration was neither a linear nor a necessary process. To be sure, the
available  experience  of  integration  constituted  a  useful  basis  for  a
further  expansion  of  the  :elds  of  cooperation.  With  the  European
Communities having been running for almost twenty years, a whole set
of customs, structures, procedures of cooperation had been developed
by the Western European governments. 
The  resumption  of  projects  for  Western  European  political
integration in the late 1960s and early 1970s was closely connected to
the beginning of détente between the West and the Soviet bloc and to
the increasing European reluctance to align with the US in international
affairs. Because of  these  changes, Western  European  political
integration ceased to be considered only as a  vague aspiration for a
faraway future and started to be seriously discussed. The relaxation of
international  tensions  favored  by  détente  led  to  a  reduction  of  the
pressure exerted by the Cold War on Europe, and to a relaxation of the
Western bloc's cohesion. As a consequence, it became possible for the
Western European countries to envisage the launch of some initiatives
in  international  affairs  autonomous  from  the  US.  The  beginning  of
détente encouraged a reassessment of international relations, opening
up a window of opportunity for an increase of the international role of
the Western European countries. 
Détente  offered some opportunities  for  Western Europe to act  in
international affairs, but it also posed some risks for it. In May 1972 the
US and the USSR signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and in
June 1973 they signed an agreement on the prevention of nuclear war.
Europeans were not consulted in these negotiations even though they
directly  concerned  European  security.  These  developments  raised
13 F. M. Malfatti, Speech «Les responsabilités croissantes de la Communauté
dans le monde,» Hannover, April 29, 1971, in ACCE, BAC 3/1978 730. See also
FCO,  Working  group  on  Europe,  Paper  on  European  political  uni:cation,
October 26, 1971, in NA, FCO 49/356. 
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doubts  about  the  credibility  of  the  American  nuclear  guarantee  in
Europe, which had already been partly called into question with the
adoption of  the  strategy  of  fexible  response  by  NATO.14 These
developments  provoked  a  «sense  of  urgency,  if  not  panic»  among
Western Europeans:15 nuclear parity and the US–USSR dialogue could
in fact lead to the establishment of a world condominium between the
two superpowers,  whereby the relative weight of Western Europe in
international affairs would be even further reduced. As a consequence,
a  strengthening  of  Western  Europe's  coordination  and  presence  in
international affairs was seen as imperative. 
The process of superpowers détente was mirrored in Europe by the
relaxation  of  tensions  between  West  Germany  and  its  Eastern
neighboring  countries,  as  envisaged  by  the  so-called  Ostpolitik
launched  by  Willy  Brandt  in  the  late  1960s.  With  Ostpolitik,  the
autonomy  and  activism  of  West  Germany  in  international  affairs
increased considerably. Such an increase constituted a potential danger
for  the  other  Western  European  countries,  since  Ostpolitik  could
ultimately lead to outcomes unwelcome to them, such a neutralist drift
of  West  Germany,  an  expansion  of  Soviet  infuence  in  Europe,  or
Germany's reuni:cation. In order to counter such possible evolutions
and to tie West Germany closely to the West, the promotion of Western
European political  integration could  be a useful  strategy.16 The West
German government itself was in favor of it, as a way to reassure its
partners about its foreign policy course.17 
14 F. Hilfrich, «West Germany's long Year of Europe. Bonn between Europe and
the United States,» in The Strained Alliance. US–European Relations from Nixon to
Carter,  ed.  M.  Schulz  and  T.  A.  Schwartz  (Cambridge  and  Washington:
Cambridge University Press and German Historical Institute, 2010), p. 239. 
15 J.  O.  Goldsborough,  «France,  the  European  crisis  and  the  Alliance,»  in
Foreign  Affairs,  52  (3),  1974,  p.  541.  See  also  G.-H.  Soutou,  «Le  Président
Pompidou  et  les  relations  entre  les  États-Unis  et  l'Europe,»  in  Journal  of
European Integration History, 6 (2), 2000, p. 140. 
16 British embassy in Washington, Memorandum «The US and the enlarged
EC: commercial and economic issues,» January 25, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1294;
W. Loth, «Détente and European integration in the policies of Willy Brandt and
Georges  Pompidou,»  in  European  Integration  and  the  Cold  War.  Ostpolitik–
Westpolitik,  1965–1973,  ed. N.  P.  Ludlow (London and New York: Routledge:
2007), pp. 55–56. 
17 T. Garton Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (London:
Vintage, 1994), p. 81. According to Andreas Wilkens instead, German positions
on Ostpolitik and European integration were kept as separate as possible from
one another (Wilkens, «New Ostpolitik and European integration: Concept and
policies in the Brandt era,» in European Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik–
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In the late 1960s increasing strains begun to appear in a number of
:elds of transatlantic relations, ranging from trade to monetary affairs,
from political relations to security affairs. The EC had become a major
commercial  competitor  for  the  US.  While  the  US  had  previously
accepted the economic costs implied by European integration, it was
harder to accept them at a time of relative economic dif:culty such as
the late 1960s. In the political sphere, Western European countries were
increasingly  reluctant  to  ease  the  burden  carried  by the  US  for  the
defense of the West and to support American initiatives such as their
intervention in Vietnam.18 Especially after Nixon's inauguration, the US
displayed an increasing tendency towards unilateralism and envisaged
a partial reduction of its engagement in Europe. From both a political
and an economic point  of  view, a  fundamental  change affecting the
transatlantic  relationship  was  Nixon's  decision  to  end  dollar
convertibility for gold and to impose a surtax on imports on August 15,
1971. 
Western  Europeans  leaders  (with  the  notable  exception  of  De
Gaulle)  had  previously  assumed  that  the  pursuit  of  European
integration could be fundamentally coherent with the preservation of
good transatlantic relations. Such an assumption probably rested on an
insuf:cient appreciation of «what such a united Europe would really
mean.»19 This assumption came to be put into question in the late 1960s,
with the US taking a more critical stance towards European political
integration,  and  with  Europe  developing  positions  and  preferences
different from the American ones.20 As Piers Ludlow has put it, what
occurred was «a signi:cant shift from the mutually bene:cial symbiosis
between  European  and  Atlantic  cooperation  […]  to  a  much  more
uneasy and uncomfortable period of coexistence.»21 
Westpolitik, 1965–1973,  ed. N. P.  Ludlow (London and New York: Routledge,
2007), p. 78). 
18 See for instance J. N.  Irwin  (US deputy Secretary of State),  Address before
the American Bar Association, London, July 19, 1971, in ACCE, BAC 134/1987
197. 
19 British  embassy  in  Washington,  Note  on  [US]/West  European  relations,
December  2,  1973,  in  NA,  FCO  30/1742.  See  also  British  embassy  in
Washington,  Memorandum «The  US and  the  enlarged  EC:  commercial  and
economic issues,» January 25, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1294. 
20 G.  Lundestad,  The  United  States  and  Western  Europe  since  1945 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 177–178, 181. 
21 N.  P.  Ludlow, «The end of symbiosis:  The Nixon era and the collapse of
comfortable  co-existence  between  European  and  Atlantic  integration,»  in
Atlantic,  Euratlantic,  or  Europe–America?,  ed.  G.  Scott-Smith  and  V.  Aubourg
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Strains in  the transatlantic  relations were not a complete novelty.
What  was  new  was  the  European  attitude  towards  them:  Western
European governments were not as ready to yield to the US as they had
tended to be in the previous decades. At a time of détente, alignment
with the US was not the only available option.  The change in attitude
was  particularly  striking  in  West  Germany  and  in  Britain.  In  the
previous  decades,  West  Germany had  been  extremely  careful  to
cultivate  the  transatlantic  relationship.  Now  it was  more  willing  to
increase its autonomy, as it showed with Ostpolitik: agreement with the
US  was  desirable,  but  it  should  not  come  at  all  costs  and  the
development  of  distinctive  Western  European  positions  could  be
envisaged.  Similarly,  Britain was  traditionally  attached  to  the
transatlantic  relationship.  However,  in  the  1970s  Britain was  a  new
member  state  of  the  EC,  and  therefore  had  to  prove  its  European
credentials. In particular, Britain was wary of appearing to be a sort of
Trojan horse of the US.22 A crucial role in this change of attitude was
played by the personal views of the new German and British leaders
Willy Brandt and Edward Heath. 
While Germany and Britain became more critical towards the US,
France partially softened its age-old confrontational attitude towards it,
making it  possible to establish a common ground  with its  European
partners. As a British diplomat put it, the French were 
pathologically  sensitive  about  any  possible  implication  that
Europe is  in  any sense  subordinate to or  dependent  upon the
United States. It is strangely like a sort of Third World psychosis
towards the colonial power.23 
The divergence between Gaullist and Atlanticist visions had been one
of  the  main  obstacles  to the  pursuit  of Western  European  political
integration in the previous years. The departure of De Gaulle from the
French  Presidency  in  1969  made  the  French  position  less
uncompromising  and  less  repelling  for  the  other  Western  European
countries,  even though Gaullist  ideas such as the notion of  «Europe
européenne»  continued  to exert  a  strong infuence  on the  French
(Paris: Soleb, 2011), p. 63. 
22 FCO,  Planning  Committee,  Paper  on  the  external  relations  of  the  EC,
November 1972, in NA, FCO 49/391; M. D. Butler (FCO, European integration
–  external),  Note  on  transatlantic  relations,  October  8,  1973,  in  NA,  FCO
30/1748. 
23 C. Ewart-Biggs (British embassy in France), Note on US/Europe, August 28,
1973, in NA, FCO 30/1739. 
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foreign policy.24  
The choice of the EC as forum for political integration
The changing strategic environment, increasing transatlantic strains
and  the  changing  European  attitudes  largely  explain  why  Western
European  political  elites  came  to  regard  the  pursuit  of  political
integration as a viable strategy to pursue in the late 1960s and early
1970s.  However,  it  was  not  obvious  that  Western European political
integration  should  be  pursued  in  the  framework  of  the  European
Communities. In fact, the Community might seem an unlikely forum
for coordination and cooperation on political issues and in international
affairs:  until  then,  it  had  mostly  dealt  with  the  establishment  of  a
common  internal  market  and  with  agricultural  matters.  An  EC
commissioner for external relations did exist, but he almost exclusively
dealt with international trade matters. 
The Community might also seem an unlikely forum for cooperation
in  international  affairs  because  it  was  only  one  among  several
international organizations promoting cooperation in Western Europe.
For  instance,  there  was  the  European Free  Trade  Area,  the  Western
European  Union  and  the  NATO  Eurogroup,  and  discussion  of
international  political  issues  was already occurring within the  WEU
and the Eurogroup. Moreover, it was possible to establish a new ad hoc
forum for political integration. However,  it was the Community that
was chosen as  the main forum for  the  pursuit  of  Western European
political integration. Despite its mainly technical and economic focus,
the promoters  of  the Community had conceived of it  as  kernel  of  a
more general  process  of integration of  Western Europe.  Accordingly,
integration as carried out in the Community had been charged with a
signi:cant  political  and  symbolic  meaning.  Moreover,  to  use  the
Community  as  forum for  the  pursuit  of  Western  European  political
24 N. P. Ludlow,  «Transatlantic relations in the Johnson and Nixon eras: The
crisis that didn't  happen – and what it  suggests about the one that did,» in
Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 8 (1), 2010, pp. 49–50; G.-H. Soutou, «The linkage
between European integration and détente: The contrasting approaches of de
Gaulle and Pompidou, 1965 to 1974,» in European Integration and the Cold War:
Ostpolitik–Westpolitik,  1965–1973,  ed.  N.  P.  Ludlow  (London  and New  York:
Routledge,  2007).  See  also  FCO, Planning  Committee,  Paper on the external
relations of the EC, November 1972, in NA, FCO 49/391. 
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integration made it possible to build upon its experience, its resources
and its economic might. At the end of the 1960s the Community was a
major world economic power, and with the entry of Britain it became
the biggest power in international trade.25
An additional reason why the Community was chosen as the main
forum for the pursuit of Western European political integration was its
membership.  France  was  a  full  member  and  protagonist  of  the
Community, while it was not member of the NATO Eurogroup. Given
its weight and position, it  would have been extremely hard to pursue
Western  European  political  integration  without  French  participation
and  commitment.  While  including  France,  the  Community  did  not
include  other  NATO members  and  other  European countries  which
could  pose  serious  obstacles  to  the  pursuit  of  political  integration,
either  because  of  their  neutralism  or  because  of  their  troublesome
domestic political situation like Spain, Portugal and Greece.
The most serious problem with the use of the Community as the
main forum for Western European political integration was the fact that
Britain was not member of it. To envisage political integration without
Britain would have been far from ideal,  especially from the point of
view  of  France's  partners  in  the  Community,  which  were  eager  to
counter the French pressure to reduce the Community's ties with the
US.  Atlanticist  European  governments  regarded  the  participation  of
Britain as a guarantee against Gaullist drifts, hence they were extremely
wary of political integration until the EC's enlargement to Britain could
be  decided  after  the  departure  of  De  Gaulle.26 With  Britain  in,  the
Community would regroup a large portion of Western Europe, and all
the main European powers. 
Even  if  it  was  decided  to  pursue  Western  European  political
integration in the framework of the Community, in the late 1960s the
Community  consisted  in  fact  in  an  aggregation  of  three  separate
communities  (ECSC,  EEC,  Euratom),  which  had  been  sharing
institutions since 1967. The :eld of  activity of each Community was
clearly delimited to sectorial tasks by its founding treaty, thus political
25 L. Coppolaro,  The Making of a World Trading Power. The European Economic
Community (EEC) in the GATT Kennedy Round negotiations (1963–67), (Farnham:
Ashgate, 2013).
26 See for instance R. Ducci (director-general of the Italian foreign ministry)
quoted in M. E. Guasconi, «L'Italia e la via europea alla pace (1969–1973),» in
Guerra  e  pace  nell'Italia  del  Novecento.  Politica  estera,  cultura  politica  e  correnti
dell'opinione pubblica,  ed. L. Goglia, R. Moro, and L. Nuti (Bologna: il Mulino,
2006), pp. 586–587. 
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integration  could  only  partially  be  pursued  inside  the  existing
framework.  New  structures  and  procedures  had  to  be  de:ned  for
member  states'  cooperation  in  political  matters,  even  though
Community institutions were to be involved in it. Some new structures
were  gradually  established  outside  the  framework  set  by  the
communities'  founding  treaties,  such  as  the  European  Political
Cooperation system and the European Council. 
 
A  few  reasons  determined  the  re-launch  of Western  European
political  integration  in the  late  1960s,  and  a  few  reasons  made  it
desirable to pursue it in the framework of the EC. For its part, the EC
Commission was clearly eager to widen its :eld of activity, and it was
increasingly aware of the fact that the growing economic weight of the
Community on the international stage could imply  the assumption of
an increasing share of responsibilities in international affairs by it. The
EC  Commission's eagerness  and readiness  to  increase  its  activity in
international  affairs would  have  not  been  suf:cient  to  make  the
Community move towards political integration in the absence of the
other more decisive strategic factors mentioned earlier. However, they
provided additional drive for the pursuit of political integration in the
EC framework.
In order to expand its competences, the EC Commission tended to
rely on the argument that the actual economic weight of the EC made it
necessary to step up its  political  weight  as  well.  It  was especially a
matter  of  not  disappointing  the  expectations  held  by  many  third
countries towards European integration, which called for  it  to  move
beyond  mere  economic  integration.  Concern  with  third  countries'
expectations  was  not  only  stressed  by  the  Commission,  but  it  was
noticed by  member  states  as  well.  For  instance,  the  Foreign  Of:ce
argued that 
the outside world [...] will not understand if the European voice
on foreign policy matters does not develop in a manner which is
appropriate  to  the  increasing  cohesion  of  the  Community  in
international economic affairs.27
When EC leaders and of:cials travelled abroad or were called by
third countries' leaders and diplomats, they were often «surprised to
see the extent to which the European identity is an accepted fact by so
27 FCO, European integration – external, Note on the Tindemans Report, July
19, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/169.
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many of the foreigners.»28 The EC Commission  noticed «l'attente d'un
nombre croissant de partenaires qui souhaitent déjà pouvoir considérer
l'Europe comme un interlocuteur unique.»29 As the President of the EC
Commission Sicco Mansholt  put  it,  «le  monde nous regarde,  parfois
avec  espoir,  parfois  avec  scepticisme,  parfois  avec  crainte.»30
Acknowledgement of third countries' interest in the EC invited it to be
more aware of its weight in international affairs and of the expectations
nurtured towards it.31 As the EC commissioner for  external relations
Christopher Soames argued, 
We  cannot  be  one  of  the  mightiest  industrial  complexes,  the
largest trading unit, the richest holder of currency reserves in the
world and not live up to the global responsibilities for peace and
prosperity that fall on us by virtue of that potential power […]
The time has come for us to play an adult political role in the
world.32 
Many  third  countries  were  critical  towards  the  Community's
commercial policy, which was deemed too protectionist. Some of them
made it clear that they could consent to the commercial policy only if it
was  included  into  a  more  general  process  of  European  political
integration, which was expected to bring bene:ts to third countries too.
28 L. Tindemans, Report on European Union, December 29, 1975, published in
Bulletin of the European Communities, supplement 1/1976. 
29 EC Commission, Report on the European Union, June 25, 1975, in AMAEF,
Affaires  politiques,  CE,  3772.  See  also  F.  M.  Malfatti,  Speech  «Les
responsabilités  croissantes  de  la  Communauté  dans  le  monde,» Hannover,
April 29, 1971,  in  ACCE, BAC 3/1978 730;  F. M. Malfatti, Address before the
European Parliament on the Commission's  programme for 1972, February 8,
1972, in ACCE, Speeches collection.  
30 Verbatim  of  the  :rst  session  of  the  Paris  Summit,  October  19,  1972,  in
AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3788. 
31 Spokesman's  group  of  the  EC  Commission,  Summary  of  speech  by
Dahrendorf,  Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik,  Bonn, January 25,
1971,  in  ACCE, BAC 3/1978 727;  R.  Dahrendorf,  Interview with  Europäische
Gemeinschaft, translated by the spokesman's group of the EC Commission, April
1972, in ACCE, BAC 3/1978 729. 
32 C. Soames, Speech to the Overseas Bankers Club, London, February 5, 1973,
in  ACCE,  BAC  173/1996  24.  See  also  EC  foreign  ministers,  Rapport  en
exécution  du  §15  du  communiqué  de  la  Conférence  de  La  Haye  [so-called
“Davignon Report”], October 27, 1970, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3786;
F.  M.  Malfatti,  Speech  to  the  European  Parliament,  September  22,  1971,  in
ACCE,  BAC 3/1978  72;  EC heads of  state  and government,  Déclaration du
Sommet de Paris,  October 21,  1972,  in  Bulletin des  Communautés  européennes,
10/1972. 
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The stress on political bene:ts in return for some economic costs had
underlain  the  traditional  American  attitude  towards  European
integration, but it spread well beyond the US. For instance, in 1972 the
Indonesian  President  Suharto  called for  Western  European  political
integration, arguing that  «si ce développement vers l'union politique
continue  à  trainer  dans  le  temps,  cette  zone  préférentielle  des  pays
riches ne peut que prendre l'aspect d'une discrimination.»33 
The Hague and Paris Summits
By the  end of  the  1960s,  some  major  obstacles  to  the  pursuit  of
Western European political  integration had disappeared,  such as the
tenure of De Gaulle. Two major factors pushing for it had appeared,
such  as  the  relaxation  of  international  tensions  and  the  increasing
European reluctance to align with the US in international affairs. Some
other secondary factors reinforced this drive, such as the eagerness of
Community institutions to deal with new :elds of activity and the calls
for political integration made by third countries. The combination of
these  factors  led  to  the  re-launch  of  Western  European  political
integration, concerning both its internal and external aspect. The project
of political  integration was :rst  addressed at  The Hague Summit  in
1969, but it was forcefully launched in 1972 at the Paris Summit. 
In  July  1969  the  new  French  President  Georges  Pompidou  had
proposed  to convene a summit  meeting  of  the  heads  of  state  and
government of the EC member states. The goal of the summit was to
discuss major changes affecting international relations and to re-launch
European  integration.  The  summit  took  place  in  The  Hague  on
December  1  and  2,  1969,  and  it  produced a  series  of  decisions  in
different :elds, overall meant to promote «completion, deepening, and
enlargement» of the EC. As far as the EC's international activity was
concerned,  the  heads  of  state  and  government  endorsed  a  German
proposal  to  explore  suitable  ways  to  re-launch  cooperation  in  the
foreign  policy  :eld.34 However, divergences  remained  on  the
33 Suharto reported in S. Mansholt, Report on visit to the ASEAN countries,
September 27, 1972, in IISG, Mansholt 222. 
34 M. E. Guasconi,  L'Europa tra continuità e cambiamento. Il vertice dell'Aja del
1969 e il rilancio della costruzione europea (Firenze: Edizioni Polistampa, 2004), p.
68. 
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institutional form that cooperation should take, and on the  desirable
relationship between European political  integration and transatlantic
cooperation. The summit's conclusions about political integration were
quite prudent and vague as a result: according to the Belgian political
director it was only decided that «il n'est pas complètement exclus que
l'on  puisse  étudier  l'éventualité  de  savoir  si,  peut-être,  avec  les
précautions d'usage, on pourrait parler de la politique extérieure.»35 
Despite their prudence, the conclusions of The Hague Summit led to
the establishment of  the system of European Political Cooperation  in
1970,  as  I  will  show in chapter  1.  The  EPC enabled  member states'
governments  to  consult  and  cooperate  in  foreign  policy  matters.
However,  the creation  of  the  EPC  and  its early  phase  were
characterized by great prudence. It  was  the summit  held in Paris  in
October 1972  which gave  a strong impetus for the  pursuit of political
integration.  As Pompidou put it,  it  was by then clear that  European
countries «peuvent retrouver une place digne de ce que nous sommes,
mais cela n'est possible qu'au moyen d'une Europe unie.»36 The need
for common action in international affairs was perceived as one of the
most important reasons for political integration by the European public
opinion as well.37 
The Paris Summit had been mainly convened in order to identify a
common European response to the American economic and monetary
decisions of August 15, 1971. The summit was also gradually endowed
with the task of designing the general lines of development of the EC in
the following years. By the time of the summit, the enlargement of the
EC to Britain had been decided, making it more pressing to promote a
qualitative  change in  the EC's international activity.  The enlargement
was  bound to turn the  EC into a  larger  economic  actor,  a  mightier
commercial  power,  and  it was closely  linked with a  deepening and
widening of  the  EC's  activity  overall.  As  the  British  Prime minister
Edward Heath argued at  the  summit,  «la Communauté, maintenant,
jouera le rôle d'une grande puissance dans le monde.»38 For this reason,
political  cooperation  was  deemed  «la  plus  nécessaire  de  nos
35 É. Davignon quoted in M. Gainar, Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne: Les
Neuf et la Coopération politique européenne de 1973 à 1980 (Bruxelles: P.I.E.–Peter
Lang,  2012),  pp.  47–48.  See also  M. E.  Guasconi,  «Il  vertice dell'Aja del  1–2
dicembre  1969:  quale  via  per  l'Europa  degli  anni  '70?,»  in  Alle  origini  del
presente: l'Europa occidentale nella crisi degli anni Settanta, ed. A. Varsori (Milano:
Franco Angeli, 2007), p. 155.
36 Verbatim Pompidou–Heath meeting, May 20, 1971, in AN, AG 5(2), 1014. 
37 Gainar, Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne, pp. 295, 298. 
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entreprises.»39 Leaders  at  the  summit decided to strengthen the EPC
and they stated their commitment to the liberalization of international
trade and to development promotion. 
The  Final  Declaration  of  the  Paris  Summit  was  particularly
signi:cant  with  regard  to  the  assertion  of  the  EC  as  a  distinct
international actor: 
L’Europe  doit  être  capable  de  faire  entendre  sa  voix  dans  les
affaires mondiales et de fournir une contribution originale à la
mesure de ses ressources humaines, intellectuelles et matérielles
et  d’af:rmer  ses  propres  conceptions  dans  les  rapports
internationaux,  conformément  à  sa  vocation  d’ouverture,  de
progrès,  de  paix  et  de  coopération  […]  Conformément  à  ses
:nalités  politiques,  la  construction  européenne  permettra  à
l’Europe d’af:rmer sa personnalité dans la :délité à ses amitiés
traditionnelles  et  aux  alliances  de  ses  États  membres  et  de
marquer sa place dans les affaires mondiales en tant qu’entité
distincte, résolue à favoriser un meilleur équilibre international,
dans le respect des principes de la charte des Nations unies.40
The  Declaration expressed some of  the  key ideas  underlying the
conception and discourse  of  the  EC as  an  international  actor  in  the
following years: the EC was to become a distinct entity speaking with a
single  voice  in  international  affairs,  and  promoting  a  distinctive
conception  of  international  relations.  It  was  to  prove  its  outward-
looking  character  and  to  engage  in  favor  of  progress,  peace,
cooperation, and stability. 
38 Minutes  of  the  Paris  Summit,  October  19,  1972,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires
politiques, CE, 3788. 
39 G. Pompidou, Statement at the opening session of the Paris Summit, October
19, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3786. 
40 EC heads of state and government, Declaration of the Paris Summit, 1972.
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Chapter 1 
Building Institutions for the EC's 
International Activity
One of the most debated aspects of the process of assertion of the EC
as an international actor was the design of the institutional structure for
it. Institutional  design was important because  it affected the character
and import of  the EC's  international  activity,  as  well  as the  kind of
actors and procedures involved in it. Debates on institutions were also
crucial  in terms of de:ning the limits and traits of the political space
which was to be  available  for the Community's external activity, and
for intergovernmental cooperation  on  international  political  matters.
The  design  of  the  institutional  structure  for  the  EC's  international
activity was particularly complex because it was closely related to other
ongoing  developments  concerning the  economic  and  political
integration of Western Europe. In particular, it was complex because EC
member  states  held divergent  visions  of  the  de:nitive  form  that
European integration should take. 
In this chapter I analyze :rst of all the process of the establishment
of the European Political Cooperation system in 1969–70, which was
the :rst and main forum for the discussion of international  political
affairs at the EC level. I then analyze the debates surrounding the exact
nature of the relationship between the Community's external activity
and the  EPC,  and the  role  that  Community  institutions  like  the  EC
Commission  could  take  in  international  affairs.  As  a  result  of  these
debates,  it  was decided that  Community and EPC structures for the
EC's international activity should remain distinct and separate. In the
last part of the chapter I analyze the attempts which were made over
time to nuance and partially bridge such a separation, notably through
the establishment  of  the  European Council  in  1974 and through the
project for the establishment of a European Union by 1980. 
What I show in this chapter is that the design of the institutional
structure for the EC's international activity was greatly affected by the
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member states'  concern for the form and forum of further European
political  integration  in  the  future.  Debates  and  negotiations  on  the
institutions  necessary  for  the  EC's  international  activity  were  partly
seen  as  proxies  of  the  debate  on  the  future  form  of  European
integration itself. They invited attention to fundamental questions such
as  whether  political  integration  should  occur  inside  or  outside  the
Community framework and whether the EC should pursue a federal or
a confederal  model of  integration.  The ambiguities and faws of  the
institutional structure which was established for the EC's international
activity  can  largely  be  explained  as  the  result  of  compromises
concerning these very delicate, fundamental and divisive issues. 
The establishment of the European Political Cooperation
At The  Hague  Summit  in  1969,  the  EC  heads  of  state  and
government agreed that a system for cooperation on foreign policy and
other political issues should be established. The design of such a system
was assigned to the political directors of the national foreign ministries.
The main political problem was to  agree on  an institutional  structure
for cooperation which could suit the federalist positions of most of the
member states' governments as well as the French intergovernmental
conception  of  European  integration.  In  the  following  months,  some
ambitious plans for  the  pursuit  of  political  integration  along federal
lines  were  deployed by Germany in  particular,  with  the  support  of
most of the other member states.  Remarks  by the French about such
plans  were  telling  of  their prudence:  «Oh  oh!  Pas  question,»1 «Ils
galopent!!,»2 «Il  va  falloir les  calmer.»3 Plans for  political  integration
along federal  lines  risked  bringing  about  «une  amputation  de  la
France.»4
In  October  1970  the  EC  foreign  ministers  adopted  the  political
directors'  report  (the  so-called  “Davignon  Report”)  and  agreed to
1 G.  Pompidou,  Handwritten  remark  on  telegram  from  the  directorate  for
political affairs, February 1970, in AN, AG 5(2), 1035. 
2 Handwritten remark on telegram from the directorate  for  political  affairs,
February 1970, in AN, AG 5(2), 1035. 
3 G. Pompidou, Handwritten remark on note by de Lipkowski, January 1970, in
AN, AG 5(2), 1035. 
4 M. Debré, Note pour Pompidou, May 15, 1972, in AN, AG 5(2), 89.
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establish  the system  of  European  Political  Cooperation.  In  order  to
promote member states' consultation and cooperation in international
affairs, the foreign ministers were to meet at least twice per year, while
a  political  committee  formed by the  political  directors  was  to  meet
more frequently.5 The EPC presidency was to match the presidency of
the Council  of ministers, so each member state would hold it for six
months.  A group  of  European  correspondents  and  a few  working
groups  were  also  gradually  established,  wherein member  states'
experts could discuss speci:c political topics. Moreover, consultations
were foreseen between member states' ambassadors in third countries
and representatives to international organizations.6 
The  EPC  system  was  to  develop outside  the  framework  of  the
Community,  according  to  an  intergovernmental  model:  cooperation
was to be based on consensus among governments, decisions were not
to  be  legally  binding,  and  Community institutions  were  not  to  be
substantially involved.7 The EPC was  to be  dealt with by the political
directorates of the national foreign ministries, while the member states'
permanent delegations to the EC would continue to deal only with the
Community  policies.  Despite  its  formal  separation  from  the
Community  system, the EPC was to contribute together  with it to the
overall endeavor of European political integration. The most important
link between  Community and EPC was given by their coincidence in
membership: only the member states of the Community could take part
in the EPC, and all of them were to  take part in it.8 Moreover, some
5 For a detailed description of  the features of  the EPC, see  M.  Gainar,  Aux
origines de la diplomatie européenne: Les Neuf et la Coopération politique européenne
de 1973 à 1980 (Bruxelles: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2012), pp. 307–376.
6 In order to stress the distinction between the Community and the EPC, the
ambassadors could not discuss Community matters, which were to be dealt
with  only  by  the  embassies'  commercial  counsellors  (De  Courcel  (MAEF,
Secrétaire général), Note sur les rapports entre la CPE et les CE, February 28,
1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3798). 
7 Because of the intergovernmental character of the EPC, Georges-Henri Soutou
interprets it  as  a  «Plan  Fouchet  light»  (Soutou,  «Les  présidents  Charles  de
Gaulle  et  Georges  Pompidou  et  les  débuts  de  la  coopération  politique
européenne: du Plan Fouchet au Plan Fouchet light,» in Relations Internationales,
140, 2009, p. 16). 
8 According to  Maria  Gainar, it was France which posed membership in the
Community as a condition for participation in the EPC,  in  order to exclude
Britain  from political  cooperation  before its entry into the  Community (Aux
origines de la diplomatie européenne, p. 51).  However, apart from the short-term
case of Britain, the coincidence  in membership between the  Community and
the  EPC  was  consistent  with  the  other  member  states'  aim  at  combining
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scope  was  left  open  for  further rapprochement  between  the
Community and the EPC systems in the future. 
The goal of the EPC was to promote consultation and cooperation
between  member  states  in  international  affairs.  No  explicit  mention
was made of the goal of establishing a common foreign policy, and no
deadlines were  decided for  further progress in political  cooperation.9
The EPC was  deliberately  given a low-key character,  and its  launch
went relatively unnoticed to external observers.10 Even from a symbolic
point of view, no efforts were made to stress the signi:cance of the :rst
EPC ministerial meeting on November 19, 1970. Failures of previous
ambitious  attempts  at  political  integration  account  for  the  low-key
character assigned to the EPC endeavor:  the adoption of  a pragmatic,
incremental approach, and a focus on few speci:c issues were deemed
preferable to the launch of grand projects. 
Federalist governments and pressure groups criticized the apparent
lack of ambition of the EPC, as well as its intergovernmental character.
For instance, the Italian government argued that «le résultat atteint est
de  minime  importance  et  la  méthode  retenue  est  radicalement
impropre»11 and federalist actors downplayed the EPC as a mere «zone
de libre échange politique.»12 The fact was that the low-key pro:le of
the  EPC and its pragmatic character were necessary conditions for its
very establishment, given the extent of the divergence between member
states'  views of the :nal form of European political integration.13 The
EPC's character made it possible to avoid the outbreak of intractable
economic and political aspects of integration. 
9 D. Allen and W. Wallace, «European Political Cooperation: The historical and
contemporary background,» in  European Political Cooperation,  ed. D. Allen, R.
Rummel, and W. Wessels (London: Butterworth Scienti:c, 1982), p. 21. 
10 D.  Möckli,  European  Foreign  Policy  during  the  Cold  War.  Heath,  Brandt,
Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity  (London and New York: I.B. Tauris,
2009), p. 19. 
11 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur l'Italie et la  CPE, January 19, 1971, in
AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3784. See also M. E. Guasconi, «L'Italia e la via
europea alla pace (1969–1973),» in Guerra e pace nell'Italia del Novecento. Politica
estera, cultura politica e correnti dell'opinione pubblica, ed. L. Goglia, R. Moro, and
L. Nuti (Bologna: il Mulino, 2006), p. 589. 
12 Bulletin de  l'Agence Europe quoted  in Gainar,  Aux origines  de  la  diplomatie
européenne, p. 59.
13 W. Wessels, «European Political Cooperation: a new approach to European
foreign policy,» in  European Political Cooperation,  ed. D. Allen,  R. Rummel, and
W. Wessels (London: Butterworth Scienti:c, 1982), pp. 6–7, 17. 
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disputes  between  intergovernmentalists  and  federalists:  the  former
could be happy with the EPC as it stood, while the latter were given the
hope that political integration could evolve in a supranational direction
in the future.14
In principle, the EPC could deal with internal and external aspects
of  political  integration,  but  in  fact  it  dealt  only with cooperation in
international affairs.15 The choice of the  issues to be addressed  for  the
member  states'  consultation  and  cooperation  was  subject  to  the
agreement of all of them. Issues seen as too divisive and delicate, such
as  defense  matters,  were  avoided,  but  a  clear  will  was  present  to
address signi:cant political issues nevertheless. Accordingly, in its early
years the EPC addressed the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in  Europe, the EC’s relations with the US, the Middle East problems,
and so on.16 Over time, the range of  issues  addressed came to cover
most of the major issues in international affairs,  so that almost all the
political units within the foreign ministries came to be involved in the
EPC.
At the Paris Summit in October 1972  the EC leaders hinted at  the
possibility of a partial rapprochement between the Community and the
EPC  systems,  but  no  substantial consequence  followed. In  fact,  the
separation between  Community and EPC was further stressed  by the
second  report  on  the  EPC,  which  was  approved  by  the  foreign
ministers  in  July  1973.17 The  workings  of  the  EPC  were  deemed
satisfactory  overall  and  only  a  handful  of  changes  were  decided.
Mutual  consultation  had  become  «almost  a  refex»  and contacts
between the  member states' foreign ministries were  occurring almost
on daily basis.18 Despite this progress, it was not always easy to move
14 Allen and Wallace, «European Political Cooperation,» pp. 21, 29. 
15 Gainar,  Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne, p. 86. A partial turn  in this
respect  occurred  in  1976,  when  the  EPC  discussed the  creation  of  a  single
European judiciary space (MAEF,  Europe occidentale, Note sur les initiatives
françaises dans le domaine de la CPE, September 27, 1979, in AMAEF, Affaires
politiques, CE, 4148). 
16 Angela Romano overstates her case when she claims that the promotion of
détente  in  Europe  was  the  main  task  of  the  EPC  («The  main  task  of  the
European Political Cooperation: Fostering détente in Europe,» in Perforating the
Iron Curtain. European Détente, Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War, 1965–
1985,  ed. P.  Villaume and O. A. Westad (Copenhagen:  Museum Tusculanum
Press, 2010)).
17 E. Blumenfeld (MEP), Projet de rapport sur la CPE, June 16, 1977, in AMAEF,
Affaires politiques, CE, 4148. 
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from the stage of mere consultation to the one of real cooperation.19 The
main change intervened in 1973 was in fact not institutional in nature,
but political: the British entry into the EC modi:ed the power balance
within  the  EPC,  provided  new  resources  for  the  EC’s  activity  in
international affairs, and it helped to direct increased attention to some
new issues dear to Britain. 
Different views on the evolution of political integration
In terms of institutions, a sharp distinction was established between
the  Community and  the  EPC.  But in terms of membership and long-
term goals, a close connection between them was established instead –
a  connection  which  has  tended  to  be  overlooked  by  most  of  the
historiography on the subject. The existence of both a distinction and a
connection between the Community and the EPC established a political
and institutional tension which  has lasted for decades.20 This tension
was due to member states’ different preferences on the relationship that
should  incur  between  the  Community  and  the  EPC.  In  turn,  such
different preferences were due to member states'  divergent views on
the  future  development of  political  integration  itself.  They  had
divergent views on the role that states should play, and on the best way
to defend and promote their  interests  in  international  affairs.  Could
delegation  to  supranational  institutions  be  more effective  than
intergovernmental  cooperation  in  this  respect?  Did  a  common
European interest in international affairs exist, complementing the mere
sum and concert of national interests? 
On  the  one  hand,  the  French  government  strongly  promoted  a
model of political integration based on intergovernmental cooperation.
18 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur cinq années de CPE, June 18, 1975, in
AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3785; Möckli, European Foreign Policy during the
Cold War, pp. 91–92; Gainar, Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne, p. 571. 
19 MAEF, Europe occidentale,  Note sur la CPE, January 7,  1972,  in AMAEF,
Affaires  politiques,  CE,  3791;  MAEF,  Europe  occidentale,  Note  sur  la  CPE,
March 28, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3784. 
20 It was the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 which merged the roles of the European
commissioner  for  external  relations  and  of  High  Representative  for  the
common foreign and security policy, and which established a single service of
external action. 
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Accordingly,  it  deemed  it  crucial  to  delimit  the  :elds  of  activity  of
Community institutions  and to preserve a sharp distinction between
them and the purely intergovernmental  instances of cooperation such
as the EPC. On the other hand, most of the other governments, the EC
Commission  and the  European Parliament  promoted  a  reduction  or
even the eradication of the separation between the Community and the
EPC.  Some  of  these  actors promoted  a  federal  model  of  political
integration,  while others were mostly concerned with enhancing the
overall  effectiveness  and  coherence  of  the  Community and  EPC
activities. 
The French government was attached to the vision of a «Europe des
États» which had been articulated by Charles De Gaulle. Member states
had  to  preserve  an  original  and  relevant  role:  federal  models  of
integration  were  opposed,  and the  establishment  of  a  European
confederation was  promoted instead,  with  a  government formed by
member states' representatives and which would be independent from
the European Parliament.21 Some supranational form of integration was
acceptable in delimited policy areas, but national governments had to
retain overall control over the process. Partners' supranationalism was
deemed illusory and utopian at best, or  else sheer demagogy. As the
French representative to the EC Étienne Burin des Roziers argued, «on
refuse de suivre les dogmatiques et les rêveurs en quête d'une Union
européenne destinée à demeurer le thème d'un exercice de style ou le
sujet de vaines et stériles controverses.»22 
According  to  France,  it  was  particularly  important  that  national
governments retained full control over foreign policy matters.23 France
opposed any rapprochement between  the  Community and  the  EPC,
seeking in fact to reduce the links between them as much as possible.24
It claimed that economic and political international issues were clearly
21 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur l'avenir institutionnel de la construction
européenne,  January  21,  1972,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires  politiques,  CE,  3771;  P.
Peltier  (French  delegation  to  the  EC),  Note  sur  l'UE,  February  27,  1974,  in
AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3771. 
22 É. Burin des Roziers (French permanent representative to the EC), Note sur
les préliminaires aux débats sur l'UE, February 27, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires
politiques, CE, 3771. 
23 M. Palliser (British permanent representative to the EC), Note on political
consultation, April 21, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1197; É. Burin des Roziers, Note
sur la CPE et le «renforcement» institutionnel de la CE, May 23, 1972, in AN,
AG 5(2), 89. 
24 P. Peltier, Note sur l'UE, February 27, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques,
CE, 3771. 
39
separate from each other  and there existed no «grey zone»  between
them requiring a concurrence of the Community and the EPC.25 France
argued  that  only  an intergovernmental  approach  could  make
cooperation on foreign policy matters possible, while the adoption of a
supranational approach would only spark endless ideological  debates
and  competence  struggles,  possibly  leading  to  the  abandonment of
political  cooperation  altogether.26 A  supranational approach  would
make it possible to reach agreement only on secondary issues, while it
would hinder the elaboration of a proper distinctive foreign policy for
the EC.27 
Italy  and  the  Benelux  countries  openly  envisaged  a  federal
evolution for  European  integration  instead,  mostly  because  of  their
political  culture and geopolitical  situation.28 A European government
with a supranational character should be established, the powers of the
European  Parliament  should  be  greatly  strengthened,  and a  single
framework  and  similar  procedures  should  be  in  place  for  all  the
instances  of  cooperation  between  member  states.  Accordingly,  the
separation between  the  Community and the  EPC  should be reduced,
25 É. Burin des Roziers, Note sur les velléités d'étendre à la politique étrangère
la compétence de la CEE, January 29,  1973,  in AN, AG 5(2),  1035;  F.  Puaux
(French political director), Note sur le deuxième rapport sur la CPE, May 29,
1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3795. A grey zone did exist, and the
economic and political directorates of the French foreign ministry waged turf
wars  concerning  their  competences  on  EC  matters  (M.  Osmont,  «Europe
politique versus Europe économique? Rivalités et répartition des roles dans les
dossiers européens entre la direction des Affaires politiques et la direction des
Affaires économiques et :nancières au Quai d'Orsay (1955–1974), in  Les deux
Europes, ed. M. Af:nito, G. Migani, and C. Wenkel (Bruxelles: P.I.E.–Peter Lang,
2009)). 
26 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur le secrétariat de la CPE, May 12, 1972,
in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3786. 
27 É. Burin des Roziers, Note sur les velléités d'étendre à la politique étrangère
la compétence de la CEE, January 29, 1973, in AN, AG 5(2), 1035. See also P.
Peltier, Note sur l'UE, February 27, 1974,  in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE,
3771.
28 MAEF,  Europe  occidentale,  Note  sur  les  aspects  institutionnels  de  la
construction européenne, June 12, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques,  RFA,
3003.  On  Italy's  position,  see  M.  Neri  Gualdesi,  «L'ancoraggio  dell'Italia
all'Europa: identità, politiche, alleanze,» in Nazione, interdipendenza, integrazione:
le relazioni internazionali dell'Italia (1917–1989), ed. F. Romero and A. Varsori, vol.
I  (Roma:  Carocci,  2005).  The  Benelux  countries'  wariness  towards
intergovernmental cooperation was mostly due to their relative weakness vis-à-
vis the bigger member states. 
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and the  EC Commission  should be  more  involved  in foreign policy
matters. It is hardly surprising that the Commission and the European
Parliament  also  envisaged  a  federal evolution  for European
integration.29 According to their view, the Commission would become a
sort  of  European  government  with  general  competence  and  the
Parliament would increase its role and powers. It is quite telling in this
respect  that  even  a  French  Gaullist  like the  Commission  President
François-Xavier Ortoli endorsed the Commission's demands.30 
The  German  government  broadly  shared  the  goal  of  a  federal
Europe as the :nal stage of integration.  It expressed its support to the
goal  of strengthening  the  European  Parliament,  to  a  more frequent
recourse to majority voting, and even to the drafting of a constitution
for  Europe.  However,  Germany  often  let  the  other  federalist
governments make most of the running – especially after Willy Brandt’s
departure from the chancellorship in 1974. Germany rather focused its
efforts on the promotion of functional progress in integration, focusing
in particular on the project of an Economic and Monetary Union. As far
as the Community–EPC relations were concerned, Germany constantly
demanded  to  loosen  the  sharp  distinction  between  them,  and  to
increase their links and coherence instead.31 
While sympathizing for a confederal evolution of the EC, during the
Heath government  Britain showed a limited interest in the debate on
supranationalism  and intergovernmentalism.  The  main  concern  it
expressed was  to  strengthen  the import  and  the  effectiveness  of the
EC's international activity in a pragmatic way.32 The separation between
the Community and the EPC was deemed very dysfunctional, since it
29 S. Mansholt, Letter to the president of the conference of the foreign ministers
of  the  member  states  and  of  the  adhering  states,  May  4,  1972,  in  AMAEF,
Affaires politiques, CE, 3791; D. Zampoli, «Verso una politica estera comune:
problemi  di  coordinamento  tra  i  lavori  della  Cooperazione  politica  e  della
Comunità negli anni Settanta,» in La Comunità europea e le relazioni esterne 1957–
1992, ed. A. Bitumi, G. D'Ottavio, and G. Laschi (Bologna: CLUEB, 2008). 
30 F.-X. Ortoli, Letter to Pompidou on the Copenhagen Summit, November 29,
1973, in AN, AG 5(2), 257. The handwritten remark by Pompidou was «Oh!
Oh!.» 
31 For  an  overview  on  the  German  position,  see B.  von  Staden  (German
political  director),  «Political  cooperation  in  the  European  Community,»  in
Aussenpolitik,  23 (2), 1972. See also MAEF, Europe centrale, Compte-rendu des
entretiens Schumann–Scheel, January 22, 1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques,
CE, 3784. 
32 E.  Heath,  The  Course  of  My Life.  An  Autobiography (London:  Bloomsbury
Reader, 2011) p. 382. 
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was very hard to de:ne and justify  a  separation between economic
international  issues  to  be  treated  by  the  former,  and  political
international issues to be treated by the latter.33 Third countries clearly
did not understand such a separation either, and they were sometimes
addressing the  EC  Commission  for  matters  falling under  the  EPC
competence instead.34 Britain’s desire to reduce the sharp Community–
EPC distinction  was  also  infuenced  by  its  administrative culture:
Britain was the only EC member state alongside Belgium whose foreign
ministry did not have separate political and economic divisions.35 In the
other member states, divisions were eager to preserve their respective
competences,  thus they  contributed  to  hinder  closer  coordination
between Community and EPC matters.  
According to the British government,  what  mattered  was the  EC's
international  activity  taken  overall. The  British wanted  a  single
institutional framework  for it, merging the  EPC  ministerial meetings
with the  meetings  of  the  Council  of  ministers  and creating a single
secretariat  to support their activities.36 Below the ministerial level the
distinction  between  Community and  EPC  could  remain,  since  its
working  was  deemed  satisfactory.37 A  rapprochement  between  the
33 M.  Palliser,  Note  on  political  consultation,  April  21,  1972,  in  NA,  FCO
30/1197; P. Cuvillier (French embassy in the UK), Note sur la Communauté et
la CPE, February 15, 1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3784. 
34 Representations  of  the  EC  member  states  at  the  UN,  Rapport  sur  la
coopération entre les Neuf lors de la 29ème session de l'Assemblée Générale,
March 1975, in NA, FCO 58/894;  H. da Fonseca-Wollheim (cabinet of Ortoli),
Note sur la visite de l'ambassadeur d'Egypte, October 29, 1975, in ACCE, BAC
25/1980 1896; J.-P. Jacqué, «La participation de la Communauté Economique
Européenne  aux  organisations  internationales  universelles,»  in  Annuaire
français de droit international, 21, 1975, p. 928. 
35 M.  D.  Butler  (FCO,  European  integration),  Note  on  the  EPC  machinery,
February  19,  1976,  in  NA,  FCO  98/166.  In  the  Foreign  Of:ce  there  was  a
department responsible for all the external questions of European integration,
regardless of their Community or EPC character (W. Wallace, «National inputs
into European Political Cooperation,» in  European Political Cooperation,  ed. D.
Allen, R. Rummel, and W. Wessels (London: Butterworth Scienti:c, 1982), p.
54). 
36 É.  Burin  des  Roziers,  Note  sur  la  demande  britannique  visant  à  porter
devant les instances communautaires les sujets qui relèvent de la CPE, January
17, 1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Grande-Bretagne, 356; M. Palliser, Note
on a Community foreign policy, March 27, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1654. 
37 J. O. Wright (FCO, Economic affairs), Note on a Community foreign policy,
March  14,  1973,  in  NA,  FCO  30/1654.  The  British  also  envisaged  regular
meetings between the member states' permanent representatives to the EC and
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Community and the  EPC would not only increase the effectiveness of
their  activity,  but  it  would  also  create  more  occasions  for  general
political debates within the EC itself. Indeed, Britain was eager to move
beyond  the  «juridisme  formaliste»  which  tended  to  dominate  the
Community  activities.38 With  the  change  in  government from
Conservative  to  Labour in  1974,  Britain continued  to  plead  for  a
pragmatic rapprochement between the Community and the EPC, but it
also adopted a much more negative attitude towards a possible federal
evolution of the EC. 
EC  member  states  held  different  conceptions  of  the  space  that
should be established at the EC level for cooperation in international
affairs.  The debate mostly concerned the size and features of  such a
space:  in  which  :elds  should  cooperation  occur?  How  should
cooperation unfold, and who should be in control of it? What should be
the  instruments  of  cooperation?  I  now  focus  on  two  signi:cant
instances of this debate, namely the discussions on the creation of an
EPC secretariat, and on the role that the EC Commission could play in
international  affairs.  These discussions shed light  on the preferences
held  by  the  member  states  on  some  fundamental  aspects  of  the
institutional  structure  for  the  EC's  international  activity,  and  in
particular  on  the  relationship  that  should  incur  between  the
Community and the EPC systems.   
The struggle on the location of the EPC secretariat
At the Paris Summit in 1972 the EC Commission proposed to move
the EPC into the Community framework.39 Such a move would have
enabled the Commission to get involved in the making of the EPC, and
it would have favored a reduction of the EPC institutional distinctness.
the political and economic directors of the member states' foreign ministries (M.
Palliser,  Note on a Community foreign policy,  March 27,  1973,  in  NA, FCO
30/1654). 
38 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur la Grande-Bretagne et la  CPE, May 8,
1973,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires  politiques,  Grande-Bretagne,  356;  MAEF,  Europe
occidentale, Note sur la Grande-Bretagne et la  CPE, June 15, 1976, in AMAEF,
Affaires politiques, Grande-Bretagne, 363. 
39 É. Burin des Roziers, Note sur la CPE et le «renforcement» institutionnel de
la Communauté, May 23, 1972, in AN, AG 5(2), 89. 
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The  Commission's  proposal  was  endorsed  by  most  of  the  member
states,  but  France  opposed it.  What  the  summit  participants  agreed
upon, was to let the EPC  institutions consider the external aspects of
the  Community policies  and to let  EPC and  Community institutions
communicate whenever  international  developments affected
Community policies.40 However,  in  the  following years  the  member
states disagreed on whether a narrow or a broad interpretation should
be given to these decisions, and new attempts to move the EPC closer
to the Community framework were frequently made.41 
In the run-up to the 1972 Paris Summit, the establishment of an EPC
secretariat was one of the most debated subjects. Its establishment was
expected to be one of the main outcomes of the summit, but it turned
out to be one of the main obstacles to the success of the summit itself.
The  proposal  to  establish  an  EPC  secretariat  was  launched  by  the
German government in  the fall  of  1971.42 The secretariat was to be  a
small standing  body charged  with  administrative  and  coordination
tasks. Since the presidency of the EPC moved from one member state to
another every six  months,  it  was  deemed  useful  to have a standing
body  able  to  give  technical support  to  the  new  presidents  and  to
increase continuity and smoothness in the EPC's activities. Indeed, the
increase of EPC activities imposed quite a considerable administrative
burden  upon  the  presidency,  which  was  especially  heavy  for  the
smaller member states. 
Member states largely agreed that a secretariat of this kind could be
useful.  Italy proposed  to  endow the secretariat  with  political
competences as well, but the other member states preferred for it to be
only  a  technical  body.43 However,  agreement on  the  traits  and
usefulness of the EPC secretariat was not matched by any agreement on
its location.  Bitter  disagreement on its  location :nally prevented the
very establishment of  the secretariat.  Given the limited role and the
low-key pro:le of the secretariat, the reasons for disagreement on its
location were purely political in  nature.  Concerns  relating to prestige
40 EC heads of state and government, Déclaration du sommet de Paris, October
21, 1972, in Bulletin des Communautés européennes, 10/1972. 
41 É. Burin des Roziers, Note sur les velléités d'étendre à la politique étrangère
la compétence de la CEE, January 29, 1973, in AN, AG 5(2), 1035. 
42 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur le développement de la CPE, January
28, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA, 3002. 
43 C. Arnaud (MAEF,  Europe), Note sur les conceptions italienne et française
sur le secrétariat de la  CPE, August 10, 1972,  in AMAEF, Affaires politiques,
CE, 3786. 
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were involved, since the future evolution of the EPC could gradually
turn the seat of its secretariat into «the political capital of Europe.»44
More importantly, the choice of the headquarters of the secretariat was
interpreted  as  a  choice  affecting the  very  lines  of  development  of
European political integration itself. 
The debate unfolded in such a way that the only considered choices
for the headquarters of the EPC secretariat were Paris or Brussels. The
case for Paris was strongly made by France, with a  remarkably direct
engagement  of  Pompidou  himself.  To  locate  the  secretariat  in  Paris
would  have  added prestige to the French capital, and it would  have
signaled the central  role  of  France  in  the  EC's international  activity.
Brussels should not have been chosen as seat of the secretariat in order
to preserve a sharp distinction between  the  Community and  the  EPC
activities.  Moreover,  the  French  government  deemed  it crucial  to
preserve  a  sharp  distinction  between the  EPC  and  the  political
consultations  carried  out  in  NATO,  whose  headquarters  were  in
Brussels.
Support for Brussels as seat of the EPC secretariat was expressed by
Germany, Britain, the Benelux countries and the EC Commission. To a
large extent, their goals were precisely the opposite of the French ones.
Apart  from  logistic  convenience,  placing  the  secretariat  in  Brussels
would  have  kept opportunities  open  for  the  development  of  closer
relations between Community and EPC in the future.45 The location of
the EPC secretariat in the same city as the NATO headquarters was not
seen  as  a  problem  but  as an  opportunity.  Moreover,  supporters  of
Brussels  were  particularly  wary  of  Paris  being  the  only  alternative
option: Luxembourg or even Rome  were occasionally mentioned, but
these options were never seriously discussed.
The purely political character of the divergence  on the location of
the EPC secretariat and its symbolic relevance hindered the outcome of
any compromise,  which  was  not  impossible  in  theory.  Scope  for
compromise could be found in the de:nition of the precise features and
functions  of  the  secretariat,  of  its  relations  with  the  Community
institutions, of the pro:le and nationality of its secretary-general, and
so  on.46 Some  member  states  were  ready  to  compromise  and  even
44 A. Rendell. «Site of political secretariat will be an important issue when Mr.
Heath and M. Pompidou meet,» in The Times, February 22, 1972. 
45 É. Burin des Roziers, Note sur les velléités de remise en cause de l’équilibre
institutionnel  de la Communauté à la  faveur du développement  de la  CPE,
March 30, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3784. 
45
Germany, Britain and Italy were among them.47 However,  France on
one side and the Benelux countries on the other side were unwilling to
yield, and the topic was :nally dropped from the summit agenda. 
Since the choice of the  headquarters of the EPC secretariat raised
very  delicate  and  seemingly  intractable  divergences  concerning  the
very  conception  of  European political integration  itself, the  project of
establishing an  EPC  secretariat  was  never  revived  in  the  following
years.  Pompidou's death in 1974 did not  soften the French position:
even  if  his  successor  Valéry  Giscard  d'Estaing  avoided  a  strong
personal involvement  in this  issue,  he could not consent  to Brussels
because  of  his  delicate  domestic  relations  with  the  Gaullists.  When
proposals were made to provide a dedicated supporting body to the
existing  EPC  institutions,  the  very  term  “secretariat”  was  carefully
avoided.  Because  of  the  sensitivity  of  the  matter,  the  main solution
envisaged  to  improve  the  coherence  and  ef:ciency  of  EPC  was  to
establish a sort of informal secretariat. Each EPC presidency was to be
assisted by some of:cials  of  the  foreign ministries  of  other  member
states, and this sort of secretariat was to be based in the capital city of
the member state temporarily holding the presidency.48  
Despite the problems that it posed, the absence of an EPC secretariat
came to be seen as having some positive aspects  as well. Its absence
was  praised,  for  instance,  because  it  forced  member  states'  foreign
ministries to cooperate very closely with each other in order to ensure
that EPC activities ran smoothly and consistently.49 Foreign ministries'
of:cials had to perform all the tasks that a secretariat would have done
on their behalf otherwise. For the French government, the absence of an
EPC secretariat was the lesser evil. If it was not possible to establish the
secretariat in Paris, then it was better not to have any secretariat at all,
even  if  that  implied  some more dif:culties  for  the EPC activities.  If
activities appeared too  complex to be  carried out in the absence of a
46 See for instance MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur le secrétariat de la CPE,
May 25, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3791. 
47 FCO, Working group on Europe, Paper on European political uni:cation,
October 26, 1971, in NA, FCO 49/356; R. A. Hibbert (British embassy in West
Germany),  Note on German views on the Summit,  August 14,  1972,  in  NA,
FCO 30/1205. 
48 F. Judd  (FCO, Minister of state),  Paper on the future development of  the
EPC,  1978,  in  NA,  FCO  98/401;  EPC  presidency,  «Non-paper»  sur
l’aménagement et le fonctionnement de la CPE, November 16, 1979, in AMAEF,
Affaires politiques, CE, 4146. 
49 Von Staden, «Political cooperation in the EC,» p. 132. 
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secretariat  supporting them, it  was preferable to reduce  the intensity
and ambition of the EPC activities rather than to establish a secretariat
making them feasible.50 
The struggle on the political role of the Commission
Much of the debate on the desirability of a rapprochement between
Community and EPC  institutions  concerned the role that  Community
institutions  should  play  in  the  EPC  activities.  The  problem  did  not
much concern the Council  of ministers, which was gradually brought
closer to the EPC ministerial meetings, and it did not much concern the
European  Parliament  either,  which  gained  the  possibility  of  posing
questions on EPC matters and remained rather marginal overall. It was
on the issue of the need to reduce the Commission's marginality in the
EPC,  or  on the need to  preserve it,  that  much of the debate  on the
institutional  structure for the EC's international  activity were focused.
Was the Commission to be a technical body acting as member states'
agent in the sole economic domains set by the EC treaties, or was it to
become a single European government with competences extending to
crucial political domains as well? 
Member  states'  preferences on  the  extent  of  the  Commission's
involvement in political issues largely mirrored their preferences on the
development  of  European  political  integration  itself.  Federalist
governments  stated  their  support  for a  heightening  of  the  political
pro:le of the Commission, even though none of them were very eager
to  devolve  actual  power  to  it.  The  main  opponent of  a  federal
evolution, namely the French government, was extremely active and
careful not to let the Commission's political role increase: as the French
put  it,  the  Commission  had  a  «vocation  essentiellement
administrative.»51 France tried to devalue the Commission's pro:le at a
symbolic  level  as  well,  either  through  protocol  choices  or  linguistic
devices. For instance, the French proposed to call “commissions” all the
technical bodies that should support member states' intergovernmental
cooperation  in  different  :elds:  in  such  a  way the  EC  Commission
50 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur le développement de la CPE, May 10,
1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3785. 
51 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur les premières réfexions sur le Rapport
Tindemans, January 9, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3773. 
47
would  become simply  one  among many  technical  bodies  assisting
national governments.52 
One strategy available  to member states to strengthen the political
pro:le of  the Commission was to  appoint strong commissioners.  As
long as the Commission was formed by rather obscure :gures, it was
hard for it to acquire much political weight. For this reason, in 1973 the
British government appointed Christopher Soames  as commissioner.53
Soames was the son-in-law of Winston Churchill and a potential leader
of  the  Conservative  party.  Britain  ensured the  external  relations
portfolio  for  him,  showing the  importance  that  it  attached  to  the
involvement of the Commission in international affairs. Conversely, the
French  government  deliberately  tried  to  counter  the  Commission's
politicization by appointing a rather low pro:le commissioner, Claude
Cheysson,  who  had a  merely  technical  background.54 In  order  to
increase  the political  pro:le  of  the  Commission,  attempts  were  also
made  to  turn  its  representation  of:ces  in  third  countries  into  what
would resemble EC embassies. For instance,  in 1973 it was Jens Otto
Krag, Prime Minister of Denmark until  just a few months earlier,  who
was  appointed head  of  the  Commission's  representation  of:ce  in
Washington.55 
Despite  the  real  possibility  of  recurring  to  these  expedients,  the
main contribution to the increase of the political role of the Commission
would  clearly  come  from  an expansion  of  its  competences.  The
Commission asked to be involved in all the EC activities and not only
in the Community ones.  To this end, the Commission always  insisted
participating in the summit meetings where national leaders discussed
the general lines of the EC's development and of the EC's international
activity,  such  as  at  The  Hague,  Paris  and  Copenhagen  summits.
According to the Commission, its  participation in such meetings  was
important even when Community policies were not directly discussed,
in order to ensure coherence and consistence to the overall EC's activity.
Despite  initial  French  resistance,  it  became  customary  for  the
52 P. Peltier, Note sur l'UE, February 27, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques,
CE, 3771. 
53 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur la RFA et la  CPE, January 9, 1973, in
AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA, 3004; Heath, The Course of My Life, p. 384. 
54 É. Burin des Roziers, Note sur la CPE et le «renforcement» institutionnel de
la Communauté, May 23, 1972, in AN, AG 5(2), 89. Ironically, Cheysson turned
out to interpret his role in a very political way. 
55 É. Burin des Roziers, Note sur la nomination de Krag, September 28, 1973, in
AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Danemark, 3211. 
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Commission's president to join member states' leaders in their summit
meetings and in the European Council. 
Within  a few  years  of the  creation  of  the  EPC,  the  Commission
managed to be associated with most of the its activities. According to a
Council  decision of December 1976, the Commission was to  join the
EPC  working  groups  only  for  the  matters  directly concerning  it.
However,  when  the  EPC presidency  was  held  by  states  other  than
France the Commission was usually invited to attend the EPC meetings
for all the agenda items, since its participation was deemed convenient
and useful in order to assert the Commission's role.56 The Commission
was  also  associated  with  the  EPC  coordination  of  member  states'
positions  in international  conferences,  and  it  took  part  in  the
conferences themselves for the matters falling within its competence.
For instance, the Commission was directly involved in the Conference
on  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe,  and in  the  Conference  on
International Economic Cooperation. Its presence combined rather than
substituted the presence of the EC member states,  which were  either
individually represented or represented by the president of the Council.
In most cases, EC delegations to international conferences were jointly
presided by the Commission and by the Council.
Some of  the  strongest  debates  on the  role  of  the  Commission in
international affairs  concerned its participation in the summits of the
main industrialized countries (the so-called “G7 summits”) which were
regularly  organized from 1974. For both its own ambitions and under
the pressure of small EC member states, the Commission asked to be
invited to the summits. It argued that it was important that the EC as
such  could  discuss  matters  of  general  interest,  such  as  the  global
economic situation, especially given the  Community's  competences in
economic matters. The British government was lukewarm towards the
Commission's  participation,  and  the French  government  strongly
opposed it.57 According to the French, the summits were mere informal
meetings between a handful of countries:  the Commission could not
expect to be associated with all the member states' external relations.58
The  Commission  and  the  small  EC  member  states  obtained  a
56 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur la présence de la Commission dans les
groupes d'experts de la  CPE, August 27, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques,
CE, 4146; MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur la présence de la Commission
lors des réunions de CPE, September 22, 1978, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques,
CE, 4146. 
57 British report on the European Council, March 25, 1977, in NA, FCO 98/291;
D. Owen, Note on Community representation at economic summits, September
1977, in NA, FCO 98/294.
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representation  of  the  Commission to  the  summits  for the matters
touching  Community competences,  and the  provision of  information
on the summit activities to all the member states. 
The Commission sometimes took initiatives in  international affairs
that appeared too political in character to the member states. Initiatives
were not dramatic in scope: the attention that they sparked was mainly
due  to  their  possible  implications  for the  development  of  the
Commission's role in the long-term. Not surprisingly, it was the French
government which was  particularly  sensitive to  these initiatives. For
instance, in 1979 the President of the EC Commission Roy Jenkins was
criticized  for  receiving some  Arab  ambassadors  and  discussing the
Camp David agreements with them, while the EC commissioner for
development  Claude  Cheysson was criticized for his  decision to  meet
the  Sahrawi liberation movement Polisario  without consulting the EC
member states.59 Cheysson sparked particularly strong French protests
when he decided by himself to express the Commission's support to the
leader  of  the  Zimbabwe  African  People's  Union  in  1979,  therefore
openly taking a side in the extremely complex Rhodesian crisis.60 As a
reaction to the protests of the member states, the Commission claimed
that it was a  «political body»  which was entitled to act  whenever an
event occurring in a third country deserved it.61 
Struggles on the extent  of involvement of the Commission in the
EC's international activity were indicative of one fundamental tension
underlying  the  entire  institutional  evolution  of  the  EC,  namely  the
tension  between  short-term  and  long-term  perspectives.  As  far  as
possible innovations were framed in a short-term perspective, member
states  could  often  :nd  an  agreement  about  them  quite  easily.  For
instance,  little harm could be expected from the participation of  the
President of the Commission in meeting of the EC heads of state and
government. What was often troublesome, was for member states to
58 V.  Giscard  d'Estaing,  Letter  to  Roy  Jenkins,  March  23,  1977,  in  AMAEF,
Affaires politiques, CE, 4086. 
59 MAEF,  Europe  occidentale,  Fiche  sur  les  initiatives  diplomatiques  de  la
Commission,  May  7,  1979,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires  politiques,  CE,  4146;  J.-M.
Merillon  (French  ambassador  to  Algeria),  Note  sur  le  séjour  à  Alger  de
Cheysson, October 18, 1979, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 4146. 
60 MAEF, Affaires africaines et malgaches, Note sur le message de Cheysson à
N'komo, May 7, 1979, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 4146. 
61 Spokesperson of the EC Commission, Statement to the press on the telegram
sent  by  Cheysson  to  N'komo,  April  30,  1979,  in  Historical  Archives  of  the
European Union [HAEU], EN 294. 
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agree on institutional changes when they were framed in a long-term
perspective.  In  this  case  even  small  changes  were  assigned  strong
political signi:cance. Not only would they constitute a precedent, but
they  were  also  regarded  as  indicating  whether  European  political
integration  would  move  in  a  federal  or  confederal  direction.  Given
member states'  divergent  preferences on the  :nal  form of  European
integration, whenever institutional changes were framed in a long-term
perspective member states were often only able to agree upon vague
compromises  about  them.  Because  of  the  vagueness  of  such
compromises,  tensions  between  member  states  would  resurface
whenever it was necessary to turn general compromises into speci:c
and concrete decisions. 
Bridging the gap: the creation of the European Council
The  establishment  of  the  EPC  system  of  political  cooperation
widened the range of the EC's international activity well beyond the set
of external trade and development policies of the Community, making
it  much  more  explicitly  political  in  character.  Despite  such  a
strengthening, the EC's international activity continued to be affected
by  problems  of  fragmented  competences,  insuf:cient  coherence,
unclear general vision, and vague :nal goals. Around the mid-1970s,
refections  on  how  to  tackle  these  problems  contributed  to  the
establishment  of  the  European  Council,  to  the  elaboration  of  a  few
projects for the establishment of a European Union encompassing all
the  dimensions  of  European  integration,  and to  an  evolution  in  the
customs and workings of the existing EC and EPC institutions. 
During the 1970s  the  Community's external  policies  continued to
focus mostly on external trade. A 1970 sentence of the Court of Justice
of the EC had ruled that Community institutions were entitled to act on
all the external matters connected to the internal matters on which the
Community was  competent,  yet  member  states  gave  a  restrictive
interpretation to  this ruling.62 Even if  the Community took  signi:cant
initiatives  on international trade matters,  it was unable to act in  other
:elds  of  international  affairs  which  were  important for  its  internal
development.  It was  particularly the establishment of the EPC  which
62 P. Taylor, «The European Communities as an actor in international society,»
in Journal of European Integration, 6 (1), 1982, p. 12. 
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led to a considerable widening of the range of international activity of
the EC overall considered during the 1970s. What remained insuf:cient
was  the  coordination  between  the  different  instances  of  the  EC's
international activity, and especially the clarity of the general political
vision underlying them. 
The  insuf:cient  strength  and  clarity  of  the  political  vision
underlying the  EC's  international  activity were particularly  felt at  a
time of serious economic and political  crisis  like the  one  which had
begun in the early 1970s. In the midst of the crisis, the Commission was
unable to assume a leading propulsive role because of member states'
disagreement  on  the  function and  character  that the  Commission
should have.  Also  the  Council  of  ministers  found it  hard  to  play a
propulsive  role  because  of  its structure  and  its  weak leadership.63
Starting from 1969,  the member states' heads of state and government
had  begun to  meet more frequently  than in the past.64 However, their
summits were called as exceptional events on an ad hoc basis. In order
to give new impetus to European integration, and  provide  a clearer
political  direction  to  the  activity  of  the  EC,  in  September 1973
Pompidou proposed to convene summit meetings on a regular basis. 
It was at the Paris Summit in December 1974 that the member states
agreed upon the creation of the European Council.65 Heads of state and
government were now to meet three times a year. In order to preserve
the light  structure  and  informal  character  of  the  European  Council,
leaders decided against giving the Council a formal legal basis. Leaders
would  provide  a  general  orientation  to  the  EC's  activity  and
development, enhancing  its coherence and dynamism. The European
Council  was  meant  to promote an  overall  re-launch  of  European
integration, in particular in its political dimension.66 As far as the EC's
63 E. Mourlon-Druol, «Filling the EEC leadership vacuum? The creation of the
European Council in 1974,» in Cold War History, 10 (3), 2010, pp. 317–318. 
64 During the 1958–68 period, the only summits held were the summits in Paris
and Bonn in 1961 and the Rome Summit in 1967. 
65 On the creation of the European Council, see  Mourlon-Druol, «Filling the
EEC  leadership  vacuum?.»  Maria  Gainar's account  overestimates  the role
played by Jean Monnet (Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne, pp. 307–316). 
66 E.  Mourlon-Druol,  «Regional  integration  and  global  governance:  The
example of the European Council (1974–1986),» in Les cahiers Irice, 9 (1), 2012, p.
94.  According to the initial French conception,  the European Council should
only deal with foreign policy and EPC matters and «contribute to the resolution
of world issues» (Pompidou quoted in A. É. Gfeller, «A European voice in the
Arab world: France, the superpowers and the Middle  East, 1970–74,» in  Cold
War History,  11 (4), 2011,  p. 663; see also Gainar,  Aux origines de la diplomatie
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international  activity  was  concerned,  the  European  Council  was
assigned the task of ensuring «progress and overall consistency in the
activities  of  the  Communities  and  in  the  work  on  political  co-
operation.»67 Being  the  only  instance  where  it  was  possible  to  treat
Community and EPC matters  together, the European Council  would
provide impulse and direction to the EC's international activity and it
would act as EC's spokesperson on the international stage.68 
The establishment of the European Council was «la mesure la plus
importante qui ait été prise pour l'Europe depuis la signature du traité
de  Rome.»69 France  played  a  fundamental  role  in  promoting  the
creation  of the  European  Council. Even  if  its  structure  was  clearly
intergovernmental in nature, member states could reach an agreement
on  its  creation  since  the  Council  was  to  complement the  existing
Community institutions, rather than challenge  them.70 The creation  of
the  Council  did  not  seek to  force  a  turn  of  the  EC in  a  confederal
direction,  even  if  it  did  favor  such  a  path.71 In  fact,  federalist
governments made some attempts to bring the European Council into
the Community framework, conceiving it as a sort of special form of
the Council of ministers, but these attempts failed.
The  creation  of  the  European Council  helped  to  reduce  the  gap
between the Community and the EPC activities. Following the creation
of the Council, a few more innovations intervened, reducing such a gap
throughout the second half of the 1970s.  Most of them occurred only
through a silent evolution of customs rather than through the adoption
of  formal  explicit  decisions  by  the  member  states.  For  instance,  the
participation of the Commission in the European Council went without
saying.  Not  only  was  the  Commission  taking part  in  most EPC
activities,  but it started also to perform some administrative functions
européenne, pp. 310–312). 
67 EC heads of state and government, Final communiqué of the Paris Summit,
December 10, 1974, available on <http://www.cvce.eu/obj/:nal_communique
_of_the_paris_summit_9_and_10_december_1974-en-2acd8532-b271-49ed-bf63-
bd8131180d6b.html>. 
68 Mourlon-Druol, «Regional integration and global governance,» p. 98; Gainar,
Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne, pp. 334–336. 
69 J. Monnet quoted in V. Giscard d'Estaing, Intervention, in Les années Giscard.
Valéry Giscard d'Estaing et l'Europe 1974–1981,  ed. S. Berstein and J.–F. Sirinelli
(Paris: Armand Colin, 2006), p. 141. See also  Mourlon-Druol, «Filling the EEC
leadership vacuum?,» p. 316. 
70 Mourlon-Druol, «Filling the EEC leadership vacuum?,» p. 320. 
71 Mourlon-Druol, «Regional integration and global governance,» p. 95. 
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in them.72 Even the European Parliament managed to gain some control
over the  EPC:  by  1978,  one  third  of  the  questions  posed  by  MEPs
during the question time concerned EPC matters.73 
The difference between Community and EPC meetings was less and
less stressed at the ministerial level and even at the lower levels, «thus
breaking  a  taboo  that  was  negatively  affecting  the  actorness  of  the
EC.»74 Member states had already agreed not to replicate the infamous
format  employed  during  the  Danish  presidency  in  1973,  when  the
foreign ministers met in Copenhagen in the EPC framework, and then
they  all  moved  to  Brussels  to  discuss  matters  in  the  Community
framework few hours later.75 At the Paris Summit in 1974 the heads of
state  and  government explicitly  agreed  that  ministers  could  hold
Council  and EPC meetings at the same time. Joint Council  and EPC
meetings became standard practice  in the following years. Sometimes
ministers  discussed  Community  and  EPC  matters in  sequence,
sometimes they discussed  Community and EPC aspects of a speci:c
issue at the same time. 
Bridging the gap: the project of the European Union
The European Council was the only EC institution which could treat
Community and EPC matters together. However, at the Paris Summit
in October 1972, the heads of state and government had approved the
72 See for instance MAEF, Affaires politiques, Note sur le dialogue euro-arabe,
December  16,  1975,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires  politiques,  CE,  3808.  According  to
Gianni  Bonvicini,  objections  to  the  Commission's association  to  the  EPC
decreased  because  of  the  successful  performance  of  the  Commission  at  the
CSCE  («The  dual  structure  of  EPC and  Community  activities:  problems  of
coordination,» in European Political Cooperation, ed. D. Allen, R. Rummel, and W.
Wessels (London: Butterworth Scienti:c, 1982), p. 37). 
73 MAEF,  Europe  occidentale,  Note  sur  l'Assemblée  européenne  et  la  CPE,
December 28, 1978, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 4146. 
74 D. Allen and A. Hauri, «The Euro-Arab  dialogue, the Venice Declaration,
and  beyond:  The  limits  of  a  distinct  EC  policy,  1974–1989,»  in  European–
American Relations and the Middle East: From Suez to Iraq, ed. D. Möckli and V.
Mauer (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 95. See also MAEF, Europe
occidentale, Note sur cinq années de  CPE, June 18, 1975, in AMAEF, Affaires
politiques, CE, 3785. 
75 Gainar, Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne, p. 339. 
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project  of  the  creation  of  a  European Union  by 1980.  The European
Union should encompass «l’ensemble de leurs relations,» that is to say
both the economic and  the  political  dimensions of  integration.76 The
Belgian  Prime  Minister  Léo  Tindemans  was  assigned  the  task  of
drafting  a  report  on  the  features that  the  EU should  have,  and  he
handed in his report  in December 1975.77 In sketching the traits of the
EU,  Tindemans  adopted  a  pragmatic  approach,  deliberately  putting
forward  limited  but  feasible proposals  rather  than  ambitious  but
utopian visions: it was «l'Europe du possible plutôt qu'une Europe du
souhaitable.»78 The Tindemans Report was overall well received by the
member states both for its  limited ambitions and for the satisfactory
balance  that  it  struck between  their  different  preferences  on  the
development of European integration, so that there was «something for
everyone.»79 
Tindemans let the general  traits of the EU be rather unde:ned:  the
EU should imply qualitative progress in integration, but it would only
constitute one  step  towards  a  further : nal  stage  of  integration,
«l'objectif ultime étant estompé dans les brumes.»80 Even the calendar
for the establishment of the EU was let unde:ned, with the dropping of
the  goal  of  1980  from the  Report.  In  terms  of  institutional  change,
Tindemans  proposed  an  overall  strengthening  of  the  existing
institutions: the European Council would be formalized, and the role of
the President of the Commission would be strengthened. The powers of
the European Parliament would be increased and the Parliament would
be involved in the process of the appointment of the Commission. Even
if  they  were  not  exclusively  federalist  in  inclination,  Tindemans's
institutional proposals did envisage a  move towards a parliamentary
model that could leave room open for a stronger federal turn of the EU
in the future.  For  this  reason the  French government opposed these
76 EC heads of state and government, Déclaration du sommet de Paris, 1972.
77 L. Tindemans, Report on European Union, December 29, 1975, published in
Bulletin of the European Communities, supplement 1/1976. 
78 MAEF, Note sur le Rapport Tindemans, March 5, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires
politiques, CE, 3773. 
79 British embassy in Bonn, Note on the Tindemans Report, January 7, 1976, in
NA, FCO 98/165; D. Maitland (British permanent representative to the EC),
Note on the Tindemans Report, January 13, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/165; MAEF,
Note sur le Rapport Tindemans, March 5, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques,
CE, 3773. 
80 M. Jobert,  «Quelques  réfexions sur le  Rapport Tindemans,» in  Paradoxes,
March 1976. 
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institutional  proposals,  receiving  implicit  support  from  the  British
government as well.81  
As far as the EC's international activity was concerned, Tindemans
proposed  to  formalize  the  possibility  for  foreign  ministers  to  hold
Council  and  EPC  meetings  at  the  same  time,  so  to  mirror  at  the
ministerial level  what  occurred  at  the  level  of  heads  of  state  and
government with the European Council.82 More generally, Tindemans
proposed to allow Community institutions to discuss «all problems if
they are relevant to European interests.»83 Tindemans's proposals in this
respect were positively received by most of the governments, especially
the British and German ones, which had since long pressed to  reduce
the  arti:cial  Community–EPC divide.84 The  French government  was
open to  the  establishment  of greater  connections  between  the  two
dimensions,  but it  opposed  their formalization.85 The introduction of
some fexibility  in this respect  was possible,  but it  was important to
keep the Community–EPC distinction alive, since «plus on abolit  les
cloisons, plus la Commission est amenée ou a la faculté de prendre des
positions politiques.»86 
The  main  proposal  put  forward  by  Tindemans  on  the  EC's
international activity was to overcome the consensus procedure in the
making of the common external policies and possibly even of the EPC.87
Member states should legally commit  themselves to consulting each
other on any foreign policy issue, and they should politically commit
themselves  to  reaching  a  common  position.  If  no  consensus  was
present,  the  minority  should  rally  to  the  views  of  the  majority  –
81 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur les premières réfexions sur le Rapport
Tindemans, January 9, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3773;  MAEF,
Note sur le Rapport Tindemans, March 5, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques,
CE, 3773; MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur la Grande-Bretagne et le Rapport
Tindemans, June 14, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Grande-Bretagne, 363.
82 Tindemans, Report on European Union, 1975. 
83 Ibid. 
84 H. L. Davies (British embassy in West Germany), Note on German views on
the Tindemans Report, March 12, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/167. 
85 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur les premières réfexions sur le Rapport
Tindemans, January 9, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3773; MAEF,
Europe occidentale, Dossier sur le Rapport Tindemans, February 11, 1976, in
AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3773. 
86 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Dossier sur le Rapport Tindemans, February 11,
1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3773. 
87 Tindemans, Report on European Union, 1975. 
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provided that some escape clause could be invoked when fundamental
national interests were at stake. The rationale for the proposal was not
to  obliterate  sensitive  national  interests,  but  to  discourage member
states  from seeking «marginal national advantage over each  other.»88
Accordingly, Tindemans's proposal was merely presented as «a matter
of political common-sense.»89 
The  main  implicit  target  of  Tindemans's  proposal  for the
overcoming of  the  consensus procedure in foreign policy matters was
the French government, whose tendency to behave as  «cavalier seul»
on a number of issues  was  regarded as «a major thorn in the fesh of
political  cooperation.»90 Indeed,  the  strongest  opposition  to  the
Tindemans's  proposal  was  expressed  by  France.  The  proposal  was
deemed  to  be  unrealistic,  since it  would  in  fact  increase  the  risk  of
turning mere disagreements into deep ruptures, and it would lead to «a
Europe  with  a  minimal  [foreign]  policy  and  member  states  with
none.»91 France  often  held minority positions  on  a  number  of
international  issues,  therefore  it  risked  losing its  veto  power  if  the
Tindemans's proposal was accepted.92 The French foreign minister Jean
Sauvagnargues even stated that «the French government did not accept
the aim of a common foreign policy» altogether.93 
Even  if member  states  gave  an overall  positive  reception  to  the
Tindemans's  Report,  the  Report itself  was quite rapidly shelved.  The
goal of establishing a European Union by 1980 was not achieved, and
most of Tindemans's proposals were not implemented. In particular, as
far as the making of the external policies of the EC was concerned, no
signi:cant change was introduced in the second half of the 1970s. Few
formal  institutional  innovations were agreed:  it  was  only  with  the
88 FCO, European integration – external, Brief on the Tindemans Report, July
19, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/169. 
89 Ibid. 
90 R.  Cooper  (FCO,  European  integration  –  external),  Note  on  the  French
behavior within the Community, January 30, 1980, in NA, FCO 98/884. See also
R. Hibbert (British embassy in France), Note on the French attitude towards the
EPC, March 17, 1980, in NA, FCO 98/884. 
91 J. Sauvagnargues reported in FCO, Record of a discussion between foreign
ministers of the Nine on the Tindemans' Report,  May 31,  1976,  in NA, FCO
98/168.  See  also  MAEF,  Note  sur le  Rapport  Tindemans,  March 5,  1976,  in
AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3773.
92 Jobert, «Quelques réfexions sur le Rapport Tindemans.»
93 FCO, Record of a discussion between foreign ministers of the Nine on the
Tindemans' Report, May 31, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/168. 
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Single European Act in 1986 that some innovation was introduced, and
especially  with the Maastricht Treaty  in 1992 that the external activity
of  the  EC/EU  was  strengthened  and  some  connections  were
established between the political and the economic dimensions. 
The institutional structure for the EC's international activity
Until the late 1960s, the international activity  of the EC  was  very
limited, fragmented, and lacking in ambition. What happened during
the :rst half of the 1970s, was a remarkable expansion of the number of
:elds of international affairs in which EC member states cooperated; a
creation  of  institutional  instances  where  coherence  between  the
different activities of the EC in international affairs could be promoted;
a  considerable  increase in  the  ambition  and  vision  of  the  EC's
international  activity.  From  an  institutional  point  of  view,  the  most
signi:cant  developments occurred in this period  were the creation of
the  European  Political  Cooperation in  1970  and  the  creation  of  the
European Council in 1974.  As a result of these developments, the EC
was now able to act in most :elds of international affairs. 
Even if the EC  was  established as a distinct international actor,  its
member states did not cease to have a foreign policy of their own. The
establishment of the EC as an international actor merely added a new
dimension  to the  member states' activity in international affairs:  they
retained their  ability to act autonomously in international affairs, but
they were now able to take advantage of the EC dimension as well. The
EC  dimension  did  put  some  constraints  on  the  member  states  by
forcing  them  to  agree  on  common  policies  in  some  cases,  and  by
inviting them to coordinate their positions in other cases. However, the
EC  dimension  offered  also  increased  opportunities  to  the  member
states. For instance, states could use the EC to strengthen and multiply
the impact of their own policies.94 On the contrary, they could use the
EC dimension  of  international  activity  to  conceal  their  positions  on
delicate matters.95
94 One of the clearest instances of this strategy was France's attempt at making
the EC endorse and adopt its Arab policy (Gfeller, «A European voice in the
Arab world»). 
95 Wessels, «EPC: a new approach to European foreign policy,» p. 12. 
58
Since the EPC and the European Council had an intergovernmental
character,  member  states  retained  a  particularly  strong  role  in  the
making of the EC's international activity. As a result, most of the EC's
international  activity  was  decided  through intergovernmental
cooperation. The intergovernmental turn of European integration in the
1970s  was  clearly  very signi:cant, but  it  should  nonetheless  not  be
overestimated.  The distinction  between  the  Community  and  EPC
aspects of the EC's international activity was important, but it was not
extremely neat. In fact, the Community and EPC were linked by strong
political ties and by some institutional ones too. Despite the major role
played by the member states, the EC's international activity was not a
mere  sum  of  national wills.  Once  positions  and policies were
elaborated, they were presented as positions and policies of the EC as a
whole.  They  became embedded in  an  EC discourse,  were  linked  to
other EC policies, and were regarded as EC policies by third countries:
to a certain extent  they acquired a logic  of their own,  escaping close
member states' control. 
In  this  chapter  I  have  shown  that  the  design  of  the  institutional
structure for the EC's international activity was very much connected to
and  infuenced  by  the  debate  on  the  form  that  further  political
integration should take in the future. To a large extent, debates on the
headquarters of the EPC secretariat, on the political initiatives of the EC
Commission, and on the relations between Community and EPC, were
proxies for  more  fundamental  debates.  Since  member  states  held
divergent  preferences on  the  :nal  form of  European  political
integration, the institutional structure for the EC's international activity
was  largely the  result  of  compromises.  The ambiguity  and faws of
some of  its  aspects  were  clearly  due to the  impossibility  to reach a
de:nitive  agreement  on  the  form  that  future  political  integration
should take. Such limits and faws of the institutional structure  posed
some obstacles for the development of the EC's international activity,
but  at  the  same  time  they  were  probably  unavoidable  for  its very
launch.
The design of the traits of the EC institutions was largely regarded
as indicative of the :nal form that European integration would take.
For  this  reason,  member  states'  positions  on  the  former  were  often
infuenced by their positions on the latter. Member states' positions on
the :nal form of European integration were often meant to appeal to
domestic political elites and public opinion. For this reason, they were
sometimes  strongly  rhetoric  in  nature.  For  instance,  the  French
government could not depart excessively from the Gaullist  vision of
integration, while the governments of Italy and the Benelux countries
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could  not  depart  from  the  federalist  orthodoxy.  While  governments
were  ready  to  make  compromises  on  punctual  aspects  of  the
institutional design, they were also required to uphold the dominant
national  conception  of  European  integration.  For  this  reason,
compromises were harder to reach whenever symbols were at stake, or
whenever the issue was subject to public scrutiny, such as during the
discussion  on  the  headquarters  of  the  EPC  secretariat,  or  on  the
admission of the EC Commission to the G7 meetings. 
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Chapter 2 
Enabling the EC to Speak with a 
Single Voice
During the 1970s, the EC member states established institutions and
mechanisms  designed  to  elaborate  coordinated  positions  on  many
international  issues.  A logical  complement  to  this  process  was  the
establishment of a set of institutions and mechanisms which were to be
used for the expression of the common positions that were elaborated.
To this end, during the 1970s the Community as such established direct
diplomatic relations with more than a hundred countries, and it entered
dozens of international organizations. Common EC views started to be
expressed to third countries and at the UN, and the EC member states
started  to  release  common  statements  on  many  international  issues.
These developments were meant to show that the EC was becoming a
distinct global player, and that the EC member states were building a
common foreign policy. It is upon these developments that I focus in
this chapter.
Since  the  international  activity of  the  Community  was separated
from  that of  the EC member  states  acting through the  EPC and the
European Council, I analyze them separately. As far as the Community
is concerned, I look at the means available for it to speak and act on the
international  stage,  such  as  its  participation  in  international
organizations,  the  establishment  of  direct  diplomatic  relations  with
third countries, and its admission to the UN General Assembly. As far
as member states are concerned, I look at the means available to the
EPC and to the European Council  in  order to speak and act  on the
international  stage,  such  as  the  release  of  common  statements,  the
performance of common démarches, and the pursuit of voting cohesion
at the UN. Finally, I consider an attempt which was made to bridge the
gap between the expression of a single voice by the Community and by
the  member  states,  namely  the  establishment  of  common  European
embassies in third countries. 
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I  show that  during the  1970s the  EC  was  endowed with  quite  a
striking set of means for the expression of a single voice in international
affairs. Such a development was clearly perceived by third countries,
which came to regard the EC as an international actor in itself. In fact,
the  available means would have made it possible for the EC to speak
with a single voice more often than it  actually  happened.  Most third
countries  would  have  favored  such  a  development,  but  the  main
obstacle  to the  full  usage of the means  available  to the EC was the
wariness of its own member states. The source of such a wariness was
the member states'  willingness to retain autonomy for  their  national
foreign  policies,  and  their  different  preferences  for  the  evolution  of
European political integration. As far as the long-term goal of political
integration  was  concerned,  member  states  tended  to  con:rm  their
support  of  it,  but  their  actual  behavior  indicated that  some of  their
pledges were only rhetorical in nature. 
The Community speaking with a single voice
Even  though the  EPC was  established in  1970,  it  produced little
visible output until 1973. Works mainly focused on the design of the
structures and procedures of the EPC itself, while works on substance
matters were quite slow until the Paris Summit and the entry of Britain
into the EC. The EPC was initiated with prudence, and member states
initially focused on mutual consultation and information rather than on
the  elaboration  of  common  positions  to  project  outside.  As  a
consequence, until 1973 the expression of EC's positions in international
affairs was mainly carried out by the Community. The means available
to the Community to this end were its  participation to international
organizations  and  conferences,  and  the  establishment  of  direct
diplomatic  contacts  with  third  countries.  Community  views  were
expressed  either  by  the  EC Commission  or  by  the  president  of  the
Council of ministers. 
During the 1950s and 1960s  the Community had been associated
with an increasing number of international organizations. In particular,
it had been associated with specialized bodies and agencies of the UN,
such as GATT, the UN Economic and Social Council and its regional
commissions,  the  UN Conference for  Trade and Development,  FAO,
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ILO, UNIDO, and so on.1 In most cases the Community was initially
invited to attend meetings as a guest,  and over time it was formally
admitted as an observer on a permanent basis.2 The Community was
also  associated  with  the  UN  activities  for  the  second  development
decade,  and  with  the  international  conferences  on  primary  goods
organized by the UN. Its association  with international organizations
often  occurred  along  with  the  association  of  other  regional
organizations,  and it was directly linked to  the competences  detained
by the  Community in :elds  such as external  trade and development
cooperation. To a great extent it was the EC Commission which was
responsible for  these  matters:  because of  this,  in  December 1970 the
Commission spoke for the :rst time on behalf of the EC in a UN body. 
The increasing participation of the Community  in the activities of
international organizations favored the establishment of direct relations
between the Community and other main actors involved in them. Until
the early 1970s, the Community had no representation of:ces in third
countries (except for the of:ce in London, which was active before the
British entry). The only representation of:ces of the Community were
the ones at international  organizations,  such as those in Paris at  the
OECD  and  UNESCO,  in  Geneva  at  the  international  organizations
based there, and in Santiago del Chile for relations with Latin America
as  a  whole.3 During the  1970s,  of:ces  at  international  organizations
were  created  also  in  New  York,  Vienna  and  Bangkok.4 The  :rst
1 FCO, Note on the status of the EEC in UN bodies, February 2, 1973, in NA,
FCO 61/1136. 
2 For the different patterns of the EC's admission to international organizations,
see  E.  Grillo  Pasquarelli,  «La  participation  de  la  Communauté  Economique
Européenne  aux  accords  multilatéraux,»  in  La  Communauté  Economique
Européenne  dans  les  relations  internationales (Nancy:  Centre  européen
universitaire,  1972),  pp.  181–182; J.-P.  Jacqué,  «La  participation  de  la
Communauté  économique  européenne aux  organisations  internationales
universelles,» in Annuaire français de droit international, 21, 1975, pp. 927–928. 
3 In  1978  the  headquarters  of  the  EC  delegation  to  Latin  America  were
transferred from Santiago to Caracas. 
4 EC Commission, Note on Haferkamp's visit to Venezuela, March 15, 1978, in
ACCE,  BAC  48/1984  20;  British  delegation  to  the  EC,  Note  on  the
Commission's external representation, September 25, 1978, in NA, FCO 98/393;
EC  Commission,  Note  d'information  sur  les  travaux  en  matière  de
représentation extérieure, November 14, 1979, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques,
CE, 4144;  L. J.  Brinkhorst, «Permanent missions of the EC in third countries:
European diplomacy in the making,» in  Legal Issues of European Integration,  10
(1), 1984, pp. 24–25; G. Bossuat and A. Legendre, «Il ruolo della Commissione
nelle  relazioni  esterne,»  in  La  Commissione  europea:  storia  e  memorie  di
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representation  of:ce  of  the  Community  in  a  third  country  was  the
representation of the EC Commission to the US, which was established
in 1971. Other of:ces at a third country's government were established
in Tokyo in 1974 and in Ottawa in 1976. 
It  was not  by chance that  the :rst  Community's  of:ce in a third
country was the one in Washington. The US had been among the :rst
countries to establish direct contacts with the Community, and it had
played  an  important  role  in  the  very  early  phases  of  European
integration. Relations with the EC member states were very deep, and
relations with the Community were very close and frequent, especially
on  trade  matters.  Community  of:cials  regularly  visited  Washington
and they regularly consulted with American of:cials on a wide range
of  issues.  In  terms  of  formal  recognition  of  the  Community,  the
Community's  mission in  Washington was given diplomatic  status  in
1972.  In  1971  US–Community  relations  were  established  at  the
parliamentary  level  too,  with  the  organization  of  regular  meetings
between members of the Congress and of the European Parliament.5
Besides  the  representation  of:ces  of  the  Commission  in  third
countries and the Community's missions at international organizations,
during the 1970s the EC Commission ensured direct contacts with third
countries  by  establishing  press  and  information  of:ces  in  Ankara,
Madrid  and Lisbon.  Moreover,  the  Commission  was  represented  by
some residing delegates in all the developing countries associated with
the Community, that is to say most Mediterranean countries, almost all
the  African  ones,  and  a  few  countries  in  the  Caribbean  and in  the
Paci:c. By the end of the 1970s the Commission had delegates in 47
developing countries.6 Commission's delegates in associated countries
were  meant  to  perform  technical  tasks  concerning  development
projects,  but  de  facto they represented the  Community in  their  host
country and they enjoyed quasi-diplomatic status.7 
un'istituzione, a cura di M. Dumoulin (Lussemburgo: Uf:cio delle pubblicazioni
uf:ciali delle Comunità europee, 2007), p. 359.  In the early 1980s of:ces  were
opened in Belgrade, Brasilia, Mexico City, and Canberra as well. 
5 M.  Schulz  and  T. A. Schwartz, «Introduction,» in  The Strained Alliance. US–
European  Relations  from  Nixon  to  Carter, ed.  M.  Schulz  and  T.  A.  Schwartz
(Cambridge  and  Washington:  Cambridge  University  Press  and  German
Historical Institute, 2010), p. 13. 
6 M.  Bruter,  «Diplomacy  without  a  state:  the  external  delegations  of  the
European Commission,» in Journal of European Public Policy, 6 (2), 1999, p. 184. 
7 On the pro:le and functions of  the Commission's delegates in developing
countries,  see  V.  Dimier  and  M.  McGeever,  «Diplomats  without  a  fag:  The
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Commissions'  representations  in  third  countries performed  more
tasks  and  gained  increasing  pro:le  over  time.  However,  they
represented only the EC Commission, not the Community as a whole.
The  representation  of  the Council  of  ministers  was  assigned  to the
embassy of the member state holding its presidency,  which was also
representing the EPC once it  was  established.  Since the Commission's
representations  in  third  countries  could  not  claim  to represent  the
Community as  a whole,  member states were  even wary of  allowing
them to use symbols of the Community, such as the fag.8 Despite the
limits  established by  the  member  states,  the  Commission's
representations  in  third  countries usually  enjoyed  diplomatic  status
and they were  listed  among state  embassies  rather  than among  the
representations  of  international  organizations,  even  though  some
formal differences set them apart from national embassies.9 
In terms of assertion of the EC as a distinct international actor with a
clear  political  pro:le,  it  may  seem  not  so  signi:cant  that  the
Community took part in specialized international organizations dealing
with  economic  matters.  Also,  the  establishment  of  direct  contacts
between the EC Commission and other  actors  was largely  aimed at
dealing with technical economic matters. However, it is important to
notice that economic matters were gaining increasing political salience
during  those  years:  even  if  negotiations  often  focused  on  speci:c
technical issues, they did offer the Community the chance to de:ne and
promote  its  own  vision  on  clearly  political  matters  such  as  the
evolution of the international trade system, and the changing relations
between industrialized and developing countries. On its own part, the
EC  Commission  was  willing  to  fully  exploit  these  opportunities  in
order to prove that it was not only a technical body, but a fully-fedged
political actor. 
institutionalization of the delegations of the Commission in African, Caribbean
and Paci:c countries,» in Journal of Common Market Studies, 44 (3), 2006. See also
Brinkhorst, «Permanent missions of the EC in third countries,» p. 25. 
8 Dimier and McGeever, «Diplomats without a fag,» p. 497. 
9 Brinkhorst,  «Permanent missions of  the EC in third countries,» pp.  28–29;
Bruter, «Diplomacy without a state,» p. 185. 
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Establishing diplomatic relations with third countries
To  a  great  extent,  the  assertion  of  the  Community  as  an  actor
speaking with a single voice in international affairs was driven by the
Commission's eagerness of self-assertion. However, the assertion of the
Community was also in tune with the eagerness of most third countries
to recognize it as an interlocutor. Indeed, third countries' eagerness to
enter  in  relations  with  the  Community  helped  to  compensate  the
limited means available for the expression of the Community's voice in
international affairs. For instance, in the mid-1970s the only diplomatic
missions of the Community in third countries were those in the US,
Japan  and  Canada,  while there  were a  hundred countries  enjoying
diplomatic  relations  with  the  Community,  and most  of  them had a
diplomatic  mission in  Brussels.10 Interest  in  the EC was spread well
beyond Western countries: as Soames argued, «countries and groups of
countries all over the world want to de:ne their relations with us.»11  
In  many  cases  third  countries'  eagerness  to  recognize  the
Community as an interlocutor depended on economic and commercial
considerations.  The  EC  was one  of  the  most  important economic
powers in  the  world  and  it  enjoyed  a  great  share  of  world  trade.
Especially after the entry into force of the Common Commercial Policy
in 1970, any third country interested in trading with Western European
countries had to address  the Community.  Establishing relations with
the Community was particularly important at times of deep change of
the  international  economy such  as the  1970s,  with  the  increasing
opening of many national economies, the increasing fuctuations of the
prices of goods and the opening of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. 
Some countries sought to enter into a dialogue with the Community
because  they  had  been  particularly  affected  by  the  deepening  of
European economic integration and by the enlargement of the EC. Most
Mediterranean countries sought agreements with the Community and
10 German  delegation  to  the  EC,  Liste  der  bei  den  EG  akkreditierten
Drittstaaten,  October  24,  1974,  in  Politisches Archiv  des  Auswärtigen Amts
[PAAA], B 200, 121849;  W. Haferkamp, Speech «The external relations of the
EC,» Royal Irish Academy, Dublin, June 8, 1979, in ACCE, Speeches collection;
G.  Bossuat,  «Origins  and  development  of  the  external  personality  of  the
European Community,» in Experiencing Europe: 50 Years of European Construction
1957–2007, ed. W. Loth (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009), p. 220. There were 138 UN
member states in 1974. 
11 C. Soames, Speech «Europe's wider horizons,» Ostasiatischen Liebesmahl,
Hamburg, March 5, 1976, in ACCE, Speeches collection. 
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demanded the establishment of consultation mechanisms with it.  The
British entry into the EC disrupted some established trade patterns, so
that  Australia and New Zealand asked to deepen relations with the
Community, and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka obtained
the conclusion of commercial agreements with it.12 India had already
signaled its attention to the  Community by being the :rst developing
country to establish direct diplomatic relations with it in 1962.13 
Other  countries  were  eager  to  develop  their  trade  with  the
Community  in  order  to  diversify  their  commercial  relations  and  to
exploit  the  European market  for  their  exports.  This  was the  case  of
many  Latin  American  countries  for  instance.  Since  1969,  regular
meetings  were  held  between  Latin  American  ambassadors  and
Community  of:cials.14 In  1970  Latin  Americans  obtained  the
establishment of a consultation mechanism with the Community, which
unfolded at the level of experts and at the parliamentary level.15 Beside
Latin  American  countries,  Middle  Eastern  and  Asian  countries  also
sought  to  establish  a  relationship  with  the  Community.16 Third
countries'  economic and commercial  interest  in  the Community  was
such that by 1979 over 80 of them had signed agreements with it.17   
In  some cases  third countries  were  more willing  to deepen their
relations with the EC than the EC itself was. For instance, the countries
of the Association of South-Eastern Asian Nations (ASEAN) established
a committee in Brussels, paid high-level visits to the Community, and
demanded to institutionalize mutual dialogue and to establish an EEC–
ASEAN association.18 Interest was such that the visit of the President of
the EC Commission François-Xavier Ortoli to Indonesia in 1974 was a
12 Speaking notes for Soames's press conference at the end of a visit in the Far
East, October 4, 1974, in Churchill Archives, Soames, 42.  
13 C. Soames, Speech at the :rst meeting of the EEC/India Joint Commission,
May  27,  1974,  in  ACCE,  Speeches  collection;  W.  Haferkamp,  Speech  at  the
opening of  the India Trade Centre in Brussels,  February 29,  1980,  in  ACCE,
Speeches collection. 
14 M. Holland, The European Union and the Third World (Basingstoke: Palgrave,
2002), p. 55. 
15 S.  Albiani,  «L'America Latina del  “semisviluppo” alla ricerca dell'Europa:
cronaca di un lento ritorno,» in Il primato sfuggente: l'Europa e l'intervento per lo
sviluppo (1957–2007), ed. E. Calandri (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2009), pp. 123, 128.
16 See for instance Record of meeting between Soames and the Iranian minister
of economic affairs, May 14, 1975, in Churchill Archives, Soames, 42. 
17 W.  Haferkamp,  Speech  «The  external  relations  of  the  EC,»  Royal  Irish
Academy, Dublin, June 8, 1979, in ACCE, Speeches collection. 
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cover  story  in  all  the  country's  newspapers.19 However,  because  of
French  and  British  wariness  the  Community responded  with  very
limited enthusiasm to the ASEAN's eagerness to deepen relations. A
joint study group was established and a joint summit meeting was held
in 1978.20  
There were two reasons for the Community's wariness towards the
deepening of  relations with some third countries demanding it.  The
:rst  reason  was  that  the  Community  was  often  attacked  for  its
conclusion of preferential trade agreements with third countries, which
were  seen  by  the  US  and  others  as  breaching  GATT  rules  and
philosophy.  Many third countries were asking preferential treatment,
but  the  Community  had  pledged  to  conclude  as  few  preferential
agreements as possible.  The second reason was that the Community
had agreed to preserve a special position in its external relations for the
developing countries associated to it. The deepening of relations with a
multiplicity  of  other  developing  countries  would  have  hit  the
associates' position: while some member states were actually in favor of
such a development, France was always extremely keen to prevent this
from happening. 
Even if economic considerations often determined third countries'
eagerness to recognize the Community as an interlocutor and to enter
into a relationship with it, many countries in fact assigned a political
value  to  the  strengthening  of  their  economic  relations  with  the
Community.21 In some cases, the relationship between the Community
and  third  countries  focused  on  economic  issues,  but  they  were
approached in a political  way. For instance,  dialogue between Japan
18 EC  Commission,  Communication  to  the  Council  on  a  meeting  with  a
delegation of ASEAN, July 26, 1972, in IISG, Mansholt 222; S. Mansholt, Report
on visit to the ASEAN countries, September 27, 1972, in IISG, Mansholt 222;
MAEF,  Note  sur  la  proposition  allemande  de  réunion  ministérielle
CEE/ANSEA, May 18, 1978, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 4150; J. Rüland,
«ASEAN  and  the  European  Union:  a bumpy  interregional  relationship,»
Discussion paper, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung Bonn, 2001,
pp.  9,  12–13.  The  member  states  of  ASEAN  were  Indonesia,  Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 
19 P.  Gorce  (French  ambassador  to  Indonesia),  Report  on  Ortoli's  visit  to
Indonesia, March 5, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3839. 
20 EC  Commission,  Communication  to  the  Council  on  a  meeting  with  a
delegation of ASEAN, July 26, 1972, in IISG, Mansholt 222; MAEF, Note sur la
proposition  allemande  de  réunion CEE/ANSEA,  May  18,  1978,  in  AMAEF,
Affaires politiques, CE, 4150; Rüland, «ASEAN and the EU,» pp. 13–14. 
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and the Community largely focused on economic issues that had strong
political  favor,  such  as  the  Multilateral  Trade  Negotiations  and the
relations  between  industrialized  and  developing  countries.  The
opening of a delegation of the EC Commission in Tokyo in 1974 had a
clear political meaning, since it was the :rst case of Japan endowing
diplomatic recognition to an international organization in which Japan
itself  was  not  part.22 Moreover,  Japan  explicitly  demanded  that  the
representation was given a high-pro:le head, able to provide political
favor to it.23 
Developing  countries  were  interested  in  the  EC  not  only  as  an
economic but also as a political actor. This was the case for the ASEAN
countries and for the Latin American ones, but it  was especially the
case of the developing countries associated with the Community. Since
its establishment in  1963,  the Euro-African association was aimed at
dealing with more than merely economic matters. The association was
endowed with a full  range of  institutions,  so that periodic  meetings
were  held  at  the  governmental  and  at  the  parliamentary  level,
addressing a multiplicity of different issues. The political component of
the  association  was  preserved  also  in  the  partnership  between  the
Community  and the  so-called ACP developing countries  which was
established in 1975. In the late 1970s the Organization for African Unity
also sought to establish a dialogue with the EC.24 
Some third countries openly encouraged and welcomed progress in
Western  European  political  integration,  asking  to  move  their
relationship with the  EC from an economic to an explicitly  political
domain. For instance, Canada wanted to elaborate a joint declaration of
principles with the EC and to establish a system of permanent bilateral
consultation with it.25 In was especially in the case of the US that the
EC's international activity was valued for its political import and not
21 EC Commission, Group for summit preparation, Document sur les relations
extérieures et les reponsabilités de la Communauté dans le monde, March 16,
1972,  in  IISG,  Mansholt  209; Presidency  of  the  Council  of  the  EC,  Note  de
synthèse sur les relations extérieures de la Communauté et ses responsabilités
dans le monde, June 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA, 3003. 
22 F. de Laboulaye (French ambassador to Japan),  Report on Ortoli's visit to
Japan, February 26, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3839. 
23 É. Burin des Roziers (French permanent representative to the EC), Note sur
la  nomination  de Krag,  September  28,  1973,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires  politiques,
Danemark, 3211.
24 MAEF,  Cabinet du ministre,  Rapport  sur  les entretiens des  ministres  des
affaires  étrangères  au  Conseil  Européen,  July  13,  1978,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires
politiques, CE, 4088. 
69
only for its economic one. The US expressed readiness to deal with the
EC as a political interlocutor, even if it did show some ambiguities in
this respect. Transatlantic strains – on which I focus in the next chapter
– did not concern the project of European political integration in itself,
but  rather  its  future  relations  with  the  transatlantic  relationship.
Because of these strains, the :rst of:cial visit of an American President
to the EC institutions could only take place with Carter in 1976, even if
it had already been envisaged in the previous years. 
The case of China was possibly the case where the political interest
underlying economic relations with the Community was the clearest.
Trade fow between China and the Community was very weak, while
there  was  a  strong mutual  interest  for  deepening  political  relations.
China had opposed European integration until the late 1960s, but after
the Sino-Soviet split it had started to strongly support it in a clear anti-
Soviet function.26 Because of its mainly strategic concerns, China was
especially calling for progress in the political and military aspects of
European  integration.27 On  the  European  side,  closer  relations  with
China  were  seen  as  useful  to  put  some  pressure  on  the  USSR.28
Following an opening by the Chinese government, the :rst contact at
the political level between the Community and China occurred in May
1975.  On  that  occasion  the  Chinese  government  announced  the
establishment  of  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Community.29 Its
25 French embassy in Ottawa, Report on Scheel's visit to Canada, September 29,
1973,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires  politiques,  RFA,  2981;  MAEF,  Europe  occidentale,
Note sur les projets de déclarations de principes entre les Neuf, le Japon, le
Canada, November 23, 1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA, 3006; French
embassy in Bonn, Report on Trudeau's visit to Bonn, March 5, 1975, in AMAEF,
Affaires politiques, RFA, 2981. 
26 FCO, Planning staff, Paper on the relations of the EC with non-European
communist countries, March 30, 1973, in NA, FCO 49/460; Li Kiang, Speech at
the  signature  of  the  EC–China  trade  agreement,  April  3,  1978,  in  ACCE,
Speeches collection. 
27 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur le voyage de Medici en Chine, January
20, 1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3795; FCO, Planning staff, Paper on
the relations  of  the  EC with  non-European communist  countries,  March 30,
1973, in NA, FCO 49/460. 
28 FCO, Planning staff, Paper on the relations of the EC with non-European
communist  countries,  March  30,  1973,  in  NA,  FCO 49/460;  M.  J.  Chenard,
«Seeking détente and driving integration: The European Community's opening
towards  the  People's  Republic  of  China,  1975–1978,»  in  Journal  of  European
Integration History, 18 (1), 2012, p. 28. 
29 Record of meeting between Soames and the Chinese foreign minister, May 5,
1975,  in  Churchill  Archives,  Soames,  42;  C.  Soames,  Notes  used for  a press
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decision was remarkable, since it long preceded the establishment of
diplomatic relations between China and the US, and since China was
the :rst communist country to establish diplomatic relations with the
Community, except for Yugoslavia.30 
Establishing unof,cial relations with the Soviet countries
By  the  mid-1970s,  the  only  countries  which  did  not  of:cially
recognize the Community were the countries of the Soviet bloc and a
handful of Asian countries.31 The attitude of the USSR was consistent
with its age-old sharp opposition to Western European integration.32 On
ideological  grounds,  the  USSR accused  the  EC of  being a  capitalist,
imperialist  and neo-colonial  endeavor.  On  a  strategic  level,  Western
European integration ran counter to the ideal scenario pursued by the
USSR, that is to say a weak and divided Western Europe and a Western
Germany  only  loosely  tied  to  the  West.  Deeper  Western  European
integration could reduce the Soviet room of maneuver in Europe and
exert undesired appeal on the neutral countries and the Central-Eastern
European countries as well.33 Central-Eastern European countries were
readier than the USSR to enter in contact with the Community, but they
could not afford to adopt strong autonomous initiatives in this regard. 
Despite the harsh Soviet criticism, in 1962 the Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev had acknowledged the  Community  as  a  reality  to  deal
with.34 No  action  was  taken  to  follow  up  this  opening,  but  in  the
following  years  technical  contacts  could  be  established between  the
Community  and  Poland,  Hungary,  Romania  and  Bulgaria.35 The
Community actively encouraged the establishment  of these relations
conference in Beijing, May 8, 1975, in ACCE, BAC 25/1980 1897. 
30 Chenard, «Seeking détente and driving integration,» p. 25.
31 Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Cambodia, Laos, and Mongolia. 
32 V.  Zubok,  «The  Soviet  Union  and  European  integration  from  Stalin  to
Gorbachev,» in Journal of European Integration History, 2 (1), 1996.
33 EPC Political Committee,  Rapport sur la CSCE, 1971, in AMAEF, Affaires
politiques, CE, 3791; FCO, Planning staff, Paper on the EC relations with the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, November 1972, in NA, FCO 49/391. 
34 W. Mueller, «Recognition in return for détente? Brezhnev, the EEC, and the
Moscow Treaty with West Germany, 1970–1973,» in Journal of Cold War Studies,
13 (4), 2011, pp. 81–82. 
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and  it  explicitly  offered  substantial  commercial  advantages  to  the
Eastern  European  countries  in  return  for  full  political  recognition.36
Among world countries, the Soviet bloc ones were basically the only
ones  which  were  so  wary  of  entering  into  relations  with  the
Community, to the extent that the Community had to actively promote
its recognition by them. 
In December 1972  the Soviet leader  Leonid Brezhnev  expressed  a
change in the Soviet  attitude, hinting at the possibility of establishing
«some sort of businesslike relations» between the Community and the
Council for  Mutual  Economic  Assistance (CMEA).37 The main reason
for this change  was the pressure exerted by some satellite countries,
which were ready to take autonomous initiatives  with regard to the
Community.38 By then it was clear that the Community would not fall
apart in the near future  as the Soviets had foreseen – on the contrary,
integration was becoming stronger. The  Common  Commercial  Policy
had endowed the Community with exclusive competence in the trade
:eld,  so it  would  soon  be  necessary  for Central-Eastern  European
countries  to  deal  directly  with  the  Community,  because  of  the
importance of their commercial relations with it. The opening made by
Brezhnev  in  1972 was  designed to give some leeway to  the satellite
countries  whilst retaining  Soviet control upon  them by proposing the
CMEA as interlocutor of the Community.39 
The  question  of  the  Soviet  recognition  of  the  Community  was
particularly relevant in the context of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation  in  Europe.  EC  member  states  decided  not  to  send  a
delegation  of  the  Community  as  such  to  the  CSCE,  but  to  include
representatives of the EC Commission in the national delegation of the
35 EPC Political Committee,  Rapport sur la CSCE, 1971, in AMAEF, Affaires
politiques, CE, 3791; S. Kansikas, «Room to manoeuvre? National interests and
coalition-building in the CMEA, 1969–74,» in Reassessing Cold War Europe, ed. S.
Autio-Sarasmo and K.  Miklóssy (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), p.
209. 
36 S. Kansikas, «Acknowledging economic realities. The CMEA policy change
vis-à-vis the European Community, 1970–3,» in  European Review of History,  21
(2), 2014, p. 317; Mueller, «Recognition in return for détente?,» pp. 82, 84–85. 
37 Brezhnev quoted in Mueller, «Recognition in return for détente?,» p. 95. 
38 Kansikas, «Acknowledging economic realities»; A. Romano, «Untying Cold
War knots: The EEC and Eastern Europe in the long 1970s,» in Cold War History,
14 (2), 2014, pp. 161–163; Mueller, «Recognition in return for détente?,» p. 93. 
39 Kansikas,  «Acknowledging  economic  realities,»  p.  324;  Mueller,
«Recognition in return for détente?,» p. 95. 
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member state holding the presidency of the Council of ministers.40 The
recognition of the Community by the Soviet countries would be one of
the goals pursued by the EC member states at the conference, but it
would  not  be  an  item  subject  to  negotiation.41 In  fact  no  formal
recognition occurred at the conference, but the EC member states acted
in a coordinated way in the CSCE and «Moscow tended to treat the
Community countries as a group.»42 By May 1973 Brezhnev had started
to use the expression “European Community” instead of the previously
employed expression “common market.”43 The EC countries made the
very signature of the CSCE Final Act conditional upon the possibility to
sign it on behalf of the EC as well. Confronted with the :rmness of their
stance, Soviet countries did not object when in 1975 the President of the
Council of ministers Aldo Moro declared that he would sign the CSCE
Final Act on behalf of the EC as such.44
As  long  as  it  was  necessary  to  establish  some  relations  with  the
Community,  the  Soviets  aimed  at  asserting  the  CMEA  as  its
interlocutor. In such a way,  the  negotiation position of the Soviet bloc
countries  would  be  stronger  and  the control  of  the  USSR  upon  its
satellites would be ensured.  Moreover, the establishment of a parallel
between the Community and the CMEA would help to  downsize the
political  ambitions  of  the  former  and  to upgrade the  international
pro:le of the  latter. In  keeping with this strategy, in  August 1973 the
secretary  of  the  CMEA paid  a  private  visit  to  the  president  of  the
Council  of  the  EC,  and  the  following  year  the  president  of  the  EC
Commission  François-Xavier Ortoli  was  invited  to  Moscow.45
Following  these  exchanges,  in  February  1975  the  :rst  EEC–CMEA
meeting  was  held.  However,  the  Community  had  no  interest  at
establishing relations with the CMEA as such, therefore strengthening
40 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Report on EPC meeting on the CSCE, September
12, 1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3792. 
41 A. Romano, «La CEE di fronte alla conferenza di Helsinki,» in Alle origini del
presente: l'Europa occidentale nella crisi degli anni Settanta, ed. A. Varsori (Milano:
Franco Angeli, 2007), pp. 126–127. 
42 D.  Möckli,  European  Foreign  Policy  during  the  Cold  War.  Heath,  Brandt,
Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity  (London and New York: I. B. Tauris,
2009), p. 138.
43 Romano, «La CEE di fronte alla conferenza di Helsinki,» pp. 129–130. 
44 A. Romano, From Détente in Europe to European Détente. How the West Shaped
the Helsinki CSCE (Bruxelles: P.I.E.–Peter Lang, 2009), pp. 210–211. 
45 T. Yamamoto, «Détente or integration? EC response to Soviet policy change
towards the Common Market, 1970–75,» in Cold War History, 7 (1), 2007, pp. 84,
86. 
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the  Soviet  grip upon the satellite  countries.46 Rather,  the  goal  of  the
Community was to establish bilateral relations with each of the Soviet
bloc countries. Because of the opposite goals of the Community and of
the USSR, EEC–CMEA talks made hardly any progress in the following
years. 
As a consequence  of the application of the Common Commercial
Policy to Eastern Europe in 1975, and of  the lack of progress  in the
EEC–CMEA  talks,  Central-Eastern  European  countries  sought  to
conclude bilateral trade agreements with the Community. Between 1976
and 1980 the Community concluded agreements with all the Central-
Eastern European countries except for the GDR and the USSR.47 In fact,
even  the  USSR  itself  entered  in  informal  negotiations  with  the
Community over :sheries matters in February 1977.48 The conclusion of
trade  agreements  and  the  existence  of  frequent  even  if  informal
contacts between the Soviet bloc countries and the Community pointed
at  a  substantial  recognition  of  the  latter  by  the  former.  As  Angela
Romano  argues,  Soviet  bloc  countries'  «persistent  denial  of  of:cial
recognition had become a mere façade.»49 
The entry of the Community into the UN General Assembly
The Soviet refusal to recognize the EC as an international actor was
a crucial factor affecting the process of the admission of the Community
to the most widely recognized forum for international affairs, namely
the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Soviet bloc countries
did  not  have  enough  votes  in  order  to  block  the  admission  of  the
Community to the UN, but they did have the power to turn it into a
politically costly process. Political disincentives provided by the Soviet
bloc  were suf:cient  to convince  the  EC not  to  seek admission until
1974. The admission of the  Community to the UN General Assembly
46 MAEF,  Europe orientale,  Note  sur le  rapport  du Comité  politique sur la
CSCE,  October  30,  1971,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires  politiques,  CE,  3791;  MAEF,
Coopération économique, Note sur les contacts CEE–Comecon, September 11,
1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3792; Romano, «Untying Cold War
knots,» p. 159; Mueller, «Recognition in return for détente?,» p. 95. 
47 Romano, «Untying Cold War knots,» pp. 164–165, 167–169. 
48 Ibid., p. 169. 
49 Ibid., p. 171. 
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was precisely one of the by-products of East–West détente: it became
possible  only  when  détente  and  the  admission  of  the  two  German
states to the UN substantially lowered the political costs involved in it.
The  Community's  admission  was  further  facilitated  by  the  Soviet
acknowledgement of the Community as a reality and by the parallel
admission of the CMEA to the UN. 
The  strengthening  of  the  Community's  presence  at  the  UN  was
mainly meant  to assert it as  something more than  a mere specialized
regional  international  organization. The  Community  initially  only
aimed at being admitted to the Second Commission of the UN General
Assembly.  The  Second  Commission  was  the  body  of  the  General
Assembly where economic affairs, international trade and development
questions  were  dealt  with.  At  that  time  the  General  Assembly  was
devoting  more  and  more  attention  to  these  issues,  on  which  the
Community had some exclusive competences.50 The EC Commission
wanted to be able to intervene directly in these UN debates: following
the Commission's pressure, in 1970 the Council of ministers decided to
demand  the  admission  of  the  Community as  such  to  the  Second
Commission  of  the  UN  General  Assembly.51 However,  EC  member
states' representatives to the UN decided not to forward the demand
«pour des raisons d'opportunité politique.»52 
The  main  obstacle  to  the  admission  of  the  Community  was  the
Soviet reticence about it: the Soviet bloc countries could consent to the
Community's admission only if the CMEA was admitted as well, which
was  an  unwelcome  perspective  for  some  EC  member  states.  An
additional  problem  was  that  the  two  German  states  were  not  full
members of the UN yet.53 In 1971 the Community launched a new bid
for  its  admission  to  the  Second  Commission  of  the  UN  General
Assembly. Obstacles linked to the Soviet position were decreasing, but
50 EC Commission,  Communication au Conseil tendant à obtenir l'admission
de  la  Communauté comme  observateur  à  la  Deuxième  Commission  de
l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies, July 14, 1971, in ACCE, BAC 25/1980
264. 
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 K. Meyer (EC Commission, General secretariat),  Note sur l'admission de la
Communauté comme observateur à la Deuxième Commission de l'Assemblée
Générale,  October 30,  1971,  in ACCE,  BAC 25/1980 264;  E.  Wellenstein (EC
Commission, DG I), Note sur la participation de la Communauté à la Deuxième
Commission de l'Assemblée Générale, May 17, 1972, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984
114. 
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the UN legal  service  argued that  a  dedicated debate  in  the  General
Assembly was required.54 Faced with the risk of a politicization of the
issue in the debate, EC member states' representatives decided to drop
the demand of admission.
According to the EC Commission and to the European Parliament,
the failure of the admission bid was partly due to a «défaut de volonté
politique des États membres.»55 EC member states' representatives to
the  UN  were  not  enthusiastic  about  losing  some  power  to  the
advantage of the  Community as such.56 To be sure, the Commission's
eagerness  for  admission  to  the  UN  was  affected  by  its  desire  to
heighten its pro:le and increase its infuence on the international stage.
The  member  states'  lack  of  enthusiasm  was  also  partly  due  to  the
implicit link between the question of the Community's admission to the
UN and the question of its admission to the incoming CSCE, which was
not  settled yet:  if  the  Community as  such  was  admitted to the  UN
General  Assembly,  it  would have  been  harder  to  keep it  out  of  the
CSCE.57 
The Community did not promote other bids for its admission to the
UN General Assembly in the following years.  Coordination between
member states ensured some representation of the  Community at the
54 C.  Christaki  de  Germain (EC Commission,  DG I),  Note sur la  Deuxième
Commission de l'Assemblée Générale, October 8, 1971, in ACCE, BAC 25/1980
264; K. Meyer, Note sur l'admission de la Communauté comme observateur à la
Deuxième Commission de l'Assemblée Générale,  October 22, 1971, in ACCE,
BAC 25/1980 264. 
55 European Parliament, Committee on legal affairs, Rapport sur les problèmes
juridiques de la participation des Communautés aux travaux des différentes
organisations  de l'ONU  (rapp.  R.  Ballardini),  May  28,  1973,  in  ACCE,  BAC
129/1983 309. 
56 E. Wellenstein,  Note sur la participation de la Communauté à la Deuxième
Commission de l'Assemblée Générale, May 17, 1972, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984
114;  C.  Christaki  de  Germain,  Note  sur  la  Deuxième  Commission  de
l'Assemblée Générale, October 26, 1971, in ACCE, BAC 25/1980 264; K. Meyer,
Note sur l'admission de la Communauté comme observateur à la Deuxième
Commission  de  l'Assemblée  Générale,  October  30,  1971,  in  ACCE,  BAC
25/1980  264;  EC  Commission,  Note  sur  la  Deuxième  Commission  de
l'Assemblée Générale, November 3, 1971, in ACCE, BAC 25/1980 265. 
57 K. Meyer, Note sur l'admission de la Communauté comme observateur à la
Deuxième Commission de l'Assemblée Générale, October 30, 1971, in ACCE,
BAC 25/1980 264; E. Wellenstein, Note sur la participation de la Communauté
à la Deuxième Commission de l'Assemblée Générale, May 17, 1972, in ACCE,
BAC 48/1984 114. 
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UN, so that for instance a single spokesperson was usually expressing
the  common  position  on  matters  falling  under  the  Community
competence.58 In the course of the discussion on the Multilateral Trade
Negotiations  on  December  7,  1972  the  President  of  the  Council  of
ministers made the :rst intervention on behalf of the Community in the
UN General Assembly.59 
It was only in November 1973 that the possibility of a new bid for
the  Community's admission  to  the  UN  General  Assembly  was
considered,  as demanded by the EC Commission.60 The Commission
argued that  the  recent  enlargement  and deepening of  the  EC made
admission necessary. Moreover, the General Assembly was increasingly
dealing  with  economic  matters  falling  under  the  Community
competence.61 Most  importantly,  there  were  less  obstacles  to  the
admission,  since  the  USSR  had  softened  its  attitude  towards  the
Community  and  the  two  German  states  had  entered  the  UN  in
September  1973.62 In  June  1974  the  Commission  argued  that  the
Community could  ask  for  admission  not  only  to  the  Second
Commission but to the UN General Assembly as a whole, which was
seen as «the ideal theatre for the Nine to assert themselves externally.»63
None  of  the  EC  member  states  were  enthusiastic  about  the
58 T. Hijzen (EC Commission, DG I), Note sur la coordination des positions des
États  membres  au  cours  de  la  28ème  session  de  l'Assemblée  Générale,
December 5, 1973, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 115. 
59 C. Christaki de Germain, Rapport sur une mission auprès des Nations Unies,
December 21, 1972, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 114. 
60 Maas (EC Commission), Note on the relations between the EEC and the UN,
November  1973,  in  NA, FCO 61/1136;  K. Meyer,  Note  on  the  status  of  the
Community at the UN General Assembly, December 6, 1973, in ACCE, BAC
25/1980 265. 
61 Maas, Note on the relations between the EEC and the UN, November 1973,
in  NA,  FCO 61/1136;  E. Wellenstein,  Note  sur  le  statut  des  Communautés
auprès de l'Assemblée Générale, December 3, 1973, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 115;
EC Commission, Working document on the status of the Community at the UN
General Assembly, June 11, 1974, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 116. 
62 Maas, Note on the relations between the EEC and the UN, November 1973,
in NA, FCO 61/1136; EC Commission, Working document on the status of the
Community at the UN General Assembly, June 11, 1974, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984
116; K.  Meyer,  Note  on  the  status  of  the  Community  at  the  UN  General
Assembly, December 6, 1973, in ACCE, BAC 25/1980 265. 
63 A. C. Maes,  «The European Community and the United Nations General
Assembly,» in Journal of European Integration, 3 (1), 1979, p. 83. 
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Commission's proposal, but none of them vetoed it either.64 
With  the  resolution  3208  on  October  11,  1974  the  UN  General
Assembly admitted the  Community as  an observer  on a  permanent
basis,  along  with  the  CMEA.  The  Community  became  the  :rst
international  organization  endowed  with  the  right  of  speech  in  the
Assembly  committees.65 The  Community delegation  to  the  General
Assembly  was  to  be  jointly  headed  by  a  representative  of  the  EC
Commission and a representative of the presidency of the Council of
ministers, with either one or the other acting as spokesperson according
to the matter discussed.66 In 1976 the  Community mission to the UN
was accorded of:cial diplomatic status. By then, the  Community  was
taking  part  in  about  :fty  international  organizations:  it  was  full
member of GATT and of a few commodity organizations, and it was
observer  member in  37  other  organizations.67 When the  Community
was  given  full  membership  in  international  organizations  and
agreements,  a  clause  was  usually  employed  assimilating  the
Community to a state.68 
The EC member states speaking with a single voice
By 1974 the possibility of the Community to express its views on
international affairs had been considerably increased over the previous
64 K.  Meyer,  Note  sur  le  statut  des  Communautés  auprès  de  l'Assemblée
Générale, June  22,  1974,  in  ACCE,  BAC  129/1983  306;  C.  Sinclair  (FCO,
European  integration  –  external),  Note  on  the  observer  status  for  the
Community at the UN, May 29, 1974, in NA, FCO 58/833. 
65 The secretary-generals  of the Organization of  American  States, of the Arab
League,  and  of  the  Organization  of  African  Unity had  been  admitted  as
observers to the General Assembly respectively in 1948, 1950, and 1965. They
could only assist to the Assembly's works, but not take the floor. 
66 Coreper, Conclusions sur le statut de la Communauté auprès des Nations
Unies, September 12, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 4144. 
67 N.  Götz,  «Western  Europeans  and Others:  The  making  of  Europe  at  the
United  Nations,»  in  Alternatives,  33,  2008,  p.  363;  P. Taylor,  «The  European
Communities as  an  actor  in  international  society,»  in  Journal  of  European
Integration, 6 (1), 1982, pp. 18–19. 
68 D.  Dormoy,  «Le  statut  de  l'Union  européenne  dans  les  organisations
internationales,» in L'Union européenne et les organisations internationales,  ed. D.
Dormoy (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1997), pp. 42–43.
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years.  The  Community  had  entered  a  number  of  international
organizations and the UN General Assembly, and a remarkable set of
direct  diplomatic  relations  had  been  established  between  the
Community and a large number of third countries around the world.
All these structures and tools allowed and invited the Community to
express  its  views  on  international  affairs.  However,  the  Community
was able to express its views only as far as its competences permitted it,
that is to say mainly on international trade and development issues. As
far as political issues were at stake, the ability of the EC as a whole to
intervene did not depend on a strengthening of the Community but
rather on progress in the EPC. 
It  was  in late  1973  that  the  EC  started  to  express  its  views  on
international issues falling outside the Community sphere. By then the
EPC had become suf:ciently structured and the EC member states had
become willing to express a distinct single voice in international affairs.
The :rst joint declaration by the EC member states on an international
issue was the EPC communiqué on the Arab-Israeli war on October 13,
1973.69 The  release  of  such  a  declaration  signaled  the  very  high
ambitions initially endowed to the EPC: the EC member states were
taking a common position on one of the most complex and delicate
international issues  of the  time, on a  pressing crisis and on a subject
which the US and the EC disagreed on, and which traditionally divided
member states themselves. The communiqué was followed by common
démarches at third countries' governments. 
The release of common statements on international political issues
and the performance of common démarches  became  one of the main
activities carried out by the EPC in the following years.70 The release of
common statements increased in number and weight  especially after
the creation of the European Council in 1974. Indeed, one of the main
functions  assigned  to  the  Council  was  «donner  un  caractère  plus
solennel ou un retentissement particulier à leur prise de position sur un
sujet d'actualité. Il s'agit pour le Conseil européen de faire entendre la
voix  de l'Europe.»71 To  this  goal,  it  was  decided that  «le  présidence
69 M. Gainar, Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne: Les Neuf et la Coopération
politique européenne de 1973 à 1980 (Bruxelles: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2012), p. 182. 
70 B. R. Bot, «Cooperation between the diplomatic missions of the Ten in third
countries  and  international  organisations,»  in  Legal  Issues  of  Economic
Integration, 11 (1), 1984, p. 157. 
71 V. Giscard d'Estaing, Letter to the other heads of state and government of the
EC  member  states  on  the  European Council,  January  21,  1977,  in  AMAEF,
Affaires politiques, CE, 4085. See also E. Mourlon-Druol, «Regional integration
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exerce la fonction de porte-parole des Neuf et se fait leur interprète sur
le plan diplomatique.»72 It became customary for the EC heads of state
and  government  to  release  declarations  on  international  issues.  The
direct involvement of leaders gave more strength and visibility to these
declarations. As Maria Gainar argues, the Council became  «une sorte
de vitrine des Neuf sur la scène internationale.»73 
The release of joint statements on international issues became one of
the  most  employed  means  for  expressing  the  EC  member  states'
cohesion at the UN too. Starting from 1975, the president of EPC made
a common statement at the opening of each session of the UN General
Assembly,  expressing  EC  member  states'  views  on  all  the  main
international  issues.74 Because  of  its  solemn  aspect  and  its
comprehensive character,  such a common statement was seen as «an
ideal  opportunity to show the pro:le of the [Nine]» in international
affairs.75 At the General Assembly EC member states were also making
common statements  to explain  their  voting decisions,  provided that
they  had  a  common  position.  While  they  made  only  two  joint
declarations in the General Assembly in 1973, they made sixty-one joint
declarations  in  1977.76 As  the  member  states'  delegations  to  the  UN
remarked, 
Les déclarations communes af:rment,  peut-être même de façon
and global governance: The example of the European Council (1974–1986),» in
Les cahiers Irice, 9 (1), 2012, p. 98. 
72 EC heads of state and government, Final communiqué of the Paris Summit,
December 10, 1974, available at <http://www.cvce.eu/obj/ :nal_communique
_of_the_paris_summit_9_and_10_december_1974-en-2acd8532-b271-49ed-bf63-
bd8131180d6b.html>. 
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plus apparente que les votes, la personnalité de la Communauté.
C'est ainsi, en tout cas, qu'elles sont  interprétées par les autres
membres des Nations Unies.77 
By the  mid-1970s the EC was expressing its own views on all the
major  international  issues.  Views  were  expressed through  the
Community if the issues fell into its competence and through member
states' joint statements in all  the other cases. Despite the large number
of  joint  statements released  by  the  Community, the EPC,  and the
European Council,  they had  only  a limited impact.  The problem was
that statements were  often very  generic because  they  had to  hide
substantial  divergences  between the  member  states'  positions.  Even
when common statements could be agreed, divergences made it hard to
follow  them  up  in  any  substantial  way. The  release  of  generic
statements which could not be substantially followed up could in fact
be counterproductive, leading to  a  loss  of  the  EC's  credibility  and
infuence abroad.78 
Together with the release of common statements, one of the most
important means for the EC member states to express a single view on
international issues was their voting cohesion at the UN. Cohesion in
voting was regarded as «la manifestation par excellence de l'identité
européenne.»79 The  EPC  devoted  many  energies  to  coordinate  and
harmonize member states' positions on the different issues at stake in
order to increase the coherence of their voting behavior. Member states'
delegations could hold as many as a few hundred meetings during a
single session of the UN General Assembly.80 EC member states' voted
together on 61 percent of the roll-call votes in the General Assembly in
1974, up from 43 percent in the previous year, and voting coherence
remained around 60 percent in the following years.81 
Despite  the  EPC  harmonization  efforts,  signi:cant  divergence
77 Representations  of  the  EC  member  states  at  the  UN,  Rapport  sur  la
coopération entre les Neuf lors de la 29ème session de l'Assemblée Générale,
March 1975, in NA, FCO 58/894. 
78 Maes, «The EC and the UN General Assembly,» pp. 82–83; Bot, «Cooperation
between the diplomatic missions of the Ten,» p. 164. 
79 German delegation to the EPC reported in R. Phan van Phi (EC Commission,
DG I), Rapport sur la réunion du groupe des Nations Unies, June 10, 1975, in
ACCE, BAC 48/1984 128. See also French delegation to the UN, Note sur la
CPE, January 25, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3798. 
80 In 1984  Bernard  Bot  was reporting around 250–300 meetings per  session
(«Cooperation between the diplomatic missions of the Ten,» p. 159). 
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remained in the member states' voting behavior at the UN. Divergence
was particularly hard to overcome on some sensitive issues: as a third
country's  diplomat  remarked,  EC  member  states  «vote  together  on
unimportant questions and apart on important ones.»82 France was «the
bête noire of voting cohesion,»83 since it was the member state the most
inclined  to  vote  alone,  but  also  Denmark  and  Ireland  often  voted
differently from the majority of the other member states. By contrast,
Germany,  Belgium  and  Luxembourg  never  voted  alone.84 EPC
coordination  efforts  helped  to  avoid  outright  opposite  voting
behaviors, however: while in 1973 EC member states ended up with a
Yes/No split :ve times, from 1975 to 1977 they split in such a sharp
way only once per session, and only one time did the split concern a
substantial issue such as the arms embargo against South Africa.85 
The EPC  achieved moderate  success  in the  harmonization  of the
foreign policies of the EC member states, and it favored the expression
of common positions on most international issues. Despite the limits of
declarations  and of  voting  cohesion,  EC member  states  increasingly
managed  to  express  common  positions  in  international  affairs.  This
achievement was sanctioned by  a  growing recognition of the EC as a
distinct international actor by third countries – not only with regard to
economic  issues  but  also  to  political  ones. EC  member  states'
delegations to the UN reported that the EC had become «a recognizable
group and a reality in the calculations of the other UN groups.»86 Also,
as a French diplomat remarked, «other people no longer ask you what
81 Representations  of  the  EC  member  states  at  the  UN,  Rapport  sur  la
coopération entre les Neuf lors de la 29ème session de l'Assemblée Générale,
March 1975, in NA, FCO 58/894; R. Foot, «The European Community's voting
behaviour  at  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly,»  in  Journal  of  Common
Market Studies, 17 (4), 1979, p. 352.   Figures may vary according to the criteria
employed to consider abstentions and resolutions adopted by consensus. 
82 Foot, «The EC's voting behaviour at the UN General Assembly,» p. 351. 
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85 Ibid., pp. 353, 355, 360. 
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France is going to do. They ask you what the Nine are going to do.»87
Member  states'  delegations  to  the  UN were  often feeling a  stronger
need to act in unison than their home governments did, since they were
«confronted day by day with the expectations or even the pressure of
Third  World countries and other regional groupings.»88 Sometimes it
was  third  countries  that  urged the  EC  to  take  the  lead  on  some
international issues, and to speak with one voice about them.89
Third countries started to look for dialogue on international political
issues with the EC member states collectively taken. The earliest case of
third countries' interest in the EC as a political interlocutor occurred in
December  1973.  While  the  EC  leaders  were  convened  for  the
Copenhagen Summit, the foreign ministers of four Arab countries went
to Copenhagen uninvited and asked to discuss with the EC  member
states.  They called for  their stronger involvement  in the Middle East
issues  and  for  closer  cooperation  between  the  EC  and  the  Arab
countries.90 Other notable instances of third countries' interest in the EC
as a political interlocutor occurred in 1975, when the EC member states
met with Egyptian and Israeli diplomats and with all the parties of the
Cyprus  confict.91 Even  the  Soviet  ambassador  at the  UN  sought  a
dialogue  with  the  EC  member  states on  disarmament.92 It  was
particularly at the UN that third countries sought contacts with the EPC
president. Outside the UN, it was sometimes more complex for third
countries  to  identify  their  interlocutor,  since  they  did  not  always
understand the separation between Community and EPC. Moreover,
the EPC president changed every six months and no secretariat existed,
so  that  it  was  remarked  that  «communication  with  third  parties  is
entirely disorganized.»93 
87 Diplomat quoted in P. Strafford, «The growing presence of the Nine at the
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Representations of the EC member states at the UN, Rapport sur la coopération
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89 Ibid., p. 160. 
90 President of the EPC, Rapport aux chefs d'état ou de gouvernement sur la
réunion des ministres des affaires étrangères des Neuf avec des ministres des
affaires étrangères arabes, December 17, 1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques,
CE, 3789. 
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93 F.  Judd (FCO,  Minister of state),  Paper on the future development of the
EPC, January 1978, in NA, FCO 98/401. 
83
No single voice for the EC at the UN Security Council
By the mid-1970s the EC member states were expressing common
positions on many international  issues,  and the EC was increasingly
regarded as a distinct international actor. The assertion of distinct and
common positions by the EC member states had a great limit, however:
no coordination  occurred between them on the  activities  of  the  UN
Security  Council.  While  the  UN  General  Assembly  did  deal  with
signi:cant issues, it was in the Security Council that the most delicate
international  issues tended to be discussed.  France  and Britain were
permanent members of the Security Council and enjoyed veto power in
it, while either West Germany or Italy were often elected as temporary
members of the Council. However, in the Security Council EC member
states  were  exclusively  serving  in  their  individual  capacity  both  in
principle and in practice. 
As the EPC activities were progressing and the EC was increasingly
expressing common positions at the UN General Assembly during the
1970s,  the  EC  member  states  which  were  not  part  of  the  Security
Council exerted growing pressure on their partners in order to discuss
the activities of the Council in the EPC framework. The EC member
states had agreed to cooperate in the activity of all the UN bodies in
which  some  member  states  were  not  taking  part,  and  the  Security
Council was the only exception to this practice. As the British conceded,
third countries tended to associate the EC as a whole with the positions
expressed by the EC members of the Security Council:  EC countries
which  were  not  members  of  the  Council  ended  up  with  being
associated with positions that they did not  even have the chance to
discuss.94 An additional reason in favor of some cooperation in Security
Council  matters  was  that  such  matters  often  came up in  other  UN
forums, so coordination in the former could help coordination in the
latter, and the other way round.95 
It was especially Belgium and the Netherlands which pressed their
partners  to discuss  the activities  of  the Security Council  in  the  EPC
framework.  Their repeated pressures led the EC foreign ministers to
94 P. M. Maxey (FCO, United Nations), Note on cooperation among the Nine on
Security Council matters, May 20, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/208; FCO, Record of
Anglo-French  consultations  on  UN  affairs,  September  1976,  in  NA,  FCO
98/210. 
95 P.  M.  Maxey,  Note  on cooperation  among the  Nine  on  Security  Council
matters, May 20, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/208.
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agree on the so-called “Dublin formula” in June 1975. According to this
formula,  the  EC  members  of  the  Security  Council  «should,  to  the
greatest  possible  extent,  inform  their  partners»  about  the  Council's
activities.96 Rather  than  establishing  a  practice  of  throughout
consultation and coordination à neuf on the Security Council's activities,
the  Dublin  formula  merely  led  to  occasional  communications  from
members to non-members. Mutual information did increase, but it was
usually given on a bilateral basis and Security Council issues continued
not to be collectively discussed by the EC member states on a regular
basis.97 
Belgium and the Netherlands repeatedly called for an improvement
of the procedures agreed upon in Dublin, but the  French government
rejected  and  vetoed any  improvement.98 Britain adopted  a  more
nuanced  position  about  it,  deeming  French  :rmness on  this  issue
«provocative»99 and «extreme […] It is not realistic, nor it is conducive
to the development of political cooperation.»100 Some more consultation
with the  EC  partners on Security Council matters  could be conceded,
even though clear limits should remain on the extent of cooperation.101
France and Britain agreed on the fact that consultation of the partners
on Security Council matters would not be mandatory, nor would they
act as spokespersons of the EC in the Council.  They would also retain
complete freedom to decide how to cast their votes in it.102 
According to the Tindemans Report on the European Union, by the
time of  the  creation of the EU, member states  would be required  to
consult with one another on all international problems and they would
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 British delegation to the UN, Note on the Security Council, April 15, 1976, in
NA,  FCO  58/971;  FCO,  Note  on  the  coordination  of  the  Nine  at  the  UN,
September 1976, in NA, FCO 98/209. 
99 FCO, Note on the coordination of the Nine at the UN, September 1976, in
NA, FCO 98/209. 
100 P.  M. Maxey, Note on cooperation among the Nine on Security Council
matters, May 20, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/208.
101 FCO, Record of Anglo-French consultations on UN affairs, September 1976,
in NA, FCO 98/210. 
102 MAEF, Nations Unies et organisations internationales, Note sur les Nations
Unies,  May 23,  1975,  in AMAEF, Affaires politiques,  CE, 3793;  P.  M. Maxey,
Note  on cooperation among the Nine on Security  Council  matters,  May 20,
1976, in NA, FCO 98/208;  FCO, Record of Anglo-French consultations on UN
affairs, September 1976, in NA, FCO 98/210. 
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be  required  to  reach  a  common  position,  if  necessary recurring  to
majority voting.103 If a common foreign policy was enforced in such a
way,  «le statut de membre permanent dont disposent la France et la
Grande-Bretagne aux Nations-Unies n'a plus de raison d'etre.»104 France
and Britain would turn into mere spokespersons of the EC in the UN
Security Council,  and third countries could argue that «since the Nine
are speaking with one voice, they need only single representation.»105
For  this  reason,  France  and Britain  opposed  Tindemans's  proposals.
The EC members of the Security Council were not very eager to present
a  common  position  in  it,  even  if  prior  coordination  between  them
usually  took  place.  Occasionally  the  EC  members  did  present  a
common position in the Security Council, but this was not turned into a
custom.106 The desire not to present a common European position in the
Security  Council  contributed  to  the  French  and  British  wariness  of
discussing security questions in the EPC.107
It is paradoxical that the EC member states made efforts to reach
common positions on many international issues, but they deliberately
sought  not  to  present  common  European  positions  in  the  most
important forum for the discussion of international affairs, namely the
Security Council. If  the pursuit of deep political integration was really
the ultimate goal pursued by the EC member states,  it was logical to
envisage for the long-term  a participation of the European Union as
such to the UN Security Council. The Tindemans Report did not make
such  a  suggestion  explicitly,  but  the  participation  of  the  EU to  the
Security Council was the natural outcome of the creation of a common
foreign policy decided with majority voting. In fact, EC member states
were extremely wary of presenting common European positions in the
Security  Council:  despite  their  pledges  of  commitment  to  the
promotion of a common foreign policy, none of them was really eager
to move towards it. 
103 L. Tindemans, Report on European Union, December 29, 1975, published in
Bulletin des Communautés européennes, supplement 1/76. 
104 MAEF,  Directeur  adjoint  des  affaires  politiques,  Note  sur  le  Rapport
Tindemans, January 12, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3773; see also
British delegation to the EC,  Commentary on the Report on European Union,
January 13, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/165. 
105 J. C. Thomas, Note on cooperation between the Nine at the UN, March 4,
1975, in NA, FCO 58/894. See also British delegation to the UN, Note on the
Security Council, April 15, 1976, in NA, FCO 58/971. 
106 Lindemann, «EPC at the UN,» p. 117. 
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The project of common European embassies
In order to increase the effectiveness and coherence of the whole set
of EC's activities in international affairs, it was necessary to reduce the
gap between the Community and the EPC spheres. This gap affected
the process of decision-making on international issues, as it was shown
in chapter 1, but it also affected the process of expression of the EC's
positions in international affairs. Both the Community and the EPC had
their own means and structures for the expression of their views and
for  the  cultivation  of  their  relations  with  third  countries.  Little
institutional  arrangements  existed  to  ensure  coherence  between  the
positions expressed by the Community and by the EPC, which could
not  be  taken  for  granted  as  a  result.  The  creation  of  the  European
Council  was  meant  to  address  such a  problem,  but  other  proposals
were also discussed to increase  the coherence between the positions
expressed by the Community and by the EPC. 
One of  these  proposals  was advanced by the  EC Commission in
1975: in the perspective of the establishment of a European Union, the
Commission proposed to establish diplomatic representations of the EC
as a whole in third countries, encompassing both the Community and
its member states.108 Until then, a double channel was in place for the
representation of the EC in third countries: the EC Commission had its
own diplomatic missions, while the Council of ministers, the EPC, and
the European Council were represented by the embassy of the member
state holding  their presidency.  In some  cases, the EC member states'
ambassadors periodically met together with  of:cials  and  leaders  of
their host country.109 The Commission's proposal aimed at presenting
third countries with a single common  European embassy,  whose very
existence was expected to increase the coherence of the EC's views on
international issues, and to favor the perception of the EC as a distinct
and cohesive international actor by external observers.
A proposal for the establishment of a common European embassy
had  in  fact  already  been  advanced  by  the  German  government  in
December 1974. The German project aimed at establishing a common
embassy in  Guinea-Bissau.110 The  EC member  states  had recognized
108 EC Commission, Report on the European Union, June 25, 1975, in AMAEF,
Affaires politiques, CE, 3772. 
109 Bot, «Cooperation between the diplomatic missions of the Ten,» p. 155. 
110 EPC presidency, Note sur la représentation commune des Neuf en Guinée-
Bissau, January 29, 1975, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3519.
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Guinean independence in August 1974, but none of them planned to
open an embassy in the country.111 According to the German proposal,
the common European embassy would represent the Community,  the
EPC,  the  European  Council  and  the  member  states  individually
taken.112 The  member  state  holding  the  Council's  presidency  would
manage the relations with the embassy and each member state would
contribute to its staf:ng and costs.113 The common ambassador would
represent common positions where available and the positions of the
different member states in the other cases. The only existing case of
common embassy at the time was the one of Niger, Upper Volta, the
Ivory Coast and Dahomey in Israel.114 
Reducing and sharing administrative costs was certainly one of the
reasons underlying the German proposal. However, its main goal was
to foster progress in European political integration, which had entered
a  period  of  relative  crisis  during  1974.115 The  very  existence  of  a
common  ambassador  would  incite  member  states  to  reduce  their
differences,  so  that  they  could  present  a  common  position  to  their
counterpart.116 The Guinean experiment would create a precedent that
could later be replicated elsewhere and that would constitute a useful
experience  for  the  envisaged  evolution  of  the  EC  into  a  European
Union.117 Guinea-Bissau  was  identi:ed  as  a  good  case  for  such  an
experiment because no established pattern of member states' relations
with  it  existed.  None  of  them  had  strong  economic  and  political
interests  there,  and  very  few  EC  citizens  lived  in  the  country.118
Moreover, it was a very small and marginal country: in case of failure,
the  experiment  of  the  common  embassy  would  not  have  seriously
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid;  MAEF,  Affaires juridiques, Note sur la représentation commune des
Neuf en Guinée-Bissau, February 5, 1975, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE,
3798. 
115 EPC presidency, Note sur la représentation commune des Neuf en Guinée-
Bissau, January 29, 1975, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3519.
116 EPC Presidency, Note sur la représentation commune des Neuf en Guinée-
Bissau, May 13, 1975, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3519. 
117 EPC presidency, Note sur la représentation commune des Neuf en Guinée-
Bissau, January 29, 1975, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3519; MAEF,
Affaires juridiques, Note sur la représentation commune des Neuf en Guinée-
Bissau, February  5,  1975,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires  politiques,  CE,  3798;  EPC
Presidency,  Note sur la représentation commune des Neuf en Guinée-Bissau,
May 13, 1975, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3519. 
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affected the pursuit of greater political integration.119 
The strongest opposition to the German proposal was expressed by
the French government.  France  had strong interests  in  the  countries
surrounding Guinea-Bissau and it was afraid that the establishment of
a common embassy could enable its European partners to exert some
indirect infuence in the region.120 France was especially opposed to the
German project because it was meant to combine the Community and
the EPC dimensions of the EC's international activity. The project was
also meant to bring about a common European foreign policy, which
was not a notion conceded by the French: 
Nous nous sommes toujours gardés jusqu'à présent d'employer
l'expression  'politique  étrangère  commune',  même comme
objectif à atteindre. Dans ces conditions, il ne serait guère logique
d'admettre le principe d'une représentation commune.121 
No common European embassy could :nally be established in Guinea-
Bissau. Similarly, the proposal advanced by the EC Commission in 1975
was rejected.
Europe may speak with a single voice, but not with only one voice
During the 1970s the EC was endowed with a number of means for
the expression of a single voice in international affairs. On one hand,
the  Community  was  admitted  to  several  international  organizations
and  conferences,  the  foremost  example  being  the  UN  General
Assembly.  Moreover,  it  established  representation  of:ces  abroad,  as
well  as  direct  diplomatic  relations  with  almost  all  of  the  world's
countries. Such a development was mostly driven by the endowment to
the  Community  of  exclusive  competence  on  trade  and  by  the  EC
Commission's  willingness  to defend its  turf  and to increase  its  own
118 EPC presidency, Note sur la représentation commune des Neuf en Guinée-
Bissau, January 29, 1975, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3519.
119 Ibid.;  EPC Presidency,  Note sur la représentation commune des Neuf en
Guinée-Bissau, May 13, 1975, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3519. 
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en Guinée-Bissau, February 11, 1975, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3798. 
121 MAEF, Affaires juridiques, Note sur la représentation commune des Neuf
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pro:le and infuence on the international stage. On the other hand, the
EPC  led  member  states  to  release  an  increasing  number  of  joint
statements on international issues and to make common démarches, as
well  as to increase their voting cohesion at the UN. Joint statements
were frequently released by the European Council too. Such an increase
of  member  states'  coordination  in  international  affairs  was  mostly
driven by their own political willingness to move towards it and by the
need to meet the expectations raised by the developments of European
integration.
Developments in European political  integration were overall  well
received  by  third  countries.  They  clearly  paid  attention  to  the  EC's
activity in international affairs, and they came to regard it as a global
player of its own – not only economic, but also political in nature. Third
countries also continued to pay attention to the EC as an international
actor  in  the  late  1970s,  when  the  EC  was  experiencing  increasing
dif:culties. Even then the EC foreign ministers could claim that the EC
was «increasingly regarded by the external world as a coherent entity
in world affairs,»122 and Soames could claim that the EC was «a pole of
attraction to the outside world» to such an extent that «countries vie
with each other to link themselves to it.»123 According to the President
of the EC Commission Roy Jenkins, third countries perceived the EC's
strengths more than most EC actors did, so that «the Community looks
stronger, sometimes more imposing, to those outside it than to those
within.»124 
Most third countries were welcoming the assumption by the EC of a
stronger  role  in  international  affairs.  The  assertion  of  the  EC  as  a
distinct international actor and its expression with a single voice were
in  fact  hindered  more  by  the  wariness  of  the  EC  member  states
themselves  than  by  the  attitude  of  third  countries.  It  was  the  EC
member  states which postponed  the  Community's  admission  to  the
UN,  which  kept  in  place  the  inef:cient  separation  between  the
122 EC  foreign  ministers, Report on European Union, November 23, 1979, in
AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 4089. 
123 C. Soames,  Speech «Europe and the wider world,» Conservative Political
Centre, Brighton, October 8, 1980, in Churchill Archives, Soames, 16. 
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Community and the EPC divisions, which failed to follow up common
statements with substantial initiatives, which rejected EPC coordination
on  Security  Council  matters,  and  so  on.  As  demonstrated  in  this
chapter,  there  were  differences  between  individual  member  states'
attitudes  towards these  issues,  and France  was  most  often the  state
holding back. However, no member state exerted a strong pressure to
move from an EC sometimes speaking with a single voice to an EC
speaking with only one voice in international affairs.  
Any member state was keen to retain and cultivate «soit son image
de marque […] soit ses liens avec un autre groupe que celui des Neuf
[…]  soit  encore  les  droits  particuliers  qu'il  tient.»125 This  naturally
applied to the biggest European powers,  namely France and Britain.
However, Germany was also especially keen to retain foreign policy
autonomy  for  East–West  relations,  Denmark  had  to  combine
membership in the EC with membership in the group of Scandinavian
countries, Ireland was particularly sensitive to neutrality and colonial
issues,  the  Netherlands  wanted  to  stress  their  concern  about
development issues, and so on. Apart from the desire to retain some
foreign  policy  autonomy,  member  states'  wariness  of  letting  the  EC
speak with only one voice in international affairs was affected by their
divergent positions on the internal and institutional aspects of political
integration. In particular, little agreement existed on the political role
that the EC Commission could play, and on the relationship between
the Community and the EPC spheres, as shown in chapter 1. 
The  question  of  the  expression  of  a  single  voice  by  the  EC  in
international affairs clearly illustrates the ambiguities and the limits of
the process of assertion of the EC as a distinct international actor. EC
member  states  often  stated  that  their  long-term  goal  was  to  have
Europe speaking with one voice on the international stage. In fact, they
did  not  aim  to  have  a  Europe  speaking  with  only  one  voice:  one
common European voice might sometimes be expressed, but it should
not substitute the choir of single national voices. As was the case for the
internal institutional aspects of European political integration, for the
external  aspects  there  was  also  a  mismatch  between  the  rhetorical
statements  and  pledges  made  by  the  member  states  and  the  actual
decisions and actions taken by them. To be sure, pledges referred to
developments  envisaged  for  the  long-term.  However,  some  actual
decisions taken in the short-term often tended to hinder rather than to
favor the realization of such pledges.
125 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur cinq années de coopération politique,
June 18, 1975, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3785. 
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Chapter 3 
Limited Room for the EC's 
International Activity
During the 1970s the EC was endowed with a multiplicity of means
and structures for the  deployment of its  international activity,  which
offered it considerable opportunities.  However,  the EC exploited only
some of  these  opportunities.  One  obvious reason  for  this was  the
member states'  dif:culty  in reaching compromises  on certain issues,
which made the EC unable to move much beyond mere statements and
vague commitments.  A more important reason was that entire  sectors
of international affairs  were excluded  from  the  range of action  of the
EC, one example being defense. In  the case of these sectors, member
states  avoided  EC  coordination,  preferring  either  to  retain  national
freedom of maneuver or to pursue Atlantic coordination. The exclusion
of  these  sectors  was  partly  due  to  the  member  states'  view  of  the
character of the EC's international activity, and partly due to their view
of the relationship between it and transatlantic cooperation.  
In this chapter I focus on the process of de:ning the range of action
available for the EC's international activity, which led to the exclusion
of entire sectors of international affairs from it. First of all, I consider the
member states'  domaines réservés,  wherein  they  deliberately envisaged
no coordination with the EC partners. Then I look at the reasons why
the  member  states  ruled  out  the  pursuit  of  EC  cooperation  in  the
defense :eld, which was clearly one of the most important domains in
international  affairs.  Despite  its  dependence  on  the  US  in  terms  of
defense, in the early 1970s the EC tried to assert quite a large range for
its international activity, developing its own positions on delicate issues
–  even  at  the  risk  of  antagonizing  the  US itself.  However,  such  an
attempt was short-lived and the EC was forced to abandon it in 1974.
Consequently,  the  EC  had  to  refrain  from  taking  its  own  tough,
autonomous stances on issues that could spark controversies with the
US, such as in regards to energy or the Middle East question. 
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The  de:nition  of  the  range  of  action  available  for  the  EC's
international activity was certainly affected by the pressures exerted on
it by the US. However, I argue that its de:nition was even more heavily
affected  by  the  EC  member  states'  own  attitudes  towards  the
transatlantic relationship. On the one hand, Germany, Britain and the
Netherlands  tended  to  block  any  political  integration  initiative  that
risked harming transatlantic relations, such as the Euro-Arab dialogue
or the pursuit of EC coordination on energy. On the other hand, France
tended  to  block  any  political  integration  initiative  that  risked
strengthening  transatlantic  relations,  such  as  the  promotion  of
European defense coordination in close connection with NATO. Aside
from  concerns  about  transatlantic  relations,  member  states  clearly
envisaged  a  system  totally  without  common  activity  in  particular
sectors  where  they  wanted  to  retain  national  freedom  of  action,  or
where they preferred to coordinate at the level of the West. As a result,
European political integration was to deal with only some aspects of
international affairs.
Member states' domaines réservés
It is not by chance that the French expression domaines réservés was
often employed to identify the :elds and issues of international affairs
where the EC member states did not envisage EC coordination, in order
to preserve their ability to deploy fully autonomous national actions.
Among the member states, France was the country the most attached to
the  notion  of  domaines  réservés,  and  it  forcefully  argued  for  their
exclusion from the range of action of  the  EC's  international  activity.
France «sometimes seemed to regard the single voice of the Nine as a
drag on their own policies.»1 However, the other member states were
also eager to retain national  freedom of action in some :elds which
were  deemed  particularly  sensitive  and  important  for  their  own
national interests.  As a result,  there were some areas of international
affairs which could not be dealt with at the EC level. 
One  of  the  most  important  domaines  réservés  for  France  was
francophone sub-Saharan Africa. To be sure, the Community was asked
to contribute  to the  development  of  this  region through preferential
1 FCO, Record of meeting between the British and German political directors,
July 16, 1976, in NA, FCO 58/975. 
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commercial  agreements  and  a  transferal  of  aid  funds.  However,  its
involvement  in  the  region would be  strictly  limited to development
promotion:  as  far  as  political  relations  were  involved,  neither  the
Community nor the EPC wanted to interfere.2 At the EPC level France
refused to discuss most of the grave crises affecting its former African
colonies during the 1970s. The French government made clear that the
possible development of a common African policy of the EC would be
given  «un  coup  d’arrêt  très  ferme.»3 French  opposition  to  EC
coordination  in  sub-Saharan Africa  was  mainly  due  to  the  fact  that
France's relations with its  former African colonies were still  strongly
neocolonial in nature. European partners were not to interfere in the
close  relations  between France  and politically  embarrassing  regimes
such as that of Bokassa in the Central African Republic. 
France was the EC member state which was by far the most attached
to the exclusion of some domains of international affairs from the EC's
international  activity.  However,  the  other  member  states  were  also
wary of coordinating with the partners at the EC level in some :elds.
For instance, given the peculiarity of its situation during the Cold War,
and  the  sensitiveness  of  its  relations  with  the  Eastern  neighboring
countries,  West  Germany  was  wary  of  excessively  involving  its  EC
partners in this  area.  EC cooperation was desirable or acceptable on
some aspects of the relations with the Eastern European countries, such
as the CSCE, for instance. However, the German government preferred
to avoid EC cooperation in other domains, even though it frequently
consulted with some partners on a bilateral basis about them. 
Britain  tended  to  be  very  supportive  of  the  goal  of  European
political integration, and it highlighted its willingness to discuss even
the more sensitive issues with its EC partners. The British willingness
to discuss the Rhodesian crisis in the EPC was particularly stressed,
since it stood in stark contrast to France's wariness of involving its EC
partners in the crises affecting its own former colonies.4 However, the
British government also argued that  the speci:city of its  interests in
some :elds of international affairs required the full preservation of its
national freedom of action. For instance, the Wilson government fought
2 Ibid.;  MAEF,  Affaires  africaines  et  malgaches,  Note  sur  les  dangers  d'une
politique  globale  de  l'Europe  en  Afrique,  November  29,  1977,  in  AMAEF,
Affaires politiques, CE, 4087. 
3 C. Martin (Cabinet of de Guiringaud), Brief for meeting of the EC foreign
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4 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur la Grande-Bretagne et la CPE, June 15,
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hardly against close EC coordination in the Conference on International
Economic  Cooperation.  Britain  argued  that  North  Sea  oil  made  its
position too peculiar to coordinate with the other EC member states on
energy matters.5 Being nuclear powers and permanent members of the
UN Security Council, France and Britain were also clearly opposed to
close EC cooperation on these  issues.  All  they could consent to was
some bilateral cooperation and some information of the partners.6 
Member  states'  willingness  to  exclude  some :elds  and  issues  of
international  affairs  from  consultation  and  cooperation  with  EC
partners clearly depended not only on the sensitivity of their interests,
but also on the difference between their own position and the positions
held  by  the  partners  in  these  respects.  If  a  state  held  a  minority
position, it clearly had no incentive to coordinate with its partners. In
case of EC coordination, it would either be forced to move closer to the
majority position and thus away from its own national interests, or it
would be placed in the position of “demandeur,” and hence be required
to  offer  substantial  counterparts  for  the  observation  of  its  interests.
Bene:ts of collective action could be lower than the costs implied by it:
as Jeffry Friden put it in political science jargon, «there is a clear trade-
off  between  the  advantages  of  scale  and  the  disadvantages  of
overriding heterogenous preferences,» thus «the closer a member state's
preference is to the EU's expected collective preference, the better off it
will be with pooling.»7
5 E. Wellenstein (EC Commission, DG I), Note sur rencontre du groupe pour le
dialogue  entre  pays  producteurs  and consommateurs  de  pétrole,  March  21,
1975, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1117; EC Commission, Report on meeting of the
group on energy, April 7, 1975, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1117; J. de Beaumarchais
(French ambassador to the UK), Note sur les déclarations de Callaghan sur le
dialogue Nord–Sud, October 8, 1975, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Grande-
Bretagne, 350. 
6  British delegation to the UN, Note on the Security Council, April 15, 1976, in
NA, FCO 58/971; P.  M. Maxey (FCO, United Nations), Note on cooperation
among  the  Nine  on  Security  Council  matters,  May  20,  1976,  in  NA,  FCO
98/208; FCO, Note on the coordination of the Nine at the UN, September 1976,
in NA, FCO 98/209.  
7 J.  A. Frieden, «One Europe,  one vote? The political  economy of European
Union representation in international organizations,» in European Union Politics,
5 (2), 2004, pp. 262, 265. 
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The renunciation to the pursuit of a European defense 
Arguably, cooperation on defense matters should be one of the main
elements in a process of political integration. Indeed, the :rst ambitious
project for European political integration focused on defense, aiming at
establishing a European Defense Community. Also, the Fouchet plans
discussed in 1961–62 envisaged a system of European cooperation on
political and defense matters. After the failure of the EDC and of the
Fouchet plans, the EC member states did not pursue other attempts at
cooperation  on  defense  matters.  Most  of  them  cooperated  in  the
framework of NATO, since, except for Ireland, they all took part in the
Alliance.  However,  France  withdrew  from  the  NATO  integrated
military command in 1966, due to concerns of national independence
from  the  US.  Besides  NATO,  EC  member  states  cooperated  in  the
framework of the Western European Union, which had precisely been
established for cooperation on defense and security matters. However,
by the early 1970s the WEU had been substantially marginalized, much
to the bene:t of NATO.8
When the goal of European political integration was re-launched at
The  Hague  and  Paris  summits,  some  projects  for  cooperation  on
defense were considered. Cooperation on defense matters would imply
a clear progression in European political integration, and it could favor
the  assertion  of  the  EC  as  an  international  actor,  strengthening  its
position and providing real grip to its international activity. Unless it
included  defense,  the  EC's  international  activity  would  keep  «le
caractère un peu irréel d’exercices d'État Major où de manoeuvres dans
lesquels on ne tire qu'à  blanc.»9 In the  long run,  it  was  argued that
«l'identité  européenne ne peut-elle  être réelle sans défense propre et
autonome.»10 Moreover,  the  establishment  of  a  European  defense
would strengthen Europe's position with regard to the US, and it would
8 S.  Duke,  The  Elusive  Quest  for  European  Security.  From  EDC  to  CFSP
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000), pp. 42, 55; T. Taylor, «A European defence entity:
European institutions and defence,» in Europe in the Western Alliance. Towards a
Europen Defence Entity?,  ed.  J.  Alford and K.  Hunt  (Basingstoke:  Macmillan,
1988) pp. 196–197. 
9 G. Robin (Presidency of the French Republic), Note sur l'Europe, August 23,
1974, in AN, AG 5(3), 921. 
10 MAEF,  Pactes et  désarmement,  Note sur les  relations  Europe/États-Unis,
July 20, 1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3792.  See also F. M. Malfatti,
Speech to the political committee of the European Parliament, October 5, 1971,
in ACCE, BAC 156/1990 2822. 
97
help to meet the American calls  for  a more balanced sharing of  the
defense burden.
Aside  from  the  bene:ts  that  the  launch  of  European  defense
cooperation  could  have  brought  to  the  development  of  European
political  integration,  its  launch  could  also  have  been  useful  for
addressing  some  of  the  grave  strategic  worries  concerning  Western
Europe  in  the  early  1970s.  Western  Europeans  were  increasingly
worried about the trustworthiness of the American commitment to the
defense of Europe in case of a crisis with the USSR. The adoption of the
fexible response strategy by NATO could have led the US to decide not
to use its nuclear weapons to defend Western Europe.11 Moreover, the
possible  reduction  of  the  American  conventional  forces  in  Europe
might encourage an aggressive Soviet  attitude and increase risks  for
Western  Europe  in  case  of  crisis.  Effective  European cooperation  on
defense matters could have been helpful for addressing these worries,
even  if  at  the  same  time  it  might  have  encouraged  an  American
retrenchment. 
Some projects for  European cooperation on defense matters  were
discussed  in  the  early  1970s.  Most  of  them  did  not  aim  at  the
establishment  of  a  European  defense  system  outside  the  NATO
framework, or at the establishment of a proper European army. They
rather aimed at reassessing the European component of NATO and at
improving coordination on arms production,  planning,  procurement,
and so on. In 1968 the European full members of NATO had established
the  Eurogroup,  which  was  precisely  aimed  at  improving  their
coordination  on  defense  matters.  However,  the  Eurogroup  mainly
addressed technical  issues,  and it  was quite weak in political  terms.
Defense cooperation projects which were discussed in the early 1970s
largely  focused  on  a  strengthening  of  the  Eurogroup  and  on  the
establishment of some connection between it and the EPC system of
political integration.12 These projects were mostly advanced by Britain
and Germany.13 
11 Duke,  The Elusive Quest for European Security, p. 53;  J. Andréani, «L'Europe,
l'OTAN et la France: les problèmes non résolus de la défense européenne,» in
Politique étrangère, 48 (2), 1983, p. 344. 
12 French embassy in Bonn,  Note sur la République Fédérale et les relations
Europe–Amérique, February  18,  1974,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires  politiques,  RFA,
2985. 
13 FCO, Report on meeting of political directors on Europe/US relations, April
27, 1973,  in NA, FCO 98/1732; French embassy in Bonn, Report on meeting
with Scheel,  October 30, 1973,  in AMAEF,  Affaires politiques,  RFA, 2997;  D.
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With Britain and France being nuclear powers, in principle it was
even possible to envisage European cooperation on nuclear defense. To
this end, West Germany insisted on including a clause in the US–USSR
non-proliferation  treaty  granting  the  possibility  for  Europe  to  build
upon the French and British nuclear capability in the future.14 However,
several  political  problems  hindered  the  development  of  a  Western
European nuclear deterrent. One major problem was the disagreement
on the extent of desirable involvement of Germany in such a project.15
Another  major  problem was  France's  willingness  to  retain  complete
national  control  over  its  deterrent,  and  its  wariness  of  cooperation
projects as a result.16 French weapons could be used for the defense of
Western Europe as a whole, but only on a case-by-case basis and at the
discretion of the French President.17 Because of these problems, projects
for  European  defense  almost  exclusively  focused  on  conventional
defense. 
One more obstacle to European cooperation on defense matters was
the  growing  diffusion  of  paci:st  and  neutralist  preferences  among
Western  European  public  opinion.18 In  such  a  political  context,  and
considering the economic crisis of the 1970s, it was hard to envisage the
substantial  increase  of  military  spending that  the  development  of  a
European defense would have required. However, the main obstacle
Möckli, European Foreign Policy during the Cold War. Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and
the Dream of Political Unity (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2009), pp. 86–88;
G.-H. Soutou,  «L'anneau et  les deux triangles:  les rapports franco-allemands
dans la politique européenne et mondiale de 1974 à 1981,» in Les années Giscard.
Valéry Giscard d'Estaing et l'Europe 1974–1981,  ed.  S. Berstein and J.-F. Sirinelli
(Paris: Armand Colin, 2006), p. 50. 
14 MAEF,  Pactes  et  désarmement,  Note  sur  l'Allemagne  fédérale  et  les
problèmes  de  défense  européenne, January  26,  1972,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires
politiques, RFA, 3002. 
15 Ibid.; R. de Saint-Legier (MAEF, Amérique), Note sur la politique américaine
à l'égard de l'Europe, December 15, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA,
3004; D. Möckli, European Foreign Policy during the Cold War, p. 89. 
16 British embassy in Washington, Memorandum «The US and the enlarged
EC: commercial and economic issues,» January 25, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1294;
R.  de  Saint-Legier, Note  sur  la  politique  américaine  à  l'égard de  l'Europe,
December 15, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA, 3004; Möckli, European
Foreign Policy during the Cold War, p. 89; G.-H. Soutou, «Le Président Pompidou
et les relations entre les États-Unis et l'Europe,» in Journal of European Integration
History, 6 (2), 2000, p. 124. 
17 Andréani, «L'Europe, l'OTAN et la France,» p. 350. 
18 R.  de Saint-Legier, Note sur la politique américaine à l'égard de l'Europe,
December 15, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA, 3004. 
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hindering progress in European cooperation on defense issues was the
mismatch between the set of Western European countries which were
pursuing political integration (i.e. the EC member states) and the set of
countries  which  were  pursuing  military  coordination  within  NATO.
Ireland constituted a problem in this respect, but the main problem was
the position of France. 
To a large extent, Britain and Germany envisaged European defense
cooperation as a way to bring France back into  the Atlantic  system.
France did envisage some cooperation with the US on defense, but only
on a strictly bilateral basis.19 France was extremely  skeptical towards
the  British  and  German  initiatives  for  defense  cooperation,  since  it
wanted  to  preserve  a  neat  separation  between  European  political
integration  and  NATO.20 As  a  consequence,  France  did  not  want  to
enter  the Eurogroup  or  other  possible  similar  arrangements,  which
Pompidou  described  as  «un  sac,  dont  la  corde  qui  le  ferme  est
américaine.»21 Another  reason  for France's  opposition was  its  worry
that the  establishment  of  a  system  of  European  defense  might
encourage a German drift  to the East.22 Moreover,  European defense
cooperation could create problems in the relations with the USSR and
with the US, and its delicacy might hinder rather than favor progress
towards European political integration.23 
In principle,  France  did not oppose European defense cooperation.
As long as it took place outside NATO, the establishment of a European
system of defense cooperation could actually offer great opportunities
19 Soutou, «Pompidou et les relations entre les États-Unis et l'Europe,»  pp. 6,
27. 
20 MAEF,  Pactes  et  désarmement,  Note  sur  l'Allemagne  fédérale  et  les
problèmes  de  défense  européenne,  January  26,  1972,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires
politiques,  RFA,  3002;   M.  Debré,  Note  sur  les  relations  franco-britanniques
dans le  domaine militaire,  February 11,  1972,  in  AN, AG 5(2),  1014;  MAEF,
Europe  occidentale,  Note  sur  les  rapports  euro-américains, July  1,  1974,  in
AMAEF,  Affaires  politiques,  RFA,  3007;  Soutou,  «L'anneau  et  les  deux
triangles,» p. 50.
21 M. Jobert, Mémoires d'avenir (Paris: Grasset, 1974), p. 268. 
22 G.-H. Soutou, «The linkage between European integration and détente: The
contrasting approaches of de Gaulle and Pompidou, 1965 to 1974,» in European
Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik–Westpolitik, 1965–1973, ed. N. P. Ludlow
(London  and  New  York:  Routledge,  2007),  p.  30;  W.  Loth,  «Détente  and
European integration in the policies of Willy Brandt and Georges Pompidou,»
in European Integration and the Cold War. Ostpolitik–Westpolitik, 1965–1973, ed. N.
P. Ludlow (London and New York: Routledge: 2007), p. 62. 
23 Soutou, «L'anneau et les deux triangles,» p. 50.
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for the exertion of French political infuence. De Gaulle had envisaged
such a development, and the French government sometimes suggested
it during  the  1970s  as  well.  For  instance,  at the  heyday  of  the
transatlantic  tensions in late 1973,  the French foreign minister Michel
Jobert argued that Europe was «more and more abandoned to herself»
and  proposed to carry out  closer European cooperation on defense.24
Cooperation should take place outside of NATO, in the WEU. For this
reason,  the proposal  was coldly received by the EC partners,  which
were eager to promote cooperation in the NATO Eurogroup instead.25 
In  1975  and  1976  some  more  projects  were  considered  for  the
development of European defense cooperation.  In the perspective of
the  establishment  of  the  European  Union,  the  EC  Commission
proposed to endow the EU with a «potential competence» on defense
matters, which would be activated only when conditions would make
it  possible.26 The  Tindemans  Report  on  the  EU  dealt  with  defense
matters  to  some  extent,  arguing that  «European  Union  will  not  be
complete until it has drawn up a common defence policy.» EC member
states  were  invited  «regularly  to  hold  exchanges  of  views  on  […]
defence  matters»  and  «to  cooperate  in  the  manufacture  of
armaments.»27 The EU was supposed to  be  established by 1980:  the
German chancellor Helmut  Schmidt argued that a common European
defense policy should be established by that time.28 As with most of the
other  proposals  of  the  Report,  the  ones  on  defense  were  rapidly
24 J.  O.  Goldsborough,  «France,  the  European  crisis  and  the  Alliance,»  in
Foreign  Affairs,  52  (3),  1974,  p. 545.  See  also  D.  Möckli,  «The  EC-Nine  and
transatlantic  confict  during  the  October  War  and the  oil  crisis,  1973–4,»  in
European–American Relations and the Middle East: From Suez to Iraq, ed. D. Möckli
and V. Mauer (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 82; M. Schulz, «The
reluctant  European:  Helmut  Schmidt,  the  European  Community,  and
transatlantic  relations,»  in  The  Strained  Alliance.  US–European  Relations  from
Nixon to Carter, ed. M. Schulz and T. A. Schwartz (Cambridge and Washington:
Cambridge University Press and German Historical Institute, 2010), p. 285n. 
25 E.  E.  Tomkins (British ambassador to France),  Note on the French policy
towards  Europe,  October  31,  1973,  in  NA,  FCO 30/1742;  Duke,  The  Elusive
Quest for European Security, p. 56. 
26 EC Commission, Report on the European Union, June 25, 1975, in AMAEF,
Affaires politiques, CE, 3772. 
27 L. Tindemans, Report on European Union, December 29, 1975, published in
Bulletin des Communautés européennes, supplement 1/76. 
28 M. Vaïsse, «Valéry Giscard d'Estaing de la défense de l'Europe à la défense
européenne,» in  Les années  Giscard.  Valéry Giscard d'Estaing et  l'Europe 1974–
1981, ed. S. Berstein and J.-F. Sirinelli (Paris: Armand Colin, 2006), p. 213.
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shelved. 
Fundamental divergences between the EC member states' views on
the  relationship  between  European  defense  and  NATO  made  it
impossible not only to establish a European defense structure, but also
to discuss defense matters in the EPC framework. Giscard argued that
the problem of European defense was «un problème qui ne peut pas
etre utilement abordé.»29 For opposite reasons, the German and Dutch
governments agreed with him: they would discuss defense matters in
the  EPC framework  only  if  a  clear  link  with  NATO  was  ensured.30
During Giscard's presidency, France partly softened its attitude towards
NATO, deciding to join the European Planning Group in NATO, for
instance.31 However, such a policy shift was not suf:cient to permit the
launch of a strong and substantial cooperation of defense matters at the
European level.  As a  result,  defense  cooperation  continued to  occur
mostly in the NATO framework and partly through bilateral contacts,
while  defense  was  excluded  from  the  range  of  action  of  the  EC's
international activity. 
The adoption of a confrontational stance towards the US
The  absence  of  any agreement  for  the  development  of  European
cooperation  on  defense  matters  constrained  the  development  of  the
EC's  international  activity,  since  the  EC  was  to  remain  strongly
dependent upon the defense provided by NATO and by the US. While
most EC actors were happy with the American provision of defense, the
dependence  upon  the  US  constrained  the  room  for  the  launch  of
autonomous  European  initiatives  in  international  affairs.  Indeed,  if
these initiatives were not welcome by the US, the US could «in the last
resort, insist on having its way by threatening to leave the Europeans to
29 Ibid., pp. 214–215. 
30 British delegation to NATO, Note on US/European relations, May 11, 1973,
in NA, FCO 98/1734; M. D. Butler (FCO, European integration – external), Note
on European identity paper, September 12, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1750.  
31 M. Schulz and T. A. Schwartz, «Introduction,» in The Strained Alliance. US–
European  Relations  from  Nixon  to  Carter,  ed.  M.  Schulz  and  T.  A.  Schwartz
(Cambridge  and  Washington:  Cambridge  University  Press  and  German
Historical Institute, 2010), p. 9; Vaïsse, «Valéry Giscard d'Estaing...,» p. 225.
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their  own  devices  unless  they  come  to  heel.»32 The  relevance  and
effectiveness  of  this  constraint  was  to  appear  clearly  in  early  1974,
when the American administration explicitly threatened a reduction of
its  commitment  to  the  defense  of  Europe as  a  way to  force  the  EC
member  states  not  to  pursue  an  excessively  autonomous  course  in
international affairs.  
In  the  early  1970s  the  EC  member  states adopted  quite  a
confrontational stance vis-à-vis the US,  signaling their will  to depart
from the American foreign policy line on some issues. The adoption of
such a  stance was  favored  by  the  beginning  of  détente  and  it  was
spurred by the increasingly divergent views between the EC and the
US on a number of issues.  Divergent  views were  held on trade  and
monetary  issues, on international political affairs,  on Western  military
cooperation, and so on. This divergence made clear that American and
European interests «are not necessarily in confict, but in the new era
neither  are  they  automatically  identical.»33 Moreover,  the  Nixon
administration was showing an increasing ambivalence about the very
goal  of  European  political  integration  and  little  concern  with  the
European complaints for the American unilateralism.34 
While divergent positions  between the EC member states and the
US  were  not  an absolute  novelty,  the Europeans'  reluctance to meet
American concerns was quite striking.35 What was particularly striking
was the German and British reluctance in this regard, since the French
wariness towards close transatlantic relations was age-old.  Especially
starting  from  1972,  France advocated the  adoption  of quite  a
32 J. T. Mase:eld (FCO, Planning staff), Note on Euro–American consultations,
June 26, 1975, in NA, FCO 49/567. 
33 H.  Kissinger,  Address to the Associated Press's annual dinner,  New York,
April  23,  1973,  available  at  <http://www.cvce.eu/obj/address_given_by_
henry_a_kissinger_new_york_23_april_1973-en-dec472e3-9dff-4c06-ad8d-d3fab
7e13f9f.html>. According to Hubert Zimmermann, «beyond East–West politics,
the Europeans were simply regarded as rivals» by the Nixon administration
(«Western  Europe  and  the  American  challenge:  confict  and  cooperation  in
technology and monetary policy, 1965–1973,» in  Between Empire and Alliance.
America and Europe during the Cold War, ed. M. Trachtenberg (Lanham: Rowman
& Little:eld, 2003), p. 141). 
34 G.  Lundestad,  The  United  States  and  Western  Europe  since  1945 (Oxford:
Oxford  University  Press,  2003), pp. 176–177;  Goldsborough,  «France,  the
European crisis and the Alliance,» p. 547. 
35 N. P.  Ludlow, «Transatlantic relations in the Johnson and Nixon eras: The
crisis that didn't  happen – and what it  suggests about the one that did,» in
Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 8 (1), 2010. 
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confrontational  attitude  towards  the  US  by the  EC.  Its call  was not
strongly resisted by the German and British governments, which were
traditionally much more eager to cultivate close transatlantic relations.
On personal grounds, both Edward Heath and Willy Brandt were less
attached to the transatlantic relationship  than their predecessors  and
they did not go well with Nixon.36 Moreover,  the German and British
governments had to prove their commitment to  the goal of  European
political integration which was set in The Hague and Paris summits. 
The  evidence  of  increasing  West  European  reluctance  to  meet
American  concerns  on  a  number  of  international  issues  led  the US
National  Security  adviser  Henry  Kissinger  to  launch  the  infamous
«Year of Europe» initiative on April 23, 1973: 
The Atlantic nations must :nd a solution for the management of
their  diversity  to  serve the common objectives  which underlie
their  unity.  We  can  no  longer  afford  to  pursue  national  or
regional self-interest without a unifying framework. We cannot
hold  together  if  each  country  or  region  asserts  its  autonomy
whenever  it  is  to  its  bene:t  and  invokes  unity  to  curtail  the
independence of others. We must strike a new balance between
self-interest and the common interest.37
Kissinger's initiative  was  aimed  at  re-launching  transatlantic
cooperation.  The  US  and  the  EC  would  discuss  most  of  the  issues
dividing them and they would work out a «New Atlantic Charter.» In
reality,  the Year of Europe initiative turned out  as an occasion  for a
further  increase  in the  existing strains.  European  reactions  to
Kissinger's  proposal were  very  wary. The  EC  governments  did  not
subscribe to the vision of the transatlantic relationship proposed by the
US, and they instead sought a reassessment of the relationship based on
Europe's own terms. They sought to exploit the Year of Europe in order
to  prove  that  the  EC  had  become  a  cohesive  political  entity  to  be
reckoned with. 
Kissinger's  attempt  at  drawing  the  Europeans  into  a  global
36 Möckli,  «The  EC-Nine  and  transatlantic  confict,» p.  78;  Schulz  and
Schwartz,  «Introduction,» p.  10;  E.  Heath,  The  Course  of  My  Life (London:
Bloomsbury Reader, 2011), p. 461. 
37 H. Kissinger, Address to the AP's annual dinner, New York, April 23, 1973.
Kissinger's  speech  was  the  most  important  call  for  a  reappraisal  of  the
transatlantic relationship, but it was not the :rst one: see for instance  French
embassy  in  Washington,  Note  sur  la  visite à  Washington  de  Dahrendorf,
October 9, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3787; French embassy in
Bonn, Note sur les relations entre la CEE et les États-Unis, January 16, 1973, in
AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA, 3004. 
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reassessment of the transatlantic relationship was perceived as «clearly
the most important single element» in his proposal by the Europeans.38
A global  approach  would  make  it  possible  for  the  US  to  extract
concessions from the EC in the  economic  and political  :elds in  return
for  the  preservation  of  the  American  security  umbrella.  Otherwise,
Kissinger warned that an exacerbation of economic and political strains
could lead to a reduction of the American commitment to the defense
of  Western  Europe.39 However,  the  EC  governments  insisted  on
isolating the discussion of security issues from the other ones, and they
opposed the drafting of a single new Atlantic Charter.40 Two separate
documents should be elaborated, one addressing security issues to be
signed  only  by  NATO  members  and  another  one  addressing  the
relationship between the US and the EC as such. The latter declaration
would  grant  American  recognition  to  the  EC  as  a cohesive  political
entity.  
Moreover, the EC member states refused to acknowledge the special
character  of  their  relationship  with  the  US.  While most  of  the  EC
governments  were  ready  and  willing  to  acknowledge  that  such  a
special character was a matter of fact, France exerted strong opposition
against it.41 France argued that its acknowledgement could offer the US
a way  «pour invoquer vis-à-vis d'eux une allégeance […] de l'Europe
des Neuf.»42 Transatlantic relations should be considered «a question
like  any  other,»43 «“normal”  and  on  the  same  basis  as  with  other
states.»44 Kissinger was particularly infuriated by the European refusal
to acknowledge the special character of their relationship, deeming the
38 H. T. A. Overton (FCO, North America), Note on US policy towards Europe,
May 21, 1973, in NA, FCO 98/1734. 
39 J. E. Cable (FCO, Planning staff), Note on the US and Europe, March 7, 1973,
in NA, FCO 30/1730; H. Kissinger, Address to the AP's annual dinner, New
York, April 23, 1973; R. Cromer (British ambassador to the US), Note on Nixon's
foreign policy report, May 8, 1973, in NA, FCO 98/1734. 
40 British delegation to NATO, Note on US/European relations, May 11, 1973,
in NA, FCO 98/1734;  H. T. A. Overton, Note on US policy towards Europe,
May 21, 1973, in NA, FCO 98/1734; British embassy in Brussels, Report on EPC
meeting on Europe/US relations, May 26, 1973, in NA, FCO 98/1734. 
41 Dutch draft for an Atlantic declaration of principles, June 1973, in AMAEF,
Affaires  politiques,  CE,  3792;  British  embassy  in  Bonn,  Note  on  US/EEC
relations, August 21, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1739. 
42 MAEF, Political director, Note sur la déclaration des Neuf, October 13, 1973,
in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3795.  
43 M.  Jobert  quoted  in  FCO,  Report  on  ministerial  EPC  meeting  on
European/American relations, June 6, 1973, in NA, FCO 98/1736. 
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draft of the EC–US Declaration so anodyne that «it would need a very
few changes in the wording for the US to sign a similar paper with the
USSR.»45 Because  of  these  problems,  negotiations  for the  EC–US
Declaration were abandoned in November 1973.
Beside  the  lack  of  progress  in  the  Year  of  Europe  negotiations,
transatlantic strains further increased after the outbreak of the Arab-
Israeli  war in October 1973. The EC member states and the US held
different views with regard to it and they were critical of each other's
positions. The Europeans held the US partly responsible for the war,
and hence for the oil embargo imposed by the Arab countries against
some Western ones, which was hitting them hard. The US complained
about the line adopted by the Europeans during the war, which was
deemed too lenient towards the Arabs. The EC's denial of support to
the American airlift to Israel caused severe irritation in the US, while
the launch of a nuclear alert by the US caused outrage in Europe, since
it was decided without even consulting or informing the Europeans.46 
The exacerbation of transatlantic tensions in late 1973 led the EC
member  states  to  publish  a  «Declaration  on the  European identity,»
which  was  one  the  most  explicit  attempts  at  asserting  the  EC's
distinctness  on  the  international  stage  during  the  1970s.  The
Declaration was elaborated by the EC member states during the Year of
Europe  and  it  was  precisely  meant  at  identifying  the  features
distinguishing the EC from the US.47 While the document had initially
been conceived of  only for internal  use,  the EC member states later
opted in favor of its publication in order to declare and highlight the
EC's distinctness. The release of the Declaration by the EC leaders at the
Copenhagen  Summit  in  December  1973  represented  the  heyday  of
44 C. Ewart-Biggs (British embassy in France), Note on US/Europe, August 28,
1973, in NA, FCO 30/1739. 
45 R. Cromer, Note on the relations between the US and the EEC, November 2,
1973, in NA, FCO 30/1742.  
46 P. Mélandri, «Une relation très spéciale: la France, les États-Unis et l'année de
l'Europe, 1973–1974,» in  Georges Pompidou et l'Europe,  ed. Association Georges
Pompidou (Bruxelles: Editions Complexe, 1995), pp. 116–117; Möckli, «The EC-
Nine and transatlantic confict,» p. 83; J. Sakkas, «Reconciling political identity
and Atlantic  partnership:  Europe and the  Middle East  crisis  of  1973–74,» in
Atlantic,  Euratlantic,  or  Europe–America?,  ed.  G.  Scott-Smith  and  V.  Aubourg
(Paris: Soleb, 2011), p. 514. 
47 The elaboration of the  Declaration was  explicitly  proposed by the British
government, but  it  was an idea  which  was already circulating (M. C. Beers,
«European unity and the transatlantic gulf in 1973,» in  Atlantic, Euratlantic, or
Europe–America?, ed. G. Scott-Smith and V. Aubourg (Paris: Soleb, 2011), p. 492).
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Europe's  attempt  at  asserting  its  international  personality  by
juxtaposing itself with the US.  
The contents of the Declaration were not particularly original: they
constituted a sort of catalogue of principles to which the EC claimed to
be attached. More than its content, the Declaration is interesting for its
stress on the notion of a “European identity,” which was not widely
employed before then.48 Most of all, the Declaration is interesting for
the  very  fact  that  the drafting and release  of  such  a  document was
deemed necessary. The decision of drafting it as well as the stress put
on the elements distinguishing the European identity from any other
were clearly closely connected to the ongoing process of assertion of the
EC on the international stage, and on the attempt at expanding its room
of  maneuver  with  regard  to  the  US.  As  Sophie  Huber  put  it,  «the
expression “European identity” seemed to echo a willingness to act and
exist.»49
The US as the tenth member state of the EC?
The  existence  of  transatlantic  structures  of  cooperation  had
provided  an  essential  framework  for  the  development  of  European
integration  since  its  very  beginning.  As  Piers  Ludlow  argues,
transatlantic  cooperation  had  made  it  possible  to  relieve  European
institutions of political and security tasks with which they would have
clearly not been able to deal on their own.50 Even if the transatlantic
48 G.  Kreis,  «L'émergence de la  notion  d'“identité”  dans  la  politique  de la
Communauté  européenne.  Quelques  réfexions  autour  de  la  Déclaration  du
sommet de Copenhague de 1973,» in Relations internationales, 140, 2009, pp. 58–
59; A. É. Gfeller, «Imagining European identity: French élites and the American
challenge in the Pompidou–Nixon era,» in  Contemporary European History,  19
(2), 2010. 
49 Huber  quoted  in  Kreis,  «L'émergence  de  la  notion  d'“identité”  dans  la
politique de la CE,» p. 72. 
50 N. P.  Ludlow, «The end of  symbiosis:  The Nixon era and the collapse of
comfortable  co-existence  between  European  and  Atlantic  integration,»  in
Atlantic,  Euratlantic,  or  Europe–America?,  ed.  G.  Scott-Smith  and  V.  Aubourg
(Paris: Soleb, 2011), pp. 63–69. See also J. Sauvagnargues (French ambassador to
West Germany), Note sur les relations entre la CEE et les États-Unis, January 16,
1973,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires  politiques,  RFA,  3004;  N.  Henderson  (British
ambassador to West Germany), Report on Brimelow's visit to Bonn, August 17,
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relationship continued to work as a useful framework in this respect, in
the  early  1970s  it  was  also  increasingly  regarded  by  EC  actors  as
hindering  further  progress  towards  European  political  integration.
Some  confrontation  with  the  US could  in  fact  favor  a  stronger  and
clearer assertion of the EC as a distinct international actor. Indeed, the
juxtaposition to an “Other” – often a relatively close one – is one of the
most common strategies employed in identity-building processes.   
In  the  early  1970s  the  EC  tried  to  pursue  such  a  strategy  of
juxtaposition, stressing the differences which set it apart from the US.
Such  a  strategy  was  particularly  promoted  by  France,  which
deliberately sought occasions to highlight the EC's distinctness from the
US.  Juxtaposing  the  EC  with  the  US  could  be  used  «as  a  sort  of
common external  tariff  behind which  to  foster  the  infant  growth of
integration.»51 Accordingly,  Kissinger  contended  that  the  Europeans
had «come to believe that their identity should be measured by [their]
distance from the United States.»52 On his part, Pompidou argued that
«l'Europe ne sera l'Europe  que si elle se distingue – je ne dis pas: se
coupe – je dis se distingue de l'Amérique.»53 France saw juxtaposition
to the US not only as favoring the assertion of the EC's distinctness, but
also as favoring an evolution of the transatlantic relationship towards a
binary  and  symmetrical  structure.  Indeed,  France  envisaged  the
evolution of the West into «un monde bipède,» wherein the US and the
EC would  have «la  même puissance,  la  même force,  la  même
capacité.»54 
It was precisely the future form of the relationship between the EC
and the US which was at stake during the Year of Europe. To what an
extent  was the EC  to become distinct  from the US  and autonomous
from it? To what an extent  was the asymmetry  between them to  be
reduced? Some of the most important elements in this respect were the
features  of  the  future  structures  and  procedures  for  transatlantic
1973, in NA, FCO 30/1739. 
51 J. T. Mase:eld, Note on Euro–American consultations, June 26, 1975, in NA,
FCO 49/567.
52 H. Kissinger, Speech to the Pilgrims of Great Britain, London, December 12,
1973,  published  in  The  New  York  Times,  December  13,  1973.  See  also  K.
Hamilton, «Britain, France, and America's Year of Europe, 1973,» in Diplomacy
and Statecraft, 17, 2006, p. 879. 
53 Pompidou quoted in M. Vaïsse, «Changement et continuité dans la politique
européenne  de  la France,»  in  Georges  Pompidou  et  l'Europe,  ed.  Association
Georges Pompidou (Bruxelles: Editions Complexe, 1995), p. 36. 
54 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur les relations Europe/États-Unis, June 7,
1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3792. 
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dialogue. One of the goals which had lead the US to launch the Year of
Europe was to establish  new  procedures  for  dialogue  with  the
Europeans,  since the existing chances for dialogue in the  OECD and
NATO  were  deemed  inadequate.55 In  fact,  the  Year  of  Europe
negotiations  themselves  constituted an  occasion  to  experiment  with
new and stronger forms of transatlantic dialogue. 
The French government was  afraid that new forms of transatlantic
dialogue could enable the US to exert an infuence on the making of the
EC policies. The US could turn into a sort of tenth member state of the
EC, hindering the adoption of distinct positions by it and perpetuating
the asymmetry in the transatlantic relationship.56 In order to avoid such
developments,  the  French  government  strove to  frame  the  Year  of
Europe negotiations as a dialogue between two separate and cohesive
entities. The EC as such would be the only counterpart of the US in the
process and it would discuss with it on a basis of equality. The French
opposed «toute  procédure  qui  prendrait  la  forme  d'une  discussion
collective:»57 the US should not be involved before the de:nition of the
common  European  positions  and  no  discussion  à  dix should  occur,
since  «ce  n'était  pas  la  voie permettant  de  faire  apparaitre  l'identité
européenne.»58 For this reason, France argued that if Nixon was to visit
55 R.  Dahrendorf,  Speech  «La  Communauté  européenne  dans  le  monde,»
American Bar Association, Chicago, March 26, 1971, in HAEU, EN 1526;  J. R.
Schaetzel  (US representative to the EC),  Speech on the EC and the US after
August 15, Mid Atlantic Group, Bonn, September 21, 1971, in ACCE, Speeches
collection; European Parliament, Resolution on relations between the EC and
the US, October 18, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1741. 
56 FCO, Note on Europe/US relations, April 27,  1973, in NA, FCO 98/1732;
MAEF,  Europe  occidentale,  Note  sur  les  rapports  Europe/États-Unis,
September 12, 1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3792; French embassy
in Bonn, Note sur les rapports Europe/États-Unis, October 30, 1973, in AMAEF,
Affaires politiques, RFA, 2997; MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur les rapports
euro-américains, July 1, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA, 3007. 
57 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Compte rendu d'un entretien entre le secrétaire
général et l'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne, November 29, 1973, in AMAEF,
Affaires  politiques,  Grande-Bretagne,  356. See  also  British  embassy in Paris,
Note on transatlantic relations, November 29, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1742.
58 MAEF,  Europe  occidentale,  Compte  rendu  d'une  réunion  CPE  sur  les
rapports Europe/États-Unis, June 9, 1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE,
3792.  C.  Ewart-Biggs,  Note  on  the  preparation  for  Copenhagen,  August  24,
1973,  in  NA,  FCO  30/1739;  MAEF,  Affaires  politiques,  Compte  rendu  des
entretiens du ministre avec Brimelow et Frank, August 31, 1973, in AMAEF,
Affaires politiques,  CE, 3792;  FCO, Note on the Year of Europe, October 15,
1973, in NA, FCO 30/1741;  MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur  les rapports
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Europe at the conclusion of the Year of Europe negotiations, he should
not meet with all the EC heads of state and government together  («it
would be like Charlemagne convening his barons and laying down the
law»),59 but only with the presidents of the Council of ministers and of
the EC Commission.60
The  American  vision  of  the  future  form  of  the  transatlantic
relationship  was  opposite  to  the  French  one. The  relationship was
clearly  to remain  asymmetrical  in kind.  In his Year of Europe speech,
Kissinger famously argued that  «the United States has global interests
and  responsibilities.  Our  European  allies  have  regional  interests.»61
American positions in the following months gave the impression to the
Europeans that the US aimed at a perpetuation of such an asymmetry.62
According to  the representation  proposed by Michel  Jobert, Kissinger
envisaged «l'Europe con:née à  sa vocation purement  régionale et  le
monde s'ordonnant autour de la puissance américaine comme autrefois
l'empire du Milieu s'entourait de sept lunes gravitant autour de lui.»63
Even  if  Jobert's  representation  was  clearly  excessively  negative  and
very  partisan,  the  US  envisaged  the  development  of the  EC  into  a
political actor, but  the EC would have to coordinate its initiatives and
positions with those of the US. 
During the Year of Europe the US sought to establish a system of
permanent  transatlantic  consultations,  so  that  the  EC would consult
Europe/États-Unis, February 26, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3792.
59 G.  Pompidou  quoted  in  N.  P.  Ludlow,  «Creating  the  expectation  of  a
collective  response:  The  impact  of  summitry  on  transatlantic  relations,»  in
International  Summitry  and  Global  Governance.  The  Rise  of  the  G7  and  of  the
European Council, 1974–1991, ed. E. Mourlon-Druol and F. Romero (London and
New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 146. 
60 MAEF, Report on Heath–Pompidou meeting, May 22, 1973, in AN, AG 5(2),
1015;  FCO, Report on EPC meeting on European/American relations, June 6,
1973, in NA, FCO 98/1736; MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur les relations
Europe/États-Unis,  June  6,  1973,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires  politiques,  RFA,  3005;
Mélandri, «Une relation très spéciale,» p. 103. 
61 H. Kissinger, Address to the AP's annual dinner, New York, April 23, 1973.
Kissinger  successively  reaf:rmed the  global–regional  distinction  (J.
Sauvagnargues,  Note sur les rapports Europe–États-Unis,  October 30, 1973, in
AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA, 2997). 
62 M. Gilbert, «Gli anni Settanta: un decennio di tensione e disattenzione nelle
relazioni transatlantiche,» in  Le crisi  transatlantiche: continuità e trasformazioni,
ed. M. Del Pero and F. Romero (Roma: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2007), p.
54.
63 Jobert, Mémoires d'avenir, p. 231. 
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with the US before adopting its positions on international issues. As the
French put it,  «le problème de la consultation préalable était au coeur
de la question des relations entre l'Europe et les États-Unis.»64 For the
Year of Europe negotiations too, the US envisaged a dialogue wherein
the  EC  did  not  present  the  US  with  de:nitive  common  positions.
However, in keeping with the quite confrontational attitude that it had
adopted,  the  EC  presented de:nitive  common  positions  to  the  US
during the negotiations.  American calls for the establishment of joint
working groups formed by the US and by each of the EC member states
were  turned down.  However,  the  elaboration  of  common  European
positions  was  a  slow  process  and  it often  required  dif:cult
compromises  between  the  member  states:  once  compromises  were
concluded,  it  was particularly hard for the US to induce changes in
them.65
Kissinger repeatedly complained about the cumbersome procedure
for decision-making in the EPC. He especially complained that the EC
was presenting the US with faits accomplis and he continued to press for
preliminary  consultations.66 Most EC member states  were sensitive to
the American complaints and ready to consent to closer consultations.
They did not share the French concerns about the possible  exertion of
American interference in the de:nition of the EC positions, and they
were,  in  fact,  quite  eager  to  anchor  the  development  of  European
political  integration to the West.67 Unlike what France  was claiming,
64 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur les relations Europe/États-Unis, May
29,  1974,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires  politiques,  RFA,  3007.  See  also FCO,  Note  on
Europe/US relations, April 27, 1973, in NA, FCO 98/1732; French embassy in
London, Note sur l'entretien anglo–américain sur les relations transatlantiques,
August  7,  1973,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires  politiques,  Grande-Bretagne,  364;  FCO,
Brief on transatlantic relations, October 4, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1741. 
65 F. Hilfrich, «West Germany's long Year of Europe. Bonn between Europe and
the United States,» in The Strained Alliance. US–European Relations from Nixon to
Carter,  ed.  M.  Schulz  and  T.  A.  Schwartz  (Cambridge  and  Washington:
Cambridge University Press and German Historical Institute, 2010), p. 244. 
66 See for instance British embassy in Bonn, Note on US/EEC relations, August
21, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1739;  MAEF,  Affaires politiques, Compte rendu des
entretiens du ministre avec Brimelow et Frank, August 31, 1973, in AMAEF,
Affaires politiques, CE, 3792; French embassy in London, Note sur l'entretien
anglo-américain sur les relations transatlantiques, August 7, 1973, in AMAEF,
Affaires politiques, Grande-Bretagne, 364. 
67 See for instance P. Harmel, Letter to the foreign ministers of the Six, February
16,  1971,  in  PAAA,  B1,  386;  MAEF,  Europe  centrale,  Compte  rendu  des
entretiens Schumann–Scheel, January 22, 1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques,
CE, 3784; Möckli, European Foreign Policy during the Cold War, pp. 84–85. 
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most EC member states did not aim at turning the EC into a political
entity comparable to the US. What they sought instead was to achieve a
stronger activity and pro:le for the EC on the international stage, so as
to reduce the imbalance in the transatlantic relationship.
Consenting to limits to the EC's autonomous activity
The EC's  attempt  to assert itself as a distinct international  actor by
adopting a  confrontational  attitude towards  the  US  was  short-lived.
The confrontational attitude had to be abandoned as soon as the US
stepped up its pressure, and  when the EC was hit by the outbreak of
the oil crisis at the end of 1973. During the early months of 1974 the US
successfully ensured that the EC would not develop a common energy
policy detached from the American one, or an autonomous role in the
Middle East. The US also obtained an acknowledgement of the special
character of the transatlantic relationship,  as well as the possibility of
getting involved in the making of the EPC.  Permanent  dialogue with
the US would be carried out and European political integration would
not go as far as to endanger transatlantic cohesion. 
France was the only member state which tended to give precedence
to the goal of  European  political integration over  the preservation of
transatlantic cooperation,  arguing that «l'évolution des rapports euro–
américains  […]  ne  doit  pas  compromettre  le  sens  et  la  portée  de
l'acheminement  des  Neufs  vers  l'Union  européenne.»68 Despite  the
American  threats,  the  French  government  did  not  expect  that
prioritizing  European  integration would  necessarily  jeopardize  the
security  of  Western  Europe,  since  «les  forces  américaines  sont  en
Europe dans l’intérêt des États-Unis.»69 In any case, France could enjoy
a free-rider position: certain as it was that its  EC partners would have
ensured that the US did not disengage from the defense of Europe, the
French  government  could safely  express  its  wariness  about  close
transatlantic relations. The expression of such a wariness responded to
domestic political  imperatives, and  it could  also  be used to  prove the
strength  of  the  French  commitment  to  the  building  of  Europe  as  a
68 MAEF, Europe occidentale,  Note sur les rapports euro-américains,  July 1,
1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA, 3007. 
69 MAEF,  Pactes  et  désarmement,  Note sur les relations Europe/États-Unis,
July 20, 1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3792. 
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politically cohesive actor.  
The  Washington  Conference  on  energy  in  February  1974  was
possibly the clearest instance of the EC member states' tendency to opt
for  the  preservation  of  Atlantic  unity  over  the  pursuit  of  European
political integration, in the case of a necessary choice between the two.
The  Conference  was  an  American  initiative,  and  it  was  meant  to
elaborate a common Western response to the energy crisis. In fact, even
if energy concerns were real, the initiative clearly had general political
goals,  namely  to  stop Europe  drifting  away from the US.  Tactically,
energy was a  good topic  to reaf:rm Atlantic  unity:  the EC member
states had diverging positions and interests on energy, and they were
also very weak because of their structural dependence on oil imports.
The American proposal for a conference of the industrialized countries
was launched a couple of days before the Copenhagen Summit in 1973,
which was expected to agree on a common energy policy but failed to
do so.70 
At the Washington Conference, Nixon and Kissinger explicitly made
a linkage between transatlantic cooperation in energy matters and in
security matters.71 They claimed that the Europeans could not enjoy the
latter  while  eschewing  the  former  by  developing  autonomous
initiatives  towards  the  Arab  countries.  According  to  the  American
project, the conference was to lead to the establishment of a permanent
organization  regrouping  Western  consumer  countries.72 France  was
opposed to the creation of such an organization, and few weeks before
the  conference  Jobert  launched an alternative  proposal,  calling for  a
global energy conference in the UN framework.73 Because of the French
opposition, the mandate for the Washington conference approved by
the Council of ministers excluded the establishment of the permanent
organization envisaged by the US.
At  the  conference  the  EC  member  states  were  forced  to  choose
between the establishment of a permanent organization and therefore
Atlantic unity on one side, or the pursuit of a distinct European energy
policy on the other side. All member states except for France yielded
70 Hilfrich, «West Germany's long Year of Europe,» p. 253. 
71 F. Venn, «International co-operation versus national self-interest: The United
States and Europe during the 1973–1974 oil crisis,» in The United States and the
European Alliance since 1945, ed. K. Burk and M. Stokes (Oxford and New York:
Berg, 1999), p. 86. 
72 Möckli, «The EC-Nine and transatlantic confict,» p. 84; Venn, «International
co-operation versus national self-interest,» p. 76. 
73 Hilfrich, «West Germany's long Year of Europe,» p. 253. 
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and opted for the former. As a result, in November 1974 they joined the
newly established International Energy Agency. The split between the
EC member states was certainly encouraged by the US, but it had also
much  to  do  with  European  and  personal  politics.  A crucial  role  in
consenting to the American initiative was played by the Germans, and
in  particular  by  the  :nance  minister  Helmut  Schmidt,  who clashed
directly  with  Jobert.74 Jobert  argued  that  Schmidt  wanted  a  Europe
receiving from the US «conseils, appuis et parfois directives,» while on
the contrary he sought a «Europe européenne.»75 The split between EC
member states  and the  creation  of  a  Western  framework for  energy
cooperation led to a substantial exclusion of energy matters from the
EC's international activity.  
Part  of  the  reason  why  the  American  administration  was
particularly  eager  to  bring  the  Europeans  back  into  line  was  their
adoption of original  positions on the Middle East.  During the Arab-
Israeli war in October 1973 the EC member states had taken a position
which was critical of Israel and of the US, and on November 6 they had
released a declaration calling for Israel's withdrawal from the occupied
territories,  and  for  the  recognition  of  the  rights  of  the  Palestinian
people. The adoption of this line was clearly linked to the European
eagerness  to  preserve  decent  relations  with  the  oil  producing  Arab
countries. On November 21, Jobert proposed to establish a permanent
structure for dialogue and cooperation between the EC and the Arab
countries.76 As Möckli puts it,  France «was particularly indignant over
Europe's marginalisation during the October War and was now keen on
enhancing the political identity of the Nine.»77 
The  adoption  of  an  original  stance  on  the  Middle  East  and  the
project of cooperation with oil producing countries were resting on an
approach that had been shaped in the EPC in the previous years. EPC
cooperation on  the  Middle East had started in early 1971 thanks to a
74 Goldsborough, «France, the European crisis and the Alliance,» p. 539. 
75 Jobert, Mémoires d'avenir, p. 289. 
76 Hilfrich,  «West Germany's long Year of Europe,»  p. 246.  The possibility of
establishing a dialogue between the EC and the Arab countries had already
been suggested by Algeria  (G. Garavini,  After  Empires:  European  Integration,
Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South 1957–1986 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012), p. 177). 
77 Möckli, «The EC-Nine and transatlantic confict,» p. 82. See also A. É. Gfeller,
«A European voice in the Arab world: France, the superpowers and the Middle
East, 1970–74,» in Cold War History, 11 (4), 2011, p. 665. 
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French  initiative,  and  the  Commission  had  proposed  to  establish  a
dialogue  with  oil  producing  countries  in  October 1972.78 EPC
cooperation  on  the  Middle  East  contributed  to  shift  member  states'
positions closer to the pro-Arab position adopted by France. The project
of Euro-Arab dialogue  put forward by France  was  aimed at  a further
strengthening  of  the  EC's  relations  with  the  Arab  countries,
complementing  their  initiatives  on  the  Middle  East  and  their
Mediterranean policies.79 In the French intentions, the project was also
clearly aimed at countering the American attempt at building a Western
front of consumer countries which would confront the producing ones.
France's partners were not eager to establish the Euro-Arab dialogue,
but  they  acquiesced  to  it,  partly  because  they  feared  negative  Arab
reactions  in  case  of  rejection of  the  project.80 They  substantially
endorsed the pursuit of closer cooperation with the Arab countries at
the Copenhagen Summit in December 1973. 
The  US  strongly  opposed  the  project  of  a  Euro-Arab  dialogue,
arguing that it undermined its attempts at addressing the Arab-Israeli
question and the  energy  problems.81 Nixon  even threatened a  troop
withdrawal  from  Europe  as  a  reaction  to  it.  Partly  because  of  the
American  opposition  and  partly  for  their  own reasons,  France's  EC
partners attached some conditions  to the establishment  of a dialogue
with the Arab countries.  Germany made  it conditional upon France's
participation  in  the  Washington conference  on  energy,  while  Britain
made it conditional upon agreement on regular consultations with the
78 Möckli, «The EC-Nine and transatlantic confict,» p. 79;  D. Allen, «Political
Cooperation and the Euro-Arab dialogue,» in European Political Cooperation, ed.
D. Allen, R. Rummel, and W. Wessels (London: Butterworth Scienti:c, 1982), p.
69.
79 Gfeller, «A European voice in the Arab world,» pp. 665–666. 
80 Ibid., p. 666. Italy was quite favorable to the project however (Garavini, After
Empires, p. 177).
81 M. E. Guasconi, «Prove tecniche di politica estera: la Comunità Economica
Europea e lo sviluppo del dialogo euro-arabo negli anni Settanta,» in  Mondo
Contemporaneo, 8 (2), 2012; Hilfrich, «West Germany's long Year of Europe,» pp.
246, 247; Gfeller, «A European voice in the Arab world,» p. 668; S. Pierantonio,
«La  guerra  di  ottobre  vista  dall'Europa:  tra  desideri  di  autonomia,  crisi
energetica e imperativi  atlantici,»  in  La Comunità europea e  le  relazioni  esterne
1957–1992, ed. A. Bitumi, G. D'Ottavio, and G. Laschi (Bologna: CLUEB, 2008),
pp. 99–103; H. A. Jawad,  Euro-Arab Relations. A Study in Collective  Diplomacy
(Reading: Ithaca Press, 1992), p. 110. 
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US.82 The launch of the dialogue became possible only  in June 1974,
after the conclusion of the Gymnich compromise on consultations with
the US. By then, it had been made clear that  the dialogue would not
address political  issues such as  the Arab-Israeli  problem, and  that  it
would  largely  eschew  oil  issues  as  well.83 As  Cheysson  remarked,
«entrés dans le dialogue qui est un exercice politique pour des raisons
politiques les Européens refusent pourtant d'y parler politique.»84
The French occasionally sought to stress the political signi:cance of
the dialogue and to give a more political character to it, so that it could
compensate for the EC's absence from the Geneva peace conference on
the Arab-Israeli  question.85 However, the dialogue preserved its very
low-key pro:le  and  its largely  economic  focus.  The biggest  political
issue  addressed  in  the  context  of  the  Euro-Arab  dialogue  was  the
participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization in it, which was
demanded by the Arab parties in order to obtain a Western recognition
of the organization. In order to avoid the need to take a position on this
issue,  the  EC member  states  resorted  to  an  expedient:  the  dialogue
would not occur between national delegations but rather between one
European and one Arab delegation,  and each  side  would be  free  to
choose the composition of its own delegation.86
The EC did not completely align with the US on  the  Arab-Israeli
question, and it managed to launch the Euro-Arab dialogue. However,
its  activism  in  the  Middle  East was substantially  constrained  and
reduced,  to the extent that the second EPC declaration about it  was
released only in 1977. The Euro-Arab dialogue was  indeed  launched,
but  it  did not  address  political  issues and it  was extremely  thin on
energy matters too. It was only with the Venice Declaration in 1980 that
the EC once again took a strong political initiative on the Middle East
question. While the declaration con:rmed the originality of  the EC's
position with regard to the American one, it  sparked limited criticism
by the US. By then the transatlantic relationship was more stable than
in the early 1970s, transatlantic communication was good and the EC
82 Hilfrich,  «West  Germany's  long  Year  of  Europe,»  p. 253;  F. de  la  Serre,
«Confit du Proche-Orient et dialogue euro-arabe: la position de l'Europe des
Neuf,» in Le dialogue euro-arabe, ed. J. Bourrinet (Paris: Economica, 1979), p. 87. 
83 Möckli, «The EC-Nine and transatlantic confict,» pp. 88–89; Hilfrich, «West
Germany's long Year of Europe,» pp. 249–250.
84 Cheysson quoted in de la Serre, «Confit du Proche-Orient et dialogue euro-
arabe,» p. 88.
85 Hilfrich, «West Germany's long Year of Europe,» p. 248. 
86 Allen, «Political Cooperation and the Euro-Arab dialogue,» p. 75. 
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had proven itself to be ready to meet most American concerns.87
The establishment of permanent consultations with the US
In  connection  with  the  re-launch  of  the  Euro-Arab  dialogue  in
March 1974, the German government proposed to establish a system of
preliminary consultations between the EC and the US. According to the
German proposal,  the  US  would be  consulted  on EPC matters  after
political  directors  had  discussed  them but  before  foreign  ministers
:nalized  decisions.88 Preliminary  consultations  would  ensure  that
European  political  integration  would  not  affect transatlantic
cooperation. France  opposed  the  German  proposal,  arguing  that it
risked leading to American  interference in  the  EC's  decision-making
and therefore to hinder the evolution of the EC into a distinct political
entity. A compromise could be agreed upon in April 1974 with the so-
called “Gymnich compromise,”  which was :nally adopted in June.  In
the previous weeks, an important change in leadership had occurred in
Britain,  Germany  and  France.  The  new British  and  German  leaders
Harold Wilson  and Helmut Schmidt were more Atlanticist than their
predecessors  and  less  committed to  the  goal  of  European  political
integration.  The  new French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing  was
also  more positive  towards  the  US compared  to  Pompidou,  and he
consented to the establishment of transatlantic consultation.89 
The  Gymnich  compromise  acknowledged  the  desirability  of
coordination  between  the  EC  and  the  US  on  matters  of  common
interests,  but  France  obtained  that  consultations  would  not  be
mandatory and neither would they be institutionalized. The EC would
agree about consulting the US «d'une façon pragmatique et cas par cas.
Si  l'un  des  partenaires  soulève la question de l'information  et  de  la
87 D. Allen and  A. Hauri, «The Euro-Arab  dialogue, the Venice Declaration,
and  beyond:  The  limits  of  a  distinct  EC  policy,  1974–1989,»  in  European–
American Relations and the Middle East: From Suez to Iraq, ed.  D. Möckli and  V.
Mauer (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 98. 
88 Hilfrich, «West Germany's long Year of Europe,» pp. 248–249. 
89 On the impact of the 1974 leadership change in Europe on the transatlantic
relations,  see  N.  P.  Ludlow,  «The  real  Years  of  Europe?  US–West  European
relations during the Ford administration,» in Journal of Cold War Studies, 15 (3),
2013, pp. 141–146.
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consultation d'un état allié ou ami, les Neuf en discuteront.»90 The US
consented to this formula, which was mirrored in the Declaration on
the Atlantic relations signed by the NATO members on June 26, 1974.91
Even if in principle consultation was to happen in both directions, in
fact it  was the EC which was expected to consult with the US. As a
British of:cial put it, 
We seek to avoid a US veto  by discovering in advance if  our
views  are  acceptable:  the  Americans  merely  inform  us,  as  a
courtesy, so that we are facing in the right direction when the
time comes to march behind them.92 
The  Gymnich  formula  worked  quite  smoothly  and  effectively.  It
allowed to avoid outright American interference in the EC policies on
one side, and the presentation of faits accomplis to the Americans on
the other side. Strains did appear between the EC and the US during
the Carter administration, but they mostly concerned personal politics,
they  did  not  really  concern  the  EC's international  activity.93 The
Gymnich  formula  worked  well  mostly  because  the  troublesome
experience of the Year of Europe had already traced the limits of the
room available for the EC's activity and it had highlighted the points of
transatlantic  tension  which  should  not  be  revived.  In  the  following
years some proposals for a further strengthening of the procedures of
90 Informal  text  of  the  Gymnich  gentlemen's  agreement,  June  10,  1974,  in
AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3792.
91 «The Allies are convinced that the ful:llment of their common aims requires
the maintenance of close consultation, cooperation and mutual trust […] In the
spirit  of  the  friendship,  equality  and  solidarity  which  characterise  their
relationships, they are :rmly resolved to keep each other fully informed and to
strengthen the practice of frank and timely consultations by all means which
may be appropriate on matters relating to their common interests as members
of the Alliance, bearing in mind that these interests can be affected by events in
other areas of the world. They wish also to ensure that their essential security
relationship  is  supported  by  harmonious  political  and  economic  relations»
(Declaration  on  Atlantic  relations,  June  26,  1974,  available  at
<http://www.nato.int/cps/fr/SID-4F186CF0-B04537D2/natolive/of:cial_
texts_26901.htm?blnSublanguage=true&selectedLocale=en&submit.x=9&
submit.y=4>). 
92 J. T. Mase:eld, Note on Euro-American consultations, June 26, 1975, in NA,
FCO 49/567. See also J. E. Cable, Note, July 30, 1975, in NA, FCO 49/567. 
93 J. Renouard and D. N. Vigil, «The quest for leadership in a time of peace.
Jimmy Carter and Western Europe, 1977–1981,» in  The Strained Alliance. US–
European  Relations  from  Nixon  to  Carter,  ed.  M.  Schulz  and  T.  A.  Schwartz
(Cambridge  and  Washington:  Cambridge  University  Press  and  German
Historical Institute, 2010). 
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transatlantic  dialogue  were  put  forward,  aiming  in  particular  at  its
institutionalization.94 However, most of the actors involved preferred to
focus on small pragmatic improvements in order not to revive battles of
principles.95 For instance, to pay a visit to the US became a habit – but
not a duty – for the president of the Council of ministers and for the
president of the European Council.96 
The  establishment  of regular  transatlantic  consultations brought
about a further  restraint  on the  EC's  international  activity.  As  the
British noted, 
The problems associated with getting an internal agreement to
conduct a genuine consultation with the Americans at the right
moment  sometimes appear  so  great  that  the  Nine  lower  their
sights  to  a  less  ambitious  goal,  which  can  be  accomplished
without contact with the Americans.97 
By trying to avoid initiatives which could lead to serious strains with
the US,  the  EC member  states  limited the  room for  their  activity in
international affairs. Indeed, «Europeans have a certain impression of
independent action, but they cannot in reality carry forward policies
which  run  counter  to  those  of  the  United  States.»98 Ambitions  of
establishing  the  EC  as  a  strong  international  actor  that  was  clearly
independent from the US were effectively abandoned by the mid-1970s.
Ties  between  the  EC  member  states  and  the  US  were  narrowed
around the mid-1970s not  only  by the  establishment  of  a custom of
transatlantic  consultations, but also by the  introduction of the summit
94 Tindemans, Report on European Union, 1975. The establishment of a sort of
«economic NATO» was also suggested (J. E. Cable, Note, July 30, 1975, in NA,
FCO 49/567). 
95 J. E. Cable, Note, July 30, 1975, in NA, FCO 49/567; P. Ramsbotham (British
ambassador to the US), Note on the Tindemans Report, January 29, 1976, in
NA, FCO 98/166; J. O. Wright (British ambassador to West Germany), Note on
the Tindemans Report, February 4, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/166. 
96 D.  Maitland  (British  permanent  representative  to  the  EC),  Note  on  the
Tindemans Report, February 20, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/167; A. Gardner, «From
the Transatlantic Declaration to the new transatlantic agenda: The shaping of
institutional mechanisms and policy objectives by national and supranational
actors,»  in  Ever  Closer  Partnership:  Policy-Making  in  US–EU  Relations,  ed.  E.
Philippart and P. Winand (Bruxelles: P.I.E.–Peter Lang, 2001), p. 87. 
97 J. T. Mase:eld, Note on European/American relations, August 18, 1975, in
NA, FCO 49/567. 
98 Ibid. 
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meetings of the main industrialized countries, the so-called G5, G6 and
G7 summits. Their introduction was  proposed by Giscard, who built
upon  ideas  already  suggested by  Schmidt.99 The :rst summit  in
Rambouillet in December 1975 gathered the leaders of the US, of Japan,
and  of  the  three  biggest  European  countries,  namely  France,  West
Germany and Britain. It is remarkable that the initiative came from the
French: in the previous years France had strenuously fought against the
establishment  of  multilateral  contacts  between  the  US  and  the  EC
member states.  Given the impossibility of pursuing strong European
political  integration  on  France's  terms,  France now  looked  at  the
establishment of a sort of directorate of great powers in order to exert
European and global infuence. Giscard's proposal was also clearly due
to  the  acknowledgement  of  the  fact  that  Europe  alone  could  not
successfully  address  the  major  economic  problems  facing  it,  and
coordination was needed at the level of Western countries.100
The EC as such was not initially meant to take part in the summits.
Pressure  exerted  by  the  small  member  states  and  by  the  EC
Commission  ensured  the  participation  of  the  President  of  the  EC
Commission  and  of  the  President  of  the  European  Council  starting
from 1977.  Matthias  Schulz and Thomas  A.  Schwartz argue that  the
creation of the G7 was «an important step in enhancing the European
Community's role in the structures of international governance.»101 It is
true  that  European  countries  were  «almost  grotesquely
overrepresented» in the summits, and they had a real chance to exert an
infuence on the international agenda.102 However, the participation of
EC member states and of EC institutions in the summits did not really
bring about an enhancement of the international role of the EC as such.
Each EC actor  took part  in  the summits  in  its  own capacity:  it  was
single  Western  European countries  that  gained international  weight,
and summits  were  not  an occasion for  the  assertion of  the  EC as  a
99 Schulz, «The reluctant European,» pp. 290–291.
100 F.  Romero,  «Refashioning  the  West  to  dispel  its  fears:  The  early  G7
summits,» in International Summitry and Global Governance. The Rise of the G7 and
of  the  European  Council,  1974–1991,  ed.  E.  Mourlon-Druol  and  F.  Romero
(London and New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 121, 123; Ludlow, «Creating the
expectation of a collective response,» p. 142.  
101 M. Schulz  and T.  A.  Schwartz,  «The superpower  and the  Union in the
making.  US–European  relations,  1969–1980,»  in  The  Strained  Alliance.  US–
European  Relations  from  Nixon  to  Carter,  ed.  M.  Schulz  and  T.  A.  Schwartz
(Cambridge  and  Washington:  Cambridge  University  Press  and  German
Historical Institute, 2010), p. 366.
102 Ludlow, «The real years of Europe?,» p. 160. 
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distinct international actor.
The  European  Council  and  the  Western  summits  were  created
around the same time, between the end of 1974 and the end of 1975.
However,  their  establishment  did  not  always  lead  to  a  two-steps
process wherein EC member states de:ned a common position in the
framework of the Council, and where they then discussed it with the
Western partners at the summits. The establishment of the Council and
of the G7 rather led to a two-pillar structure. On some international
matters,  the  EC  member  states  de:ned  a  common  position  in  the
Council  and  then  they  upheld  it  in  the  G7  summits.  On  other
international matters, the EC member states preferred to avoid de:ning
a common EC position, and instead sought to retain national freedom
of  action  at  the  G7  summits.  Therefore,  they could  hardly  claim to
represent the views of the EC as such in the summits. 
The range of action available to the EC's international activity
The assertion of the EC as an international actor required not only
providing it with means and structures for action, but also de:ning the
range of action available to it.  During the 1970s, the range of action
available to the EC's international activity was gradually de:ned. The
limits of  this  range mainly depended on the existence or absence of
incentives for member states to coordinate action at the EC level.  In
some cases, member states had no incentive to coordinate with their EC
partners because they held minority positions:  for this reason, states
defended  their  domaines  réservés and  France  did  not  consent  to  EC
cooperation on defense. In other cases, member states had incentives to
coordinate at a level higher than the EC: coordination at the G7 level
was preferable for  some major  economic problems for  instance.  The
limits of  the range of action available to the EC also depended on the
pressure  exerted  by  the  US  for  the  exclusion  of  some  sectors  of
international affairs from  it.  American pressures led to constraints on
the  EC's  international  activity  mainly  because,  given  their  strategic
dependence in terms of both defense and energy needs, the EC member
states were in no position to resist them. 
As a result of this process of de:ning the range of action available to
the  EC's  international  activity,  such  activity  was  considerably
constrained. However, the EC had been endowed with a large set of
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institutions,  procedures  and  tools  to carry  out  a  distinct  activity  in
international  affairs. Moreover,  the  EC  member  states  continued  to
pledge their commitment to the goal of turning the EC into a distinct
global player with its own distinct pro:le. Such pledges could not be
easily  subverted  and  the  existing  institutions  could  not  be  easily
dismantled. Given the limits constraining the range of action available,
the most effective strategy for the EC to carry out a distinct activity on
the global stage was to focus on :elds where cooperation was possible
and where the means available to it could fully be exploited. Therefore,
the EC member states would take only limited common initiatives with
regard to the Middle East and to defense. The EC would rather focus its
activity on :elds such as international trade, development cooperation,
human rights promotion, and so on. 
In terms of assertion of the EC as a distinct  global player,  the EC's
activity  in  the  :elds  of  development  cooperation,  dialogue  with  the
developing  countries  and  human  rights  promotion  was  particularly
signi:cant. Activity in these :elds allowed the EC to exploit the means
available for the assertion of its international role, while simultaneously
respecting the range of action available for its activity. As a result, a sort
of division of labor was established between the EC and the US. The
division  was largely based on the military/civilian cleavage:  military
and security issues were largely to be dealt with by the US and NATO,
while “civilian” issues were  available  for  the deployment of  distinct
and original action by the EC. While clearly deriving from the limited
range of action available to the EC's international activity,  its civilian
focus  was  consistent  with  the  EC's age-old  discourse  presenting
European integration as an endeavor for international cooperation and
progress.103 Since  the  division  of  labor  was  not  based  on  a
regional/global cleavage, the EC was able to deploy an original action
with a global reach, even though it was no real global power. In this
way,  the EC would  also  contribute  to discharge the US of  some of  its
global responsibilities.104 
In  the  following  chapters  I  look closely  at  the  EC's  international
activity in the :elds of development cooperation (chapter 4), promotion
of dialogue with the developing countries on the international  order
(chapter 5), and promotion of human rights (chapter 6). I analyze the
ways in which the EC tried to develop and pursue initiatives in these
103 Romero, «Refashioning the West to dispel its fears,» pp. 120–121. 
104 See  for  instance  S.  Mansholt,  Address  to  the  Committee  for  Economic
Development, New York, November 16, 1972, in IISG, Mansholt 217; Cabinet of
C. Soames, Report on meeting Kissinger–Soames, May 20, 1973, in Churchill
Archives, Soames, 42. 
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:elds which would contribute to its own assertion as a global player
and to highlight its original pro:le as such. 
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Chapter 4 
The EC as Partner of the Developing 
Countries
Cooperation with developing countries was one of the oldest :elds
of activity of the EC in international affairs. The EEC Treaty in 1957 had
associated the colonies of the member states to the Community: they
were to be included in the common market and they were to receive
development aid from the EC Commission. After the accession of these
countries  to  independence  from  around  1960,  the  form  of  their
association to the Community was adjusted but the association  itself
was not  eradicated.  In the early 1970s, deep changes occurring inside
and outside Europe and the British entry into the EC made it especially
necessary  to  reassess  the  development  cooperation  policy  of  the
Community.  The reassessment led to the  establishment  of a two-tier
system of cooperation, with the Lomé Convention addressing the old
associated  countries  and  other  former  colonies,  and  with  some
cooperation policies addressing other developing countries. 
In  this  chapter  I  analyze  the  process  of  reassessment  of  the
Community's development cooperation in the 1970s. First of all, I look
at the debates on development cooperation that occurred at the 1972
Paris Summit, which led to the de:nition of the two-tier structure of the
Community's system of cooperation. Then I look at the negotiations for
the renewal of the association that took place between 1972 and 1975,
which led to the Lomé Convention. Several new developing countries
were included in the Lomé system, and some innovative instruments of
cooperation were introduced. Finally, I look at the negotiations for the
establishment of the worldwide tier of the Community's development
cooperation.  All  these  processes  were  closely  connected  with  an
underlying debate on the conception of the role of the EC with regard
to the  developing countries,  and with  regard to international  affairs
more  generally.  Thus,  in  analyzing  these  processes  I  focus  on  the
different conceptions of the role of the EC which were promoted by the
different EC actors involved.
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I  argue  that  in  the  :rst  half  of  the  1970s  the  Community's
engagement in favor of development cooperation ceased to be seen as
an activity merely aimed at dealing with some post-colonial issues. The
Community's engagement in favor of development cooperation rather
started to be conceived and presented as a sign of the EC's distinctive
character as an international actor: the EC claimed to be an outward-
looking  actor,  genuinely  concerned  with  developing  countries'
problems, eager to move beyond the colonial legacy. The conclusion of
the Lomé Convention in 1975 was hailed by the EC as important proof
of the distinctive character of  its  international activity. Even if Lomé
could be presented in this way,  I  show that  the reassessment of the
Community's development cooperation was in fact less determined by
an enlightened design than by a compromise between member states'
economic and political interests. 
The 1972 Paris Summit and the EC's concern with development
The 1972 Paris Summit was the :rst  occasion for old and new  EC
member states to discuss  the Community's development cooperation.
The relevance of the summit made it seem like a good occasion to stress
the  EC's  concern for  development  issues and to  show it  to  external
observers.  In  those  years,  development  issues  were acquiring
increasing  salience,  partly  because  of the  increasing activism of
developing countries  on the international  stage, and partly because of
the  interest  in development  issues expressed  by  parties,  social
movements and public opinion  in Western Europe. While the  summit
was due to focus on other issues, it was seen as important to signal that
the  enlarged  Community  was  not  to  become  an  inward-looking
fortress. It was important to signal that the enlarged EC was aware of
its increased international responsibilities,  and that it aimed at being
more  outward-looking  and  attentive  to  the  developing  countries'
problems.1 A  stronger  engagement  with  cooperation  would  have
1 British  delegation  to  the  EC,  Paper  on  the  external  relations  and
responsibilities  of  the  Community,  March  16,  1972,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires
politiques,  CE,  3786;  European  Parliament,  Résolution  à  l'intention  de  la
prochaine conférence au sommet,  July  5,  1972,  in  ACCE,  BAC 79/1982 223;
Mémorandum  néerlandais  sur  la  conférence  des  chefs  d'État  et  de
gouvernement,  July  1972,  in  NA,  FCO  30/1203;   MAEF,  Coopération
économique,  Note  sur  la  conférence  au  sommet,  September  29,  1972,  in
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signaled the generous character of the EC and its ambition at «faire le
bien dans le monde.»2 
The need to improve the EC's image as an international actor was
made more pressing by the  outcome of  the UN Conference on Trade
and Development,  which convened in  April  1972, and  was  deemed
disappointing by the developing countries. Signaling the Community's
concern for development issues was also seen as a good way in which
to counter  the  European youth's  increasing disenchantment  towards
European  integration  itself.3 The  1968  events  had  highlighted  a
cleavage between youth and political elites in the EC. Because of young
peoples' increasing concern for the developing world, the EC political
elites  found  it  useful  to  stress  the  Community’s  commitment  to
development  cooperation  in  order  to  re-legitimize  integration:  the
youth  «ne  doit  pas  croire  que  nous  nous  réunissons  pour  etre  plus
riches.  L'aide  aux  pays  sous-développés  est  un  idéal  qui  doit  la
séduire.»4 
In order to signal the Community's concern for development issues,
the  participants  in the  summit  discussed the  adoption  of  a  few
initiatives.  In particular, they discussed the adoption of a quantitative
target  for  the  share  of  member  states'  GDP  to  be  devoted  to
development cooperation.  At the UNCTAD Conference in 1972 a 0.7
percent target had been approved for public aid. The EC Commission
proposed to rise the target to the 1 percent of GDP at the summit, but
the  proposal  received  no  support  apart  from  Belgium.5 The  debate
rather focused on the opportunity to restate the 0.7 percent target – not
AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3787.  
2 E. Heath’s intervention, Minutes of the Paris Summit, October 19, 1972, in
AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3788. See also MAEF, Minutes of Schumann–
Heath meeting, August 24, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3787; G. de
Juniac (French ambassador to Belgium), Note on the Paris Summit, October 17,
1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3787.
3 S. Paoli, «The  infuence of  protest  movements on the European  integration
process:  An  interpretation  of  the  1972  Paris  Summit,»  in  Europe  in  the
International Arena during the 1970s: Entering a Different World, ed. A. Varsori and
G. Migani (Bruxelles: P.I.E.–Peter Lang, 2011).
4 The King of the Belgians quoted in Juniac, Note sur la conférence au sommet,
October 17, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3787. 
5 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur la préparation du sommet, March 22,
1972,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires  politiques,  CE,  3786;  EC  Commission,
Communication en vue de la préparation de la conférence au sommet, July 7,
1972, in ACCE, BAC 79/1982 225.  
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really a major advance in fact.6 Not even this target could be restated in
Paris, however.  This was  mainly  because  Britain opposed it,  since its
share of public aid was considerably lower than its partners'.7 Beside
the  target  for  aid,  the  Commission  proposed to  set  a  target  for  the
increase of the EC's imports from developing countries in the following
years.  The target  stated that  a 15  percent annual increase should  be
pursued  by strengthening the  commercial  preferences offered by the
EC.8 France opposed the proposal, arguing that  it was not realistic in
scope, uncertain in outcome, and that the priority should have gone to
increasing aid instead.9 The main French concern in this regard was to
avoid reducing the  relative  commercial  advantages  enjoyed  by  the
developing countries associated with the EC. 
The British government proposed three initiatives at the summit. It
proposed to untie bilateral development aid, removing the requirement
for recipient countries to grant bene:ts and procurements to the donor
country,  which was rejected by France.10 The British also proposed to
improve the terms of future European loans to developing countries – a
proposal  which  was  met  with  neither  strong  opposition  nor
6 Minutes of the Paris Summit, October 20, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques,
CE, 3788.
7 A. Douglas-Home, Note on aid and the Summit, September 21, 1972, in NA,
FCO 30/1211; J. de Beaumarchais (French ambassador to the UK), Note sur la
conférence au sommet, October 17, 1972,  in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE,
3787. The structure of British aid differed from that of the other member states
because the private sector played a much bigger role in the British case. 
8 EC Commission, Communication en vue de la préparation de la conférence
au  sommet,  July  7,  1972,  in  ACCE,  BAC  79/1982  225.  According  to  the
Commission's  estimates,  a  15  percent  increase  of  imports  from  developing
countries would have brought  about  a 6 percent  increase of  their GPD (EC
Commission, Memo on the objective for imports of manufactured products into
the enlarged Community, September 28, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1213).  
9 MAEF,  Coopération  économique,  Note  sur  la  préparation  du  sommet
européen,  September  15,  1972,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires  politiques,  CE,  3787;  C.
Soames (British ambassador to France), Note on UK proposals on aid, October
15, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1215; MAEF, Coopération économique, Note sur des
points qui pourraient être évoqués au Sommet, October 18, 1972, in AMAEF,
Affaires politiques, CE, 3787; A. Douglas-Home, Note on aid and the Summit,
October 10, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1214; Minutes of the Paris Summit, October
20, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3788. 
10 A.  Douglas-Home,  Statement  on  the  enlarged  Community  and  the
developing countries, July 12, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1203; A. Douglas-Home,
Note on aid and the Summit, October 10, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1214. 
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enthusiasm.11 The most important British proposal was the approval of
a debt waiver,  which suggested that the terms of EC member states'
past  loans  to  the  poorest  developing  countries  be improved.12 The
waiver  was  presented  as  an  immediate,  signi:cant  and  clearly
identi:able measure. Germany had reservations about it for :nancial
reasons however, and France strongly opposed the waiver because of
the  relevance  of  French  loans  involved,  and  because  the  British
proposal had been tailored to bene:t the Indian subcontinent, which
was no political priority for France.13
Diverging  positions  on  the  actual  initiatives  on  development
proposed for immediate adoption at the summit made it impossible to
approve any of them. The  summit's :nal declaration announced only
vague engagements in the :eld and merely added that «ce questions
feront  l'objet  d'études.»14 Disappointment  for  such  a  result  was
expressed  by  developing  countries'  observers  and  by  the  European
Parliament.15 If  the  summit was to be used as an occasion to give a
signal  and  improve  the  EC's  image  as  partner  of  the  developing
countries, it failed. Why could agreement in principle on the adoption
of initiatives on development not be translated into an agreement on
actual initiatives? One  reason was the absence of viable promoters of
compromise. British and French positions were «poles apart,»16 and the
positions of Belgium, the Netherlands and the EC Commission were
11 A.  Douglas-Home,  Statement  on  the  enlarged  Community  and  the
developing countries, July 12, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1203.
12 Ibid.; D. Williams (FCO, ODA), Draft telegram on aid at the EEC Summit,
September 18, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1210. 
13 J. A. Robinson (FCO, European integration), Paper on the strengthening of
the institutions of the Community and progress in the political :eld, May 3,
1972, in NA, FCO 30/1197; J. J. B. Hunt (Cabinet, Second permanent secretary),
Minute on the European summit meeting, May 10, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1198;
N.  Henderson (British  ambassador  to  West  Germany),  Note  on  aid and the
Summit, September 22, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1211; A. Douglas-Home, Note on
aid and the Summit, October 10, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1214; British embassy in
Bonn, Note on aid and the Summit, October 12, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1214; C.
Soames, Note on UK proposals on aid, October 15, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1215.  
14 EC heads of state and government, Declaration of the Paris Summit, October
21, 1972, in Bulletin des Communautés européennes, 10/1972.
15 J.-M. Soutou (French ambassador to Algeria), Note on the comments on the
Paris  Summit  in  the  Algerian  press,  October  23,  1972,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires
politiques,  CE,  3788;  European Parliament,  Resolution  on  the  results  of  the
Paris Summit, November 15, 1972, in ACCE, BAC 79/1982 224. 
16 C. Soames, Note on the UK proposals on aid for the Summit, October 15,
1972, in NA, FCO 30/1215. 
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considered  radical  or  even «extravagant.»17 Germany and Italy were
wary of wasting energy in  the development cooperation  :eld,  which
was  no  priority  for  either  of them.18 Another  factor  hindering
compromise was the  fact that many other issues were on the  summit
table, and most of them had a higher priority for member states. 
The structure of the EC's development cooperation
The idea  of using the  Paris  Summit as an occasion to improve the
EC's image as partner of the developing countries failed. The  summit
was more fruitful as far as the discussion on the general structure of the
EC development cooperation was  concerned.  The main  questions to
de:ne were whether and to what an extent the Euro-African focus of
the EC's cooperation was to stay. What was decided at the summit was
that  the  EC  «attache  une  importance  essentielle  à  la  politique
d'association,»19 but at the same time the EC was also invited «à mettre
en  oeuvre  progressivement  une  politique  globale  de  coopération  au
développement  à  l'échelle  mondiale.»20 A  two-tier  system  of
cooperation was designed, with the  Yaoundé  association  on one side
and new worldwide policies on the other side. This compromise put at
least a temporary end to the struggle between the so-called regionalist
and mondialist  views of  the  Community's  development cooperation
that  had  been  ongoing  since  its  very  establishment,  opposing  in
particular France to the Netherlands and Germany. 
Despite the German and Dutch opposition to it, the preservation of
the  Yaoundé system  of  association  with  former  European  colonies
17 D. Williams, Note on aid at the EEC Summit, September 18, 1972, in NA,
FCO 30/1210. See for instance S. Mansholt, Declaration to the plenary session
of  UNCTAD  III,  April  17,  1972,  in  ACCE,  BAC  2/1975  54;  S.  Mansholt,
Intervention at the exceptional meeting with the socialist group at the European
Parliament  on  Mansholt's  observations  for  a  new economic  policy,  May 29,
1972, in HAEU, GSPE 54.  
18 J.  Sauvagnargues  (French  ambassador  to  West  Germany),  Note  sur  la
conférence au sommet, October 18, 1972,  in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE,
3787; C. Lucet (French ambassador to Italy), Note sur la conférence au sommet,
October 18, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3787. 
19 EC heads of state and government, Déclaration du sommet de Paris, 1972.
20 Ibid.
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could not be called into question. According to the interpretation given
by the Council of ministers, the EEC Treaty required the Community to
offer the former colonies the possibility of association. The preservation
of the association and of its centrality was a strong political priority for
France.21 The association was a means for France to continue to exert
«une  infuence  régulatrice  et  stabilisatrice»22 in  Africa and  to  enjoy
economic  and  political  bene:ts  out  of  it while  hiding  behind  the
Community façade. As an Italian diplomat put it, the Yaoundé system
«was little more than a way of preserving a French sphere of infuence
at  Community expense:»23 France contributed only 33  percent to the
European Development Fund,  but  its  former colonies bene:ted of the
80  percent of  it.24 The  centrality  of  Euro-African  relations  was  an
important element of the Gaullist orthodoxy which could not be easily
dismissed.25 According to France the association was 
un  élément  essentiel  de  l'acquis  communautaire  et  un  pilier
indispensable et exemplaire des relations extérieures des Neuf.
Elle manifeste principalement l'action spéci:que et permanente
de  la  Communauté  sur  des  régions  […]  qui  sont  […]  le
prolongement naturel, géographique et historique de l'Europe.26 
Beside the French government, the EC Commission  was  also  strongly
attached  to  the preservation of the  Yaoundé  association, since it  had
21 Minutes  of  the  Paris  Summit,  October  19,  1972,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires
politiques, CE, 3788.
22 MAEF,  Coopération  économique,  Note  sur  le  renouvellement  de  la
Convention de Yaoundé, January 17, 1973, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759. See also F.
Turpin,  «L'association  Europe–Afrique:  une  “bonne  affaire”  pour  la  France
dans ses relations avec l'Afrique (1957–1975)?,» in L'Europe unie et l'Afrique: de
l'idée  d'Eurafrique à  la  Convention de Lomé I,  ed.  M.-T.  Bitsch and G.  Bossuat
(Brussels, Paris and Baden-Baden: Bruylant, LGDJ and Nomos Verlag, 2005). 
23 A. Grandi reported in S. J. G. Cambridge (British embassy in Italy), Note on
the EEC association and reverse preferences, February 20, 1973, in NA, FCO
30/1690. 
24 J.-R.  Bernard  (SGCI),  Note  sur  l'Afrique  noire  francophone  devant  le
problème de l'élargissement du marché commun, June 15, 1970, in AN, AG 5(2),
89. 
25 «A Gaullist  government  still  think  that  decisive  infuence  in  outlandish
places  like  Chad  and  Djibouti  is  worthwhile  in  itself»  (J.  Ling  (FCO,  West
Africa), Report on visit to Paris to discuss West Africa, November 13, 1972, in
NA, FCO 30/1271). 
26 MAEF, Coopération économique, Note sur les négociations d'association et
la politique d'aide de la CEE, July 3, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA,
3007. 
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established an entire  directorate-general devoted to it (the DG VIII).27
Also, the associated countries had vested interests in the  preservation
of the association,  since they depended substantially upon trade with
and aid from the Community.  
The Netherlands and Germany did not support the cultivation of
neocolonial relations, favoring a liberal approach to international trade
and  development.  Moreover,  their interests  were  mostly  directed  at
developing countries which were not associated with the Community.
For this reason, the Netherlands and Germany had to reluctantly accept
the establishment of the association in 1957, but they had always tried
to  overcome  or  at  least  weaken  it.  As  the  French  remarked,  «nous
considerons  [...]  que  l'association  est  une  :n  en  soi,  alors  que  les
allemands la considèrent comme une étape transitoire vers un régime
très largement ouvert sur l'extérieur.»28 In principle, the British view on
the association was closer to the German and Dutch one. However, the
overcoming of the association was no priority for  Britain in the short
term.  Edward  Heath  had  granted  Pompidou the British agreement to
the preservation of the association,  and the agreement was formally
stated  in  the  Treaty  of  accession  of  Britain  to  the  Community.29
However, Britain still aimed at overcoming the association in the long
run:
We  would  not  wish  to  see  these  special  arrangements  as  a
permanent feature of the international scene […] we hope by and
large that this would be both the :rst and the last time we would
have to extend discriminatory treatment of this character; that we
would  try  to  keep  it  to  a  respectable  minimum;  and that  we
would try to reduce it over time.30
As a result of the strong attachment of France to the association, and
of the British unwillingness to challenge its existence, the association
was  preserved.  However,  German,  Dutch  and  British  pressures
managed to secure the establishment of a world tier of development
27 British of:cials were «impressed by the attachment of DG VIII of:cials to the
dogma  of  the  existing  Yaoundé  system»  (W.  J.  Adams  (FCO,  European
integration), Note on the association under Protocol 22, September 29, 1972, in
NA, FCO 30/1266). 
28 P.  Achard  (SGCI),  Note  sur  le  renouvellement  et  élargissement  de  la
Convention  de  Yaoundé,  June  5,  1973,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires  politiques,  RFA,
3005.
29 Minutes of Pompidou–Heath meeting, May 20, 1971, in AN, AG 5(2), 1014. 
30 D. Williams, Note on association problems, December 29, 1972, in NA, FCO
30/1269.
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cooperation to complement  it. Even if the establishment of a two-tier
structure for the Community's development cooperation resulted from
a compromise between these divergent  preferences, such a structure
tended  to  be presented  by  the  Community  as  the  outcome  of  a
pragmatic  and  sensible  approach to  development.31 The  Community
could not address the problems of all the developing countries, since its
resources were limited.  A focus on Africa  would ensure rational  and
effective cooperation,  and it  would offer the chance of experimenting
with innovative forms of cooperation, which could later be transferred
to a global level. At the same time, the worldwide tier of cooperation
showed that  the  Community did  not  disregard  the  most  pressing
problems of non-associated developing countries. 
Even if the Paris Summit was successful in reaching a compromise
on the structure of the EC development cooperation, the compromise
itself was rather vague. What was the relative weight of the two tiers?
To what an extent was the association to remain central in the system?
Much depended on the relationship that would be established between
the  association  and  the  former  British  colonies,  which  would  be
affected by the British entry into the EC. If they joined it, the association
would  clearly  remain  the  central  element  of  the  Community's
development cooperation,  while in  the opposite  case  it  risked being
gradually emptied and marginalized.  The British Treaty of  adhesion
offered three  options to  the  Commonwealth  developing  countries
located in Africa,  the Caribbean and the Paci:c: each of them could
decide to join the association with the Community, to negotiate a looser
system of association with it, or to opt for a mere trade agreement with
it. 
France's position  on  the  desirable  relationship  between  the
association and the former British colonies was informed by its concern
with  the  preservation  of  a  Yaoundé-like  association  as  the  central
element of the Community's development cooperation. Attachment to
it was due to several economic, political and strategic considerations.
According to the British, the French attachment to the association even
had pre-political components, with «a strong emotional element»32 and
«a substantial element of amour-propre»33 involved.  The French came
31 C. Cheysson, Intervention devant la Commission paritaire de l'association,
June 28, 1973, in ACCE, BAC 40/1985 57. 
32 E. E. Tomkins (British ambassador to France), Note on the French African
policy, June 8, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1796. 
33 Ibid.
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to the conclusion that the  entry of as many  Commonwealth  states as
possible into the association would minimize the risk of emergence of
substantial challenges to it: 
La  véritable  sauvegarde  de  la  politique  d'association  dite  'de
Yaoundé'  est  étroitement  liée  à  son  application  non
discriminatoire  au  plus  grand  nombre  possible  d'États  du
Commonwealth associables, quelque importantes que soient les
conséquences :nancières de cette perspective.34 
The  enlargement  of  the  association  would  bring the  British  on
board, and it would remove the differentiated treatment of francophone
and  anglophone  African  countries,  which  was  politically  hard  to
justify.35 The  only  French  hesitation  about  the  enlargement  to  the
Commonwealth associables regarded the case of Nigeria. Because of its
size,  Nigerian  entry would  heavily  imbalance  the  association  and it
would challenge  French  infuence  in  Western  Africa,  hence  a  mere
commercial agreement with it was preferable.36 
The British position on the enlargement of the association rested on
the acknowledgement of the fact that «we are stuck with something like
the  Yaoundé  arrangements  until  the  end  of  this  decade.»37 If  the
Commonwealth  countries  did not  join  the  association,  Britain  could
hardly obtain signi:cant changes to it.38 Britain would have to transfer
34 SGCI, Note sur les perspectives de la politique d'association, December 1972,
in  HAEU,  SGCICEE  8759.  See  also  SGCI,  Note  sur  le  renouvellement  et
élargissement de la politique d'association, April 11, 1973, in HAEU, SGCICEE
8759; C. Soames, Note on the problems of association, November 7, 1972, in
NA,  FCO  30/1268;  MAEF,  Coopération  économique,  Note  sur  le
renouvellement  de  la  Convention  de Yaoundé,  January  17,  1973,  in  HAEU,
SGCICEE 8759. 
35 SGCI, Note sur les perspectives de la politique d'association, December 1972,
in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759; SGCI, Note sur le renouvellement et élargissement
de la politique d'association, April 11, 1973, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759. 
36 M. G. Fort (British high commission in Nigeria), Note on the French attitudes
towards Nigerian association with the EEC, September 23, 1972, in NA, FCO
30/1266; C. M. Le Quesne (FCO, Africa), Note on France, Nigeria, the EEC etc.,
June 1, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1694; P.  Achard, Message pour le  répresentant
permanent  auprès  des  CE  sur  le  renouvellement  et  élargissement  de  la
Convention de Yaoundé, July 5, 1973, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759. 
37 D. Williams, Note on association problems, December 29, 1972, in NA, FCO
30/1269. 
38 J.  A.  Robinson,  Note,  February  14,  1973,  in  NA,  FCO  30/1690;  FCO,
European  integration,  Note  on  meeting  of  the  Commonwealth  associables,
February  15,  1973,  in  NA,  FCO  30/1690;  FCO,  Memorandum  «The  new
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substantial funds to the francophone associates, while at the same time
bearing  alone  the  burden  for  development  aid  to  its  own  former
colonies.39 As a consequence, the accession of Commonwealth countries
to  the  association was  desirable.  The  Foreign  Of:ce  declared  itself
«anxious to take evert step open to us to ensure that as many of the
Commonwealth countries concerned as  possible choose  the Yaoundé
option.»40 The  entry  of  the  Commonwealth  associable  countries  was
substantially favored also by the other EC member states, which were
eager to reduce the French infuence on the association.41 
The departure from the Yaoundé model of association
For various different reasons, all the EC member states favored the
accession  of  the  Commonwealth  developing  countries  to  the
association.  The  problem  was  that these  countries were  extremely
skeptical  about  it.  They  had criticized  the  association since  its  very
establishment,  and they  widely  regarded it  as  a  French-driven neo-
colonial  arrangement  –  quite  an  accurate  assessment  indeed.42 The
negative  attitude  of  the  associable  states  was  further  incited by  the
Commonwealth secretariat, which lobbied hard in order for them not to
join the association,  with a particularly heavy involvement of general-
secretary  Arnold  Smith.43 In  order  to  overcome the  associables'
Yaoundé Convention,» March 29, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1709. 
39 J. Ling, Note on the external relations of the EC: West Africa, June 1972, in
NA, FCO 30/1264; FCO,  ODA, Paper on aid and association, July 4, 1972, in
NA, FCO 30/1264. 
40 A.  Douglas-Home,  Note  on  Yaoundé  association  and  Commonwealth
countries in Africa, July 19, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1265. 
41 See for instance S. J. G. Cambridge, Note on the EEC association and reverse
preferences, February 20, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1690. 
42 Angles (French embassy in the UK), Note sur les pays du Commonwealth et
la Communauté élargie, April 7, 1972, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759; A. E. Furness
(British  embassy  in  Senegal),  Note  on  contact  between  Commonwealth
associables and Yaoundé associates, September 8, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1272;
SGCI, Note sur les perspectives de la politique d'association de la CEE avec les
pays africains, December 1972, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759. 
43 J.  de  Beaumarchais,  Note  sur  l'association  de  certains  États  du
Commonwealth à la Communauté élargie,  July 5,  1972,  in HAEU, SGCICEE
8759; M. D. Laidler (FCO, European integration), Report on conversation with
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wariness, the British government and the EC Commission lobbied them
as well.44 Infuential initiatives to convince the associables to join were
taken  in  particular  by  the  new deputy  director-general  of  DG  VIII,
Maurice  Foley.45 However,  lobbying  was  not  suf:cient  to  overcome
resistance.  The  most  effective means  available  to the  Community to
convince  the  associables  to  join  was  to  amend  the  features  of  the
association that they disliked the most. 
EC member states had quite a large  amount of  room of maneuver
with regard to the design of the features of the new association. At the
Paris Summit the EC member states had agreed on the principle of the
preservation of the acquis of the Yaoundé association, but the content of
the  acquis  was  not  clearly  de:ned.  In fact,  «aucune  garantie  de
substance  n'a  été  donné  quant  au  contenu  futur  du  régime
d'association.»46 According  to  minimalist  interpretations,  to preserve
the  acquis  merely  meant  to  preserve  the  existence  of  a  special
association agreement  between the  Community and  a  limited  set  of
developing  countries.47 According  to  maximalist  interpretations,  to
preserve  the acquis  meant to preserve all  the main instruments and
features of the Yaoundé association, if only slightly adapting them to
Salter, September 20, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1266; A. Smith, Letter to the foreign
ministers of the Commonwealth associable countries, October 12, 1972, in NA,
FCO 30/1267. 
44 J. Ling, Note on the external relations of the EC: West Africa, June 1972, in
NA, FCO 30/1264; A. Douglas-Home, Note on the Yaoundé association and
Commonwealth countries in Africa, July 19, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1265; W. J.
Adams, Note on the association under protocol 22, September 29, 1972, in NA,
FCO 30/1266; D. Williams, Note on association problems, December 29, 1972,
in NA, FCO 30/1269; SGCI, Analyse du mémorandum de la Commission sur
les  relations  futures  entre  la  Communauté  et  les  pays  en  voie  de
développement situés en Afrique, dans le Caraibes et le Paci:que, April 9, 1973,
in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759. 
45 A. Hewitt  and K. Whiteman, «The Commission and development policy:
bureaucratic politics in EU aid – from the Lomé leap forwards to the dif:culties
of adapting to the twenty-:rst century,» in  EU Development Cooperation. From
Model to Symbol (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), pp. 140–141.
Foley  was  a  former  British  Labour  politician  who  had  been  minister  for
development.  As  a  Christian  trade  unionist,  since  his  youth  he  had  been
cultivating a remarkable network of acquaintances in sub-Saharan Africa, both
in the Christian and in the trade union circles. 
46 MAEF, Coopération économique, Note sur les relations de la CEE avec les
pays associés et associables, May 10, 1973, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759. 
47 See  for  instance  D.  J.  E.  Ratford  (FCO,  European  integration),  Note  for
Anglo-French talks on association questions, May 3, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1692.
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the  new  situation.  As  Britain  pointed  out,  «the  core  of  that
disagreement  is  whether  the  new  convention  of  association  will  be
broadly on the same terms of the present Yaoundé Convention.»48 
Since  the  associable  states  would  reject  a  Yaoundé-type  of
association,  substantial  change  of  its  features  should  be  devised.
However, the priority for France was to keep the association as close as
possible  to  the  Yaoundé  model. France  saw the  enlargement  of  the
association as useful to secure the preservation of its centrality, but the
enlargement should not come at the price of signi:cant changes to the
association.49 As the former Commission of:cial Dieter Frisch put it,
France  was  trying  to  «“sauver  les  meubles”  de  l'association
“francophone”  initiale.»50 The Yaoundé  system  of  cooperation  had
largely been conceived by the French to the advantage of the former
French colonies, and  also its  management  was largely infuenced by
France and by French of:cials. France feared that its partners aimed at
«une  dénaturation  profonde  de  la  politique  d'association.»51 Open-
ended  negotiations  for  the  renovation  of  the  association  should
absolutely be avoided, and only the Commonwealth associables opting
for the Yaoundé model could come to the negotiation table.52 
While  for  the  French the  preservation  of  the  Yaoundé  model  of
association was more important than its enlargement, for the British it
was  the  other  way round.  The  British  priority  was  to  get  as  many
associables as possible to join the association: «who participates is more
important  than  the  nature  of  the  association  itself.»53 Thus  it  was
48 FCO, Note on Protocol 22, July 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1696. 
49 FCO, Record of Anglo-French talks on association questions, May 14, 1973,
in NA, FCO 30/1693; É. Burin des Roziers (French permanent representative to
the  EC),  Note  sur  les  negociations  avec  les  EAMA  et  les  pays  du
Commonwealth  associables,  May  17,  1973,  in  HAEU,  SGCICEE 8759;  E.  E.
Tomkins, Note on the French African policy, June 8, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1796. 
50 D. Frisch, «Le role de la France et des français dans la politique européenne
de  coopération  au  développement,»  in  La  France,  l'Europe  et  l'aide  au
développement.  Des  traités  de  Rome à  nos  jours,  ed. G.  Bossuat  (Paris:  IGPDE,
2013), p. 119. 
51 SGCI, Note sur les perspectives de la politique d'association, December 1972,
in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759.
52 É.  Burin  des  Roziers,  Note  sur  le  renouvellement  de  la  Convention  de
Yaoundé et  sur l'association des pays du Commonwealth,  April  11,  1973,  in
HAEU, SGCICEE 8759.  
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desirable  to  get  rid  of  the  features  of  the  Yaoundé  model  that
discouraged  the  associables  to  join.54 Accordingly,  they  argued,  the
features  of  the  new association  should  be  de:ned  as  limitedly  and
vaguely  as  possible  before  the  opening  of  the  negotiations.  This
position  was  supported  by  Germany  and  the  Netherlands,  which
aimed at weakening the association to the advantage of the worldwide
tier of cooperation. As the French remarked, «il semble donc que nous
soyions  en  désaccord  avec  les  Allemands  sur  tous  les  points
fondamentaux  concernant  le  renouvellement  et  l'élargissement  de
l'association.»55 At the very least, Germany and the Netherlands aimed
at overcoming the elements of the Yaoundé model that they regarded as
neocolonial, such as  the  commercial preferences  offered  to the EC by
the associated countries. 
On April 4, 1973 the Commission issued its memorandum on the
incoming negotiations.56 The Commonwealth associable countries were
invited to join relatively open-ended negotiations for a new association
agreement.  The  negotiations  were  not  to  be  explicitly  based on the
Yaoundé model,  and the associables  were not  required to  indicate a
preliminary choice between the three options envisaged in the  British
Treaty of adhesion. The French insisted on tying the negotiations to the
Yaoundé model, but their position was increasingly isolated during the
process of de:nition of the Community's negotiation mandate. Indeed
the mandate did not satisfy France, which found it «général, incomplet,
souvent ambigu.»57 However, even the new French commissioner for
development Claude Cheysson agreed  that the negotiation should be
open and  that  no  step  should  be  taken  that  could  discourage  the
associables to adhere.58 
This  approach  was  successful  in overcoming the  associables'
54 J. A. Robinson, Note on Smith and association with the Community, January
4,  1972,  in  NA,  FCO  30/1266.  See  also É.  Burin  des  Roziers,  Note  sur  les
negociations avec les EAMA et les pays du Commonwealth associables, May
17, 1973, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759; FCO, Note on the memorandum from the
Commission on the  negotiations  under Protocol  22,  May 1973,  in  NA, FCO
30/1693. 
55 SGCI,  Note  sur le  renouvellement  et  élargissement  de  la  Convention  de
Yaoundé, June 5, 1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA, 3005. 
56 EC  Commission,  Memorandum  sur  les  relations  futures  entre  la
Communauté, les actuels EAMA et les pays d'Afrique, des Caraibes, des océans
indien et paci:que, April 4, 1973, in ACCE, BAC 3/1978 910. 
57 SGCI,  Note  sur le  renouvellement  et  élargissement  de  la  Convention  de
Yaoundé et la coopération au développement, November 16, 1973, in AMAEF,
Affaires politiques, RFA, 3006. 
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wariness, since all of them participated in the :rst conference with the
Community on July 25 1973.  At  the conference,  the President of  the
Council  of  ministers  made  it  clear  that  the features of  the new
association would not necessarily have to be the same as the Yaoundé
ones.59 The  British  claimed  that  «all  this  constitutes  inevitably  a
considerable defeat for the French,»60 while «we have secured all our
objectives.»61 From a political and symbolic point of view, the July 1973
conference marked a shift  in the external relations of the EC. As the
British remarked, «this must have been the :rst meeting ever held by
the Community at which no single word of French was uttered from
start to :nish.»62 The age-old dominance of the French conception of the
Community's  relations with the developing countries was challenged
as never before. 
The abolition of the reverse preferences
The reverse preferences were the most controversial element of the
Yaoundé association. They consisted in the concession of preferential
commercial treatment by the associated countries to the  Community's
exports to them. Associated countries were not obliged to offer such a
preferential treatment, but its concession was regarded as important in
political terms. Critics of reverse preferences  argued that they were a
neocolonial arrangement, since it was unfair that developing countries
with  big economic and :nancial problems should offer a preferential
58 FCO, ODA, Record of Cheysson's visit to A. Douglas-Home, May 24, 1973, in
NA, FCO 30/1694. Cheysson was «described by some as “Pompidou's gift to
the British”» (K. Whiteman, «Africa,  the ACP and Europe: the lessons of 25
years,» in Development Policy Review, 16, 1998, p. 32). 
59 President  of  the  Council  of  the  EC,  Declaration,  Conférence  d'ouverture
entre la CEE, les EAMA, d'autres États africains et certains pays indépendants
du Commonwealth, July 25, 1973, in ACCE, BAC 40/1985 65. 
60 J. A. Robinson, Report on the meetings in Brussels on Protocol 22, July 27,
1973,  in  NA,  FCO  30/1696.  See  also  M.  Palliser  (British  permanent
representative to the EC), Note on the opening conference, July 28, 1973, in NA,
FCO 30/1696. 
61 J. A. Robinson, Report on the meetings in Brussels on Protocol 22, July 27,
1973, in NA, FCO 30/1696. 
62 M.  Palliser,  Note  on the  opening conference,  July  28,  1973,  in  NA,  FCO
30/1696. 
139
treatment  to  the  exports  of  the  EC countries.63 The  actual  economic
impact of reverse preferences was quite negligible, but the issue became
highly politicized and therefore hotly debated. The struggle was mostly
symbolic  in  nature,  and  concerned  divergent  conceptions  of  the
relations between the Community and the developing countries. 
For France reverse preferences were «the essential political element
in an association agreement»64 and they had to be considered part of the
acquis  of  the  Yaoundé  association.  They  supposedly  made  the
cooperation  system  less  one-sided:  reverse  preferences  made  the
association a sort of free trade area, wherein countries accorded mutual
preferences  to  each  other.65 For  this  reason,  reverse  preferences
contributed to make the association special and to differentiate it from
other  cooperation  agreements.66 Moreover,  reverse  preferences  made
the association secure, since they were seen as an essential element in
order to base it on a free trade area and therefore make it consistent
with  the  GATT  rules.67 These arguments  made  by  France  were
supported  by  most  of  the  francophone  associated  countries
themselves.68 
On the contrary, for Britain reverse preferences were not «part of the
distinctive character of the association.»69 Their  actual import  was so
little that there was no reason to attach too strong an importance to
them,  either  in  defending  or  criticizing  them.70 However,  reverse
63 R. S. Faber (British embassy in the Netherlands), Note on EEC association
and reverse preferences, February 20, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1690. 
64 E. E. Tomkins, Note on the French African policy, June 8, 1973, in NA, FCO
30/1796. 
65 MAEF,  Coopération  économique,  Note  sur  le  renouvellement  de  la
Convention de Yaoundé, January 17, 1973, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759. 
66 J. Ling, Report on visit to Paris to discuss West Africa, November 13, 1972, in
NA, FCO 30/1271. 
67 J. A. Robinson, Record of Anglo-French talks on association questions, May
14, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1693; MAEF, Coopération économique, Note sur les
Pays-Bas et les négociations avec les pays associés et associables, October 31,
1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Pays-Bas, 3447. 
68 European  Parliament,  Committee  for  development  and  cooperation,
Relazione  sui  risultati  della  nona  riunione  annuale  della  Conferenza
parlamentare dell'associazione, June 6, 1973, in HAEU, PE0 1594. 
69 D. J. E. Ratford, Note for Anglo-French talks on association questions, May 3,
1973, in NA, FCO 30/1692. 
70 M. D. Butler (FCO, European integration), Note on the EEC association for
developing  Commonwealth  countries,  December  11,  1972,  in  NA,  FCO
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preferences had become one of the main targets of the associable states'
criticism,  thus the  associables  could  hardly  be  expected  to  join  the
association as long as reverse preferences were in place.71 According to
France, Britain advocated the abolition of reverse preferences also for a
tactical concern. In the incoming negotiations for the new association,
the  francophone  developing  countries  would  enjoy  a  stronger
bargaining  position  with  regard  to  the  anglophone  ones,  since  the
former  would  be  able  to demand  counterparts  in  return  for their
concession  of  reverse  preferences.  On  the  other  hand,  if  reverse
preferences  were  abolished  at  the  outset  of  the  negotiations,  the
anglophone countries  would  be  better  placed to  promote  their  own
vision of the association.72 
Even  though  the  British  opposition  to  reverse  preferences  was
mainly  based  on  pragmatic  and  tactical  considerations,  it  was  also
consistent  with  a  liberal  conception  of  the  Community's  role  in  the
international trade system. Reverse preferences were criticized not only
by Britain, but also by the other EC member states strongly linked with
a  liberal  view  of  international  trade,  especially  the  Netherlands.
According  to  them,  reverse  preferences  were  not  even  necessary  to
ensure the association's consistence with GATT rules, and in fact they
were contrary to the spirit of GATT.73 Reverse preferences were strongly
criticized  also  by  the  US,  which  was  wary  of  the  Community's
preferential  agreements  with  groups  of  third  countries.74 Liberal
30/1268; J. de Beaumarchais, Note sur l'élargissement de l'association, June 11,
1973, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759. 
71 M. D. Butler, Note on reciprocity in the trading provisions  of the renewed
Yaoundé Convention, July 7, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1264; FCO, ODA, Report on
meeting with Ferrandi, December 14, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1269. 
72 É.  Burin  des  Roziers,  Note  sur  le  problème  des  préferences  inverses,
February 14, 1973, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759; G. D. Cumming, «Les relations
entre le Royaume-Uni et la Communauté européenne dans le domaine de l'aide
au  développement  entre  1975  et  2000:  infuence  mutuelle  ou  dialogue  de
sourds?,» in  La France, l'Europe et l'aide au développement. Des traités de Rome à
nos jours, ed. G. Bossuat (Paris: IGPDE, 2013), p. 69. 
73 N. Statham (British embassy to West Germany), Note on the association with
the EEC for developing Commonwealth countries,  January 10,  1973,  in  NA,
FCO 30/1688; J.-M. Palayret, «Da Lomé I a Cotonou: morte e tras:gurazione
della Convenzione CEE/ACP,» in Il primato sfuggente: l'Europa e l'intervento per
lo sviluppo (1957–2007), ed. E. Calandri (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2009), pp. 36–37.
74 D. Williams, Note on association problems, December 29, 1972, in NA, FCO
30/1269; É. Burin des Roziers, Note sur les États-Unis et les accords de libre
échange de la Communauté, May 28, 1973, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759. 
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criticism  of  reverse  preferences  further  fostered  French  support  for
them, since defending reverse preferences was seen as a way to signal
the  French  distance  from  the  American  vision  of  the  international
economic order.75
During preparations for the negotiations of the new association, the
Commonwealth  associable  countries  did  not  backtrack  on  their
rejection  of  reverse  preferences,  and  they  actually  managed  to
undermine support for them among the francophone associates too. In
the  common  statement  delivered  by  the  African  countries  at  the
conference with the Community in July 1973, the concession of reverse
preferences was excluded. With support for reverse preferences already
being weak within the EC, France and the Commission :nally had to
consent to their abolition.76 The abolition of the reverse preferences was
one  of  the  most  signi:cant  departures  of  the  Community's
development cooperation system from the Yaoundé model, signaling a
move  away  from  a  neocolonial  conception  of  the  Community's
relations with the developing countries. As Kaye Whiteman put it, the
abandonment of reciprocity was  the  «jewel in the crown»  of the new
system.77
The innovative aspects of the Lomé system of cooperation
The  reassessment  of  the  system  of  cooperation  between  the
Community  and  former  colonies  of  its  member  states  led  to  the
conclusion  of a  new  Convention,  which was  signed  in  Lomé  on
February  28,  1975.78 The  Convention  established  a  system  of
75 SGCI, Note sur les perspectives de la politique d'association de la CEE avec
les pays africains, December 1972, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759.
76 J.  A.  Robinson,  Note  on  Protocol  22,  September  12,  1973,  in  NA,  FCO
30/1698. 
77 K. Whiteman, «The rise and fall of Eurafrique. From the Berlin Conference of
1884–1885 to the Tripoli EU–Africa Summit of 2010,» in The EU and Africa: from
Eurafrique to Afro-Europa,  ed. A. Adebajo and K. Whiteman (London: Hurst &
Company, 2012), p. 33.
78 On  the  Lomé  negotiations,  see  G.  Migani,  «Un  nuovo  modello  di
cooperazione Nord–Sud? Lomé, la CEE ed i paesi ACP,» in La Comunità europea
e  le  relazioni  esterne  1957–1992,  ed.  A.  Bitumi,  G.  D'Ottavio,  and  G.  Laschi
(Bologna: CLUEB, 2008). 
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cooperation between the EC and 46 developing countries  located in
Africa, the Caribbean and the Paci:c.  Despite the inclusion of  a few
Caribbean and Paci:c  countries,  the  system continued to  be  mostly
centered  on  the  Euro-African  region.  The  institutional  and  :nancial
aspects  of  the  system  of  cooperation did  not  undergo  signi:cant
changes  with  regard  to  the  Yaoundé  association,  while  some
considerable  innovations  were  introduced  with  regard  to  the
commercial aspects.
In terms of institutions, the most relevant change with regard to the
Yaoundé  association  was  their  renaming.  The  anglophone  countries
wanted to overcome the term “association”  in favor of less one-sided
denomination,  therefore the  system  of  cooperation  was  called
“partnership”  instead of  “association”  and the  developing  countries
participating in it were called “ACP countries” instead of “associated
countries.” Similarly, the reference to the association was removed from
the institutions of the system, which were renamed “EEC–ACP Council
of  ministers” and  “EEC–ACP  Consultative  assembly.”79 Apart  from
renaming, the most signi:cant institutional innovation of Lomé was the
organization of some meetings between members of the Community's
Economic and Social Committee and economic and social actors of the
ACP countries, starting from June 1977.80 
As  for  the  :nancial  aid,  the European  Development  Fund was
increased,  but  the funds per capita decreased.81 The most  interesting
evolution  regarding  aid  concerned  the  Community's own  ways  of
managing it.82 Until the early 1970s, decisions on the allocation of the
funds were  largely  subject  to discretional  choices  and  infuenced by
personal  acquaintances.  Fund  allocation  was  mainly  managed  by
former French colonial  administrators who had become  Commission
of:cials, and in particular by the director of the EDF Jacques Ferrandi.
His approach to aid allocation came under increasing criticism as the
British  joined  the  EC  and  Cheysson  became  commissioner  for
79 A. E. Furness, Report on visit to Dakar by Deniau, March 9, 1973, in NA,
FCO 30/1690. 
80 J.-M. Palayret, «Il Comitato economico e sociale e le relazioni con i Paesi e i
territori associati e gli ACP, 1958–1985,» in  Il Comitato economico e sociale nella
costruzione europea, ed. A. Varsori (Venezia: Marsilio, 2000), p. 117. 
81 E. Grilli,  The European Community and the Developing Countries  (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
82 V.  Dimier,  «Institutionnalisation  et  bureaucratisation  de  la  Commission
européenne: l'exemple de la DG Développement,» in Politique européenne, 11 (3),
2003. 
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development.  Younger  of:cials  with  different  backgrounds  and
operational styles acquired more weight, and aid started to be allocated
on the basis of objective criteria.83 Recipients' needs and capacities were
evaluated,  as  well as the likely effectiveness of aid.  The adoption of
more  objective  criteria  was  requested  by  Britain.  Objective  criteria
bene:ted the anglophone developing countries, which were larger than
the francophone ones,  and which  were  relatively  good in designing
sound developmental  projects.  For  this reason,  Dimier  interprets the
adoption of objective criteria of aid allocation as a  strategy aimed at
reducing French dominance.84 However, British sources show that their
adoption  was  sought  by  Britain not  only  because  of their  expected
bene:ts: internal pressures and  the  institutional culture made  Britain
eager to overcome the neocolonial methods of Ferrandi.85 
The single most innovative element of the Lomé cooperation system
was  its mechanism  for  the  stabilization of  the  developing countries'
export revenues,  the so-called Stabex.  Since the establishment  of the
association, commercial cooperation was seen as a crucial element of it
beside  :nancial  aid,  characterizing  it  as  a  system  of  global
cooperation.86 However, the commercial element of the association had
undergone a gradual erosion over the years.87 According to the French,
its weakening could  bring about  a loss of  the «raison  d’être» of the
association  itself.88 In  order  to  counter  the  gradual  erosion  of  the
commercial component of the association, little could be done on the
commercial  preferences  side.  New,  different  measures  had  to  be
83 G. Migani, «L'aide au développement: entre anciennes priorités et nouveaux
dé:s,»  in  La  Commission  européenne  1973–1986.  Histoire  et  mémoires  d'une
institution, ed. É. Bussière, V. Dujardin, M. Dumoulin, P. Ludlow, J. W. Brouwer,
and  P.  Tilly  (Luxembourg:  Of:ce  des  publications  de  l’Union  européenne,
2014), pp. 407–408; Frisch, «Le role de la France et des français...,» pp. 123–125.
84 V.  Dimier,  «Constructing  conditionality:  The  bureaucratization  of  EC
development aid,» in European Foreign Affairs Review, 11 (2), 2006. 
85 FCO, ODA, Paper on aid and association, July 4, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1264;
FCO,  ODA, Note on Protocol  22 negotiations,  October 2,  1972,  in NA, FCO
30/1266; FCO, ODA, Note on commodity proposals made by the Commission
for the renegotiation of Yaoundé, April 3, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1709. 
86 SGCI, Note sur les perspectives de la politique d'association de la CEE avec
les pays africains, December 1972, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759. 
87 European Parliament,  Risoluzione sulla convenzione d'associazione tra  la
CEE e gli Stati africani e malgascio associati, January 7, 1970, in Archives du
Conseil de l'Union européenne, CM6 EAMA2 TEMP 429. 
88 SGCI, Note sur les perspectives de la politique d'association de la CEE avec
les pays africains, December 1972, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759. 
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identi:ed  and  introduced.  «Conservation  de  l'acquis  ne  signi:e  pas
immobilisme  et  absence  d'innovation:»89 as the  French  recognized,
«l'association […] ne peut se survivre qu'au prix d'une transformation
profonde.»90 
Refections  on  new  measures  to  strengthen  the  commercial
component  of  the  association  largely  focused  on  the  elaboration  of
instruments  for  the  stabilization  of  the  revenues  of  the  associated
countries'  exports.91 Revenues had  experienced increasing oscillations
over the previous years, and they had decreased overall, worsening the
situation of many associated countries. Ideas to tackle the problem had
been emerging in different circles.92 Most of the projects were based on
an insurance model, with funds going to support producers' revenues
in  case the  market  made  them  fall below  a  certain  threshold.  The
introduction of instruments for the stabilization of export revenues met
the French concern with a strengthening of the commercial element of
the  association.  As  for  the  British  position,  Britain  had  already
established  a  system  of  stabilization of  sugar  exports  in  the
Commonwealth framework,  and it  was eager to translate  it  into the
Community.93 Moreover, stabilization measures met the British concern
for endowing the association with some innovative, original elements
which would be able to make it attractive for the associable countries.94
For this reason and for its  concerns about the erosion of commercial
89 Commission paritaire de la Conférence parlementaire de l’association CEE–
EAMA, Compte rendu de la  conférence d’ouverture  entre  la  CEE,  les  États
concernés par le protocole n° 22 du Traite de Bruxelles et certains autres États
africains, July 26, 1973, in ACCE, BAC 28/1980 59. 
90 SGCI,  Note  sur  le  renouvellement  et  élargissement  de  la  politique
d'association, April 11, 1973, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759. 
91 SGCI, Note sur les perspectives de la politique d'association de la CEE avec
les pays africains, December 1972, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759; M. Palliser, Note
on Deniau's views on the Mediterranean and Protocol 22, March 27, 1973, in
NA, FCO 30/1691; SGCI,  Note sur le  renouvellement et élargissement de la
politique d'association, April 11, 1973, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759. 
92 R.  J.  Spencer  (British  delegation  to  the  EC),  Note  on  the  association  for
developing Commonwealth countries, July 6, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1264; FCO,
Record  of  meeting  with  of:cials  from DG VIII,  July  13,  1972,  in  NA,  FCO
30/1265;  W. J.  Adams, Note on association under Protocol 22, September 29,
1972, in NA, FCO 30/1266. 
93 J.-F.  Deniau,  Intervention à  la  commission  paritaire  CEE–EAMA, June 2,
1971, in ACCE, BAC 2/1975 14;  FCO, Note on Protocol 22, May 4, 1973, in NA,
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cooperation, also the EC Commission supported stabilization measures.
Opposition to the establishment of a system of export stabilization
was expressed by the Dutch and partly by the German governments.95
Their  opposition  was  not  in  principle,  since  the  Netherlands  and
Germany  were  actually  open  to  the  establishment  of  a  worldwide
system  of  export  stabilization.96 However,  they  were  wary  of  the
introduction  of stabilization  measures  at  the  regional  level  of  the
association,  since  it  would  further  strengthen  the  speci:city  of the
relationship between the Community and the associated countries. The
establishment  of  stabilization  measures  was  not  strongly  opposed,
however,  and  the  Dutch  and German resistance  instead focused  on
their details and on the size of their :nancial import.97  
As a result of the negotiations between the EC member states, the
establishment of a system for the stabilization of the revenues of the
associated countries' exports was approved,  known as the Stabex. The
Stabex  was  to  compensate  countries  for  revenue  instability,  with  a
transferral of funds to them with zero interest charged.98 Compensation
payments  were  allocated  almost  automatically  and  according  to
objective criteria, since they were due whenever revenues fell below a
determined threshold: aid directionality was further reduced compared
to the Yaoundé system. For its objective and for its features the Stabex
was  presented  by  the  EC  as  a  major  sign  of  its  commitment  to
94 K. A. East (British high commission in Nigeria),  Report on visit  of Foley,
September 1, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1266; R. Goldsmith (British delegation to the
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addressing developing countries' problems. 
Lomé as a new model of international relations?
The Lomé Convention featured a few  signi:cant departures  from
the  Yaoundé  model of  association, especially in terms of commercial
provisions.  The  most  notable  ones  were  the  abolition  of  the  reverse
preferences  and  the  establishment  of  the  Stabex  mechanism. The
innovations  introduced  in  the  Lomé  Convention  allowed  the
Community to present it as a contribution to the establishment of a new
model  of  relations between industrialized  and developing countries.
Lomé was deemed an exemplary model of international cooperation, a
particularly advanced system  for  development  promotion,  and «une
vision d'un monde nouveau dans un ordre différent.»99 The preamble of
the  Convention  proclaimed  that  it  established «a  new  model  for
relations between developed and developing states,  compatible with
the aspirations of the international community towards a more just and
more balanced economic order.»100 
The main reason why Lomé could be presented in this way was that
it was the :rst major instance of reception and implementation of some
of  the  demands  that  the  developing countries  had been making for
years. A few weeks before the signature of the Lomé Convention, the
1974 session of the UN General Assembly had ended. As I will show in
chapter  5,  the  developing  countries  had  managed  to  make  the
Assembly approve the goal of the establishment of a new international
economic order.  However, the prospects for its implementation were
low,  and  little  agreement  could  be  reached  with  the  industrialized
countries on actual measures to improve the situation of the developing
countries. Lomé could be presented as a system of cooperation which
included some of the measures demanded by the developing countries,
and  which  was  introduced  in  agreement  with  some  industrialized
countries. From such a perspective, Lomé could certainly be regarded
as a model to translate to a global level. 
99 C. Cheysson, Address to the ACP–EEC Joint Committee, December 1, 1976,
in ACCE, BAC 75/1997 1. 
100 ACP–EEC  Convention  of  Lomé,  February  28,  1975,  available  at
<http://aei.pitt.edu/4491>. See also European Parliament, Report on the Lomé
Convention (rapp. C. Flesch), October 10, 1975, in HAEU, PE0 2043.
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The claim  of the innovative and pioneering character of the Lomé
system  has been challenged by some scholars,  who have stressed the
clear aspects of continuity between Lomé and the Yaoundé association.
For instance, Marjorie Lister has argued that «instead of creating a new
economic order, Lomé was an elaboration of the old order,» and that it
«was really about traditional politics; it was about creating a sphere of
infuence for the European Community.»101 Similarly, Lotte Drieghe and
Jan  Orbie  argue  that  Lomé  was  not  a  novel  project,  but  rather  «a
continuation  of  the  largest  member  state's  policies  on  a  European
scale.»102 To be sure, a number of elements did  clearly  link the Lomé
model of cooperation with its predecessor:  its regional focus, the clear
imbalance  of power  between  the  Community  and  the  developing
countries,  most  of  the  instruments  of  cooperation,  and  so  on. The
preservation and pursuit of the EC member states' interests did play an
important role in the design of the Lomé system. However, this is not
really  surprising.  Lomé  was  not  an  enlightened  and  disinterested
project  designed by some visionaries,  but  it  was  instead  largely  the
result of intergovernmental bargaining and horse trading between the
EC member states' political and economic interests.
Despite the clear role played by member states' horse trading, Lomé
was suf:ciently innovative and original in its approach that it could
credibly be presented as a novel model for international relations. Most
importantly, Lomé was regarded as such by many external observers.
For the Community, this was an extremely important result.  Drieghe
and Orbie are right in pointing out that the presentation of Lomé as a
novel model of international relations was closely linked to the EC's
need to strengthen its legitimacy and role on the international stage.103
In early 1975 the  EC was experiencing a serious crisis: the success of
Lomé allowed it to counter it at least at a symbolic level. With Lomé,
the EC showed that it was able to establish the most ambitious system
of development cooperation to date, and that it was willing to promote
a new model of international relations based on interdependence and
cooperation.  In the previous years the EC had been calling for it  in
several forums: Lomé proved that its commitment was sincere, and that
the  Community  was  ready  to  meet  developing  countries'  concerns
which could not be met in other international arenas.
101 M. Lister, The European Community and the Developing World: The Role of the
Lomé Convention (Aldershot: Avebury, 1988), pp. 81, 188, 193. 
102 L. Drieghe and J. Orbie, «Revolution in times of Eurosclerosis: the case of
the :rst Lomé Convention,» in L'Europe en formation, 353–354, 2009, p. 179. 
103 Ibid., p. 179. 
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The weakness of the worldwide tier of cooperation
According to the compromise reached by the EC member states  at
the Paris Summit in 1972, the  preservation of the regional tier of the
Community's  system of  development  cooperation should have  been
combined  with  the  establishment  of  a  set  of  cooperation  policies
addressing the developing countries which were not included in it. The
establishment  of  cooperation policies  towards  these  countries  had
always  been  advocated  by  Germany  and  the  Netherlands,  and  the
British  entry  into  the  EC  strengthened  their  calls.  Britain  was  very
interested  in  the  establishment  of  the Community's  policies  which
addressed its former colonies but  which could not be included in the
association system because of their size –  countries such as India and
Pakistan.104 The  establishment  of  a  global tier  of  development
cooperation  was favored also  by the  EC Commission,  which  would
expand its infuence as a result. 
A  :rst  step  towards  the  establishment  of  a  global tier  of
development cooperation was the establishment of the  Community's
system  endowing preferential  commercial treatment  to the
manufactured goods exported by the developing countries in 1971. The
only other global-level Community cooperation policy was the food aid
policy, which addressed food crises in different developing countries.
France made the establishment of more ambitious and comprehensive
worldwide  policies  of  cooperation  conditional  upon the  successful
renewal of the regional association.105 In turn, the British government
made the pursuit of the negotiations for the renewal of the association
conditional  upon  the  approval  of  the  principle  of  the  concession  of
Community aid to non-associated countries.106 In July 1974 the Council
con:rmed such a principle, and it also approved the establishment of a
small program of technical assistance to non-associated countries.107 
104 British ministry of  overseas  development,  Brief  on EEC aid to  the  non-
associate developing countries, June 7, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/4. 
105 MAEF,  Coopération  économique,  Note  sur  le  renouvellement  de  la
Convention de Yaoundé,  January 17,  1973,  in  HAEU,  SGCICEE 8759;  SGCI,
Note sur le renouvellement et élargissement de la Convention de Yaoundé et la
coopération  au  développement,  November  16,  1973,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires
politiques, RFA, 3006. 
106 EC  Commission,  DG  VIII,  Note  sur  l'aide  :nancière  et  technique
communautaire en faveur de PVD non-associés, April 9, 1975, in ACCE, BAC
25/1980 1896.
107 Ibid. 
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The strength of the link between the renewal of the association and
the beginning of cooperation with non-associates was made patent by
the timing of the Commission communication on aid to non-associates
in 1975: the Lomé Convention was signed on Friday, February 28, and
the Commission adopted the communication when it next met,  which
was on Wednesday, March 5. The Commission proposed to allocate 766
million dollars to non-associates over the 1976–80 period, with a special
focus  on  the  least  developed  countries and  on  Asia  in  particular.108
However, the Council could not adopt the proposal because of German
and Italian resistance  on :nancial  grounds.109 After  the  departure of
Willy Brandt and Erhard Eppler and after the outbreak of the crisis, the
German  government  had  lost  some  enthusiasm  for development
cooperation. The  adoption  of  the  Commission's  proposal  was
particularly hindered by the weakening of the British government. The
Commission  launched  its  proposal  at  the  height  of  the struggle  of
renegotiating the British membership of the EC: the British minister for
cooperation Judith Hart was campaigning for an outright exit, and thus
she was in an awkward position to  give  support  to the Commission's
proposal for aid to non-associates.110 
It was the pressure exerted by the European Parliament that favored
the overcoming of the deadlock in the Council on the strengthening of
the  Community's  cooperation  policies  towards  non-associated
countries.  The  Parliament  obtained  the  insertion  in  the  Community
budget  for  1976  of  20  million  dollars  to  be  destined  to aid  to  non-
associates.111 Financially,  the  engagement  was  almost  negligible.
Politically,  however,  it  was an important  step.  Continued opposition
from some member states hindered agreement on the allocation of the
funds for several months: only the risk of an institutional clash with the
Parliament over budgetary powers led the Council to decide to make
the  20  million  dollars  available,  and  to  approve  their  allocation  in
November  1976.112 About  73  percent  of  funds  were  destined  for the
108 Ibid. 
109 British ministry of overseas development, Brief on the EEC aid to the non-
associate developing countries, June 7, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/4. 
110 EC  Commission,  DG  VIII,  Note  sur  l'aide  :nancière  et  technique
communautaire en faveur de PVD non-associés, April 9, 1975, in ACCE, BAC
25/1980 1896. 
111 FCO, European integration, Note on aid to non-associates, June 14, 1976, in
NA, FCO 98/4. 
112 British delegation to the EC, Report on Coreper meeting on aid for non-
associates, October 7, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/4. 
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poorest  Asian countries (mainly  India,  Pakistan and Bangladesh),  20
percent to  Latin  America  and  7  percent to  non-associated Austral
African countries.113 
However  tentative,  the  launch  of  the  Community's  initiative  for
development cooperation with non-associated countries was signi:cant
because it signaled that the Community did not aim at focusing solely
on the Euro-African region nor on the former colonies of the member
states. A speci:c debate took place on the opportunity of signaling such
an engagement. France preferred the assumption of a low-key pro:le
by the Community in this respect and it proposed that the Community
should  merely  contribute  to  initiatives  taken  by  other  international
organizations  in  favor  of  the  non-associated  countries.114 On  the
contrary, the EC Commission and the other  EC member states argued
that the Community's engagement in favor of the non-associates should
be clearly visible.115 Moreover,  the Community's  cooperation  initiative
with  non-associates was  signi:cant  because  the  allocation  of  funds
tended  not  to  be  based  on  merely  political  criteria,  but  rather  on
objective criteria such as the evaluation of countries' poverty and basic
needs. 
Community  funds  for  aid  to  non-associated  countries  constantly
increased in the  late 1970s, reaching 138.5 million  dollars for 1980.116
However,  their  inclusion  in  the  Community budget  was  subject  to
yearly negotiations and debate and the funds were allocated on an ad
hoc basis. The lack of a certain basis for it made it impossible to design
and  implement long-term  development  projects.  When  the  Council
:nally agreed on grounding the program on a stable basis, the approval
of the  ensuing regulations  was blocked for several months by a veto
113 The  repartition  of  funds  between  the  three  regions  remained  almost
unchanged during the following years (G. Chedeville, «Evolution of the EEC
policy towards development cooperation,» in The EEC in the Global System, ed.
K. B. Lall, W. Ernst, and H. S. Chopra (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1984), pp.
70–71). 
114 Presidency of the Council of the EC, Note sur l'aide :nancière et technique
à  des  PVD  non  associés  en  1976,  August  11,  1976,  in  NA,  FCO  98/4;  D.
Maitland  (British  permanent  representative  to  the  EC),  Report  on  Council
meeting  on  the  Community  :nancial  and  technical  aid  to  non-associated
developing countries, November 9, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/5. 
115 W. J. Adams (British delegation to the EC), Note on aid to non-associates,
August 27, 1975, in NA, FCO 58/895. 
116 J. L. F. Buist (FCO, ODA), Note on 1981 Community budget: aid to non-
associates, September 12, 1980, in NA, FCO 98/719. 
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cast by the Netherlands for constitutional reasons.117 As a result, by 1980
the worldwide tier of the Community's development cooperation was
still extremely limited and fragile. 
Development cooperation and the assertion of the EC as a 
distinctive actor
During  the  1970s  the  system  and  policies  of  development
cooperation of the Community were thoroughly reassessed. Some new
elements  were  introduced,  while  some existing  elements  underwent
signi:cant changes, such as the system of cooperation with the former
colonies  of  the EC member states.  In almost  all  the instances of  the
reassessment  of  the  Community's  development  cooperation,  a
juxtaposition was evident between the position held by France on one
side and the position held by the Netherlands and Germany on the
other  side.  France  advocated  a  system  of  development  cooperation
largely  centered  upon  the  association  with  the  former  colonies  in
Africa, possibly very close to the model of cooperation designed in the
previous  decades.  On  the  contrary,  the  Netherlands  and  Germany
sought  to  reduce  the  strength  of  the  Euro-African  focus  of  the
Community's system of cooperation and they sought to move it away
from a neocolonial model. 
For  its  intermediate  position  between  the  French  views  and  the
Dutch and German ones, Britain played a particularly infuential role in
the reassessment of the Community's development cooperation. Its role
was  particularly  infuential  because  such  a  reassessment  was  made
necessary by the British entry into the EC and by the consequent need
for  de:ning  the  relationship  between  the  Community  and  the
Commonwealth developing countries.  The result  of the struggle and
compromise  between the  different  views held by the member states
was  the  establishment  of  a  two-tier  system  of  development
cooperation.  At  least  a  partial  departure  was  possible  from  the
neocolonial model of the relationship between the Community and the
developing countries, thanks to the abolition of the reverse preferences
and the adoption of objective criteria for aid allocation. 
Some of the features  of  the Lomé system of  cooperation made it
117 FCO,  ODA,  Note  on  aid  to  non-associates,  August  1979,  in  NA,  FCO
98/411. 
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particularly  innovative,  such  as  its  multi-dimensional  character  and
especially its mechanism for the stabilization of export revenues. The
Lomé system was presented as proof of the generous character of the
Community  and  of  its  genuine  concern  with  developing  countries'
problems: Lomé proved that the EC was an original, progressive and
distinctive international actor. It was neither sel:sh nor inward-looking,
and it was ready to move beyond the colonial legacy. Lomé was also
presented as a major contribution to the establishment of a new model
of  international  relations,  promoting  international  cooperation  and
interdependence  and  promoting  a  reduction  of  the  gap  between
industrialized and developing countries. 
The Lomé system allowed the EC to present itself as a distinctive
international actor, even if in fact the system was not as innovative and
as  disinterested  as  the  Community  pretended  it  was.  Many  of  its
features were in continuity with the Yaoundé system of cooperation,
and  many  of  its  innovative  features  resulted  from sheer  bargaining
between member states' interests. To be sure, there were a few actors
which  were  sincerely  concerned  with  the  developing  countries'
problems,  especially  within  the  EC  Commission  and  the  European
Parliament – but in reality they exerted limited infuence. Even if Lomé
was not as innovative as the Community pretended it to be, it was still
possible for the Community to present it as such. The attention paid by
Community to stress and signal the importance of Lomé indicated that
development  cooperation  had  acquired  a  central  place  in  the
Community's international activity, especially as far as the assertion of
a distinctive character of the EC was concerned. 
Even if the establishment of the Lomé cooperation system could be
presented  as  a  success,  other  aspects  of  the  reassessment  of  the
Community's development cooperation were less successful. Attempts
to  use  the  Paris  Summit  to  signal  the  Community's  concern  with
development failed, and also the attempt at establishing a global tier of
cooperation was overall unsuccessful. These failures were particularly
striking because member states did agree on the opportunity of acting,
but they were unable to do so because they disagreed on the particular
measures to take. As a result of this inability, the Community often had
to  resort  to  making  mere  pledges  and  rhetorical  commitments.
However,  the inability of  following up all  these pledges with actual
measures affected the credibility of the Community's claims, as well as
its image as a committed partner of the developing countries. 
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Chapter 5 
The EC as Promoter of a New 
International Order
The 1970s were a period of wrenching change for the international
economy.  The international monetary system  was  shaken by  Nixon's
decision in August 1971 to decouple the dollar from gold. A round of
GATT negotiations  for the liberalization of trade  took place.  National
economies  became increasingly interconnected, patterns of  industrial
production were changing,  and  markets were experiencing increasing
instability.  Some developing countries and Japan asserted themselves
as new infuential actors, while the US and the EC were struggling to
reassess their  role.  Even if most  of  the changes concerned economic
issues, they were fundamentally political in character. The international
order  and  the  balance  of  power between states  were  changing.  In
particular,  the  developing  countries were  challenging  the  position
enjoyed by the industrialized  ones,  demanding radical changes to the
international order. The  import and complexity of  all  these problems
led governments  to discuss  and  negotiate  solutions  and  changes
throughout the whole decade. 
This chapter focuses on the participation of the EC in the debates
concerning  the  reassessment  of the  international  economic  order.  In
particular, it focuses on the debates concerning the reassessment of the
developing countries' role in the international system. Debates about it
occurred  mainly  at  the  UN Conference  for  Trade  and Development
(UNCTAD),  the  UN  General  Assembly,  and  at the  Conference  for
International Economic Cooperation (CIEC), starting from 1975.  To be
sure, there were other important aspects of the international economy
which were discussed during the 1970s, such as monetary  issues and
trade between industrialized countries. The reason why I do not focus
speci:cally on these debates is that they were less relevant in terms of
assertion of  the EC as  an international  actor  promoting a distinctive
vision of the international order.  Debates on the developing countries'
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role offered more opportunities for the EC  to articulate a distinctive
vision of it.  
In  the  debates  on  the  international  economic  order  and  on  the
developing countries' role in it, the Community constantly advocated a
reduction of the gap between industrialized and developing countries,
and  the  establishment  of permanent  mechanisms  for  dialogue  and
cooperation  between  them.  It  argued  that  it  was essential  to  avoid
confrontation between juxtaposed  economic  blocs,  and  the EC rather
tried  to  promote regional  integration  and  interregional  dialogue.
International  economic  relations  were  conceived  as  a  positive  sum
game, wherein the welfare of any actor depended on the welfare of the
others. The EC heavily emphasized the value of interdependence and
dialogue,  and  it  tried  to assert  itself  as  the  most  progressive
industrialized actor. The adoption of such a position was clearly linked
to the impossibility for the EC to afford a confrontation with producing
countries,  but  it  was  also  consistent  with the  narrative  of  European
integration itself,  and  it was useful  to  assert  and highlight  the  EC's
distinctiveness  as  an  international  actor. Despite  the  EC's  efforts  to
assert  itself  as  a  progressive  actor,  deeds  fell  short  of  words  in  this
respect. 
Offering trade preferences to the developing countries 
The  :rst  occasion  for  the  EC  to  promote  its  vision  of  a  more
balanced international  order was  the establishment  of the system of
generalized preferences for the developing countries' exports. As early
as  1963  the  Community  proposed  that  industrialized  countries
endowed a preferential tariff treatment to some of the exports of the
developing  countries.1 The  measure  was  aimed  at  favoring  the
inclusion of these countries in the international trade and at promoting
their  economic development,  so that  the gap between them and the
industrialized  countries  could  be  reduced.  The  principle  of  the
introduction  of  generalized  preferences  for  developing  countries'
exports was unanimously approved by the member states of UNCTAD
in 1968.2 Its approval was one of the :rst instances of negotiated and
shared adoption of a  measure  improving the position of developing
1 EC delegation, Statement on the access to markets, CIEC, February 19, 1976,
in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1120. 
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countries in the international system. 
The  Community  system  of  generalized  preferences  entered  into
force  on July  1,  1971.  It  endowed preferential  tariff  treatment  to  all
manufactured goods coming from the developing countries, with a few
limits and safeguard clauses. The most important limit was clearly the
exclusion  of  most  agricultural  goods  from  the  system.  Despite  this
limit,  the  Community  presented  the  establishment  of  its  system  of
generalized preferences as a sign of its commitment to a more balanced
and more just international economic order. No chance was missed to
underline the fact that the Community had been the :rst – and for a
few years the only – major industrialized actor to turn the commitment
made  in  UNCTAD  into  actual  measures.3 The  President  of  the  EC
Commission  Franco  Maria  Malfatti  claimed  that  the  concession  of
preferences  was  «a  political  act,  which  proves  the  attitude  of  the
Community and its member states towards the Third World better than
any other act.»4 
The commercial preferences offered  to the manufactured goods of
all the  developing countries were not the only preferences offered by
the  Community to  third countries.  The  Community offered  special
commercial  preferences  to  the countries  associated  with it,  such  as
those taking part in the Yaoundé cooperation system. In the early 1970s
the  Community concluded  new  preferential  commercial  agreements
with some developing countries, such as the Mediterranean ones. These
agreements were presented by the Community as a contribution to the
development  of  these  countries  and  to  their  greater inclusion in
international trade. However, these agreements were heavily criticized
not  only  by  those  developing  countries  which  happened  to  be not
bene:ting  from  them,  but  :rst and  foremost  by  the  American
government.5 
2 UNCTAD was one of  the main arenas for discussion between industrialized
and developing countries; general UNCTAD conferences were convened every
four years starting from 1964. 
3 The US established their scheme of  generalized preferences in 1974, but it
attached  many  political  clauses  to  it  ( G. Garavini,  After  Empires:  European
Integration,  Decolonization,  and  the  Challenge  from  the  Global  South  1957–1986
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 132n).
4 F.  M.  Malfatti,  Dichiarazione  in  occasione  della  messa  in  vigore  delle
preferenze generalizzate, June 21, 1971, in ACCE, Speeches collection. See also
R. Dahrendorf, Exposé à l'OCDE, June 7, 1971, in ACCE, BAC 3/1978 727. 
5 E.  Martino  and  J.-F.  Deniau,  Projet  de  communication  sur  la  politique
d'association et de régimes préférentielles de la Communauté, April 9, 1970, in
HAEU, EM 156; N. Samuels (US deputy under-secretary of state), Speech «The
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The actual impact of the Community's preferential agreements upon
world trade and American exports was very limited, to the extent that
Europeans  complained  that American criticism had «more  emotion
than logic.»6 Indeed, the reason for the American criticism was political
rather than economic. The US argued that the Community's preferential
agreements favored the  division  of  the  world  into  separate  and
competing  trading  blocs,  thus  undermining the  promotion  of  free
trade.7 They were not only at odds with the GATT principle of the most
favored  nation, but  also  with  the  very  philosophy  underlying  the
GATT.  Moreover,  the  US resented the  possible  expansion  of  the  EC
preferential agreements to Latin America.8 Since the EC was the largest
trading power  in  the  world,  the  EC's  preferential  agreements  could
become a real challenge to the international trade system. However, the
Community continued to state its support to the  pursuit of  a greater
liberalization  of  world  trade  and  it  turned  down  the  political
signi:cance of its preferential agreements, arguing that «preferences are
not  a  devilish  invention  designed  to  undermine  the  world  trading
system.»9 
uni:cation  of  Europe  and  the  Atlantic  partner,»  Friedrich  Ebert  Stiftung,
Leverkusen, April  14,  1972,  in ACCE, BAC 173/1996 24;  French embassy in
Washington, Note sur la visite à Washington de Dahrendorf, October 9, 1972, in
AMAEF,  CE,  3787;  G.  Migani,  «Gli  Stati  Uniti  e  le  relazioni  eurafricane  da
Kennedy a Nixon,» in Dollari, petrolio e aiuti allo sviluppo: il confronto Nord–Sud
negli anni '60–'70, ed. D. Caviglia and A. Varsori (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2008),
pp. 58–59. 
6 FCO, Planning staff, Paper on the external relations of the EC: relations with
the developing world, May 1, 1973, in NA, FCO 49/460. 
7 EC  Commission,  DG  I,  Note  sur  la  position  américaine  en  matière  de
préférences généralisées, December 1, 1969, in HAEU, EM 156; British embassy
in Washington, Memorandum «The US and the enlarged EC: commercial and
economic issues,» January 25, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1294; MAEF,  Coopération
économique, Note sur les négociations commerciales entre la CEE et les États-
Unis, January 29,  1972,  in AMAEF,  RFA, 3002;  H.  Kissinger,  Address  to the
Associated  Press's  annual  dinner,  New  York,  April  23,  1973,  available  at
<http://www.cvce.eu/obj/address_given_by_henry_a_kissinger_new_york_2
3_april_1973-en-dec472e3-9dff-4c06-ad8d-d3fab7e13f9f.html>;  R.  Cromer
(British ambassador to the US), Note on Nixon's foreign policy report, May 8,
1973, in NA, FCO 98/1734. 
8 Migani, «Gli Stati Uniti e le relazioni eurafricane,» p. 59. 
9 E.  Wellenstein  (EC Commission, DG I), Report on  Soames's  visit to the US,
February 18,  1973,  in  Churchill  Archives,  SOAM 42. See  also  P.  Malvé (EC
Commission's delegation to the US), Speech on the evolution of economic and
commercial  relations  between  the  US and the  EC,  St.  Louis  Conference  on
world trade, September 23, 1971, in ACCE, Speeches collection.
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The  Community  argued  that  preferential  agreements  were  to  be
limited in number and scope, and that they were helpful for tying some
developing countries to the West.10 Special agreements were necessary
to promote their growth, since most of these countries were strongly
underdeveloped and the near absence of manufactured goods among
their exports made it impossible for them to bene:t of the system of
generalized preferences.11 While the Community stressed the economic
rationale underlying the agreements,  France was explicit  about their
political  rationale.  The  preservation  of  preferential  agreements  was
important because they signaled «l'originalité et dans une large mesure
la  personnalité  de  la  Communauté  Economique  Européenne.»12
Moreover, France favored the establishment of a regional trading bloc
encompassing  Western  Europe,  the  Mediterranean  and  Africa,  in
keeping with the age-old notion of Eurafrica. 
In order to preserve and stress the distinctness of the Community
within the international economic order, France was also attached to
the  Community's  common  external  tariff.  The  US  repeatedly
complained about  the  trade barriers  defending the Community,  and
they  were  extremely  critical  of  its  strictly  protectionist  policy  on
agricultural trade. In the perspective of the incoming Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, some EC member states envisaged not only a reduction
of  the  Community's  agricultural  protectionism,  but  also  a  gradual
dismantling  of  the  common  external  tariff  altogether.  However,  the
French  government  opposed  such  a  development,  arguing  that  the
Community's common external tariff had an essential political meaning
and should be preserved in the long-term too.13 The common external
tariff signaled the EC's distinctness and it  was necessary in order to
avoid the dilution of the EC into a broad Western free trade area.
The  Multilateral  Trade  Negotiations  (the  so-called  Tokyo  Round)
that took place during the 1970s  led to a  reduction of  trade  barriers
between  countries.  However, the  Community  preserved  its
protectionist agricultural policy and its common external tariff, which
10 J.-F. Deniau, Rapport sur des entretiens avec les autorités américaines, March
13, 1970, in HAEU, EM 102.
11 Ibid.; E. Martino and J.-F. Deniau, Projet de communication sur la politique
d'association et de régimes préférentielles de la Communauté, April 9, 1970, in
HAEU, EM 156.
12 MAEF, Coopération économique, Note pour visite de Soames à Paris, March
16, 1973, in AMAEF, Grande-Bretagne, 356. 
13 MAEF,  Projet  d'intervention  de  Jobert  au  Conseil  sur  la  conception
d'ensemble des futures relations commerciales, May 1973, in AN, AG 5(2), 1035.
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was  deemed  useful  to protect  European producers  at  such a  time of
crisis,  and  of  the  deep changes to the international economy.  Despite
third  countries'  criticism,  the  Community  also  preserved  its  special
preferential  arrangements  with  the  developing  countries  associated
with it. The only result that could be obtained by the external pressures
was  a gradual overcoming of  the  reverse preferences  granted to the
Community by the developing countries associated with it. 
The EC as the most progressive industrialized actor
The  1972  conference  of  UNCTAD  in  Santiago  del  Chile  was  an
extremely  important  occasion  for  a  general  discussion  of  the
remarkable changes which were  affecting the international  economic
system and for  the  de:nition of  suitable  measures  to address  them.
While  at  the  previous  general  conference  of  UNCTAD  in  1968  the
developing  countries  had  mostly  aimed  at  gaining  some  speci:c
improvements in the trade :eld, by 1972 they had adopted more radical
demands,  envisaging  a  fundamental  overhaul  of  the  whole
international  economic  order.  Developing  countries'  agenda  had
undergone  a  politicization,  and  a  connection  had  begun  to  be
established between the economic demands made by the G77 and the
political demands made by the Non-Aligned Movement.14 As a result,
the Santiago Conference was the :rst instance of thorough discussion at
a world level about the very structure of the international order. 
The Santiago Conference was also an important occasion for the EC,
since it was the :rst instance where it could articulate its general vision
of the international economic order and present it to all of the world's
countries. In those months the EC was making substantial progress for
its  assertion  on  the  international  stage,  since  the  EPC  had  been
launched a few months earlier and the member states were preparing
for the Paris Summit and for the entry of Britain. By inviting the EC
member  states  to  de:ne  common  positions  on  some  of  the  main
international issues of the time, the Santiago Conference was the :rst
major occasion to present the EC as a distinct international actor and to
express its distinctive views. In particular, in Santiago the EC had the
14 Garavini, After Empires, p. 134; G. Garavini, «Completing decolonization: the
1973 “oil  shock” and the  struggle  for  economic  rights,»  in  The  International
History Review, 33 (3), 2011, p. 478.
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chance to stress its attachment to the notion of multilateral dialogue
and to show its willingness to meet some of the developing countries'
concerns. Its attitude sharply contrasted with the American one, which
was much more reluctant in this respect. 
In  Santiago  the  EC  stressed  its  belief  in  the  intrinsic  value  of
multilateral dialogue.15 The EC took an active role at the conference,
trying  to  mediate  between  the  radical  demands  of  the  developing
countries  and  the  conservative  positions  of  the  US  and  Japan.  The
adoption of this role was particularly promoted by the President of the
EC Commission Sicco Mansholt, who personally engaged in promoting
dialogue  and  in  asserting  the  EC  as  the  main  interlocutor  for  the
developing countries.16 In keeping with this approach, the EC endorsed
the developing countries'  call  for  their  extensive involvement in  the
management of the international economic system. It was the EC which
promoted the approval of resolutions calling for the participation of the
developing countries in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations and in the
reform  of  the  international  monetary  system.  These  two  resolutions
were deemed «les plus importants succès obtenus par les pays en voie
de  développement  et  [ils] n'auraient  pas  été  possible  sans  la
Communauté.»17 
The EC's  acknowledgement of the need to reform the international
economic system and its adoption of an active role in this respect were
promoted by Mansholt and other members of the European delegations
in  Santiago.  Their  position  built  upon  refections  that  had  been
developed by several European actors in the previous years, especially
by leftist politicians and movements, but also by Catholic actors. One of
the clearest examples of  such refections was the speech of the Italian
foreign  minister  Aldo  Moro  at  the  1969  session  of  the  UN  General
Assembly.18 Moro advocated the notion of «integral peace,» calling for a
15 EC Commission, Communication on UNCTAD III, March 3, 1972, in ACCE,
BAC 2/1975 52. 
16 Garavini,  After  Empires,  pp.  148–150;  J.  van  der  Harst,  «Sicco  Mansholt:
coraggio  e  convinzione,»  in La  Commissione  europea:  storia  e  memorie  di
un'istituzione,  ed.  M.  Dumoulin  (Luxembourg:  Uf:cio  delle  pubblicazioni
uf:ciali delle Comunità europee, 2007), p. 190. 
17 EC  Commission,  Rapport  sur  les  résultats  de  la  3ème  session  de  la
CNUCED, June 13, 1972, in ACCE, BAC 2/1975 54. 
18 L. Tosi, «L'evoluzione di una politica: l'Italia e la sicurezza collettiva dalla
Società  delle  Nazioni  alle  Nazioni  Unite,»  in  Nazione,  interdipendenza,
integrazione: le relazioni internazionali dell'Italia (1917–1989), ed. F. Romero and A.
Varsori, vol. I (Roma: Carocci, 2005), p. 247.
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substantial  reduction  of  the international  economic  and  political
unbalances. Countries should join efforts to remove causes of instability
and promote global development,  and they should all adopt an open,
cooperative attitude in their mutual dealings. 
Besides praising the intrinsic value of dialogue, in Santiago the EC
argued  in  favor  of  some  substantial  reforms  of  the  international
economic  system.  In  particular,  it  advocated  a  more  rational
international  division  of  labor.19 The  developing  countries  should
industrialize  and  overcome  their  reliance  solely  upon  the  export  of
primary  commodities,  which  accounted  for  75–80  percent  of  their
foreign exchange earnings.20 In order to adapt the European economy
to these changes, the EC Commission envisaged an ambitious strategy
for  the  restructuring  of  the  European industrial  sector.21 It  is  worth
noticing that the prospect of  changes to the international  division of
labor was supported by the European trade unions as well.22
In  Santiago  the  EC  also  argued  in  favor  of  an  «aménagement
concerté de l'économie,» that is to say a stronger involvement of public
actors  in  the  management  of  the  international  economy.23 Even  if
member states held partly different views on this subject, there was a
widespread feeling  that  stronger  public  intervention  was  needed in
order to ensure the stability and ef:ciency of the international economy
and to bring about  «un ordre international plus juste.»24 Interventions
were  needed  especially  in  the  trade  :eld,  for  instance  through  the
19 EC Commission, Communication on UNCTAD III, March 3, 1972, in ACCE,
BAC 2/1975 52; European Parliament,  Rapport sur la préparation de la 3ème
session de la CNUCED (rapp. P.-B.  Cousté),  March 13,  1972,  in ACCE, BAC
2/1975 53. 
20 H. Coppens,  G. Faber,  and  E.  Lof,  «European  Community's  security  of
supply with raw materials and the interests of developing countries: The need
for  a  cooperative  strategy,»  in  The  Lomé  Convention  and  a  New  International
Economic Order, ed. F. Alting von Geusau (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1977), p. 164. 
21 However, after the outbreak of the economic crisis  the EC adopted a much
more defensive approach in this respect (L. Mechi and F. Petrini, «La Comunità
europea nella divisione internazionale del lavoro: le politiche industriali, 1967–
1978,» in Alle origini del presente: l'Europa occidentale nella crisi degli anni Settanta,
ed. A. Varsori (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2007), pp. 272, 277).  
22 Garavini, After Empires, p. 129. 
23 European Parliament,  Rapport sur la préparation de la 3ème session de la
CNUCED (rapp. P.-B. Cousté), March 13, 1972, in ACCE, BAC 2/1975 53. 
24 Ibid. 
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conclusion of international agreements on primary commodities.25 
Only a handful of substantial measures could in fact be agreed upon
at  the  1972  UNCTAD  conference,  mainly  because  of  the  great  gap
between  many  of  the developing  countries'  demands  and  the
industrialized countries' willingness to meet them. The EC blamed the
very  strict  position  adopted by  the  US  and  Japan,  which hindered
agreement with the developing countries.  The EC member states were
in  fact  opposed  to some  measures  demanded  by  the  developing
countries: the strict position adopted by the US and Japan offered them
the chance  to enjoy a free rider position in this respect.  While the US
and  Japan  ensured that  industrialized  countries  would  make no
substantial concessions, the EC could claim that it was ready to make
those concessions and blame the other industrialized countries for  the
failure  of  the  conference. From  the  point  of  view  of  the  EC  the
conference  was  quite  successful,  since it allowed the  EC to  play  an
active and constructive role, to highlight its distinctness and to improve
its image among third countries.26 
How new should the new international economic order be? 
Developing countries were disappointed by the poor results of the
Santiago Conference. As a consequence, they adopted a more radical
stance towards the existing international economic order, and a more
confrontational approach towards the industrialized countries. At the
conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Algiers in September 1973
it  was  decided  they  would  exert  pressure  on  the  industrialized
countries  by  limiting  the  production  and  raising  the  price  of  oil.27
Industrialized  countries  which  depended  on  oil  imports  would  be
forced to make concessions,  which would bene:t all  the  developing
countries. Banners in Algiers proclaimed that the «OPEC is the shield of
the Third World,» and an Indian diplomat openly stated «we intend to
exploit the oil crisis to force you into a general revision of the terms of
25 EC Commission, Communication on UNCTAD III, March 3, 1972, in ACCE,
BAC 2/1975 52. 
26 EC  Commission,  Rapport  sur  les  résultats  de  la  3ème  session  de  la
CNUCED, June 13, 1972, in ACCE, BAC 2/1975 54. 
27 Garavini, After Empires, pp. 175–177. 
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exchange that will do us more justice.»28 Oil prices quadrupled in late
1973, strongly hitting the EC, which depended on oil  imports for 95
percent  of  its  oil  consumption  and  for  50–60  percent  of  its  energy
needs.29
The  employment  of  oil  as  a  political  weapon  was  effective  in
increasing the developing countries'  pressure upon the industrialized
ones.  They obtained the  convocation of  a  special  session of  the  UN
General  Assembly  in  spring  1974,  which  was  precisely  aimed  at
promoting a  reform  of  the  international  economic  order.  The  works
carried out in the special and in the ordinary session of the UN General
Assembly in 1974 led to the approval of a resolution calling for a new
international  economic  order  and  of  a  program  of  action  aimed  at
bringing it about. The former called for 
the Establishment of a New International Economic Order based
on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest
and  cooperation  among  all  States,  […]  which  shall  correct
inequalities and redress existing injustices,  make it  possible  to
eliminate  the  widening  gap  between  the  developed  and  the
developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic
and social  development and peace and justice for  present  and
future generations.30
Moreover,  the  UN  General  Assembly  approved the  Charter  of
economic rights and duties of the states. Reforms envisaged by the UN
General Assembly concerned most of the domains of the international
economic relations, spanning from the monetary :eld to the trade of
primary commodities, from international :nance to development aid.
However, most of the reforms were bound to remain on paper. Western
countries  acquiesced  in the  approval  of  these UN  documents  by
consensus, but they did not  feel  committed to the  reforms called by
them.31 The  EC continued to  concede  that  some  reforms  of  the
28 Ibid., p. 180.
29 Ibid.,  p.  166;  J.  Sakkas,  «Reconciling  political  identity  and  Atlantic
partnership:  Europe  and  the  Middle  East  crisis  of  1973–74,» in  Atlantic,
Euratlantic, or Europe–America?, ed. G. Scott-Smith and V. Aubourg (Paris: Soleb,
2011), p. 509; The Lomé Convention and a New International Economic Order, ed. F.
Alting von Geusau (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1977), p. 232. 
30 UN General Assembly, Res. 3201 «Declaration on the establishment of a new
international  economic  order,»  May  1,  1974,  available  at  <http://www.un-
documents.net/s6r3201.htm>.
31 L. Tosi, «Europe, the United Nations and dialogue with the Third World,» in
Europe  in  the  International  Arena  during  the  1970s:  Entering  a  Different  World
(Bruxelles: P.I.E.–Peter Lang, 2011), pp. 171–172. 
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international  economic order were needed,  since some of  its  aspects
were obsolete and it was necessary to recognize the increasing weight
acquired by the developing countries.32 However, most industrialized
countries  wanted  the  fundamental  features  and  institutions  of  the
existing  international  order  to  stay  in  place,  while  the  developing
countries wanted quite a radical change to them.33 
The approach adopted by the developing countries in 1973–74 was
described  as  «polémique,  agressif  et  peu  réaliste»  by  the  EC.34 Its
confrontational  character  discouraged  the  reception  of  developing
countries'  demands  by  the  industrialized  countries.35 Most  of  the
demands were deemed too radical:  as far as rhetorical commitments
and endorsement  of  general  principles  were  required,  the  EC could
adopt quite forward positions, but its position was much more hesitant
when  developing  countries'  demands  implied  massive  :nancial
transfers and a strong impact on the domestic economy. Compared to
the early 1970s, the EC's stance was more reluctant also because of the
magnitude of the economic crisis hitting it in those years. Moreover, EC
member states did not want to depart excessively from the American
position, since transatlantic relations were undergoing a delicate phase.
As for the EC Commission, the departure of Mansholt at the end of
1973 reduced its eagerness to meet developing countries' demands.
While the EC was not willing to meet most of the demands made by
the  developing  countries,  it  could  not  really  afford  to adopt  a
confrontational  attitude  towards  them  either.  Especially  after  the
developing countries's decision to employ oil as a political weapon, the
EC was very vulnerable and exposed to pressure. In order to deal with
this awkward position,  the EC remained extremely wary of  making
substantial  concessions to the  developing countries, but  at  the same
time it adopted a relatively open and positive attitude towards them.36
In particular, it continued to state its readiness to engage in dialogue
32 President of the Council of the EC, Speech at the CIEC, December 16, 1975,
in  ACCE,  BAC 48/1984 1118;  President  of  the Council  of  the EC, Speech at
UNCTAD IV, May 6, 1976, in ACCE, Speeches collection. 
34 EC  Commission,  DG  I,  Note  sur  la  6ème  session  extraordinaire  de
l'Assemblée Générale, May 10, 1974, in ACCE, BAC 129/1983 306. 
33 President of the Council of the EC, Declaration to the UN General Assembly,
April 10, 1974, in ACCE, BAC 129/1983 306. 
35 EC Commission, Report on the Charter of economic rights and duties of the
states, July 4, 1974, in ACCE, BAC 25/1980 987. 
36 Ministero degli esteri,  Elementi per un intervento sulla CCEI al Consiglio
europeo, November 1975, in Archivio Centrale dello Stato [ACS], Moro, 121. 
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with the  developing countries  and its staunch belief  in  the  intrinsic
value of multilateral  dialogue.  As the EC Commission proudly stated,
«the Community will never be the :rst to stop trying to negotiate.»37 
The  EC  tried  to  perform  as  «the  developing  world's  most
understanding  partner.»38 Consultation  and  coordination  did  occur
with the other industrialized countries, but the Community was eager
to  preserve  and  stress its  speci:city.39 Its  adoption  of  an  open  and
positive attitude was clearly due to the need to avoid a head-on confict
with  the  developing  countries,  but  it  was  also  connected  to  some
fundamental traits of the EC's self-conception as an international actor.
The EC was eager to assert itself as mediator and promoter of dialogue
between the industrialized and the developing countries,  even when
their positions were very far apart. In this respect, there was an analogy
with the EC's aspiration to promote dialogue and moderation between
the Eastern  and  the  Western  blocs.  The  Italian  ministry  for  foreign
affairs argued that the EC should act as «factor of political equilibrium
between East and Est and of economic equilibrium between North and
South,» promoting an overcoming  of  the  sharp  division  between
blocs.40 
In  the  UN  debates  on  the  international  economic  order,  the  EC
conceded that some of the developing countries'  demands should be
met, especially with regard to the assertion of national sovereignty on
natural resources. However, the EC insisted on a recognition of the fact
that industrialized countries  did  have  some legitimate rights,  and not
only  duties  as  the developing  countries  tended  to  suggest.41 In
particular, the EC insisted  on a recognition of all countries' right  to a
37 EC Commission, DG I, Report on the Charter of economic rights and duties
of the states, September 1974, in ACCE, BAC 25/1980 987. 
38 G. Garavini, «The colonies strike back: The impact of the Third World on
Western Europe, 1968–1975,» in Contemporary European History, 16 (3),  2007,  p.
318.
39 See for instance B. Lindemann, «European Political Cooperation at the UN:
A challenge  for  the Nine,» in  European Political  Cooperation,  ed.  D.  Allen,  R.
Rummel, and W. Wessels (London: Butterworth Scienti:c, 1982), p. 113. 
40 Ministero  degli  esteri,  Affari  politici,  Appunto  sul rapporto  sull'UE,
September 15, 1975, in ACS, Aldo Moro, 124.  See also B. Lindemann, «Europe
and the Third World:  The Nine at the United Nations,» in The World Today,  32
(7), 1976, p. 261. 
41 Council of the EC, Note sur la Charte des droits et devoirs économiques des
États, September 7, 1973, in ACCE, BAC 25/1980 279; K. Waldheim, In the Eye of
the Storm (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985), p. 113. 
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stable  access  to  commodities:  «la  souveraineté  sur  les  ressources
naturelles doit ainsi trouver son corollaire dans des devoirs […] envers
tous ceux dont le  bien-être et le développement dépendent de l'accès
libre à ces ressources.»42 Access to commodities could not be restricted
as a means of exerting political pressure: as the EC Commission argued,
«this is the one positive thing the Community has sought in the Charter
[of  economic  rights  and duties].  Without  equity  on  this  subject,  the
Charter  would  not  justify  subscription  by  member  states.»43 The
recognition of mutual interests was presented as a necessary condition
for  the  reform  of  the  international  economic  order  and for  the  EC's
contribution to  it.44 In order to underline this concept, the EC insisted
on printing on the fy leaf of the Charter of economic rights and duties
Benito Juarez's sentence «Respect for the rights of others is peace.»45 
The EC argued that developing countries and industrialized ones
were both responsible for the functioning of the international economy:
La  communauté  mondiale  est  confrontée  actuellement  à  des
problèmes de dimension telle que des solutions ne peuvent  être
recherchées que sur le plan mondial. Toute action visant à faire
face  à  ces  problèmes  doit  être entreprise  dans  un  esprit  de
solidarité entre États.46 
The EC constantly stressed the notion of interdependence: the EC could
preserve  its  prosperity  only  if  prosperity  spread  to  the  developing
countries as well,  but at the same time developing countries had no
chance of experiencing economic progress if they let the industrialized
countries fall into crisis.47 International economic relations were seen as
a  positive  sum  game,  thus  «interdépendance,  coresponsabilité  et
concertation» were stated as the key elements characterizing the EC's
42 EC Commission, DG VIII,  Document de travail sur la Charte des droits et
devoirs économiques des États, December 10, 1973, in ACCE, BAC 25/1980 279.
43 EC Commission, Report on the Charter of economic rights and duties of the
states, July 4, 1974, in ACCE, BAC 25/1980 987. See also E. Wellenstein,  Note
sur la  Charte des droits et devoirs économiques des États, February 1974, in
ACCE, BAC 25/1980 987. 
44 Council of the EC, Éléments d'une déclaration communautaire à l'Assemblée
générale, April 5, 1974, in ACCE, BAC 129/1983 309. 
45 EC Commission, Report on the Charter of economic rights and duties of the
states, July 4, 1974, in ACCE, BAC 25/1980 987. 
46 Council of the EC, Éléments d'une déclaration communautaire à l'Assemblée
générale, April 5, 1974, in ACCE, BAC 129/1983 309. 
47 FCO, United Nations,  Paper on the New International Order,  January 22,
1975, in NA, FCO 49/573. 
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vision of a desirable international order.48
The Conference on International Economic Cooperation
Instances of dialogue and negotiations between industrialized and
developing countries at the UN produced little results. Little agreement
could  be  reached  on  reforms  and  adjustments  of  the  international
economic system, and in fact industrialized and developing countries
often confronted one another in an aggressive way. In order to create a
multilateral forum more conducive to dialogue, in 1975 the Conference
on  International  Economic  Cooperation  (CIEC)  was  established.
Following its establishment, debates on the reform of the international
economic system tended to shift from the UN to the CIEC. 
It  was  the  French  government  which  proposed  to  convene  a
conference  on  international  economic  issues  outside  the  UN
framework. The proposal was launched as early as February 1974, and
it was initially meant to focus only on energy issues.49 Its launch was
clearly closely connected with the Washington conference  on energy
promoted by the US. While the US was stressing the need to strengthen
solidarity between the consumer countries, France rather stressed the
need to  strengthen the dialogue between consumers  and producers,
arguing that «il faut éviter de créer l'impression de la constitution d'un
cartel  des  riches.»50 The  French  proposal  was  clearly  dictated  by
political concerns to do with securing national autonomy from the US
and with breaking France's isolation on energy issues.  However, the
proposal also built  on ideas that the EC had been advocating in the
previous years. EC actors had repeatedly advocated dialogue with the
producing  countries,  arguing  that  «we  must  not  create  a  “Holy
Alliance” of the rich consumer countries in opposition to the producer
48 President of the Council of the EC, Speech at the CIEC, December 16, 1975,
in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1118. 
49 F. Petrini, «L'arma del petrolio: lo “shock” petrolifero e il confronto Nord–
Sud. Parte I,»  in  Dollari, petrolio e aiuti allo sviluppo: il confronto Nord–Sud negli
anni '60–'70, ed. D. Caviglia and A. Varsori (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2008), p.
103. 
50 F.  Puaux  (French political  director) quoted in E.  Wellenstein,  Note sur la
coopération dans le domaine énergétique, January 11, 1974, in HAEU, EN 455. 
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countries.»51 
Agreement on the conference proposed by the French was dif:cult
to  reach.  Governments  held different  views  on  the  relationship that
should incur between the conference and contemporary initiatives for
strengthening  consumers'  solidarity,  on  the  combination  of  energy
topics with other topics as demanded by the developing countries, and
on the structure of the conference itself. Once the conference was :nally
convened, it was no longer a conference on energy held at the height of
confrontation between producers and consumers, but it  was a much
broader “Conference on International Economic Cooperation” held in
the aftermath of the period of deepest confrontation.52 By the time of
the opening of CIEC, industrialized and developing countries «talked
with, not to each other» anymore.53 
As the British representative to the UN noticed, 
The mood has changed. Partly because Western countries have
obviously taken the demands more seriously and partly because
the developing countries have begun to realise the futility of false
consensus, counsels of moderation have begun to be heard.54
Developing countries had realized that  the  confrontational  approach
adopted in 1973–74 would be unlikely to bring about actual reforms of
the  international  economic  system.55 As  far  as  the  industrialized
countries were concerned, the US had softened its attitude towards the
developing countries' demands.56 The EC member states acknowledged
that «the only hopeful strategy which remains is to seek a consensus on
51 H.  Simonet,  Speech  «US/European  relations  and  the  energy  problems,»
Council  on  Foreign  Relations,  New York,  June  5,  1973,  in  ACCE,  Speeches
collection. 
52 For a history of the CIEC, see G. Garavini,  «L'arma del petrolio: lo “shock”
petrolifero  e  il  confronto  Nord–Sud.  Parte  II,»  in  Dollari,  petrolio  e  aiuti  allo
sviluppo: il confronto Nord–Sud negli anni '60–'70, ed. D. Caviglia and A. Varsori
(Milano: Franco Angeli, 2008). 
53 J. Pronk quoted in I. Richard (British permanent representative to the UN),
Report on the 7th special session of the General Assembly, October 1, 1975, in
NA, FCO 98/207. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid.; P. H. R. Marshall (British delegation to the UN), Note on CIEC and the
North–South dialogue, March 1, 1977, in NA, FCO 98/296. 
56 D.  Caviglia,  «La  conferenza  di  Rambouillet  tra  rilancio  dell'economia
internazionale e dialogo Nord–Sud,» in  Dollari,  petrolio e aiuti  allo sviluppo:  il
confronto Nord–Sud negli anni '60–'70,  ed. D. Caviglia and A. Varsori (Milano:
Franco Angeli, 2008), pp. 208–209; Garavini, After Empires, pp. 216–217. 
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a  generally  acceptable  reform  of  the  international  system.»57 Some
actual concessions had to be made, even though it was necessary to
ensure that they would be reasonable and that they would be balanced
by other  measures  bene:tting the Western countries.  As the Foreign
Of:ce observed, 
The increasing transfer of resources from the richer to the poorer
countries is, and should be, inevitable. It must be our objective to
see  that  this  process  takes  place  in  an  ordered and controlled
manner  […]  The  process  of  detailed  discussion  creates  the
opportunity to turn something wild, extravagant and expensive
into something rational, practical and reasonably priced.58
The EC continued to state its support for the pursuit of multilateral
dialogue and its attachment to the notion of interdependence between
industrialized and developing countries. Interdependence was seen not
only as a matter of fact in the existing international economic system,
but also as an ideal to be actively pursued.59 As an observer put it at the
time,  the  EC  should  promote  «optional  interdependence,  that  is  a
strategy in which a deliberate choice is made for mutually dependent
relations,  cooperation and partnership.»60 EC leaders  hoped that  the
developing countries' economic growth would directly favor the EC's
own economic re-launch.61 In order to cultivate the dialogue, the EC
was required to make some concessions to the developing countries:
however, the cost of these concessions was expected to be lower for the
EC than the cost which would have been implied by a confrontation
with the developing countries. In case of any failure of the dialogue,
57 FCO, United Nations,  Paper on the New International Order,  January 22,
1975, in NA, FCO 49/573. See also I. Richard, Report on the 7th special session
of the General Assembly, October 1, 1975, in NA, FCO 98/207. 
58 FCO, Planning staff, Paper for a more coherent UK policy in the dialogue
between  developed  and  developing  countries,  July  15,  1976,  in  NA,  FCO
49/639. 
59 F.-X. Ortoli,  Intervention  au Conseil  sur le dialogue Nord–Sud, March 30,
1976, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1121; EC Commission, DG I, Note sur la poursuite
de la CCEI, July 16, 1976, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1124.
60 L.  J.  Brinkhorst,  «Lomé and further,»  in  The  Lomé Convention  and a  New
International Economic Order,  ed. F. Alting von Geusau (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff,
1977), p. 6. 
61 EC Commission, DG I,  Note sur la poursuite de  la CCEI, July 16, 1976, in
ACCE,  BAC  48/1984  1124;  C.  Cheysson,  Note  sur  le  Tiers  Monde  dans  la
relance économique, February 1, 1977, in NA, FCO 98/295; EC Commission,
Communication pour les négociations :nales pour la CCEI, March 17, 1977, in
ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1129.
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European economic problems would increase and the Soviet appeal on
developing  countries  would  grow.  A failure  of  dialogue  would  be
«néfaste pour la consolidation de la position de la Communauté dans le
monde.»62 
To  a  large  extent,  the  CIEC  had  been  conceived  as  a  forum  for
dialogue  on  international  economic  matters  alternative  to  the  UN
forums.  The EC was critical  of  the latter  because their own features
encouraged  confrontation  between  economic  blocs,  favored  grand
general discussions with limited actual outcomes, and gave excessive
weight  to  the  developing  countries.  These  problems  were  clearly
exposed not only by the sessions of the General Assembly in 1974, but
also by the bitter confrontation experienced at the UNCTAD conference
which was held in Nairobi at the same time as the CIEC. As Frank Judd
argued,  «if  anybody  set  out  to  design  a  structure  to  guarantee  the
maximum  chance  of  confrontation  he  could  not  do  better  than  the
present shape of UNCTAD.»63 Nineteen developing countries and eight
industrialized  ones  were  participating  in  the  CIEC,  with  the
Community representing all the EC member states.64 The small number
of participants was expected to be conducive to dialogue, as well as to
make the conference works more ef:cient thanks to time saving and to
the relatively high quality of the delegations.65  
The  industrialized  countries  made  concerted  efforts  not  to
reproduce  in  the  CIEC  the  confrontations  between  economic  blocs
experienced at  the  UN.  There  was  some coordination  between their
positions, but consultations were kept con:dential and industrialized
countries deliberately refrained from having a single spokesperson.66
62 E.  Wellenstein,  Note  sur  l'état  du  dialogue  Nord–Sud,  May 25,  1976,  in
ACCE, BAC 79/1982 5. See also F.-X. Ortoli, Intervention sur le dialogue Nord–
Sud, March 30, 1976, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1121; EC Commission, DG I, Note
sur la poursuite de la CCEI, July 16, 1976, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1124.
63 F. Judd (Minister for overseas development), Note on UNCTAD IV, June 8,
1976, in NA, FCO 49/637. 
64 Beside the Community, the countries participating in the CIEC were Algeria,
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq,  Jamaica,  Japan,  Mexico,  Nigeria,  Pakistan,  Peru,  Saudi  Arabia,  Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, USA, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and Zambia. 
65 EC Commission,  DG I,  Note sur les problèmes Nord–Sud, November 25,
1976, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1128. 
66 EC  Commission,  Remarques  sur  les  travaux  de  la  commission
“développement” de la CCEI, March 3, 1976, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1120; EC
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The Community paid particular attention to highlight the speci:city of
its positions. This strategy was promoted not only by France,  which
was traditionally wary of too close a coordination with the US, but it
was shared by all the member states. As Cheysson put it, «il faut cesser
de nous enfermer de part et d'autre dans des casemates soigneusement
forti:ées,  soigneusement  fermées  avant  même que  nous  nous
rencontrions.»67 Despite this concern, the positions of the Community
and  of  the  US  had  undergone  a  considerable  rapprochement  in
comparison to the early 1970s. A particularly important step for their
coordination was the creation of the G7: as Giuliano Garavini argues,
«the creation of the G7 was a direct response to the battle waged by the
Global South to promote a new international economic order.»68
While  the  European  and  American  positions  had  undergone  a
rapprochement, the developing countries held increasingly divergent
positions. Even if they managed to present a common front at the CIEC,
their  economic  situations  and  prospects  were  increasingly  different.
The Community duly encouraged the surfacing of these divisions, in
order to weaken the negotiating position of the counterparts  and to
overcome  the  dynamic  of  sharp  juxtaposition  between  cohesive
economic blocs. As Schmidt argued, the industrialized countries should
try «to break up the unholy alliance between the LDCs and OPEC.»69
Among  the  developing  countries,  the  Community  addressed  the
moderates and the hardliners in different ways, by token of whether
they  were  producers  or  consumers,  and  whether  they  were  the
emerging countries and the least developed ones. However, despite this
attempt  at  moving  beyond  a  juxtaposition  of  economic  blocs,  a
fundamental  division  did  remain  between  industrialized  and
developing countries at the CIEC.  
According  to  the  EC,  if  the  CIEC  format  of  dialogue  proved
successful,  it  could  lead  to  the  constitution  of  a  sort  of  economic
Security Council. Only a few representative countries would take part
in it, and regional organizations would possibly be involved as well.70
Commission, DG I,  Document sur le sens de  la CCEI,  November 3, 1976, in
ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1119. 
67 C.  Cheysson,  Speech  to  the  European  Parliament  on  the  North–South
dialogue, February 15, 1978, in ACCE, BAC 210/1989 408. 
68 Garavini,  After  Empires,  p.  206. See  also  Caviglia,  «La  conferenza  di
Rambouillet...,» p. 191. 
69 Schmidt quoted in Garavini, After Empires, p. 209. 
70 EC Commission,  DG I,  Note sur les problèmes Nord–Sud, November 25,
1976,  in  ACCE,  BAC 48/1984 1128;  A. Stakhovitch (EC Commission,  DG I),
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Dialogue  would  be  less  confrontational  and  more  focused  on  the
research  of  actual  solutions.  Besides  envisaging  an  economic
complement  to  the  UN Security  Council,  the  EC also  envisaged the
establishment  of  a  system  of  «collective  comice  secouriste» which
would  complement  the  UN  collective  security  system.71 The  CIEC
format of dialogue did not prove as successful as the EC had hoped.
The  main  problem  was  that  the  moves  of  the  nineteen  developing
countries taking part in it were closely scrutinized by the other G77
members.  Developing  countries  taking  part  in  the  CIEC  could  not
negotiate away the positions adopted by the G77 as a whole, and they
had to prove their loyalty by strongly upholding them.72 As a result,
chances  for  compromise  between  industrialized  and  developing
countries in the CIEC were not much higher than in the UN. 
The EC and the outcomes of the CIEC
The Community pursued two main substantial goals at the CIEC.
Commodity  producing  countries  should  consent to  ensure  an
«approvisionnement suf:sant et continu des pays consommateurs dans
des  conditions  de  stabilité.»73 In  particular,  oil  producing  countries
should ensure stable and secure provisions to the EC. The other main
goal  was  the  establishment  of  a  «concertation  systématique»74 on
energy  matters  between  producing and  consuming  countries.  The
establishment  of  a dedicated  forum  on  energy  would  ensure  the
exchange of mutual information and retain the possibility of discussing
fuel  prices  taking  into  account all  of  the  actors' interests. It  was
maintained that prices should be rewarding for the producers but also
Note sur les formes institutionnelles de la continuation du dialogue Nord–Sud,
March 1, 1977, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1129. 
71 J.  Callaghan, Speech to the CIEC, December 16, 1975,  in ACCE, Speeches
collection. 
72 G.  Corea,  Need  for  Change.  Towards  the  New International  Economic  Order
(Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1980), p. 29. 
73 Council  of  the  EC,  Position  générale  sur la  CIEC,  December  9,  1975,  in
ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1118. 
74 E. Wellenstein, Note sur la relance du dialogue avec les pays producteurs de
pétrole, May 28, 1975, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1117. See also EC Commission,
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equitable  for  the  consumers,  and  they  should  favor  the  economic
growth of both groups of countries.75
The  Community was  particularly  eager  to  establish  a  permanent
forum for dialogue on energy, but  this proposal was part of a more
general  aspiration to institutionalize dialogue  with  the  developing
countries in a number of :elds. For instance, the  Community favored
the establishment of systems of permanent consultation on industrial
cooperation and on  primary  commodities.76 Support  for such  systems
of  consultations  clearly  mirrored  the  EC's belief  in  the potential of
multilateral  dialogue  and in the usefulness of a joint management of
the  international  economic  system.  Moreover,  it  mirrored  the  EC's
preference  for  a  management  of  crucial  aspects  of  the  international
economy  by  political  actors,  even  though  EC  member  states  held
slightly different  preferences  in  this  regard.77 The establishment of  a
permanent  forum  for  dialogue on  energy  matters  turned  out  to  be
impossible,  however,  since  the  developing  countries  deemed the
counterparts offered by the industrialized countries insuf:cient.78  
The developing countries saw the CIEC as a chance to gain some of
the concessions that they had not managed to attain in the UN forums.
CIEC measures would probably be less grandiose than those envisaged
at the UN, but they would be agreed with the industrialized countries
and  they  would  therefore  have  a  much  higher  chance  of  being
implemented. Developing countries pursued several goals at the CIEC:
they advanced demands concerning their public :nance situation and
development aid, the problem of the instability of commodities markets
and the worsening of the terms of exchange of their exports, the need
for industrial cooperation and for transfers of technology, and so on.
The  whole  set  of  developing  countries'  demands  aimed  at
strengthening the means of management of the international economy
75 E. Wellenstein, Note sur la relance du dialogue avec les pays producteurs de
pétrole, May 28, 1975, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1117. 
76 EC delegation,  Déclaration sur la formation des prix et les  mécanismes de
marché,  CIEC, March 20,  1976,  in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1121; EC delegation,
Déclaration sur la coopération industrielle, CIEC, April 24, 1976, in ACCE, BAC
79/1982 5. 
77 H.  Schmidt,  Speech  to  the  US  Council  of  the  International  Chamber  of
Commerce, New York, October 2, 1975, in AMAEF, RFA, 2987; EC Commission,
DG VIII,  Document sur la coopération industrielle, January 8, 1976, in ACCE,
BAC  48/1984  1118;  MAEF,  Coopération  économique,  Note  sur  la  CCEI,
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by public actors and at increasing the developing countries' role in this
respect.79 
In  order  to  address  the  developing  countries'  demands,  the
Community adopted an approach «progressive et  réaliste,»80 aimed at
avoiding «the over-facile generalizations of principle which lead some
to  maximalism  and  others,  through  reaction,  to  minimalism.»81 The
Community  claimed  to  share  most  of  the  developing  countries'
concerns in principle, but it argued that many of the measures that they
demanded were unfeasible,  ineffective or even detrimental  for them.
The  Community  tried  to  shift  the  debate  away  from  the  grand
measures  aiming  at  a  deep  restructuring  of  the  international  order,
arguing that 
à des  solutions  certes  intellectuellement  idéales mais  qui  ne
pourraient être mises en oeuvre qu'à moyen ou long-terme, nous
avons  toujours  préféré  des solutions  concrètes  mais  plus
immédiates, même si nous reconnaissons volontiers qu'elles sont
encore partielles.82 
The CIEC works focused mainly on the issue of the stability of the
commodity  markets  and  on  the  issue  of  the  indebtedness  of  many
developing  countries.  The  instability  of  commodity  prices  and  the
decreasing terms of exchange of the  export of  raw materials were a
central concern for the developing countries. The problem of instability
had especially worsened with the increasing volatility of exchange rates
and the declining value of the dollar.83 Previous debates about these
issues with the industrialized countries had not led to agreement on
signi:cant measures to address them. The only measure that had been
introduced  was  the  Stabex  mechanism,  but  it  only  concerned  the
developing countries that took part in the Lomé cooperation system. In
the  CIEC  the  parties  discussed  once  again  measures  to  stabilize
markets, such as the indexation of commodity prices, the creation of
buffer stocks :nanced by a UN Common Fund, a strengthening of the
IMF  Compensatory  Financial  Fund,  and  the  conclusion  of  some
79 G.  Garavini,  «La  Comunità  europea  e  il  Nuovo  ordine  economico
internazionale: 1974–1977,» in Ventunesimo Secolo, 2006, p. 119. 
80 President of the Council of the EC, Speech at the CIEC, December 16, 1975,
in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1118. 
81 EC delegation, Statement on the access to markets, CIEC, February 19, 1976,
in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1120. 
82 President of the Council of the EC, Speech at UNCTAD IV, May 6, 1976, in
ACCE, Speeches collection. 
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commodity agreements on a product-by-product basis. 
Agreement on the establishment of a UN Common Fund to create
buffer stocks of commodities was regarded by the developing countries
as  «the acid test  of  serious intent  by industrialised countries.»84 The
Community supported the goal of the  stabilization of  the  commodity
markets,  which  would  also  ensure  stable  and  secure  commodity
provisions for it.85 However, the EC member states could not agree on
the measures to adopt to that end.86 They heavily opposed indexation
and they were divided on the other envisaged measures. Germany was
particularly resistant,  opposing the Community's  participation in the
UN  Common  Fund  and  the  conclusion  of  a  general  agreement  on
commodities.87 As a result of the divisions within the Community and
of  the  wariness  of  the  other  industrialized  countries,  the  actual
outcomes of the negotiations on commodities in the CIEC were very
limited. 
The :nancial situation of many developing countries was seriously
deteriorating,  and the indebtedness of non-oil  producing developing
countries rose from 9.2 billion dollars in 1973 to 39 billion dollars in
1975.88 As early as 1964 the industrialized countries had subscribed to
the target of devoting 0.7 percent of GDP to public development aid,
but they were nowhere near to it  in the late 1970s. The EC member
states  merely  stated  that  they  «s'efforceront  d'atteindre  dans  les
meilleurs  délais» the  target.89 Given  the  industrialized  countries'
reticence on aid, the developing countries rather focused their efforts
on the debt issue. What they sought was not only an improvement of
future borrowing conditions, but also at least a partial cancellation of
their debts towards industrialized countries.90 They came to regard the
debt issue as a key test of the industrialized countries' willingness to
84 F. Judd, Note on UNCTAD IV, June 8, 1976, in NA, FCO 49/637. See also G.
Corea quoted in Garavini, After Empires, p. 223. 
85 EC Commission,  Communication sur les matières  premières, February 26,
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cooperate  in  the  CIEC.91 The  Community  failed  this  test:  despite  a
Dutch  proposal  for  a  collective  debt  moratorium,  the  Community
offered only some help on a strictly case-by-case basis.92 It argued that
«les instruments  existants en ce domaine ont fait  leurs preuves»93 so
there was no need to bring any substantial change to them. 
CIEC parties could eventually agree on only a few actual measures
for  the  improvement  of  the  international  economic  system.94 It  was
decided  that  speci:c  agreements  concerning  price  and  the  trade  of
some  commodities  would  be  negotiated.  The  establishment  of  a
Common Fund for commodities was also agreed in principle, but it was
a  lengthy  process  which  produced  poor  results  in  the  end.95 As  a
goodwill gesture, the industrialized countries participating in the CIEC
agreed to launch a special action in favor of the developing countries
worth 1 billion dollars.96 However, the initiative fell well short of the
«Marshall  Plan  for  the  Third  World»  which  had been  called  on  by
European leaders such as the British Prime Minister Howard Wilson
and the President of the EC Commission Roy Jenkins.97
By  the  end  of  the  1970s,  dialogue  between  industrialized  and
developing  countries  had  been  carried  out  in  several  forums,  but
results were remarkably disappointing. The reason for this failure did
not  lie  in  the  format  of  the  dialogue.  Part  of  its  reason  was  that
developing  countries  found  it  increasingly  dif:cult  to  elaborate  a
coherent  and  cohesive  strategy  for  the  pursuit  of  their  goals.  Their
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economic  situations  were  becoming  more  and  more  divergent,  and
political  divisions  were  present  between  them.  Moreover,  the
possibility of using oil as a political weapon and the majority enjoyed at
the  UN  were  clearly  not  suf:cient  for  the  developing  countries  to
impose their vision of the international order and to bring about its
restructuring.  The  deterioration  of  the  economic  situation  in  some
developing countries  in  the  late  1970s encouraged them to  abandon
altogether demands for a radical change of the international order.98 
The poor results of the dialogue between industrialized countries
and developing ones were also due to the resistance  exerted by the
former against  any substantial  change to  the  international  economic
order. Despite their rhetorical pledges and commitments, industrialized
countries  had  no  intention  of  giving  up  their  infuence  on  the
international  economic  system.  The  Community  itself  continued  to
state its commitment to the pursuit of a more equitable and balanced
international economic order, but in fact it did not take many actual
initiatives  to  bring  it  about.99 The  economic  crisis  hitting  the
Community  clearly  made  it  very  dif:cult  for  its  member  states  to
consent to costly measures in favor of the developing countries.  The
crisis  rather invited the adoption of a defensive attitude,  which was
also favored by the weakening of the European social actors which had
been pressing for the adoption of a progressive attitude towards the
developing countries, such as the social movements and some left-wing
parties and trade unions.100
Overcoming blocs: the promotion of interregional dialogue
One  of  the  reasons  why  the  CIEC  had  been  launched  was  to
experiment with a format of international dialogue which was expected
to be less conducive to confrontation compared to the UN forums. The
EC was particularly eager to overcome the confrontation between the
industrialized  and  developing  countries  and  to  promote  a  less
98 V. Prashad,  The Darker Nations. A People's History of the Third World  (New
York  and  London:  The  New  Press,  2007),  pp. 207–223.  Other  developing
countries adopted more radical positions instead (Garavini,  After Empires,  pp.
242–243). 
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dichotomous structure of the international economic order. However,
the CIEC was not very successful in this respect. To a large extent, also
in the CIEC dialogue that took place between a set of industrialized
countries on one side and a set of developing countries on the other
side.  In  terms  of  overcoming  the  logic  of  confrontation  between
economic blocs, the EC attempted some other experiments at the same
time as the CIEC, and they were slightly more successful in this respect.
The  EC  promoted  the  establishment  of  permanent  forums  for
dialogue with the Latin American countries,  the  Arab countries,  the
ACP countries, and the ASEAN countries. To be sure, the establishment
of these forums was not only due to the search for a form of dialogue
with  the  developing  countries  which  was an  alternative  to  the  bloc
confrontation. There were speci:c motives behind the launch of each of
these  dialogues,  such  as  the  desire  to  ensure  secure  oil  supplies  to
Europe, the will of preserving a special relationship with many former
European colonies,  the  need to respond to  third countries'  desire to
deepen commercial relations with the Community, and so on. Except
for the ACP case, the EC played a small role in the establishment of
regional  organizations  in  other  continents,  even  though  the  EC
occasionally claimed to constitute a model for them.
The  EC  warmly  welcomed  the  emergence  of  other  regional
organizations during the 1970s and it encouraged their consolidation. It
expressed its eagerness to establish structures and habits of permanent
dialogue with them.  In part,  the  EC envisaged the  establishment  of
dialogue  with  regional  groups  of  developing  countries  for  tactical
goals:  for  instance,  the  EC  hoped  that  its  establishment  of  close
relations with the ACP countries would help to soften G77 positions.
However, the EC envisaged the establishment of dialogue with regional
groups for strategic  goals too,  namely to favor the emergence of an
international  order  structured  around  a  few  large  groupings  of
countries rather than two economic blocs. In turn, such an order would
favor the promotion of the EC's distinctness, which risked waning if
industrialized countries formed a common cohesive front of their own.
As Cheysson put it, 
[Europe's] development and its integration favor the emergence
of a multipolar world, less dangerous than a world dominated by
the  superpowers  […]  On  this  point  the  speci:c  interests  of
Europe  coincide  with  those  of  the  LDCs,  who  want  greater
balance in international affairs.101
The EC consistently supported the development of regionalism and
101 Garavini, After Empires, p. 217. 
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of  interregional  contacts  during  the  1970s.  The  establishment  of
permanent  and  sometimes  institutionalized  structures  and  habits  of
dialogue  with  other  regional  organizations  was  the  most  evident
element of this process, but not the only one. Another element was the
very strong and ultimately effective defense of the Community policies
granting preferential  commercial  treatment  to  the  regions associated
with the EC, despite the heavy criticism waged against them by some
third  countries.  Similarly,  the  Community  made  strong  efforts  to
defend  and  preserve  the  regional  orientation  of  its  development
cooperation  policy.  These  instances  of  the  promotion  of  regionalism
show that the process was not necessarily innovative, and it was partly
linked with  the  desire  to  preserve  old  areas  of  European  infuence,
especially  in  Africa.  For  this  reason,  the  French  government  was
particularly eager to cultivate the EC's links with Africa and with the
Arab  countries.  In  1979  Giscard  even  launched  the  project  of
establishment of a “trilogy” between the EC, the African countries and
the countries of the Arab League, but the other EC member states did
not endorse it.102 
Despite the French attachment to the cultivation of its  traditional
regional areas of infuence, the EC's attempt at promoting regionalism
and  interregional  contacts  was  not  only  due  to  this  concern  of
cultivating old links. The frequency and consistency of the EC's attempt
at promoting them indicate the existence of a sort of refex: regardless
of  the  countries  or  of  the  matter  at  stake,  the  EC  always  found  it
bene:cial  to  advocate  progress  in  regional  integration  and  the
establishment of dialogue and cooperation with other regions. The EC
addressed Latin American organizations,  the Arab League countries,
the ACP countries and the countries of the Organization for African
Unity, the ASEAN: dialogue was sought with all the existing regional
organizations, the only major exception to this pattern being the EC's
wariness  towards  the  establishment  of  contacts  with  the  CMEA.  In
terms of the promotion of interregional contacts, the establishment of
links between the Community and ASEAN in 1978 is regarded as «a
seminal  moment  for  inter  regionalism»  and  as  «the  model  for
102 French Presidency of  the  Republic,  Note  sur le  projet  de  trilogue euro-
arabo-africain, April 18, 1980, in NA, FCO 98/949; H. Jean-Baptiste (Presidency
of the French Republic), Note sur le trilogue, November 26, 1980, in AN, AG
5(3), 918. In the previous years,  Giscard had envisaged the establishment of a
Euro-African dialogue that would complement the existing Euro-Arab dialogue
(G. Robin (Presidency of the French Republic),  Note sur le Conseil européen,
July  4,  1977,  in  AN,  AG  5(3),  913;  V.  Giscard  d'Estaing,  Allocution  à  la
conférence franco-africaine, May 22, 1978, in AN, AG 5(3) 326). 
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interregional cooperation.»103
The international order and the assertion of the EC as a distinctive 
actor
The  economic  crisis  which  hit  Western  Europe starting from late
1973 was a crucial factor for the de:nition of the EC's attitude towards
the existing international  economic order. Before the outbreak of the
crisis, the EC repeatedly stated its sympathy towards the developing
countries'  demands for  a more balanced and fair  economic order.  It
promoted some initiatives  to  meet  their  concerns,  and it  repeatedly
signaled its readiness to agree to the adoption of stronger measures in
their  favor.  However,  American  opposition  hindered  agreement  on
such  measures  in  the  international  instances  of  dialogue  with  the
developing  countries.  The  radicalization  of  developing  countries'
demands made it harder and harder to agree on actual measures. The
outbreak  of  the  economic  crisis  in  late  1973  made  it  increasingly
dif:cult for the EC to consent to radical reforms of the international
economic order.  Europe's  economic troubles  made it  politically  very
hard  for  governments  to  consent  to  costly  measures  favoring
developing countries, even when developing countries softened their
attitude around the mid-1970s. 
Despite  the  clear  difference  between  the  period  preceding  the
outbreak of the economic crisis and the period following it, there was a
remarkable continuity in EC's attitude during the 1970s. While rejecting
the  developing  countries'  most  radical  demands  for  reforming  the
international economic order, the EC constantly adopted an open and
positive  attitude  towards  their  concerns.  It  stressed  its  sympathy
towards  the  developing  countries,  its  staunch belief  in  the  value  of
dialogue, and its desire to play the role of the most progressive actor
among  the  industrialized  countries.  It  constantly  advocated  the
promotion  of  a  more  balanced  international  order,  of  a  stronger
interdependence between countries, and of a more rational and better-
managed  international  economic  system.  It  repeatedly  sought  to
overcome the juxtaposition of economic blocs, exploring the possibility
of promoting interregional dialogue. 
103 M. Doidge, The European Union and Interregionalism. Patterns of Engagement
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), p. 10, italics in original text. 
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 The adoption of this attitude was clearly connected with tactical
concerns:  on  the  one  hand  it  was  useful  to  reduce  the  risk  of
confrontation with the developing countries, which the EC could not
really afford, and on the other hand it was useful in order to stress the
EC's distance from the conservative American positions. The adoption
of an open and positive attitude was not only due to tactical concerns,
however. It was also connected with a sincere belief in the virtues of
multilateral dialogue and international cooperation held by infuential
EC actors. «The very idea that cooperation was the preemptive and sole
response to the dangers of crisis operated as the foundational myth of
European integration:»104 dialogue and cooperation being core elements
of the EC's narrative of European integration itself, the EC was willing
to link its international pro:le to their promotion. 
As  I  have  shown,  the  clear  limit  of  this  attempt  was  the  EC's
dif:culty in matching this open and positive attitude with the approval
of  actual  measures  meeting  the  developing  countries'  demands  and
bringing about real improvement of the international economic order.
The EC did make some contributions to the reduction of imbalances
between  industrialized  and  developing  countries  through the
introduction  of  trade  preferences,  and  to  a  more  consensual
management  of  the  international  economic  system  through  the
involvement of developing countries in it. However, the EC was overall
unable  to  match  the progressive  image  that  it  was  projecting with
adequately substantial  measures  in  keeping  with  it.  This  problem
resonated the dif:culty experienced by the EC in matching words with
deeds  which  was  shown  in  chapter  4  with  regard  to  development
promotion. The same problem of matching words with deeds affected
the EC's attempt at presenting itself as  a promoter of human rights in
third countries, as I will show in the following chapter. 
104 F.  Romero,  «Refashioning  the  West  to  dispel  its  fears:  The  early  G7
summits,» in International Summitry and Global Governance. The Rise of the G7 and
of  the  European  Council,  1974–1991,  ed.  E.  Mourlon-Druol  and  F.  Romero
(London and New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 119. 
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Chapter 6 
The EC as Promoter of Human Rights 
in Third Countries
During the 1970s, human rights were established as an important
issue on the international political agenda, attracting an unprecedented
amount of attention from the UN and from individual states alike, as
well as attention from NGOs and infuential sectors of public opinion.
Increasing criticism was directed at the ongoing instances of colonial
rule, at the policies of racial discrimination like apartheid, at the violent
repression  of  domestic  political  opposers,  and  so  on.  As  an
acknowledgement of the relevance acquired by human rights, in 1977
the  Nobel  Prize  for  peace  was  awarded  to  Amnesty  International.
According to Samuel Mon, the main reasons for the increasing attention
paid  to  human  rights  during  the  1970s  were  «the  failure  of  more
maximal  visions  of  political  transformation»1 and  the  nonpartisan,
ecumenical character of the notion of human rights.2 Some civil society
actors and political actors in many Western countries came to regard
the promotion of human rights as a viable goal on which to focus. 
The increasing salience of human rights affected the EC as well as
many other international actors. The EC discussed human rights with
regard  to  Western  Europe,  so  that  cooperation  with  the  Council  of
Europe and the  possibility  for  the  EC as  such  to  join the  European
Convention  on  human  rights  were  considered.3 The  EC  discussed
human rights with regard to its neighborhood, as recent historiography
has  shown:  during  the  1970s  the  EC  engaged  in  favor  of
1 S.  Moyn,  The Last Utopia. Human Rights in History  (Cambridge and London:
Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 141. 
2 Ibid., pp. 132, 144. 
3 On  April  5,  1977  the  Council  of  ministers,  the  EC  Commission  and  the
European Parliament released a joint declaration on the respect of fundamental
rights  within  the  Community.  In  1979  the  EC  Commission  proposed  the
accession of the EC to the European Convention on human rights. 
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democratization  in  Spain,  Portugal  and  Greece,  and  it  notably
discussed human rights with the Soviet countries in the CSCE, both
before and after the conclusion of its Final Act.4 Historiography has so
far neglected another :eld of the EC's engagement in favor of human
rights in the 1970s, namely their promotion in third countries outside of
Europe. In this chapter, I focus on the EC's promotion of human rights
in the Portuguese colonies, in Chile, in South Africa and in the African
countries taking part in the Lomé Convention. 
I  analyze  the  reasons  why  the  EC  engaged  in  the  support  and
promotion of human rights outside Europe during the 1970s. I analyze
the ways and means in which such an engagement unfolded, and the
reasons why it  encountered only a limited success.  While a  general
agreement  existed  on  the  desirability  of  asserting  the  EC  as  an
international actor promoting human rights, EC member states tended
to split  on the translation of such a general  goal  into speci:c actual
policies.  This was due to the member states'  divergences on foreign
policy goals, understandings of human rights, and visions of the EC's
international role. In most cases, deeds fell well short of words. Despite
the limited results, I argue that the EC's decision to engage in favor of
human  rights  outside  of  Europe  was  part  of  the  EC's  attempt  at
highlighting its distinctiveness as an international actor: the EC sought
to present itself as an actor that cared about people and that was driven
by  values,  not  only  by  interests.  It  is  worth  noticing  that  the  EC's
engagement in human rights promotion began before they were placed
high on the international agenda by Jimmy Carter in 1977. 
External pressures putting the EC on the defensive
The  beginning  of  the  EC's  engagement  in  human  rights  issues
outside of Europe was largely spurred by third countries' attacks to the
EC's relations with Portugal, Chile, South Africa and Israel during the
4 On  the  Mediterranean  countries  see  for  instance  European  Council,
Declaration on democracy, April 8, 1978, in ACCE, BAC 39/1986 535. On the EC
and human rights  at the CSCE see S. Lamberti Moneta,  Helsinki Disentangled
(1973–75):  West  Germany,  the  Netherlands,  the  EPC  and  the  Principle  of  the
Protection of Human Rights, PhD thesis (University of Trento), 2012; A. Romano,
From Détente in Europe to European Détente. How the West Shaped the Helsinki Final
Act  (Bruxelles:  P.I.E.–Peter  Lang,  2009);  D.  Thomas,  The  Helsinki  Effect
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
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1960s  and  early  1970s.  Especially  at  the  UN,  these  countries  were
heavily  criticized  for  their  policies  violating  individual  or  people's
rights (the expression “human rights” became popular only in the late
1970s).5 Even if other countries did violate rights, the UN focused upon
these few cases mainly because of their Western character. Developing
countries enjoyed a majority position in most of the UN bodies and
they could count on Soviet support on these issues: in order to attack
the  Western  countries,  the  Soviet  bloc  ones  were  ready to  wrap  «a
blanket of non-aligned solidarity and virtue around their own heads.»6 
In parallel with attacks by third countries, the EC's relations with
Western  countries  violating  human  rights  were  increasingly  coming
under :re in Western Europe as well. Public opinion paid increasing
attention to human rights issues, and the mobilization of NGOs and
pressure groups increased considerably.7 The role played by grassroots
mobilization  promoted  by  Amnesty  International  was  especially
striking,  but  a  number of  other  groups were  active.  The increase  in
citizens'  concern  for  human  rights  was  particularly  strong  in  the
Netherlands, where it reinforced a «sense of moral obligation in world
politics»  that  traditionally  affected  Dutch  foreign  policy.8 Citizens'
concern  also  exerted  signi:cant  pressure  on the  left-wing  parties  in
Britain and Germany.9 
Developing and Soviet countries attacked the EC member states for
their  bilateral  relations  with  the  Western  countries  violating  human
rights, and for the NATO support to some of them. Some motives made
it desirable for the EC member states to address these attacks together.
5 Moyn, The Last Utopia, pp. 149, 155.
6 British delegation to the UN in Geneva, Report on the 32nd session of the UN
Commission on human rights, March 5, 1976, in NA, FCO 58/972. 
7 A. Iriye, Global Community. The Role of International Organizations in the Making
of the Contemporary World  (Berkeley and Los Angeles:  University of California
Press, 2004), pp. 126–138. 
8  E. H. Arens, «Multilateral institution-building and national interest: Dutch
development  policy  in  the  1960s,»  in  Contemporary  European  History,  12  (4),
2003.  See also  Lamberti Moneta,  Helsinki Disentangled, pp. 50–76;  P. R. Baehr,
«Trials and errors: The Netherlands and human rights,» in  Human Rights and
Comparative Foreign Policy, ed. D. P. Forsythe (Tokyo: United Nations University
Press, 2000), p. 57. 
9 A. M. Fonseca and D. Marcos, «Cold War constraints: France, West Germany
and Portuguese decolonization,» in  Portuguese Studies,  29 (2), 2013,  p.  224;  P.
Aires  Oliveira,  «The  United  Kingdom and the  independence  of  Portuguese
Africa (1974–1976): Stakes, perceptions and policy options,» in Revue française de
civilisation britannique, 18 (2), 2013, p. 108. 
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If they could agree on a common approach to human rights, the EC
member states' position would be strengthened, since the adoption of a
common  approach  would  have  substantially  increased  the  costs  for
third countries to exert pressure upon them.10 Countries attacking them
would  :nd  it  harder  to  exploit  divergences  in  policy  lines  and  the
particular exposure of individual member states on some issues. By the
same token, if a common approach was adopted rogue countries would
also  :nd  it  harder  to  threaten  retaliatory  measures  in  case  of  the
adoption of a tougher stance on human rights by the EC member states.
Some EC member  states  also  regarded cooperation in  human rights
issues  desirable  because  it  would  further  widen and strengthen the
range  of  activity  of  the  EPC.11 Human  rights  could  potentially
constitute  an  occasion  to  make  the  EC's  international  activity  more
effective, by favoring a combination of EPC and Community means:
EPC diplomatic initiatives could complement Community's measures
concerning  trade  and  development  cooperation.  Cooperation  on
human rights at the EC level would bene:t member states also because
it  would  reduce  the  human rights  advocates'  pressure  against  their
bilateral  policies,  and  therefore  enable  them  to  preserve  quite  a
business-as-usual approach in the bilateral sphere.12 
Even if cooperation  in human rights  at the EC level tended to be
regarded as  desirable,  some obstacles hindered it.  The main obstacle
was the member states' divergences in regards to the issue of what role
human rights should play as a foreign policy goal, and as an object of
European cooperation.  EC actors  had  different  views on the subject,
and they also had different interests at stake in the countries concerned.
Should human rights promotion  aim  to bring about  actual  change  in
third  countries,  or  rather  should  it  be  about asserting  a  distinctive
image of the EC as an international actor? How was the goal of human
rights  promotion to relate  to other  foreign policy goals,  such as the
preservation  of  European  economic  and  strategic interests  in  third
countries?  Reaching a  compromise  on these questions was not  easy,
and outcomes were often partial and ambiguous. 
10 FCO, United Nations, Brief on human rights at the UN, March 9, 1976, in
NA,  FCO  58/970;  M.  Palliser  (FCO,  Permanent  under-secretary),  Note  on
human rights and foreign policy, April 29, 1977, in NA, FCO 58/1143.  
11 R. A. Hibbert (British political director), Note on coordination with the Nine
on human rights questions, December 1977, in NA, FCO 58/1146. 
12 MAEF, Affaires africaines et malgaches, Note sur la consultation politique à
neuf  sur  l'Afrique  au  sud  du  Sahara,  March  11,  1974,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires
politiques, CE, 3803. 
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Distancing itself from Portuguese colonialism
The only European empire which had not undergone decolonization
by the early 1970s was the Portuguese one. Portugal was ruled by an
authoritarian government and it was not a member of the EC, but it
was a member of NATO and therefore a close ally of most EC member
states.  Its  colonies  in  Central  and  Austral  Africa  exerted  increasing
resistance to the Portuguese rule,  but  Portugal  made strong military
and political  efforts  to  retain  control  over  them.  Portugal  called  for
solidarity  from  NATO  partners  in  this  endeavor  and  it  exerted
successful  pressures  on the US.13 The European partners  of  Portugal
struggled to hold a balanced position, combining the continuation of
military  cooperation,  arms  trade  and  commercial  relations  with
Portugal  alongside  criticism  of  colonialism  and  the  cultivation  of
discreet contacts with African liberation movements.14 
EC  member  states  believed  that  the  demise  of  the  Portuguese
empire was inevitable: only its particular path and timing was still to be
decided. The most desirable pathway was a peaceful  and negotiated
process  of  decolonization,  which would allow Portugal  to withdraw
with honor from its empire. Negotiated decolonization was seen as the
best way to ensure stability and the preservation of Western infuence
in the African regions concerned.15 Since the Portuguese government
seemed unable to accept the inevitability of decolonization, EC member
states were ready to give help and support to it.  Not only economic
help was foreseen, but also help on a political and even cultural level: a
proper «education politicize» of the Portuguese was deemed necessary
to make them change their attitude.16 
13 M.  Del  Pero,  «I  limiti  della distensione:  gli  Stati  Uniti  e  l'implosione del
regime portoghese,» in Alle origini del presente: l'Europa occidentale nella crisi degli
anni  Settanta,  ed.  A.  Varsori  (Milano:  Franco Angeli,  2007); B.  Cardoso Reis,
«Portugal and the UN: A rogue state resisting the norm of decolonization,» in
Portuguese Studies,  29 (2), 2013,  p. 273; L. Nuno Rodrigues, «The United States
and Portuguese decolonization,» in Portuguese Studies, 29 (2), 2013. 
14 N. MacQueen, The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa. Metropolitan Revolution
and the Dissolution of Empire  (London and New York: Longman, 1997),  p.  55;
Fonseca and Marcos, «Cold War constraints.» 
15 MAEF,  Europe méridionale, Note sur la France et l'avenir du Portugal en
Afrique, March 10, 1971, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3519. 
16 French embassy in Lisbon, Note sur les dif:cultés du Portugal avec les pays
d'Europe du Nord, April 7, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3520.
See also MAEF, Europe méridionale, Note sur la France et l'avenir du Portugal
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The  EC  member  states  held  different  views  in  regards  to  the
opportunity of exerting pressures on the Portuguese government. The
Portuguese government was reportedly characterized by «une extreme
susceptibilité»17 about  external  pressures  on  its  colonial  policy.
According  to  France,  Germany  and  Britain,  public  pressure  could
alienate Portugal, hindering the pursuit of a negotiated decolonization
process. For this reason, con:dential dialogues on a bilateral basis were
preferable. According to Denmark, the Netherlands and Ireland on the
other  hand,  clear  public  initiatives  in  favor  of  decolonization  were
needed. They envisaged initiatives spanning from the exertion of public
pressures  upon  Portugal  to  the  adoption  of  a  more  confrontational
voting behavior  at  the  UN,  as  well  as  the  possibility  of  supporting
African  liberation  movements  and  the  expulsion  of  Portugal  from
NATO.18 The main rationale behind these public initiatives was less to
do with exerting effective pressure for change than it was to do with
indicating to the European public and to third countries that the EC
opposed the Portuguese colonial policy. For as long as the goal was to
assert  the EC as a clear  resister  of colonialism, the mere reliance on
con:dential dialogue was clearly insuf:cient. 
Concerns  about  the  image  of  the  EC  with  regard  to  Portuguese
colonialism was  closely  linked to the increasing politicization of  the
Portuguese colonial issue at the UN. The focus on the Portuguese issue
at the UN became more and more visible,  and in the early 1970s the
Western allies of Portugal were increasingly attacked for their alleged
support  for  its  colonial  policy.19 While  the  US  opted  to  support
Portugal,  the  Europeans  complained about  the  «embarras  croissant»
en Afrique, March 10, 1971, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3519. 
17 MAEF, Affaires africaines et malgaches, Note sur la démarche européenne à
Lisbonne, March 4, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3519. See also
French embassy in Lisbon,  Note sur les dif:cultés du Portugal avec les pays
d'Europe du Nord, April 7, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3520;
Auswärtige  Amt, Note  on  the  problems of  Portuguese  territories  in  Africa,
April 3, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3803.  
18 EPC presidency, Report on EPC meeting on Portuguese territories in Africa,
April 4,  1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques,  CE,  Groupes d'experts Afrique
CPE. 
19 French  delegation  to  the  UN,  Note  sur  les  territoires  administrés  par  le
Portugal,  October  29,  1973,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires  politiques,  Portugal,  3516;
French delegation to the UN, Note sur l'occupation illégale de la Guinée-Bissau
par le Portugal, November 12, 1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal,
3519;  A. Almada E Santos, «The role of the decolonization committee of the
United Nations Organization in the struggle against Portuguese colonialism in
Africa: 1961–1974,» in The Journal of Pan African Studies, 4 (10), 2012.  
188
which «l'obstination de Lisbonne» caused them.20 Their preservation of
links with Portugal would harm European relations with the African
countries and decrease the credit enjoyed by the EC among developing
countries.  Additionally, Western  European  public  opinion was
increasingly  attuned to  Portuguese colonialism.  Dutch public opinion
was  particularly critical  of it: the Dutch  media devoted considerable
attention  to  it,  some  demonstrations  were  organized,  and  some
products  from  the  Portuguese  colonies  were  boycotted,  such  as
Angolan coffee.21 The mobilization of public opinion was mirrored  by
the  positions adopted  by  the  left-wing parties  of  the  government
majority, which called for the adoption of a more critical stance towards
Portuguese policies. 
The  tension  between  the  need  not  to  alienate  the  Portuguese
government and the need to assert the EC as a clear critic of Portuguese
colonialism made it hard for the EC to agree on a common position. In
the EPC context,  agreement was reached for  the exertion of discreet
bilateral  pressures upon the Portuguese  government, along with the
adoption of some mild public position intended as a «manifestation de
“bonne volonté” exploitable devant les opinions publiques nationales
et  auprès  des  gouvernements  africains.»22 However,  the  Dutch  and
Danish  governments  deemed  the  common  European  initiatives  too
mild.  They complemented them with stronger bilateral  initiatives  in
terms  of  support  to  the  African  liberation  movements  and  of  a
convergence with the developing countries at the UN debates on the
Portuguese colonial rule.23 The Netherlands and Denmark deliberately
20 MAEF,  Affaires africaines  et  malgaches,  Note  sur les  territoires portugais
d'Afrique, April 10, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, Groupes d'experts
Afrique CPE. On the relaxation of the US position see Nuno Rodrigues, «The
US and Portuguese decolonization,» p. 177. 
21 French embassy in Lisbon, Note sur les dif:cultés du Portugal avec les pays
d'Europe du Nord, April 7, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3520;
French embassy in The Hague, Note sur la situation au Mozambique, July 19,
1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3518; R. M. Ponte Vieira Lopes,
Between Cold War and Colonial Wars. The Making of West German Policy towards
the Portuguese Dictatorship, 1968–1974, PhD thesis (LSE), 2011, pp. 62–63.
22 MAEF,  Affaires africaines  et  malgaches,  Note  sur les  territoires portugais
d'Afrique, April 10, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, Groupes d'experts
Afrique CPE. 
23 French delegation to the UN,  Note sur les territoires portugais d'Afrique,
December  3,  1971,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires  politiques,  Portugal,  3516;  French
embassy in Lisbon, Note sur les dif:cultés du Portugal avec les pays d'Europe
du Nord, April 7, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3520; French
embassy in The Hague, Note sur les Pays-Bas et la Guinée-Bissau, February 14,
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sought  to  differentiate  their  position  from  the  position  of  their
European partners, in order to increase their political credit among the
developing countries.24 For instance, in August  1974 the Netherlands
broke the agreement for a joint recognition of Guinea-Bissau by the EC
countries in order to recognize it slightly in advance of its partners.25 
The Portuguese revolution of April 1974 made it easier for the EC
countries  to  agree  a  common  European  approach  to  Portuguese
decolonization: the new Portuguese democratic government itself was
in  favor  of  decolonization,  and the  decolonization  law of  July  1974
opened the way for a quick accession of colonies to independence. The
EC supported the new Portuguese policy, not only in political terms but
also in economic ones.  EPC and Community means were effectively
combined,  so  that  EPC endorsements  of  the  new Portuguese  policy
were complemented by the provision of Community aid to the former
Portuguese  colonies  and  of  :nancial  and  commercial  support  to
Portugal itself.26 To a large extent,  the Portuguese issue was the :rst
instance  of  a  pattern  which  characterized  the  EC's  attitude  to  most
other cases of human rights violations in third countries: the EC was
increasingly attentive to and critical of  them, but it  found it  hard to
agree on common measures because it was divided between advocates
of a prudent approach and advocates of a vocal approach. 
Distancing itself from human rights violations in Chile
The  policies  of  the  military  dictatorship  established  in  Chile  in
September 1973 became the :rst instance where international concerns
with human rights violations spread around much of the world. For
this reason, it was the :rst case which directly confronted the EC with
1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3519. 
24 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur les territoires portugais d'Afrique, April
22, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3803. 
25 MAEF, Europe méridionale, Note sur la reconnaissance de la Guinée-Bissau,
August 10, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3519; French embassy
in The Hague,  Note sur la reconnaissance de la Guinée-Bissau et la politique
intérieure  néerlandaise,  August  14,  1974,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires  politiques,
Portugal 3519. 
26 J. A. de Sedouy (cabinet of Cheysson), Report on Cheysson's visit to Lisbon,
October 15, 1974, in HAEU, EN 1067. 
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major  human  rights  violations  committed  by  a  non-European
government.  The de:nition of  the Western European reaction to the
policies of the new Chilean government became an important item on
the  political  agenda  since  the  very  occurrence  of  the  coup.  The  EC
relations with Chile underwent close scrutiny by third countries,  but
also by European public opinion: European parties, trade unions and
the press all called for the EC to act in order to oppose human rights
violations in Chile. Calls were advanced especially by the socialist and
communist  parties,  which  pressed  their  national  governments.  For
instance, in Britain a movement of solidarity with Chile developed in
close ties with the Labour party.27 In the European Parliament, socialists
promoted questions, resolutions and the envoy of a mission to Chile.28
The  former  President  of  the  EC  Commission  Sicco  Mansholt  was
personally  concerned  with  Chile,  which  he  visited  as  leader  of  the
Socialist International, an event which «deeply shocked» him.29 Trade
unions organizations also appealed to the EC in order for  it  to take
initiatives.30
In  order  to  respond to  third  countries'  pressure  and the  calls  of
public  opinion,  and  to  the  personal  concern  expressed  by  some
European political actors, the EC member states released several public
declarations  on  the  Chilean  issue,  and  the  European  Parliament
approved a few resolutions on the subject.31 Public declarations were
not  expected  to  be  very  effective  in  bringing  about  an  actual
27 M. D. Wilkinson, «The Chile solidarity campaign and British government
policy  towards  Chile,  1973–1990,»  in  European  Review  of  Latin  American  and
Caribbean Studies, 52, 1992. 
28 L. Fellermaier (MEP, head of socialist group), Message to the President of the
EC Commission,  July  29,  1975,  in  ACCE,  BAC 48/1984 1055;  L.  Boselli  (EC
Commission,  DG  I),  Report  on  meeting  of  the  political  committee  of  the
European Parliament, October 21, 1976, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1055.
29 S. Mansholt, Statement at the end of visit to Chile, March 21, 1975, in IISG,
Socialist International 264. 
30 Brussels  secretariat  of  the  CGT–CGIL standing  committee,  Letter  to  the
president  of  the  Council  of  the  EC,  October  4,  1973,  in  NA,  FCO 30/1684;
European  Trade  Union  Confederation,  Letter  to  the  President  of  the  EC
Commission, September 9, 1974, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1055. 
31 See for instance European Parliament, Resolution on the military coup in
Chile,  October 17,  1973,  in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1055; European Parliament,
Resolution  on  the  violation  of  human  rights  in  Chile,  October  15,  1976,  in
ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1055; European Parliament, Resolution on the deportation
of political and trade unions personalities in Chile, January 19, 1978, in ACCE,
BAC 48/1984 1055. 
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improvement  of  the  human  rights  situation in  Chile,  but  they were
more useful for domestic European purposes. For the improvement of
the  situation  in  Chile,  hopes  were  put  in  the  exertion  of  discreet
pressure on the Chilean government through con:dential diplomatic
contacts. For instance, the EC repeatedly addressed Pinochet «fain we
Le government chilies use de Clemenceau et suspense execution de sec
condemnations à mort et adventuresses condemnations futures.»32 
Deeming  con:dential  initiatives  insuf:cient,  some  sectors  of
European public opinion and the Dutch government called the EC to
enforce economic sanctions against Chile.33 In particular, calls aimed at
cutting European provisions of aid to the country. The Community's
aid to Chile at this time mostly consisted of food aid: since it bene:ted
the poorest sectors of the population, the Council of ministers decided
not  to  cut  it.  However,  it  decided  to  channel  aid  through  non-
governmental organizations like the churches rather than through the
Chilean government itself.34 The outcome of the discussion on cutting
aid to Chile set a blueprint for later Community debates on the use of
aid  cuts  as  a  sanction  against  human  rights  violations  in  a  third
country:  aid  transfers  directly  bene:ting  the  poorest  sections  of  the
population would not be cut, but measures would be taken to ensure
that the recipient government did not divert  it.  A typical method to
prevent this from happening was to channel aid through NGOs. 
Besides economic  sanctions,  the  EC discussed the  opportunity of
making symbolic political gestures to signal its concern with the human
rights  situation in  Chile.  In  particular,  the  possibility  of  moving the
headquarters  of  the  EC  Commission's  representation  of:ce  in  Latin
America from Santiago del Chile to another country was discussed. The
of:ce was meant to deal with relations with Latin America as a whole
and  not  with  Chile  as  such.  The  reason why  it  had  been  based  in
Santiago  was  that  a  number  of  Latin  American  organizations  and
intergovernmental conferences were hosted there. Given the technical
rationale  for  the  Santiago  seat,  pressures  for  moving  the  of:ce  for
political reasons were initially resisted by Commission of:cials.35 Later
in  the  decade,  the  main  headquarters  of  the  EC's  activity  in  Latin
32 President of the Council of the EC, Message to Pinochet, 1974, in AMAEF,
Affaires politiques, CE, 3803. See also L. Boselli, Report on visit by the Chilean
ambassador, November 6, 1975, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1056. 
33 A. Douglas-Home, Note on food aid to Chile, October 26, 1973, in NA, FCO
30/1684.
34 Ibid.; E. Reuter (cabinet of Jenkins), Report on H. Allende's visit, September
6, 1977, in HAEU, EN 1141.  
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America were set in Caracas. The EC Commission made a few other
symbolic gestures to signal its concern. For instance, several high-level
meetings were held between commissioners and leaders of the Chilean
opposition, often at the encouragement of the EC Commission's itself.36 
The EC took a few common measures to signal its concern with the
human  rights  situation  in  Chile.  However,  adopted  measures  were
clearly disproportionately small with regard to the alleged concern of
the  EC  member  states.  The  Chilean  situation  was  not  thoroughly
discussed  in  the  EPC  framework,  thus  adopted  measures  mainly
concerned  the  Community.  In  this  regard,  their  modesty  was  less
apparent and in fact they were quite remarkable. Never before had the
Community  discussed  the  use  of  aid  sanctions  for  human  rights
reasons, nor had it modi:ed its aid policies to address human rights
issues.  The  Commission  took  quite  explicit  political  positions  with
regard to Chile, which could hardly be justi:ed with the mere pursuit
of its technical and economic tasks. It is remarkable that member states
like France did not protest against the Commission making explicitly
political gestures, such as meeting the leaders of the opposition. 
Distancing itself from white minority rule in Austral Africa
During  the  1970s,  the  situation  in  a  number  of  Austral  African
countries  sparked  international  concern.  There  were  the  Portuguese
colonies  :ghting  for  independence  :rst  and  then  struggling  to
overcome  deep  internal  divisions  and  heavy  foreign  interferences.
There was South Africa with its domestic apartheid regime and with its
aggressive foreign policy towards its neighbors. There was the ongoing
crisis in Rhodesia, where a white minority government de:ed internal
opposition  and  widespread  external  criticism.  Some  of  these  issues
35 W. Renner (EC Commission, Delegation for  Latin America),  Note on the
location of the Commission delegation for Latin America, October 17, 1973, in
Churchill Archives, Soames, 48/25; L. Boselli, Report on visit by the Chilean
ambassador, November 6, 1975, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1056. 
36 W. Renner, Letters to Soubestre and Cohen, August 26, 1975, in ACCE, BAC
25/1980 1889; W. Renner, Note on Precht's visit to Brussels, September 2, 1976,
in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1058; L. Boselli, Note on Precht's visit, September 24,
1976, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1058; G. Beinhardt (EC Commission, DG I), Note
on Silva Henriquez's visit, October 10, 1976, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1058; E.
Reuter, Report on H. Allende's visit, September 6, 1977, in HAEU, EN 1141.  
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were not altogether new, but they acquired new salience in the 1970s. In
respect to them, the EC tried to assert an image of itself as a supporter
of the independence of the African peoples and as an opponent of racial
discrimination. 
There  were  three  main  reasons  why  the  EC  actors  deemed  it
important to project an image of the EC as an actor having progressive
positions  on  Austral  African  issues.  Firstly,  these  issues  attracted
increasing  international  attention.  African  and  developing  countries
were  seriously  concerned  with  them,  and  they  looked  at  the  EC's
attitude towards these issues as a crucial test for the EC's international
pro:le and for its credibility. Secondly, the Soviet Union was asserting
itself as a supporter of the struggles of the Austral African liberation
movements,  seeking  «d'assumer  la  direction  de  l'Afrique
progressiste.»37 As long as Western countries' positions on the Austral
African issues remained timid, the Soviet infuence in the area could
further increase, directly challenging the West: «il fallait veiller à ce que
l'URSS et Cuba n'apparaissent pas comme les défenseurs de l'Afrique
contre le colonialisme. Les Neuf devraient se ranger délibérément du
coté de l'indépendance des Africains.»38 Finally, if the EC was too timid
or conservative on Austral African issues, it risked wasting the capital
of credibility that it had gained among African countries thanks to its
engagement in development cooperation.39 For this reason, of:cials of
the  EC  Commission  deliberately  tried  to  link  support  to  African
regionalism, promotion of development and support to the struggle of
the liberation movements  in Austral Africa.  For instance,  the adjoint
director-general  of  DG  VIII  Maurice  Foley40 promoted  the
establishment  of  the  South  African  Development  Coordination
Conference.41
37 EPC working group on Africa, Conclusions on Angola, December 16, 1975,
in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3522. See also O. A. Westad, The Global
Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 214–218. 
38 H.-D.  Genscher  quoted  in  MAEF,  Europe  occidentale,  Report  on  EPC
meeting on Angola, February 24, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal,
3523. 
39 Presidency of the Council of the EC, Note sur les implications politiques des
aides  aux  pays  de  l'Afrique  australe,  March  31,  1976,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires
politiques, CE, 3775. 
40 On Foley, see p. 136n.
41 A. Hewitt  and K. Whiteman,  «The Commission and development policy:
Bureaucratic politics in EU aid – from the Lomé leap forwards to the dif:culties
of adapting to the twenty-:rst century,» in  EU Development Cooperation: From
Model to Symbol (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), p. 142.
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In order to assert itself as a supporter and as a trustworthy partner
of the African peoples, the EC deployed a number of initiatives during
the 1970s. A series of joint declarations on Austral African issues were
released  by  the  EPC  and  by  the  European  Council,  spanning  from
Angolan  independence and war  to  the  settlement  of  the  Rhodesian
problem, and from the apartheid policies to the status of Namibia.42 The
EPC made strong efforts to follow up joint declarations with consistent
voting  behavior  at  the  UN.  The  release  of  declarations  was  often
followed  by  the  promotion  of  con:dential  diplomatic  contacts,
especially with the South African government.43 Besides purely verbal
initiatives, the EC provided some aid to the victims of apartheid,  to
South Africa's neighboring countries and to some liberation movements
active in the region.44 This aid was seen as the price for the EC to pay
«pour  assurer  sa  présence  en  Afrique  australe  et  en  même temps
sauvegarder ses intérêts politiques et économiques.»45 
Most  of  the  efforts  focused  on  exerting  pressure  on  the  South
African government,  which was involved in almost all  of  the issues
affecting  Austral  Africa.  In  order  to  exert  pressure  on  it,  the  EC
observed the arms embargo approved by the UN and introduced some
additional sanctions, such as restraints on South Africa's sporting and
cultural  contacts with Europe. The most  salient  EC initiative against
apartheid was the establishment of a code of conduct for the European
companies which were active in South Africa.  The code was largely
inspired to the code of conduct approved by the British government in
1974,  and  it  was  aimed  at  de  facto  overcoming  some  apartheid
42 See for instance Council of the EC, Message to the UN Secretary General on
the occasion of Namibia Day, August 26, 1975, in NA, FCO 58/897; EC foreign
ministers,  Declaration  on  Angola,  February  23,  1976,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires
politiques,  Portugal,  3522;  EPC  presidency,  Common  statement  at  the  UN
conference against apartheid, July 27, 1977, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE,
4149;  EPC presidency,  Common statement  at  the  UN conference  to  combat
racism and racial discrimination, August 15, 1978, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 129. 
43 See  for  instance  MAEF,  Affaires  africaines  et  malgaches,  Note  sur  la
démarche  au  Cap au  sujet  du  retrait  des  forces  sud-africaines de  l'Angola,
March 13, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3522.
44 EPC presidency, Common statement at the UN conference against apartheid,
July 27, 1977, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 4149;  Auswärtige Amt, Ref.
410, Beziehungen der EG zu den Konfiktstaaten im südlichen Afrika, February
10, 1978, in PAAA, B 200, 121704.
45 Presidency of the Council of the EC, Note sur les implications politiques des
aides  aux  pays  de  l'Afrique  australe,  March  31,  1976,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires
politiques, CE, 3775. 
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practices.46 The adoption of an EC code was proposed by Britain in July
1977 and the code was approved by the EPC in September 1977.47 The
main reason for the speed with which the code was adopted was the
risk of the EC appearing as too mild a critic  of apartheid,  at  a  time
when Soweto riots were taking place, the UN was holding a conference
against  apartheid,  and  the  US  were  strengthening  their  measures
against apartheid.48 The implementation of the code was only assigned
to the individual member states and it was far from perfect.
The set of verbal, economic and legal initiatives adopted by the EC
tried to convey an image of the EC as an opponent of South African
policies,  of  white  minority  rule  in  Austral  Africa,  and  of  external
interferences  in  Angola  and  Namibia.  Apartheid  was  deemed  as
«parfaitement étrangère à l'esprit de notre temps»49 and as an «insulte à
la dignité de l'homme.»50 According to the EC commissioner Claude
Cheysson, the struggle in Austral Africa was  «le  même que celui que
nous avons mené il y a trente ans:»51 it was a :ght for human dignity
and for the basic values praised by Europe. 
Despite  the  EC's  efforts  to  assert  itself  as  a  supporter  of  the
independence  of  African  peoples  and  as  an  opponent  of  racial
discrimination, EC initiatives were falling short of the demands made
by the African countries and by some European pressure groups. The
EC  member  states  continued  to  recognize  the  South  African
government  as  legitimate,  opposing  its  expulsion  from the  UN and
denying support to the African National  Congress.52 The EC did not
break  economic  relations  with  South  Africa:  with  the  Community
46 Code of conduct for companies with interests in South Africa, September 20,
1977, in ACCE, BAC 39/1986 535. For a detailed analysis of the code, see M.
Holland,  «Disinvestment,  sanctions  and the  European Community's  code of
conduct in South Africa,» in African Affairs, 88 (353), 1989. 
47 M.  Holland,  The  European  Community  and  South  Africa.  European  Political
Cooperation under Strain (London and New York: Pinter, 1988), p. 32. 
48 Ibid., p. 32. 
49 French delegation to  the UN,  Projet  d'intervention sur l'Afrique du Sud,
October 30, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, EPC, Problèmes africains.
50 EPC presidency, Common statement at the UN conference against apartheid,
July 27, 1977, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 4149. 
51 Cheysson,  Message aux journées d'études sur l'apartheid, April 6, 1978, in
PAAA, B 200, 121849. 
52 EPC presidency, Report on meeting of working groups on Africa and the
UN, June 28, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, EPC, Groupes d'experts
Afrique. 
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accounting for half of South-African foreign trade volume and for more
than a half of the foreign investments in South Africa, trade sanctions
by the EC would have exerted a very strong pressure on its government
but they would have been costly for Europe as well.53 Limits on the
EC's willingness  to meet demands for  forceful  initiatives in favor of
African peoples were largely due to the strong material interests held
by some member states in the region. Moreover, the EC could not strain
excessively its relations with South Africa because its regional infuence
made dialogue with South Africa necessary in order to bring ongoing
negotiations  on  Angolan,  Namibian  and  Rhodesian  issues  to  a
satisfactory  end.54 In  order  not  to  alienate  the  South  African
government,  most  of  the  EC  initiatives  in  fact  paid  only  a  limited
attention to the domestic apartheid policies and rather focused on the
more general Austral African issues. 
The constraints on the EC's initiatives on Austral Africa
The  set  of  initiatives  taken  by  the  EC  in  order  to  promote
independence and :ght racism in Austral Africa were less the result of
a shared European approach to the issues concerned than the result of a
compromise between divergent approaches by the different EC actors
involved. The EC member states were pursuing different lines on the
Austral African issues, and divisions between them made it dif:cult to
agree  on common initiatives  and to  project  a  coherent  image of  the
overall EC's stance on Austral African problems. To be sure, problems
affecting Austral Africa during the 1970s were extremely complex and
even single  states  struggled to de:ne coherent and effective policies
towards them. The attempt at coordinating EC member states' policies
towards them was possibly over-ambitious, and in any case its main
outcome was a mere set of statements, declarations, and démarches. 
Some member states were calling for the adoption by the EC of very
53 United Nations,  Press  release on the  visit  of  the  chairman of  the  special
committee against apartheid to Brussels, June 21, 1978, in ACCE, BAC 39/1986
535. Germany and Britain were the second and third largest suppliers of South
Africa (FCO, Paper on the future British policy towards South Africa, March 29,
1977, in NA, FCO 49/727). 
54 FCO, Brief on Southern Africa for the European Council, March 30, 1978, in
NA, FCO 98/400; MAEF, Affaires africaines et malgaches, Note sur les mesures
contre l'Afrique du Sud, May 17, 1978, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 4150.
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stringent measures against South African policies. Such member states
were Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and often Italy as well: these
countries did not have signi:cant material interests in Austral Africa,
while they had some infuential domestic pressure groups calling for
the  adoption  of  strong  measures.55 These  countries  were  calling  for
comprehensive  trade  sanctions  against  South  Africa,  for  a  sharp
reduction of European contacts with it, and for the adoption of much
more public initiatives by the EC. They were giving substantial support
to African liberation movements and they regularly voted differently
from their  EC partners  in  the  UN votes  on Austral  African issues.56
Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands were deemed «dogmatic to the
forward, moralistic position on apartheid.»57 In fact, their EC partners
accused them of being more interested in improving their own image
on the international stage than in effectively bringing about real change
in Austral Africa. As a French diplomat noticed, 
Pour les Irlandais et les Danois, soutenus pas les Italiens et les
Hollandais, il faut que les Neuf prennent à l'égard de l'Afrique
du Sud des initiatives dans le seul but d'af:cher leur hostilité à
l'apartheid,  et  cela  indépendamment des  évènements  qui
peuvent  survenir  […]  Il  s'agit  de  leur  part  d'une  attitude  de
principe qui, du reste, se justi:e plus par le désir de manifester
leur  intérêt pour la défense des droits de l'homme et d'af:cher
des positions “anticolonialistes” que par le souci de provoquer
des changements réels.58 
Britain,  France and Germany had a much more prudent position
with regard to Austral Africa, and to South Africa in particular. They
had signi:cant economic interests there: South Africa was an important
55 R.  J.  Dalton  (British  delegation  to  the  UN),  Note  on  the  Community
coordination on Namibia, December 21, 1976, in NA, FCO 58/977; FCO, Brief
on Southern Africa  for  the  European Council,  March 30,  1978,  in  NA, FCO
98/400. 
56 R. J. Dalton, Note on the Community coordination on Namibia, December
21, 1976, in NA, FCO 58/977;  FCO, Report on EPC meeting on South Africa,
March 17, 1978, in NA, FCO 98/400;  H. Kvale Svenbalrud, «Apartheid and
NATO: Britain, Scandinavia, and the Southern Africa question in the 1970s,» in
Diplomacy & Statecraft, 23 (4), 2012, p. 753. 
57 Kvale Svenbalrud, «Apartheid and NATO,» p. 756. 
58 MAEF,  Affaires  africaines  et  malgaches,  Note  sur  les  mesures  contre
l'Afrique du Sud, May 17, 1978, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 4150. See
also R. J. Dalton, Note on the Community coordination on Namibia, December
21, 1976, in NA, FCO 58/977; FCO, Paper on the future British policy towards
South Africa,  March 29,  1977,  in NA, FCO 49/727; D. Owen,  Human Rights
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1978), p. 94. 
198
market for some European industries and it was an important supplier
of commodities, providing, for instance, 35 percent of the EC's uranium
imports.59 Britain, France and Germany would have borne by far most
of the costs of any economic sanctions: according to British estimates, a
universal  trade  embargo  against  South  Africa  could  cost  Britain  1
percent  of  GDP.60 Besides  economic  interests,  these  countries  had
geopolitical concerns as well, especially regarding shipping routes and
the Soviet infuence in the region. 
There is reason to believe in the sincerity of the British, French and
German  commitment  to  a  change  of  South  African  policies.  Moral
considerations aside, the costs of preserving white minority rule were
expected  to  grow  increasingly  over  time  and  to  eventually  become
untenable. The weight and relevance of black Africa was expected to
grow as well, so that 
if  it  came  to  an  either/or  choice,  the  balance  of  economic
advantage for the United Kingdom would seem to lie in black
rather than white Africa and the passage of time seems likely to
tip the balance further in this direction.61 
The  adoption  of  European initiatives  for  a  change of  South  African
policies would also be useful since they would help «to remove the
causes of further communist opportunism.»62 
Britain, France and Germany sought gradual and negotiated change
in Austral Africa, in order to ensure the preservation of political and
economic stability.63 For  this reason,  they opposed the adoption of  a
confrontational  stance  as  demanded  by  their  EC  partners.  They
59 FCO, Paper on the future British policy towards South Africa,  March 29,
1977, in NA, FCO 49/727; EC Commission, DG I, Brie:ng note for Harriman's
visit, June 22, 1978, in ACCE, BAC 39/1986 535; Ponte Vieira Lopes,  Between
Cold War and Colonial Wars, pp. 33–38. For :gures on trade fows between South
Africa and the EC member states see Holland, The EC and South Africa, p. 53. 
60 FCO, Paper on the future British policy towards South Africa,  March 29,
1977, in NA, FCO 49/727; MAEF, Affaires africaines et malgaches, Note sur les
mesures contre l'Afrique du Sud, May 17, 1978, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques,
CE, 4150. 
61 FCO, Paper on the future British policy towards South Africa,  March 29,
1977, in NA, FCO 49/727. See also Owen, Human Rights, pp. 89–90. 
62 H.-D. Genscher quoted in FCO, Report on EPC meeting on Angola, February
25, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/6.
63 FCO, Paper on the future British policy towards South Africa,  March 29,
1977,  in  NA, FCO 49/727;  FCO,  Brief  on Southern  Africa for  the  European
Council, March 30, 1978, in NA, FCO 98/400. 
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opposed the break of diplomatic relations with South Africa and they
gave only limited support to liberation movements.64 They opposed the
adoption of public EC initiatives, which may well win some support
among  the  African  countries  but  which  were  likely  to  cause  a
hardening of the South African line.65 They opposed the adoption of
trade  sanctions,  which  were  deemed  counterproductive  since  they
would make the South-African government close their ranks and they
would  foster  instability.66 However  sensible  such  a  prudent  stance
might have been, the problem with its adoption was that it  «donnait
l'impression de défendre les minorités blanches.»67 
Some  difference  set  France  apart  from  Britain  in  terms  of  its
approach to Austral African issues. Britain overall favored de:ning a
common  EC  position  and  it  actively  promoted  its  elaboration.  For
instance, Britain sought cooperation with the EC partners on Rhodesia
and  it  proposed  common  initiatives  such  as  the  deployment  of  a
European mission  to  Namibia.68 This  attitude stemmed both  from  a
general British favor towards the EPC and from the awareness of the
particular  exposure  of  Britain  in  Austral  Africa.69 On  the  contrary,
France  was  wary  of  cooperating  with  the  partners.  It  opposed  the
release of some joint declarations, the deployment of common missions,
the joint recognition of Angola, and so on.70 The main French fear was
that  the  de:nition  of  a  common European  policy  on  Austral  Africa
could lead to the de:nition of a common European policy on Africa as a
64 French embassy in Bonn, Note on Ogbu's visit to Bonn, August 30, 1973, in
AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA, 2985. 
65 FCO, Report on EPC  meeting  on Southern Africa, March 22, 1976, in NA,
FCO 98/183. 
66 FCO, Paper on the future British policy towards South Africa,  March 29,
1977,  in  NA, FCO 49/727;  FCO,  Brief  on Southern  Africa for  the  European
Council, March 30, 1978, in NA, FCO 98/400. 
67 A. Duff (FCO, Middle East and Africa) quoted in MAEF, Report on NATO
Council,  March  25,  1976,  in  AMAEF,  Affaires  politiques,  CE,  EPC,  Groupes
d'experts Afrique. 
68 FCO, European correspondent, Note on Namibia, April 29, 1976, in NA, FCO
58/973; FCO, Brief  on Southern Africa for the European Council,  March 30,
1978, in NA, FCO 98/400.  
69 MAEF, Note sur la politique britannique en Afrique australe, May 20, 1976,
in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Grande-Bretagne, 378; FCO, Paper on the future
British policy towards South Africa, March 29, 1977, in NA, FCO 49/727. 
70 FCO, Report on EPC meeting on Angola, February 25, 1976, in NA, FCO
98/6; British embassy in Paris, Note on Southern Africa, May 4, 1976, in NA,
FCO 58/973. 
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whole, which was not regarded as a desirable development.71 
Seventy resolutions on apartheid were voted on at the UN between
1973 and 1980: the EC member states voted in unison only 17 times.72
Because of the deep divisions between EC member states on the Austral
African  issues,  most  of  the  efforts  were  directed  at  «achieving  the
minimum of divergence of views among the Nine, rather than a joint
policy.»73 As a result,  much energy was spent on reaching outcomes
which were not very incisive. Even when common initiatives could be
agreed upon, they were often «insuf:ciently robust in substance and
insipid in tone,»74 and they lacked the large political support that was
vital  to  nurture  them.  Because  of  their  compromised  character,  no
member state was ready to strongly defend such initiatives from the
criticisms that they received from the African countries on one side and
from South Africa on the other side.
Even when it was possible to reach common positions in the EPC,
the  EC  member  states  often  broke  with  them,  either  by  adopting
stronger  bilateral  initiatives  or  by  withdrawing  from  the  common
initiatives  themselves.75 In  order  to  cover  the  differences  between
member  states,  quite  strong  rhetorical  positions  were  taken,
complementing the  weak character  of  common initiatives.  However,
this strategy was not very effective, since it further exposed the EC to
criticisms of incoherence between its words and deeds. As a result, the
EC failed to convey a clear idea of its position on Austral African issues.
While  a  general  orientation  in  favor  of  multiracialism  and
independence  could  be  discerned,  there  were  too  many  nuances,
making  it  hard  to  discern  the  European  position  on  more  speci:c
aspects of the issues at stake. 
71 C. Martin (cabinet of de Guiringaud), Brief for meeting of the EC foreign
ministers, October 3, 1977, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 4149. 
72 Holland, The EC and South Africa, p. 69. 
73 N. J. Thorpe (FCO, Central and Southern Africa), Note on coordination of the
policies of the Nine at the 33rd UN General Assembly, April 1978, in NA, FCO
58/1286. 
74 R. J. Dalton, Note on the Community coordination on Namibia, December
21, 1976, in NA, FCO 58/977. 
75 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Report on EPC meeting on Austral Africa, May
5, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3794. 
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The EC taking the offensive on human rights
In the cases of Portugal, Chile and South Africa, the EC was mostly
con:ned to a defensive position on human rights. Since these countries
belonged to the  West,  the  EC had some links  with  them,  and third
countries  and  sectors  of  the  European  public  opinion  continued  to
attack such links. Even if criticism focused mostly on rogue Western
countries,  violations  of  human  rights  occurred  in  a  number  of
developing countries as well.  Open criticism of them  by the EC  was
hindered by  some  obstacles,  however.  Developing  countries  would
have attacked European criticism as an attempt  to interfere  with their
internal  affairs.  They  would  have  argued  that  observance  of  some
human rights  was a luxury that countries affected by basic social and
economic problems could not yet afford. Moreover, European criticism
concerning political rights would have spurred demands for a stronger
European engagement for the promotion of economic rights, but the EC
member states were not much willing to grant it.76   
Despite  these  obstacles,  in  the  late  1970s  the  EC  adopted  an
offensive stance on human rights. The EC kept quite a prudent attitude
towards human rights violations occurring in Soviet bloc countries, and
it rather focused on violations occurring in developing countries. The
adoption of  a  more  offensive  stance  on human rights  was  largely  a
reaction to the shift in the US human rights policy promoted by the
Carter  administration.  Human  rights  promotion  had  not  been  a
primary goal  for  the  previous administrations,  and  Henry Kissinger
was  extremely skeptical  about it.  Despite  the  prudent and tentative
character of the EC engagement in favor of human rights, in early 1976
it was possible for EC diplomats to claim that «Western delegations as a
whole now look to the Nine for a lead on the entire range of human
rights questions.»77 Since January 1977, Carter turned human rights into
a focal item on the US foreign policy agenda – in words if not in deeds.
A human rights bureau and a human rights committee  were created,
and the US decided to cut aid and military cooperation to some gross
human rights violators:78 now it was the EC that had to catch up with
76 D. Williams (Ministry for overseas development), Note on human rights and
aid, July 12, 1976, in NA, FCO 58/1010. 
77 British delegation to the UN, Note on human rights at the UN, May 3, 1976,
in NA, FCO 58/1009. 
78 The human rights bureau had been created during the Ford administration
because of Congressional pressure.  As Barbara Keys shows, the bureau was
initially  meant  to  be  a  mere  “cosmetic  gesture”  however  (Keys,  «Congress,
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the American activism on human rights. 
 Together with the shift in the American foreign policy, the adoption
of an offensive stance on human rights by the EC in the late 1970s was
also linked with the constantly increasing concern with human rights
among  European  public  opinion.  The  pressure  exerted  on  the
Community by NGOs and individual citizens grew to such an extent
that in 1978 the EC Commission had to establish a standing ad hoc
group  to  answer  their  appeals  and  enquiries  on  humanitarian
questions.79 The  European  Parliament  also  focused  a  great  deal  on
human  rights  issues,  to  the  extent  that  between  1973  and  1979  it
approved  as  many  as  530  resolutions  concerning  them.80 MEPs
frequently posed questions concerning human rights issues with regard
to an extremely large  range of  world countries.  Human rights  were
seen  by  the  Parliament  as  a  useful  issue to  focus  upon  in  order  to
strengthen its own authority and legitimacy. The Parliament sought to
assert itself as «the forum which best stood for European values»81 and
as  «the  conscience  and  the  critical  voice  of  Europe.»82 While  the
Parliament was only partly successful in asserting itself in such a way,
its  pressure  on  human  rights  issues  was  quite  successful  and  it
managed to place and keep human rights on the EC's agenda.
The adoption of a proactive stance on human rights by the EC was
promoted also by the  British government.  It  was the  British foreign
minister  David  Owen  in  particular  who  stressed  the  importance  of
human rights, to the extent that he published a book about the issue in
1978,  in  which  he  argued  that  «a  concern  for  human rights  should
permeate our whole foreign policy.»83 However, human rights were to
Kissinger, and the origins of human rights diplomacy,» in Diplomatic History, 34
(5), 2010), p. 833. 
79 EC Commission, General secretariat, Compte rendu de la première réunion
du Groupe  inter-services chargé d'examiner les réponses à donner aux lettres
émanant d'organisation à but humanitaire,  December 6,  1978,  in  HAEU, EN
298. 
80 K. Arts, Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The Case of the
Lomé Convention (Den Haag: Kluwer Law International, 1998), pp. 265–266. 
81 A. É. Gfeller, «Champion of human rights: The European Parliament and the
Helsinki process,» in Journal of Contemporary History, 49 (2), 2014, p. 395. On the
impact of the Parliament's political discourse on its own assertion and on the
de:nition of a European identity, see E. De Angelis, The Political Discourse of the
European  Parliament,  Enlargement,  and  the  Construction  of  a  European  Identity,
1962–2004, PhD thesis (LSE), 2011. 
82 G. Bersani (MEP) quoted in Gfeller, «Champion of human rights,» p. 407. 
83 Owen, Human Rights, p. 2. 
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become only one among many factors determining foreign policy – in
fact,  they were likely  to  remain  «a  very  minor  factor.»84 Other  EC
member states such as the Netherlands and Denmark were strongly
concerned  with  human  rights  as  well,  but  they  were  not  much
interested in dealing with them at the EC level, since they were aware
that cooperation would probably constrain and dilute their relatively
radical stances on the subject. Finally, the adoption of a proactive stance
on human rights was promoted by the engagement of some prominent
Community :gures such as the President of the EC Commission Roy
Jenkins  and  the  EC  commissioner  for  external  relations  Wilhelm
Haferkamp. Haferkamp described himself as a convinced supporter of
Amnesty International,  and  close relations existed between Amnesty
and his cabinet and the Commission's directorate-general for external
relations.85
To a large extent, the adoption of a proactive stance on human rights
by the EC was connected with the perceived need to de:ne its traits as
an  international  actor.  Commitment  to  human rights  would  help  to
give purpose to  the EC's international activity and it would  reinforce
the image of a «force for good» that the EC had been trying to assert in
the  previous  years,  especially with  its  initiatives  towards  the
developing countries. Asserting itself as an actor supporting freedom,
democracy  and  the  underdog,  the  EC  sought  to win  the  hearts  of
domestic  and  international public  opinion.86 However  desirable  the
EC's initiatives on human rights might have been, there were few cases
where  human rights  violations  could  be  raised without  putting  the
interests  of  some EC  member  states  at  stake.87 The  asymmetry  in
member states' interests and links with third countries made it dif:cult
to  agree on cases to target for proactive initiatives. In particular,  the
French government was wary of discussing the human rights situation
of developing countries with its EC partners, since the situation in  a
few former French colonies was  extremely negative. France dismissed
the usefulness of the «démarches platoniques» of EPC and argued that
it  was  up  to  the  UN,  not  to  the  EC,  to  judge  on  internal  political
84 FCO, Proposed comparative assessment of the human rights performance of
foreign governments, August 17, 1976, in NA, FCO 49/688. 
85 W. Haferkamp, Letter to Baichère, November 25, 1977, in HAEU, EN 1092. 
86 European Parliament, Report of proceedings, May 11, 1977, in ACCE, BAC
210/1989 408. 
87 R. A. Hibbert, Note on human rights, July 15, 1977, in NA, FCO 58/1146; D.
F. Murray (FCO, Asia), Note on human rights and foreign policy, September 15,
1977, in NA, FCO 58/1146. 
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regimes.88 
In  order  to isolate the  pursuit of  human  rights  violations from
political  considerations, in 1976 the German government proposed to
its EC partners to promote the establishment of an International Court
of Human  Rights,  on  the  model  of  the  European  Court.89 An
independent  international  court  could  help  governments to  avoid
dif:cult choices  of  priority between divergent  foreign  policy  goals.
Moreover, an independent international court could focus on human
rights violations occurring in the Soviet countries and in the developing
ones  attracting limited criticism,  and as consequence these countries
would exert less  pressures on the West.  Even if the German proposal
was admittedly a proposal for the long-term, it was received with «the
greatest skepticism» by the other EC member states and it was rapidly
shelved.90 
EC  initiatives  for  proactive  human  rights  promotion  in  third
countries followed a double strategy. On the one hand, a focus would
be put on  a  few rogue states  and direct pressures would be exerted
upon them. Single country cases would be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis  and  close attention  would  be  paid  to  the  worst  human rights
offenders.  On  the  other  hand,  EC  efforts  would  mainly  focus  on
improving the  general  international atmosphere,  spreading awareness
for  human  rights  and  trying  to  gradually  turn  their  respect  into  a
widespread international norm.  In 1977  the EC member states agreed
on  drafting  a general annual  EPC  report  on  human  rights.91 EC
ambassadors  in  third  countries  were  required to  provide  a  regular
assessment of the human rights situation in their host countries.92 
88 MAEF, Amérique, Note sur les droits de l'homme en Amérique Latine, April
4, 1978, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 4087. 
89 Auswärtige Amt,  Note sur la création d'une Cour internationale des droits
de l'homme, August 20, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/209. 
90 FCO, United Nations, Report on meeting of the UN experts group, August
27, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/210. 
91 M. K. O. Simpson-Orlebar (FCO, United Nations), Note on human rights
and foreign policy, December 7, 1977, in NA, FCO 58/1146. 
92 M. K. O. Simpson-Orlebar, Note on human rights, September 19, 1977, in
NA, FCO 58/1146. 
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The inclusion of human rights in the Lomé Convention
It  was  mainly  in  the  :eld  of  the  Community's  development
cooperation policies that the EC adopted a proactive stance on human
rights in the late 1970s. The provision of the Community's development
aid  to  countries  grossly  violating  human  rights  came  increasingly
under  :re  in  the  EC.  Concern  was  expressed  in  the  media,  in  the
parliaments and by pressure groups such as the European Movement
and Amnesty  International.93 British  public  opinion  was  particularly
wary of the possibility that European public money could be diverted
by third governments violating human rights, or that the concession of
aid could by hailed by such governments as a sign of political approval
of their actions by the EC.94 Calls were made to tie the provision of aid
to a country to its human rights performance. However, developmental
experts  argued  that  aid  cuts  would  cause  project  disruptions  and
:nancial waste, would probably be ineffective, would certainly harm
the  poor,  and  they  could  lead  to  attach  other  strings  to  aid.95
Developmental  experts  rather  suggested  positive  conditionality,  but
these proposals were met with little success.96 
It was with reference to Uganda that the issue of the provision of aid
to a country where human rights were violated was :rst discussed at
the Community level. The Ugandan government led by Idi Amin Dada
was  effectively  committing  patent  gross  violations  of  fundamental
human rights. As a signatory of the Lomé Convention, Uganda was a
recipient of Community aid. Since the Lomé Convention did not allow
the  suspension  of  aid  for  political  reasons,  the  British  government
93 See  for  instance  British  Council  of  the  European Movement,  Resolution,
March 18,  1978,  in  ACCE, BAC 39/1986 535;  United Nations Association of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Letter to Owen, May 19, 1978, in NA, FCO
98/331;  Amnesty  International,  Resolution  on  the  renewal  of  the  Lomé
Convention, June 10, 1978, in NA, FCO 98/332. 
94 J.  Hart,  Note  on human rights  and aid,  September  8,  1976,  in  NA,  FCO
49/689;  A.  J.  Coles  (British  delegation  to  the  EC),  Note  on  the  Lomé
renegotiation, January 18, 1978, in NA, FCO 98/330. 
95 J.  Hart,  Note  on human rights  and aid,  September  8,  1976,  in  NA,  FCO
49/689.
96 E. Luard (FCO, Parliamentary under-secretary), Paper on human rights and
foreign policy, May 23, 1977, in NA, FCO 58/1144; E. Luard, Note on human
rights policy, August 2, 1978, in NA, FCO 58/1414. 
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reacted to  domestic  pressures  concerning Uganda  by  asking the  EC
Commission to reduce and delay aid to Uganda as much as possible.97
Aid was indeed heavily delayed, so that by March 1977 only 0.2 percent
of the available funds had been spent.98 On June 21, 1977 the Council of
ministers approved the so-called Uganda guidelines. According to this
decision, the Council would take steps «to ensure that any assistance
given by the Community to Uganda does not in any way have as its
effect  a  reinforcement  or  prolongation of  the  denial  of  basic  human
rights to its people.»99 
The decision to reduce and delay aid to Uganda because of its poor
human rights performance was the very :rst instance of use of aid cuts
as a political sanction by the Community. Similar de facto suspension of
aid for human rights reasons was decided with regard to Equatorial
Guinea in 1978,  the Central  African Republic  in 1979 and Liberia in
1980.100 Delays  in  aid  provision  did  express  the  EC's  concern  with
human rights violations, but they were contingent solutions resting on
weak legal grounds.101 In order to codify the possibility of cutting aid in
case of gross human rights violations, the British government called for
the inclusion of human rights provisions in the new Lomé Convention,
which  was  due  to  be  renewed  in  1979.  According  to  the  British
proposal,  the new Convention  should include a  reference to human
rights in the preamble and an operational clause allowing the reduction
or  suspension  of  aid  to  a  country  in  case  of  gross  and  persistent
violations of human rights.102 The inclusion of human rights in the new
Lomé Convention was described by the British government as «one of
97 The  only  legal  option  available  was  outright  denunciation  of  the
Convention, which was not deemed desirable.
98 A. Young-Anawaty, «Human rights and the ACP–EEC Lomé II Convention:
Business as usual at the EEC,» in New York University Journal of International Law
and Politics, 13 (63), 1980, p. 65n. 
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(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), pp. 267–268. 
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102 M.  Jenkins  (FCO,  European  integration  –  external),  Note  on  the  Lomé
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our main aims»103 in the negotiations. 
When the EEC–ACP Joint Committee met in Maseru in June 1977, it
reached  a  general  agreement  for  the  inclusion  of  some  reference  to
human rights  in  the  new Convention.104 However,  despite  the  open
attitude  of  some  ACP countries,  in  the  following  months  the  ACP
group  came  to  oppose  the  inclusion  of  human  rights  in  the  new
Convention.105 Their  opposition  to any  operational  clause  was  strict,
while their attitude remained slightly more open to the inclusion of a
general reference in the preamble.106 They claimed that the Convention
should  have  a  merely  economic  character  and that  the  Community
should not interfere with the internal affairs of the ACP countries. Even
if some ACP states did criticize human rights violations committed by
their partners, «when others outside Africa took this question up, the
automatic African reaction was to close ranks.»107 
Besides  the  ACP  opposition,  the  inclusion  of  a  human  rights
provision in the new Convention was hindered by the opposition of
France and Germany to it. France claimed that the provision would be
regarded as interference by the ACP countries, and France itself had no
desire to let its EC partners interfere with its African policy.108 While the
French government opposed both the inclusion of an operational clause
and of a reference to human rights in the preamble, Germany could
envisage the latter.109 Germany worried that a worsening of the EC's
relations  with the  ACP countries  could  lead to  an expansion of  the
103 F. Judd (FCO, Minister of state), Note on the renegotiation of Lomé, March
8, 1978, in NA, FCO 98/330. 
104 Young-Anawaty, «Human rights and the ACP–EEC Lomé II Convention,»
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105 Council of ACP ministers, Resolution on human rights, December 1977, in
NA, FCO 98/307;  President  of  the  Council  of  ACP ministers,  Speech at  the
opening  of negotiations  with the EEC, July 24, 1978, in ACCE, BAC 39/1986
535.  The  ACP  countries  which  showed an  open  attitude were  Botswana,
Cameroon,  Ivory  Coast,  Kenya,  Liberia,  Tanzania,  Mauritius,  Bahamas,
Barbados, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea (E. Reuter, Note on human rights in the
Lomé context, September 5, 1977, in ACCE, BAC 39/1986 535;  FCO, Note on
human rights and the Lomé Convention, March 3, 1978, in NA, FCO 98/330).  
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Council, March 13, 1978, in ACCE, BAC 39/1986 535.
107 A. J. Coles, Note on the Lomé renegotiation, January 18, 1978, in NA, FCO
98/330. 
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Soviet infuence on it. Most of all, the German wariness was due to the
counterparts that the ACP countries could demand in exchange for the
inclusion  of  a  human  rights  provision:  they  could  increase  their
pressure  on  Austral  African  issues  and  advance  demands  for  the
promotion of economic rights and on the treatment of their nationals
migrated  to  the  EC.110 Also,  most  of  the  other  EC  member  states
opposed the inclusion of an operational clause on human rights in the
new Convention. Only the Netherlands supported the British proposal,
but domestic political reasons made the Dutch support not very strong
and effective.111 
Britain insisted that «only an operative provision in the Convention
would give the Community a totally watertight position.»112 However,
in the memorandum for the negotiation of the new Convention the EC
Commission proposed to include a reference to human rights in the
preamble and to release a unilateral declaration on them, but it did not
envisage the inclusion of an operational clause.113 The Commission did
not expect such a clause to be acceptable to the ACP states, and it was
keen to preserve the security and stability of the Lomé trade and aid
provisions. Moreover, according to the Commission in case of human
109 U.  Stefani  (EC  Commission,  General  secretariat),  Report  on  Coreper
meeting on the renegotiation of the Lomé Convention, April 28, 1978, in ACCE,
BAC  39/1986  535;  British  embassy  in  Luxembourg,  Report  on  the  Council
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Affaires économiques et :nancières, Note sur les entretiens franco-allemands,
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rights violations aid should not be suspended, but it should rather be
provided according to special criteria and by special means, as it had
been decided for  Chile.  The Commission  proposed to  tie  aid not  to
human  rights,  but  to  the  observance  of  some  norms  on  working
conditions  identi:ed  by  the  International  Labour  Organization.  The
proposal was opposed by Britain since it undermined its bid for human
rights,  but  it  was  also  received  with  little  enthusiasm  by  the  other
member states.114 
Even if the Commission did not endorse the British proposal for the
establishment of a formal link between aid provision and respect  of
human rights,  it was active in establishing an informal link between
them: it was largely due to an autonomous Commission's initiative that
Community aid to some central African countries was suspended in the
late  1970s.115 Despite  its  attachment  to  the  human  rights  issues, the
European  Parliament  failed  to  exert  any strong  pressure  on  human
rights  during the  renegotiation  of  the  Lomé  Convention.  The  main
reason  for  this  was  that  the  Parliament was  divided  on  the
establishment  of  a  link  between aid and human rights.116 Especially
because  of  the  socialists'  pressure,  the  Parliament  expressed serious
doubts on the  use of aid  cuts  as an instrument for the promotion of
political goals.117 
In June 1978 the EC foreign ministers agreed that a general reference
to human rights should be included in the preamble of the new Lomé
Convention. Britain did not manage to overcome its isolation on the
inclusion of an operational clause in the Convention: what the ministers
could agree in June 1979 was to take an internal Community decision to
use aid for objectives consistent with human rights.118 According to the
internal decision adopted by the Council on November 20, 1979, in case
114 G.  E.  FitzHerbert  (FCO,  European  integration  –  external),  Note  on  the
Commission proposal on working conditions, February 7, 1979, in NA, FCO
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of  consistent  denial  of  the  dignity  of  man  the  Community  would
«consider the necessary action.»119 Despite British efforts, not even in an
internal  decision  could  an  explicit  link  be  established  between  aid
provision and the respect of human rights. 
Human rights and the assertion of the EC as a distinctive actor
EC engagement in favor of human rights begun as a reaction to the
pressures exerted by third countries and European civil  society with
regard to the human rights violations committed by Western countries
like Portugal, South Africa and Chile. In the second half of the 1970s the
EC turned to a more offensive and proactive policy of human rights
promotion,  addressing  human  rights  violations  occurring  in
developing countries and approving sanctions against them. It is highly
signi:cant that this shift started before the accession of Carter to the US
presidency. The strengthening of the EC policy on human rights was
not merely a reaction to the strengthening of the American one, even
though the latter contributed to reinforce the EC's drive towards a more
assertive policy in the late 1970s. 
An important role in the promotion of the EC's engagement in favor
of human rights was played by European public opinion and by civil
society  actors.  Direct  contacts  were  established  between  the
Community  institutions  and  civil  society  actors  such  as  Amnesty
International.  It  was  the  :rst  case  where  NGOs,  movements  and
citizens  managed to  exert  a  strong infuence  on  some EC's  external
policies.  It  was  also  the  :rst  case  where  the  European  Parliament
managed to exert such an infuence. However, governments continued
to  play  a  crucial  role  in  the  making  of  the  EC's  external  policies:
pressures  from  below  could  exert  an  infuence  especially  when  a
government decided to back them. The context of  domestic political
situation  and  individual  agency  played  an  important  role  in  this
respect, as the examples of the Netherlands and Britain showed. 
While  a  clear  shift  in  favor  of  human  rights  concerns  could  be
118 British  delegation  to  the  EC,  Report  on  the  ACP/EEC  negotiating
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119 Council of the EC, Decision on the Lomé Convention, November 20, 1979,
in NA, FCO 98/615. 
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detected in the EC's discourse, at the level of actual policies the shift
was much more blurred. A clear cleavage existed between rhetoric and
deeds.  Actual results were particularly poor in the cases of  Portugal
and of Austral Africa. Despite their poverty, policies implemented in
the case of Chile were relevant because they were the :rst case where
aid  was diverted out  of  human rights  concerns.  Building  upon this
experience,  aid  cuts  were  used  as  a  sanction  in  Uganda  and  other
African countries: even though negative conditionality could not enter
the Second Lomé Convention, it was established as a strategy that was
possible to use. The EC member states could reach agreement only on a
limited  number  of  initiatives,  mainly  because  they  had  divergent
interests in the targeted countries. Since agreement on initiatives was
often  the  result  of  dif:cult  compromises  between  these  divergent
interests,  initiatives were often timid and uncertain,  and no member
state was ready to defend them strongly. 
To some extent, improvement of the human rights situation in third
countries  was  a  marginal  goal  of  the  EC's  human  rights  policies
themselves. These policies should not be seen as the expression of a
shared moral code or even of a European identity, but rather as part of
an  attempt  to  build  and  assert  an  EC's  international  identity.  The
instrumental character of  the EC's engagement with human rights is
made  quite  clear  by  the  mismatch  between  rhetoric  statements  and
actual policies. The EC actors did not promote human rights in third
countries as a way «to realize their principled beliefs,»120 but rather to
respond to  domestic  and external  pressure and to  contribute  to  the
assertion of the EC as a distinctive international actor. 
As Jack Donnelly argues, one of the main reasons why states pursue
human rights in foreign policy is that «human rights are important to
national identity.»121 According to David Chandler, «an interventionist
ethical foreign policy can be a powerful mechanism for generating a
sense  of  political  purpose  and  mission.»122 Ethical  foreign  policy
provides «a sense of self-identity, purpose and self-belief,»123 which was
precisely what the EC was seeking in the 1970s. It is not by chance that
the EC started to express concern with human rights at the same time
120 Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, p. 42. 
121 J.  Donnelly,  Universal  Human  Rights  in  Theory  and  Practice  (Ithaca  and
London: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 159.
122 D. Chandler, «Rhetoric without responsibility: The attraction of “ethical”
foreign policy,» in British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 5 (3), 2003,
p. 299. 
123 Ibid., p. 300. 
212
as it  sought to assert itself as an international actor: to identify with
original, “trendy” causes could be a strategy for the EC to heighten and
differentiate its pro:le as such. 
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Conclusions 
The establishment of the EC as an international actor
The  argument  of  this  thesis  has  been that the  EC's  international
activity underwent a major qualitative change in the 1970s,  leading to
the assertion of the EC as a distinct and distinctive international actor.
The goal of this dissertation was not to prove that the EC developed a
single  common foreign policy,  that  it  turned into a unitary cohesive
political actor,  or that it became a full-fedged global power. None of
these  things happened.  The  goal  of  this  dissertation  was  instead  to
prove that some signi:cant steps were taken during the 1970s towards
the  strengthening  of  the  EC's  international  activity.  The  EC  was
established as  a  political international  actor,  that  is  to  say it became
something more than a  loose set of countries sharing some economic
arrangements and interests as it was until the late 1960s. This outcome
was  the  result  of a  thorough  process  of  reassessment  of  Western
Europe's role in a changing, globalizing world. 
Achievements and shortcomings of the EC as an international actor
must  be assessed in  a  reasonable way.  It  is  not  reasonable to assess
them by comparing the international activity of the EC to that of the US
or of  one of the European powers. The EC was not a state and it was
not bound to become one, despite the federalists' rhetoric and efforts. It
is  not realistic  to  assess  the  achievements  of  the  EC's international
activity by adopting as a benchmark the excessively high expectations
held by many  towards it.  Its establishment and development was  an
extremely complex  and dif:cult  process:  it  was  dif:cult to  agree on
common  action in international  affairs by many  different  states with
partly divergent interests and with different political cultures. It was all
the more dif:cult to do so in a context like the one of the 1970s, which
was troubled by a  deep multi-dimensional  crisis.  In  retrospect,  it  is
striking that the EC managed not to fall apart during that period, and it
is remarkable that it  actually managed to proceed towards  a form of
political integration. 
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To notice the progress made towards political integration should not
lead us to overlook the serious limits and faws that affected the EC's
international  activity.  The  range  of  action  available  to  it  was  quite
seriously  constrained  by  the  member  states'  unwillingness  to
coordinate  policies  in  some  domains  and  by  their  willingness  to
coordinate some policies at the level of the West rather than at the EC
level. Member states preserved quite a considerable room for their own
independent activity in international affairs, somehow competing with
the EC and with its attempt to speak with a single voice. Even in the
:elds where the EC was able to act, its activity was not always effective.
These  faws  were  partly  due  to  the  weaknesses  of  the  institutional
structure managing the EC's international activity, with the inef:cient
separation between Community and EPC branches. Flaws were partly
due to the vague principles  and ambiguous vision guiding the EC's
international  activity,  which  resulted  from  fragile  compromises
between divergent conceptions or interests held by the member states.
Despite these limits,  I  do  argue that the EC was established as a
distinct international actor during the 1970s. The Community greatly
increased its  ability to act on the international stage,  not only at the
regional  level  but  also  at  the  global  one.  Its  competences  were
broadened,  its  institutional structure  was  strengthened,  means  were
endowed to  it  for  the expression  of a  single  voice,  and  its  political
pro:le was heightened. Some relevant policies and initiatives could be
agreed upon, and a discourse could be shaped on the EC's international
role  and  pro:le.  The member  states  started  to coordinate on
international affairs outside the Community framework,  and the EPC
system made it possible for them to reach common positions on quite a
large number of international issues. The international pro:le of the EC
was  further  heightened  by  the  European  Council's  activity,  which
contributed to assert its presence on the international stage. 
The need to consider both the Community and the EPC
Scholars  and  observers  often  dismiss  the  import  of  the  EC's
international activity. Their judgements are sometimes drawn from a
prevalent focus on “high politics” matters. The Community had little
possibility to act in these :elds; the EPC could act, but it tended to :nd
it dif:cult to do so effectively. The EPC had a promising start in the
early 1970s but then it was not always successful in living up to the
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high expectations held towards it. As it was noticed already at the time,
«histologist […] de la cooperation politicize, accumulate lech occasions
per dues, lech démarches vanes, et un certain herbalism.»1 It is possible
to make a more balanced and accurate assessment of the achievements
and shortcomings of the EC's international activity by also taking into
consideration “low politics” matters, by way of looking at the whole
picture of the EC's international activity. In contrast to the somehow
disappointing trajectory of the EPC, most of the external policies of the
Community grew considerably both in effectiveness and scope during
the 1970s. 
Some of the literature on European integration suggests that the EC
tried to assert itself as an international actor in the early 1970s, but the
EC  drastically  retrenched  its  ambitions  as  early  as  in  1974,  as  a
consequence of  American pressure  and of  the  energy and economic
crisis. Daniel Slick’s study on the EPC is the clearest expression of this
interpretation.2 This interpretation rests  on the adoption of a narrow
perspective, since it rests on an analysis of the EPC alone and on a focus
on the short-term which magni:es the ambitions held by the EC during
the Year of Europe and the disenchantment experienced by it in 1974.
Looking  at  the  whole  picture  of  the  EC's  international  activity  and
adopting  a  more  long-term  perspective,  a  different  interpretation
emerges. 
The  1973–74 period  was clearly  a  turning  point  for  the  EC's
international activity. However, unlike how Möckli perceives it, I see it
as a  beginning point  for  it rather than  its ending point.  The 1969–73
period  was not  the  period  when  the  EC  was  able  to  act  on  the
international  stage.  In  fact,  it  was  a  formative  period  for  the  EC's
international activity, when a rough image of the EC as an international
actor  was being sketched.  The  EC's  international  activity  was  very
much  an  endeavor  in  the  making,  with  relatively  vague  traits  and
general  ambitions.  Most of  the  debates  in  those  early  years  were
somehow  inward-looking:  they  focused  mostly  on  structures,
procedures  and  institutions  internal  to  the  EC.  The  EC  itself  was
undergoing signi:cant changes, with the decisions taken in The Hague
and Paris summits and with the entry of Britain into it. 
 The 1973–74 crisis tested the EC's project of political integration. As
a result,  traits  and ambitions  of  the  EC's  international  activity  were
1 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur cinq années de  CPE, June 18, 1975, in
AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3785. 
2 D. Möckli, European Foreign Policy during the Cold War. Heath, Brandt, Pompidou
and the Dream of Political Unity (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2009). 
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de:ned  much  more  clearly.  This  de:nition  did  certainly  imply  a
diminution of  the  initial  ambitions of  the EPC,  but  it  did not  bring
about  the  end of  the  EC's  international  activity.  On the  contrary,  it
brought  about  its  proper beginning.  Key  elements  of  the  EC  as  an
international  actor  could  be  de:ned:  the  European  Council  was
established,  the  EC became a  recognizable  player  at the  UN,  and it
obtained  recognition  from  the  Soviet  bloc  and  from  China.  The
transatlantic crisis greatly contributed to de:ning the limits of the room
available  to  the  EC  and  of  its  range  of  action:  these  limits  were
narrower than anticipated by the  EC leaders  in  the early 1970s,  but
their  clari:cation  invited  the  EC  not  to  embark  on  unrealistic  and
divisive projects.  Moreover,  the  division  of  labor  with  the  US
contributed to the de:nition  and projection  of  a distinctive “civilian”
pro:le for the EC as an international actor,  which could be articulated
quite successfully at the CSCE, in Lomé, and at the CIEC. 
To look at both the Community and the EPC dimensions of the EC's
international  activity  is  important  not  only  to  give  a  balanced
assessment  of  its achievements  and  shortcomings,  but  also  to
appreciate the real divide affecting the EC's international activity. To be
sure, the divide between the Community and the EPC was important in
institutional  and  procedural  terms,  and  it  had  an  impact  on  the
effectiveness and form of political integration. However, its importance
has been overestimated in  the literature.  The external  policies  of  the
Community  and  the  EPC  were  quite  closely  complementing  and
connected with each other,  and the gap between them was relatively
bridged  after the relaxation of the French attitude and the creation of
the European Council in 1974–75. Conversely, the existing literature on
this topic has tended to underestimate the real divide deeply affecting
the EC's international activity, namely the divide between the domains
which could be addressed at the EC level and the domains which could
not. 
As I  have shown in chapter 3, the EC's international activity was
deliberately limited to some domains  of international affairs. Member
states were not to coordinate and cooperate  at the EC level  on all the
international  issues:  there were sectors of  international  affairs which
were reserved for national action or strictly bilateral cooperation, there
were sectors reserved for cooperation at a European level different than
the EC (such as  the NATO Eurogroup for  instance),  and there were
sectors reserved for cooperation at a higher level, either with the US or
with the West more generally.  The acknowledgement of  the existence
and relevance of this divide leads to a more balanced assessment of the
achievements of the EC's international activity. It is clearly legitimate to
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criticize the EC's inability to deploy convincing actions in the sectors
where it was allowed to act – this inability was certainly present – but it
is less sensible to criticize the EC's inability to act in sectors where it
was not supposed to act at all. 
The paramount role played by the member states
Some recent works on European integration history have stressed
the role played by actors  other than states in the making of  the EC
policies,  such  as  the  EC  Commission,  the  European  Parliament,
transnational networks, and so on.3 The EC Commission played some
role in the making of the EC's international activity, especially when its
presidents  or  members  were  authoritative  and  eager  to  assert  the
Commission's  role  on  the  international  stage.  The  Commission  was
successful  in  launching  some  initiatives,  in  exerting  pressure  for
common action in some :elds of international affairs, and in promoting
some original ideas for the EC's international activity. The Commission
also played a role in seeking compromise between different member
states'  positions,  even  though  sometimes  the  Commission's  own
positions required compromise with the member states.  For instance,
on development issues the Commission – especially during Manhole’s
and Acheson’s tenures – tended to take very progressive positions that
states were unwilling to endorse. 
The  role  of  the  European  Parliament  in  the  EC's  international
activity was very marginal. The Parliament had the chance to intervene
on some issues and exert some infuence upon them, mainly as far as
trade  and  development  cooperation  were  concerned.  In  terms  of
political impact, the Parliament contributed to the establishment of the
3 On the role of the Commission, see for instance La Commissione europea: storia
e  memorie di un'istituzione,  ed.  Michel  Dumoulin (Lussemburgo: Uf:cio delle
pubblicazioni  uf:ciali  delle  Comunità  europee,  2007),  and  La  Commission
européenne 1973–1986. Histoire et mémoires d'une institution,  ed. É.  Bussière,  V.
Dujardin, M. Dumoulin, P. Ludlow, J. W. Brouwer, and P. Tilly (Luxembourg:
Of:ce  des  publications  de  l’Union  européenne,  2014).  On  the  role  of
transnational  networks,  see  Transnational  Networks  in  Regional  Integration.
Governing Europe 1945–83, ed. W. Kaiser, B. Leucht, and M. Gehler (Basingstoke:
Palgrave  Macmillan,  2010),  and  Transnational  European  Union.  Towards  a
Common Political  Space,  ed.  W. Kaiser  and P.  Starie (London and New York:
Routledge, 2005). 
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world tier of development cooperation and especially to the adoption
of  EC initiatives  against  human  rights  violations  in  third  countries.
While the direct impact of the Parliament was limited in terms of actual
policies  and  initiatives,  it  played  a  more  important  role  in  the
promotion of common European views on international affairs. Debates
and  works  in  the  Parliament  and  cooperation  between  European
parties  contributed  to  identify  themes,  principles,  and  ideas  upon
which the EC's international activity could build. 
Even if  the EC Commission and to a  minor extent  the European
Parliament exerted some infuence on the EC's  international  activity,
states, and in particular their governments, clearly played a paramount
role. They played a crucial role in the de:nition and assertion of the
EC's international activity, as well as in the making of the EC's policies
and initiatives in international affairs. In particular, a central role was
played by the national ministries of foreign affairs, both at the level of
the minister himself and of the senior of:cials and diplomats. Senior
of:cials were particularly important to ensure some continuity in the
national  foreign  policy  lines.  A central  role  was  also  played by the
heads  of  state  and  government  of  the  EC  member  states,  not  only
because  of  their  infuence  on  the  lines  adopted  by  their  own
governments, but also because crucial decisions for the de:nition and
assertion  of  the  EC's  international  activity  were  taken  at  summit
meetings. 
Among the member states,  France played a particularly signi:cant
role. On most of the issues and debates considered in this dissertation,
France's  position  differed  from  the  one  of  its  partners  –  on the
institutional structure for the EC's international activity, on the political
role  of  the  Commission,  on  the  relationship between  political
integration and transatlantic cooperation, and so on. France was at the
same  time  the  most  vocal advocate  of  a  strong  assumption  of  an
international role by the EC and the member state which objected to the
strengthening of the EC's international activity  the most.  France often
objected to  it precisely  because  its  conception  of  the  EC  as  an
international actor differed strongly from the conception held by most
of  its  partners.  For  the  French government,  Community  institutions
should play a very limited role in the EC's international activity, and
such an activity should develop autonomously from the US, while for
the other member states it was often the other way round. 
Member states played a paramount role in the de:nition of the EC's
international  activity,  in  the  assertion  of  the  EC  as  an  international
actor, and in the making of the international initiatives and policies of
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the EC. The role to be played by the member states was also a central
aspect of the de:nition of the EC's international activity itself. It was a
central question for the de:nition of the range of action available for
the EC's international activity and for the de:nition of the institutional
structure  for  it.  States  preserved  a  considerable  infuence  in
international affairs because the EC's international activity was largely
based  on  an  intergovernmental  model,  and  because  they excluded
some sectors of international affairs from it.  The very establishment of
the EC's international activity had been conceived of to enable member
states  to  preserve an  international  infuence,  making  them  more
adapted  to the  undergoing  evolution  of  the  international  order.  The
EC's international activity provided member states with a new layer to
play with, either to multiply their weight on the international stage or
to conceal their positions behind the EC's façade. 
Different conceptions of the EC as an international actor
In  this  dissertation  I  have  paid  particular  attention  to  the
conceptions  of  the  EC  as  an  international  actor  which  underlay  its
activities. Some of these conceptions were shared by the member states
or agreed by them through compromise. For instance, they agreed that
the EC was to be not only an economic international actor, but also a
political  one,  and  its  international  activity  was  to  contribute  to  the
deepening of Western European political integration. However, the EC
was to act only in some sectors of international affairs: it was desirable
that  the  EC  spoke  with  a  single  voice  sometimes,  but  it  was  not
desirable  that  its  voice  came to  be  the  only voice  of  Europe on  the
international stage. 
Member states also agreed that the EC was to focus on “civilian”
activities on the international stage. The EC's international activity was
to  be  endowed with  a  distinctive  character,  or  at  least  it  was  to be
presented as having a distinctive character. It was to stress the virtues
of  international  dialogue  and  cooperation,  and  to  advocate  an
overcoming  of  power  politics  and  bloc  confrontation.  The  EC's
international  activity  was  to  be  aimed  at  making  a  distinctive
contribution  to  international  relations.  It  was  to  promote  their
domestication, with the establishment and strengthening of multilateral
institutions and norms, and with the application of domestic categories
to  the  international  relations,  such  as  the  notion  of  the  respect  for
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individual rights,  and the drawing of parallels between the working
class and the developing countries. 
Member states had different and sometimes divergent conceptions
with  regard  to  other  aspects  of  the  EC's  international  activity.  One
major  divergence  between  them  regarded  the  desirable  degree  of
involvement of the Community institutions in the EC's international
activity.  Some  member  states  advocated  a  federal  evolution  for
European  political  integration,  while  others  (especially  France)
envisaged a confederal evolution. As I showed in chapter 1, divergent
member  states'  conceptions  of  the  long-term  evolution  of  political
integration greatly affected the design of the institutional structure for
the  EC's  international  activity.  Its  structure  was  mainly  built  along
intergovernmental lines due to the French insistence, but also because
supporters of the federal model were not always consistent with their
rhetoric: no government was in fact too eager to devolve actual powers
to the Community institutions. 
Another major divergence between member states' conceptions of
the  EC's  international  activity  regarded  its  relationship  with
transatlantic cooperation. Most governments envisaged a pursuit of the
EC's international activity in connection with the US and NATO, as a
complement and contribution to transatlantic cooperation rather than
as an alternative  to it.  In  contrast  to  this  position,  France  tended to
envisage the pursuit of the EC's international activity in juxtaposition to
the transatlantic cooperation, or at least in autonomy from it.  Its EC
partners  partially endorsed such a vision during the  brief  period of
European  challenge  to  the  US  during  the  Year  of  Europe,  but  they
moved away from it in early 1974. Even if France continued to oppose
the establishment of a too-close relationship between European political
integration and transatlantic cooperation, it did not manage to impose
its  vision  and  it  had  to  consent  to  measures  such  as  the  Gymnich
compromise on preliminary consultation with the US. 
France and its EC partners tended to be at odds also with regard to
their  conception  of  the  focus  of  the  EC's  international  activity:  for
France, the EC should mainly focus on the Euro-African region and on
the Mediterranean, while the other member states tended to envisage
an overcoming of the age-old Euro-African focus, which was closely
connected with the colonial legacy. The difference between these two
conceptions was particularly evident  in the case of the development
cooperation  policies.  As  a  result  of  these  divergent  drives,  the  EC's
international activity was to address all of the world's countries, but it
was to retain quite a  signi:cant  focus on the Mediterranean and on
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Africa, through the Mediterranean policy, the Euro-Arab dialogue, the
Lomé Convention, and so on. 
Finally,  member  states  had  different  conceptions  of  the  relative
weight that values and interests were to have in the EC's international
activity.  For  some member  states,  especially  the  small  ones,  the  EC
should  be  a  sort  of  a  moral  international  actor,  observing  and
promoting  speci:c  values  rather  than  sheer  interests.  In  particular,
countries  like  the  Netherlands  argued  that  the  EC  should  show
particular concern with the problems of the developing countries and
with human rights. They claimed that value promotion could go as far
as to hit some material interests of the EC. For other member states,
especially the ones having signi:cant interests in third countries, value
promotion should  not  go  so  far.  This  divergence  in  conception  was
substantially resolved by the adoption by the EC of a strongly value-
oriented rhetoric, which was complemented with much more prosaic
and  interest-oriented  decisions  and  actions.  This  strategy  was
particularly  evident  in  the  cases  considered  in  chapters  5  and  6,
wherein the EC spoke at length on the need to reform the international
order and promote human rights, but it failed to take many actions in
reality.
Reasons for stressing the distinctive character of the EC
The EC made frequent and consistent efforts to stress its original
character  as  an  international  actor.  It  claimed  that  its  approach  to
international relations was innovative and possibly even pioneering. It
continuously  stated  its  ambition  to  move  beyond  power  politics,
towards  a  system  of  international  relations  based  on  cooperation,
dialogue  and  interdependence.  A  more  balanced  and  more  just
international system should be promoted, and the EC was to «faire le
bien dans le monde.»4 As Sophie Huber has put it,  «les responsables
européens  entreprirent  de  construire  une  identité  politique  que  l'on
pourrait  quali:er  de  volontariste,  créative,  originale,  altruiste  et
universaliste.»5 This insistence upon the original, distinctive character
4 E. Heath’s intervention, Minutes of the Paris Summit, October 19, 1972, in
AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3788.
5 S.  Huber,  «Dialogue  avec  le  Tiers  Monde:  l'Europe  communautaire  à  la
recherche d'une identité postcoloniale,» in Relations internationales, 140, 2009, p.
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of the EC's international activity was closely linked to the EC's own
narrative of European integration: European integration was supposed
to promote a new model of international relations not only between the
EC member states, but also between the EC and third countries. This
way of framing the EC's activity was largely rhetorical,  even though
some EC actors were sincerely persuaded by it. 
The  efforts  made  by the  EC to  stress  its  distinctive  and  original
character  as  an international  actor  were not  only linked to the EC's
narrative of European integration. I argue that the process of assertion
of the EC as a distinctive international actor was closely connected with
the process of its assertion as a distinct international actor. To stress the
original character  of its international activity  was useful for the EC in
order to assert itself as a recognizable actor. The stress put by the EC on
values and on its original approach to international affairs was useful
to cultivate the division of labor between the EC and its member states
in international affairs,  and between the EC and the US. It  was also
useful  to  make  up for some faws  of  the  EC's  ability to  act  on the
international stage. 
The stress  put  on the  original  character  of  the  EC's  international
activity  was  closely  connected  to the  establishment  of  a  division  of
labor between the EC and the member states.  As I have argued, the
fundamental division characterizing the EC's international activity was
not the one between the Community and the EPC, but the one between
the :elds inside the range of action of the EC and the ones outside it.
This division provided an opportunity for member states to play with
the  national  and  EC  layers.  They  could  respond  to  domestic  and
external pressures for value-oriented initiatives by delegating them to
the EC layer.  In  this  way they could claim to be receptive  of moral
concerns, while at the same time defusing some of the pressure exerted
on the national foreign policy and retaining its freedom of action for a
more traditional pursuit of material interests. 
An  example  of  this  strategy  was  the  EC's  initiatives  for  human
rights promotion in Austral Africa. At the EC level, a large number of
high-pro:le  declarations were released and value-oriented initiatives
were launched to respond to the pressure of anti-apartheid movements
and of most African countries. Some of their pressure could be defused
in  such  a  way,  making  it  easier  for  member  states  to  continue  to
cultivate  interest-oriented  low-pro:le  bilateral  relations  with  South
Africa. The possibility of establishing this sort of division of labor and
of playing with the EC layer offered an incentive for member states to
32. 
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promote  the  assertion  of  the  EC  as  a  distinct  and  distinctive
international actor. At the same time, the importance of the existence of
such a division of labor invited states to put some limits on the EC's
assertion, in order to preserve room for independent national activity
on the international stage. 
The capabilities–expectations trap
One  of  the  main  reasons  why  the  EC  repeatedly stressed its
distinctive character as an international actor was to rationalize some of
its limits and to make up for them. The EC's international activity was
clearly  hindered by limited capabilities  to deploy effective,  coherent,
and incisive initiatives.  To  claim a distinctive, original  character as an
international actor made it possible for the EC to rationalize some limits
of its capabilities. For instance, it made it possible to suggest that the
EC did not have capabilities to act in the defense :eld because the EC
was  simply  not  interested  in  power  politics.  Similarly,  it  made  it
possible to suggest that the EC was eager to establish a dialogue with
commodity  producing  countries  because  it  believed  in  the  intrinsic
value  of  dialogue  and  interdependence,  and  not  only  because  its
strategic  dependence  made  it  impossible  for  the  EC  to  afford
confrontation with those countries. 
To  claim  a  distinctive  and  original  character made  it  not  only
possible for the EC to rationalize its limited capabilities, but also to try
to  make up for  them: where the EC was not able to go  with deeds, it
tried to go  with words.  Thus, it  resorted to rhetoric,  statements  and
declarations in order to mark its presence on the international stage. In
order to mark a presence,  it  was  clearly  useful  to  adopt innovative,
original,  imaginative  positions.  For  instance,  disagreement  between
member states and limited :nancial possibilities made the EC largely
incapable of meeting many of the requests advanced by the developing
countries for the reform of the international economic order. Both in the
UN and in the CIEC, the EC tried to make up for its incapacity to meet
developing countries' requests by expressing and stressing progressive
visions of the international order and by making rhetorical concessions
to the developing countries. 
The  problem  with  resorting to  rhetoric  in  order  to  make  up  for
limited capabilities was that this strategy created and widened the gap
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between the EC's capabilities to act and the expectations held towards it
by internal and external observers. Christopher Hill has identi:ed such
a capabilities–expectations gap with regard to the EC in the early 1990s:
The Community had been talked up […] to a point where it is not
capable  of  ful:lling  the  new  expectations  already  (and  often
irrationally) held of it. This is true both of the number and the
degree of expectations.6 
This happened «because a coherent system and full actorness are still
far  from realization,»  and because  «not  just  in  terms of  substantive
resources […] but in terms of the ability to take decisions and hold to them
– the EC is still far from being able to ful:l the hopes of those who want
to  see  it  in  great  power  terms.»7 The  existence  of  a  gap  between
expectations and capabilities clearly created a problem of credibility for
the EC's international activity and it led to disappointment with it. The
existence of this problem was already apparent to some EC actors in the
1970s,  who complained  about the  dif:culty  for  the  EC  as  an
international  actor  «not  to  gain  a  hearing  but  rather  to  meet  the
expectations placed in us.»8 
Possibly  the  most  signi:cant  instance  of  this  gap between
expectations and capabilities in the 1970s concerned the very goal of the
establishment of the EC as an international actor. Member states stated
their commitment to the goal of asserting the EC as an international
actor, of endowing it with a common foreign policy, of enabling it to
speak with a single voice.  Some went as far as to envisage a common
army,  a  constitution,  and so on. However,  the  EC's  assertion on the
international  stage  fell  short  of  the  expectations  which  were  raised
towards  it  –  not  surprisingly,  given  their ambitiousness.  These
expectations were fueled by the member states, but it was the member
states themselves which  made it impossible for the EC to meet them.
Member states' governments did not really aim to turn the EC as such
6 C.  Hill,  «The  capability-expectations  gap,  or  conceptualizing  Europe's
international role,» in Journal of Common Market Studies, 31 (3), 1993, p. 315. 
7 Ibid., p. 318, italics in original text. 
8 D. H. A. Hannay (cabinet of Soames), Note on the bilan of the Community's
external relations 1973–1976, October 25, 1976, in Churchill Archives,  Soames,
48/6. See also Spokesman's group of the EC Commission, Summary of speech
by Dahrendorf, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Bonn, January 25,
1971,  in  ACCE,  BAC  3/1978  727;  EC  Commission,  Group  for  summit
preparation, Document sur les relations extérieures et les reponsabilités de la
Communauté dans le monde, March 16, 1972, in IISG, Mansholt 209; Verbatim
Heath–Schumann meeting, August 24, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE,
3787. 
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into a  full-fedged global power with a single cohesive foreign policy
and only one voice on the international stage. They rather aimed at  a
more modest coordination of foreign policies and cooperation in some
:elds of international affairs, but they rarely stated it openly. Part of the
reason why the EC's international activity is usually regarded as weak
and disappointing is that the EC itself fueled  unrealistic expectations
about it. 
The analysis of the EC's international activity during the 1970s does
not only show the existence of a capabilities–expectations gap, but also
the existence of a sort of capabilities–expectations trap. The EC and its
member states often  resorted to  high-pro:le rhetorical proclamations
and ambitious  statements  on  many  international  issues,  and  this
created expectations among the observers. The EC's insistence upon the
innovative  and generous character of  its international activity created
the expectation that such an activity would be  substantially  different
than traditional foreign policy. The EC found itself trapped in a sort of
vicious circle, wherein it had to resort to high-pro:le rhetoric to make
up for  its  limited  capabilities  to  act,  but  this  rhetoric  further  raised
expectations, setting extremely ambitious standards and goals  which
could hardly be met. As a result, the limited capability of the EC to act
effectively  and  coherently  in  international  affairs  was  exposed even
more.
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Chronology
1950s and 1960s
1951 Establishment of the European Coal and Steal Community
1954 The French National Assembly rejects the Treaty establishing 
a  European  Defence  Community;  the  Western  European  
Union is established
1958 Establishment of the European Economic Community
1962 Failure of the Fouchet Plans for political integration
1966 France withdraws from the military integrated command of  
NATO
1967 Merging of the institutions of the European Communities
1968 Establishment of the NATO Eurogroup
Completion of the EC customs union
1969
Establishment of  a Community delegation in Santiago del  
Chile
April 28 Charles De Gaulle resigns from the French Presidency
June 20 Georges Pompidou becomes President of France
September 28 Willy Brandt becomes West German Chancellor
December 1-2 The Hague Summit of the EC
1970
January 1 The common commercial policy enters into force
July 1 The Malfatti EC Commission takes of:ce
October 27 Approval  of  the  :rst  report  on  the  European  Political  
Cooperation and establishment of the EPC
November 19 First EPC ministerial meeting
December The Commission speaks for the :rst time on behalf of the EC 
in a UN body
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1971
March 31 Sentence of the Court of Justice on the external competences 
of the Community (AETR case)
July 1 Entry into force of the EC's system of generalized preferences
August 15 Decoupling of dollar from gold and imposition of a surtax on 
US imports
October Establishment of the EC Commission's permanent 
representation of:ce in Washington
1972 
January 22 The British treaty of adhesion to the EC is signed, Britain joins
the EPC
March 21 Malfatti resigns from the EC Commission's presidency, he is 
succeeded by Sicco Mansholt
April 13 – May 21UNCTAD Conference in Santiago del Chile
April 23 French referendum on the EC's enlargement
May 22 US–USSR SALT I Treaty
October 19-21 Paris Summit of the EC
November 16 The  EC  member  states  appear  collectively  at  the  NATO  
Council for the :rst time
December 7 First  intervention on behalf  of  the Community  at  the UN  
General Assembly
December 21 Leonid  Brezhnev  opens  to  the  establishment  of  relations  
between the CMEA and the EC
1973
January 1 Britain, Ireland and Denmark enter the EC
January 6 The Ortoli Commission takes of:ce
April 23 Henry Kissinger's speech on the “Year of Europe”
June 22 US–USSR agreement on the prevention of nuclear war
July 3 Opening of the CSCE
July 23 Approval of the second EPC report
September 5-9 The Non-Aligned Movement decides to use oil prices as a  
political weapon
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September 9 Opening  of  the  Multilateral  Trade  Negotiations  (GATT  
Tokyo Round)
September 18 The  two  German  states  are  admitted  to  the  UN  as  full  
members
September 25 The President of the EC Council meets with Kissinger: it is  
the  :rst  time  that  the  EC  speaks  with  a  single  voice  in  
international affairs, CSCE aside
September 27 Pompidou proposes to convene EC summits on regular basis
September 28 Jens  Otto  Krag  is  appointed  head  of  the  Commission's  
representation of:ce in Washington
October 13 EPC communiqué on the Arab-Israeli war, it is the :rst joint 
declaration  by  the  EC member  states  on  an  international  
issue
November 6 EPC declaration calling for the recognition of the rights of the 
Palestinian people
November 14 The drafting of the EC–US declaration of principles is halted
November 21 Michel  Jobert  proposes  to  establish a  permanent  dialogue  
between the EC and the Arab countries
December 12 “Pilgrims' speech” by Kissinger
December 14-15 Copenhagen Summit of the EC; the EC ministers meet with 
Arab ministers
December 15 Release of the Declaration on European identity
1974
February Establishment of the EC Commission's representation of:ce  
in Tokyo
February 11-13 Washington Conference on energy
March 4 Harold Wilson becomes British Prime Minister
Relaunch of the project of Euro-Arab dialogue
April 21 “Gymnich compromise” on EC–US consultations
May 1 The UN General Assembly approves the program for a new 
international economic order
May 16 Helmut Schmidt becomes West German Chancellor
May 19 Valéry Giscard d'Estaing is elected French President
June 26 Ottawa Declaration on the Atlantic relations
August 9 Richard Nixon resigns from the US Presidency
September 16 The President of the EC Commission is invited to Moscow
October 11 The Community is admitted to the UN General 
Assembly as an observer on permanent basis
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November 18 Establishment of the International Energy Agency
December 4 Germany proposes to establish common European embassies
December 9-10 Paris Summit of the EC, the establishment of the European  
Council is approved
December 12 The UN General Assembly approves the Charter of economic 
rights and duties of the states
1975
May 8 Establishment of EC–China diplomatic relations
June Approval  of  the  “Dublin  formula”  on  EC member  states'  
consultation on UN Security Council matters
June 5 Referendum on British membership to the EC
August 1 The CSCE Final Act is signed on behalf of the EC as 
such
September The  EPC  President  inaugurates  the  custom  of  making  a  
common statement at the opening of each session of 
the UN General Assembly
November 15-17 G5 Summit in Rambouillet
December 16 First ministerial meeting of the CIEC
December 31 Submission of the Tindemans Report on European Union
1976
The EC mission to the UN is given diplomatic status
October 18 Funds for cooperation with non-ACP developing countries  
are included in the Community budget
1977
January 6 The Jenkins Commission takes of:ce
Jimmy Carter is the :rst US President to visit the EC 
institutions
May 7 The EC joins the G7 summits
June 3 Conclusion of the CIEC
June 21 Approval  of  the  “Uganda guidelines”  on  aid  and human  
rights
September 20 Approval of the EC Code of conduct for European companies
in South Africa
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October 11-12 Agreement for the drafting of annual EPC reports on human 
rights
1978
April 3 EC–China trade agreement
November Establishment of a Commission's standing group to answer  
appeals and enquires on humanitarian questions
November 20-21 First EC–ASEAN ministerial meeting
1979
March 3 Margaret Thatcher becomes British Prime Minister
June 7-10 First direct election of the European Parliament
November 20 The EC will «consider the necessary  action»  in  case  of  
consistent  denial  of  the  dignity  of  man  in  aid  recipient  
countries
December 24 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
1980-81
1980 Ronald Reagan is elected US President
1980 Venice Declaration on the Middle East
1981 North-South summit in Cancun
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Here are reported the positions and affliations of all the people who are mentioned in
the dissertation, or who authored sources which were quoted in it. Reported positions
refer to the period for which the people were mentioned. 
Achard, Pierre – SGCI (France)
Adams, W. James – FCO, European 
integration, 1971-72; British 
delegation to the EC, 1973-77 
Amin Dada, Idi – President of Uganda
Angles – French embassy in the UK
Arnaud, Claude – MAEF, Europe
Baudouin – King of the Belgians
Beaumarchais, Jacques de – French 
ambassador to the UK
Beinhardt, Gerd – (Germany) EC 
Commission, DG I
Bernard, Jean-René – Secretary-
general of SGCI (France)
Bersani, Giovanni – (Italy) Member of 
European Parliament
Blumenfeld, Erik B. –  (Germany) 
Member of European Parliament
Bokassa, Jean-Bédel – President of the 
Central African Republic, 1966-76; 
Emperor of Central Africa, 1976-79
Boselli, Luigi – (Italy) EC Commission, 
DG I
Brandt, Willy – West German foreign 
minister, 1966-69; West German 
chancellor, 1969-74; President of 
the Socialist International, 1976-92  
Brezhnev, Leonid – General secretary 
of the Communist Party of the 
USSR
Budd, Colin R. – FCO, European 
integration (external)
Buist, J.L.F. (Ian) – FCO, Under-
secretary at the ODA
Burin des Roziers, Étienne – French 
permanent representative to the 
EC
Butler, Michael D. –  FCO, European 
integration (external), 1972-74; 
FCO, Assistant under-secretary for 
European integration, 1974-76
Cable, James E. – FCO, Planning staff
Callaghan, James – British foreign 
minister
Cambridge, Sydney J. G. – British 
embassy in Italy
Carter, Jimmy – President of the US
Cheysson, Claude – (France) EC 
commissioner for development
Christaki de Germain, Carl – (France) 
EC Commission, DG I
Coles, A. John – British delegation to 
the EC
Cooper, Robert F. – FCO, European 
integration (external)
Cromer, Rowley – British ambassador 
to the US
Cuvillier, Philippe – French embassy 
in the UK
Da Fonseca-Wollheim, Hermann – 
(Germany) cabinet of F.-X. Ortoli
257
Dahrendorf, Ralf – (West Germany) 
EC commissioner for external 
relations
Dalton, Richard J. – British delegation 
to the UN
Davies, Hugh L. – British embassy in 
West Germany
Davignon, Étienne – Belgian political 
director
De Courcel, Geoffroy C. – MAEF, 
Secretary-general
De Gaulle, Charles – President of the 
French Republic
De Guiringaud, Louis – French foreign 
minister
De Juniac, Gontran – French 
ambassador to Belgium
De Laboulaye, François – French 
ambassador to Japan
De Saint-Legier, René – MAEF, 
Amérique
Deniau, Jean-François – (France) EC 
commissioner for development
Duff, A. Antony – FCO, Deputy 
under-secretary for Middle East 
and Africa, 1975-77
East, Kenneth A. – British high 
commission in Nigeria
Eppler, Erhard – West German 
minister for economic cooperation
Ewart-Biggs, Christopher – British 
embassy in France
Faber, Richard S. – British embassy in 
The Netherlands
Fellermaier, Ludwig– (West Germany) 
Member of European Parliament, 
head of the socialist group
Ferrandi, Jacques – (France) EC 
Commission, DG VIII
FitzHerbert, Giles E. – FCO, European 
integration (external)
Foley, Maurice – (Britain) EC 
Commission, DG VIII
Fort, Maeve G. – British high 
commission in Nigeria
Frisch, Dieter – (Germany) EC 
Commission, DG VIII
Furness, Alan E. – British embassy in 
Senegal
Giscard d'Estaing, Valéry – French 
minister of economy and :nance, 
1969-74; President of the French 
Republic, 1974-81
Goldsmith, Robert (Bob) – British 
delegation to the EC
Gorce, Pierre – French ambassador to 
Indonesia
Haferkamp, Wilhelm – (West 
Germany) EC commissioner for 
external relations
Hart, Judith – British minister for 
cooperation
Heath, Edward – British Prime 
minister
Henderson, J. Nicholas – British 
ambassador to West Germany
Hibbert, Reginald A. – British embassy 
in West Germany, 1972-75; British 
political director, 1976-79; British 
embassy in France, 1979-82
Hijzen, Theodorus – (Netherlands) EC 
Commission, DG I
Hunt, John J. B. – British cabinet, 
Second permanent secretary
Jean-Baptiste, Henry – Presidency of 
the French Republic
Jenkins, Michael R.H. – FCO, 
European integration (external) 
Jenkins, Roy – (Britain) President of 
the EC Commission
Jobert, Michel – French foreign 
minister
Judd, Frank – Minister for overseas 
development, 1976-77; FCO, 
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minister of state, 1977-79 
Khrushchev, Nikita – First secretary of 
the Communist Party of the USSR
Kissinger, Henry – US national 
security advisor, 1969-75; US 
Secretary of State, 1973-77
Knighton, William M. – British trade 
department, under-secretary
Krag, Jens Otto – Danish Prime 
minister, 1971-72; Head of the EC 
Commission's representation of:ce 
in the US, 1974-76
Laidler, M. D. – FCO, European 
integration
Le Quesne, C. Martin – FCO, Deputy 
under-secretary for Africa
Ling, Jeffrey – FCO, West Africa
Luard, Evan – FCO, Parliamentary 
under-secretary
Lucet, Charles – French ambassador to 
Italy
Maas – EC Commission, DG I
Maitland, Donald J.D. – British 
permanent representative to the 
EC
Malfatti, Franco Maria – (Italy) 
President of the EC Commission
Malvé, Pierre – (France) EC 
Commission's delegation to the US
Mansholt, Sicco – (Netherlands) EC 
commissioner for agriculture, 
1958-72; President of the EC 
Commission, 1972-73; vice-
president of the Socialist 
International
Marshall, Peter H.R. – British 
delegation to the UN
Martin, Claude – Cabinet of L. De 
Guiringaud
Mase:eld, J. Thorold – FCO, Planning 
staff
Maxey, Peter M. – FCO, United 
Nations
Merillon, Jean-Marie – French 
ambassador to Algeria
Meyer, Klaus – (West Germany) EC 
Commission, General secretariat
Moro, Aldo – Italian foreign minister, 
1969-72, 1973-74; Italian head of 
government, 1974-76
Muller, Jean-Claude – (France) EC 
Commission, DG VIII
Murray, Donald F. – FCO, Assistant 
under-secretary for Asia
Nixon, Richard – President of the US
Ortoli, François-Xavier – (France) 
President of the EC Commission
Overton, Hugh T.A. – FCO, North 
America
Owen, David – British foreign 
minister
Palliser, A. Michael – British 
permanent representative to the 
EC, 1973-75; FCO, Permanent 
under-secretary, 1975-82
Peltier, P. – French delegation to the 
EC
Phan van Phi, Raymond – (France) EC 
Commission, DG I
Pinochet, Augusto – President of Chile
Pompidou, Georges – President of the 
French Republic
Puaux, François – French political 
director
Ramsbotham, Peter – British 
ambassador to the US
Ratford, David J.E. – FCO, European 
integration
Renner, Wolfgang – (West Germany) 
Head of the EC Commission's 
representation of:ce in Latin 
America
Reuter, Étienne – (Luxemburg) 
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Richard, Ivor – British permanent 
representative to the UN
Robin, Gabriel – Presidency of the 
French Republic
Robinson, John A. – FCO, Assistant 
under-secretary for European 
integration
Samuels, Nathaniel – US deputy 
under-secretary of State
Sauvagnargues, Jean – French 
ambassador to West Germany, 
1970-74; French foreign minister, 
1974-76
Schaetzel, J. Robert – US 
representative to the EC
Schmidt, Helmut – West German 
minister of :nance, 1972-74; West 
German chancellor, 1974-82
Sedouy, Jacques A. de – (France) 
Cabinet of C. Cheysson
Shepherd, John A. – British embassy in 
the Netherlands
Simpson-Orlebar, Michael K.O. – FCO, 
United Nations
Sinclair, Carolyn – FCO, European 
integration (external)
Smith, Arnold – (Canada) Secretary-
general of the Commonwealth
Soames, Christopher – British 
ambassador to France, 1968-72; EC 
commissioner for external 
relations, 1973-77
Soutou, Jean-Marie – French 
ambassador to Algeria
Spencer, Rosemary J. – British 
delegation to the EC
Stakhovitch, André – (France) EC 
Commission, DG I
Statham, Norman – British embassy in 
West Germany
Stefani, Umberto – (Italy) EC 
Commission, General secretariat
Suharto – President of Indonesia
Thomas, Jeremy C. – British 
delegation to the UN
Thorpe, Nigel J. – FCO, Central and 
Southern Africa
Tindemans, Léo – Belgian Prime 
Minister
Tomkins, Edward E. – British 
ambassador to France
Wellenstein, Edmund – (Netherlands) 
EC Commission, DG I, 1967-76; 
Chairman of the CIEC committee 
on development, 1975-77
Williams, Douglas – FCO, ODA, 1968-
74; Ministry for overseas 
development, 1974-77
Wilson, Harold – British Prime 
Minister
Wright, J. Oliver – FCO, deputy 
under-secretary for economic 
affairs, 1972-74; British ambassador 
to West Germany, 1975-81
260
